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PREVIEW OF THE COURT'S DOCKET
Section: Press Preview
After this term's unpleasantness, the justices may look forward to a respite.
But abortion, smoking, and the religion clause are back (all in unusual
forms), not to mention the death penalty and impeachment.
No Calm After the Storm
It's a hard act to follow.After a term filled with blockbustercases n  high drama, the coming term
could turn out to be something of an
anticlimax.
The justices might welcome a quieter
term, one in which the alliances forged
last term may have time to solidify. A
term in which the justices can stay out of
the spotlight for a bit, while the other
branches make news-and possibly. big
changes.
But outside forces may not permit the
Court to tread water. Already. the gov-
ernor of Guam has petitioned the Court for
a review of the territory's law banning
abortion, apparently hoping that he can
convince the Court to forget that Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey. 60 U.S.L.W. 4795 (June 29.
1992). cvcr happencd. The Court could
reject the Guam case out of hand. .
Among the 64 cases the Court has al-
ready agreed to hear in the coming tenn
are a goodly number of important cases-
involving issues ranging from animal sac-
rifice to judicial impeachment, from home
offices to smoking in prisons. And abor-
tion is already on the docket. in the fonn
of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic. No. 90-985. which was restored to
the calendar for reargument after appar-
ently deadlocking the Court last term.
Bray tests whether the blockade of abor-
tion clinics should trigger the intervention
of federal courts under the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871.
Here are summaries of some of the lead-
ing cases to be argued this fall:
* Santeria and Scalia. The most in-
triguing case of the fall term may be
Church of the Lkumi Babalu Aye Inc. v.
City offHialeah. No. 91-948.
It is the first serious test of the strength
of Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Antonin Scalia's
revision of doctrine on the free-exercise
clause. That case held that government
can enforce laws against religious prac-
tices so long as the laws are applied neu-
trally and generally, such as the total ban
on the use of peyote in the Smith case.
In the current case, the religious prac-
tice at issue is the sacrifice of animals-
chickens. pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea
fowl, goats, sheep. and turtles, to be ex-
act-essential to the practice of the San-
teria religion, which came to the United
States via Cuba and now has more than
50,000 adherents in South Florida alone.
The city of Hialeah. Fla., enacted a series
of ordinances aimed at prohibiting the
killing of animals for "sacrifice" in a
"ritual or ceremony.*
Since the ordinances do not prohibit the
killing of animals for food-the church
notes in its brief that the city "has not in-
terfered with the sale of lobsters to be
boiled alive"--the church claims that it is
being singled out and argues that the or-
dinances are precisely the kind of laws
forbidden under Smith. The fact that the
Court decided to hear the case suggests it
may agree-or at least that it wants to
clarify what it said in Smith.
An impressive array of religious groups
and church-state separationists has sided
with the church, voicing fears about other
religious practices that could be endan-
gered if the Santeris church loses-in-
cluding shchitah, the kosher method of
animal slaughter.
* Does Innocence matter? The key
death-penalty case of the year landed on
the Court's docket in the bizarre, last-
minute way in which the Court has han-
dled a number of such cases in recent
years: While it granted certiorari in the
case of Texas death-mw inmate Leonel
Herra on Feb. 19, it denied a stay of his
execution. If not for a lower Texas court
that subsequently delayed the execution,
the Court would have been weighing the
claims of innocence of a dead man.
The question before the Court in Her-
rera v. Collins. No. 91-7328. seems to
have an answer so obvious that it should
not have to be asked: Does it violate the
Eighth and 14th Amendments to execute
an innocent person? But this Court is tak-
ing the question seriously, and the Bush
administration is seriously siding with
Texas. Solicitor General Kennth Starr
has filed a brief arguing that the Constitu-
tion does not entitle a prisoner to federal
habeas corpus review, even on a claim of
innocence. The government argues that
the state appellate review process and
clemency are adequate to handle claims of
innocence. If ever there was a case pitting
compassion and justice against the me-
chanics of the law, this is it.
0 The other Nixon Impeachment.
Lawyers arguing the case of Walter Nixon
Jr. v. United Stares. No. 91-740, would
do well to read Chief Justice William
Rehnquist's latest book, Grand Inquests.
this summer. As they argue the esoteric
history of the Constitution's impeachment
clause, they should take into account that
they ate arguing before a ranking expert
on the subject. Rehnquist's book focuses
on two of the most notorious, if unsuc-
cessful, impeachment efforts in history,
against Justice Samuel Chase and Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson.
The issue in the Nixon case is whether
the Senate violates its mandate to try "all
impeachments" when it delegates to a
committee the gathering of evidence-and
whether that question is even justiciable
by the Court. The question was brought by
Walter Nixon Jr., who was impeached
from his federal judgeship in Mississippi
in 1989. David 0. Stewart, a partner in the
D.C. office of Boston's Ropes & Gray,
has argued on behalf of Nixon that the
Senate violated its duties "by providing
that 88 senators never hear the evidence
in an impeachment case. . . . Impeach-
ment becomes easy. conviction is politi-
cally expedient. judicial independence is
sapped, and the constitutional balance of
powers is tilted forever."
* Cruel and unusual smoke. The
complaint of a self-described health nut
who happens to be serving a life sentence
in Nevada State Prison for murder has
made its way onto the Court's docket.
William McKinney claims that it is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment for the
SEE PREVIEW, PAGE S41
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promises to be one
of the most
intriguing cases
of the fall term.
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state to force him to share a cell with a
five-pack-a-day smoker. He convinced the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
that he should at least have the chance to
convince a jury on the point, so Nevada
has appealed to the high court in Helling v.
McKinney. No. 91-1958.
Hawaii Attorney General Warren Price
Ill has filed suit on behalf of 34 other
states arguing on the side of Nevada
that, among other things, "a complete ban
Ion smokingl would physically and
psychologically disturb many smoking
prisoners, making them more prone to
violent behavior."
* The home office. The Internal Rev-
cate Service is trying to stem the flow of
taxpayers who have discovered the virtues
of working out of their homes-or at least
telling the IRS that they do.
In Commissioner v. Nader Soliman,
No. 91-998, the IRS is battling with a
Virginia anesthesiologist who declared a
home office even though he did much of
his work at three hospitals. When the IRS
balked at his deductions, Soliman won a
U.S. Tax Court determination that gave a
broad and sympathetic interpretation of
the rules on home offces. Concerned that
the ruling created a loophole that anyone
who does some work at home could abuse,
the IRS took the case to the 4th Circuit
and lost, beting the stage for high court
review.
0 Labor peace. To help ensure that
government construction projects are
completed on time and on budget. dozens
of government agencies have entered into
agreements with labor unions-agree-
ments that are now before the Court. In
exchange for a guarantee of labor peace
for the duration of the project, the agen-
cies agree to require that all contractors
hire only union labor.
Two consolidated cases-Massachu-
sers Water Resources Aurhority v. Asso-
dated Builders and Contractors. No. 91-
274, and Building and Construction
Trades Council v. Associated Builders and
Contractors, No. 91-261--tst the agree-
ments that were made in the $6 billion
Boston Harbor cleanup project. Associ-
ated Builders and Contractors-which has
challenged similar deals elsewhere-
claims that the agreements violate con-
tractors' rights to bargain freely with their
workers.
0 RICO and porno. Ferris Alexander
Sr. was convicted on federal obscenity and
racketeering charges for the distribution of
seven specific magazines and videotape in
the Minneapolis area. In Alexander v.
United States. No. 91-1526. the 73-year-
old man is not challenging his six-year
prison sentence, but he is attacking the
massive RICO penalty that flowed from
the conviction: an order that be forfeit his
entire chain of 13 retail bookstores, in-
cluding an estimated $8.9 million in bus-
iness proceeds, as well as the property and
assets.
After Alexander lost before the 8th
Circuit. the goverment destroyed his en-
tire inventory of books and tapes, sending
three tons of material to a garbage-
proesainA plant.
Alexander asks whether the First
Amendment allows the seizure of his non-
obscene materials simply because he also
sold material found to be obscene. It will
be intriguing to see whether the Court
views this as a case of government over-
kill, as it did Jacobson v. United States.
112 S. Ct. 1535 (April 6. 1992). the child
pornography decision of last term.
0 Gutting Mirands. In Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). the Court ruled
that 4th Amendment claims should not be
raised in federal habeas corpus petitions if
they were fully and fairly reviewed in state
courts. A case to be argued this fall, With-
row v. Williams. No. 91-1030. seeks to
apply the same rule to Miranda claims.
The case involves the conviction of
Robert Williaims on charges relating to a
1985 murder in Michigan. Williams made
While allowing newspapers to be sold
in sales boxes, Cincinnati went after
two advertising publications-one for
a school, the other for a real-estate
company-under its ordinance
forbidding the distribution of
commercial handbills on public
property.
some incriminating admissions to police
before he was given the Miranda wanting
and made some more after he was warned
and after he was promised leniency if he
talked. Michigan appeals courts sup-
pressed some of his statements but al-
lowed others. Williams then filed a federal
habeas petition and won a reversal of his
conviction on the Miranda claims.
The Wayne County prosecutor appealed
to the high court, asking it to remedy the
"sorry state of affairs" in which Miranda
claimn are given review in federal habeas
cases.
* Commercial speech, Cincinnati
style. In Discovery Network v. Cincinnati.
No. 91-1200, the Court will be asked
whether Cincinnati can selectively ban
newspaper sales boxes based on the nature
of the publication they dispense.
While allowing newspapers to be sold
in these boxes, Cincinnati went after two
advertising publications-one for a
school, the other for a real-estate com-
pany-under its ordinance forbidding the
distribution of commercial handbills on
public property. The publishers chi
lenged the ordinance on First AmendmR
grounds.
The 6th Circuit held the ordinance un-
constitutional under the First Amendment.
and now Cincinnati has appealed in what
is shaping up as a major commercial-
speech case.
A broad range of media, advertising,
and manufacturing groups are arguing
against the ban. Government groups are
siding wjth Cincinnati. joining in a brief
written by Richard Ruda, chief counsel of
the D.C.-based State and Local Legal
Center. Ruda called the First Amendment
argument "yet another example of the in-
genuity of counsel in fashioning constitu-
tional challenges to a city's ordinary ex-
ercise of its police power." 0
THE TOP FIVE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD RIDE IN FALL BIKE FEST '92
5. You have your choice: 25, 30, 50, 70, 75, or 100 miles.
Routes for every level of interest!!
4. You won't have to worry about your own medical,
mechanical, or sag support - when you ride with us, we
take care of you!
3. PRIZES, PRIZES, PRIZES... A trip to Hawaii for the
top fundraiser and guest; Fila Bicycle for the second
top fundraiser, Crate & Barrel Gift Certificates; Bike
Shop Gift Certificates; 'The Best Looking Helmet Cover
I've Ever Seen" helmet cover.
2. The best view of the fall foliage is from your bicycle
seat.
1. MAKE A DIFFERENCE to more than 3,500 people in
the greater Washington area who live with multiple
sclerosis every day.
On Sunday, September 13. the Fairfax Government Center hosts 30. 70,
and 100 mile rides through Northern Virginia. On Sunday, October 11.
Holberg's Delicatessen at the Sheraton-Potomac Hotel hosts 25, 50, and 75
mile rides through Montgomery County, Maryland.
All riders enjoy famous MS hospitality-fully equipped rest stops, delicious
and nutritious snacks and lunch, and the best volunteers in town.
Don't miss this tour! Call the FALL BIKE FEST HOTLINE
at (202) 466-6151 for more information.
Court Postpones Abortion Protest Case
Justices Order New Arguments in Fall Over Blockade of Va. Clinic
By Ruth Marcus
The Supreme Court yesterday
put off one of the most important
cases of the current term whether
federal courts have the power to
stop Operation Rescue antiabortion
protesters from blocking access to
clinics.
The court, without explanation,
ordered a new round of arguments
next fall in the case, which involved
an Alexandria abortion clinic that
won a court order stoppinrtOper*
stion Rescue protesters from block-
ading the clnic.
Still to come before the court
adjourns this summer is a potential-
ly much broader ruling on abortion,
when the justices are called upon to
determine the degree of constitu-
tional protection for abortion rights
in a Pennsylvania case. The law at
issue in that case requires married
women to notify their husbands be-
fore having abortions and imposes a
24-hour waiting period on all wo-
men seeking abortions.
The case the court didn't decide
yesterday, while having broad im-
plications for abortion clinics and
their patients, was not technically
about a woman's right to abortion.
Instead, it concerned whether an
1871 law that prohibits conspira-
cies to deprive people of their civil
rights can be used to stop abortion
clinic blockaders.
Although the court gave no rea-
son for its action in the Operation*
Rescue case, many observers on
both sides of the issue speculated
that the court is evenly split on the
case. justice Clarence Thomas was
not yet a the court when the case
was argued last October. and he
could become the deciding vote.
In other action yesterday, the
court:
m Ruled 6 to 3 that Hawaii's ban on
write-in voting in both primary and
See ABORTION. A8, CoL
Supreme Court Puts Off Abortion Clinic Protest Case
ABORION Frn I triggered charges from some abor- means that legal 
remedies to en- civil rights laws in recent years.
ABORTION,FromAl tion rights supporters that the con- sure women's right to abortion re- would be on the side of Operation
general elections does not violate servative-doninated court was act- main under federal law,* 
said Helen Rescue.
its citizenls' constitutional rights. ing to protect President Bush from Neuborne, executive 
director of the Another possibility is that, at-
justice Byron R. White said the a ruling that could cause him pouit- NOW Legal Defense Fund, 
which though a majority of justices agreed
Hawaii law, similar to that in three ical damage. The Bush administra- brought the case. However, 
she on the outcome o( the case, they
other states, imposed only 'a very tion entered the case, Bray . Al- said, 'I think its probably 
just a were splintered about the reasoning
limited* burden on voters' rights to randria Women's Health Cinic, on short-term win.R and hope 
that additional time and an
support candidates of their choice the side of the Operation Rescue Operation Rescue spokesman 
additional vote might forge a more
and was justified by the state's de- protesters Bob Jewitt said the court's 
action cohesive rationale.
sire to guard against 'party raiding' Kim Gandy, executive vice pres- will not affect the group's 
inmewdi- Court observers searching for
at the primary stage and avert 'di- ident of the National Organization ate plans. 'It's business 
as Usual Clues about what might be going on
visive. sore-loser candidacWies n for Women. denounced it as 'a po- with Operation Rescue.* 
he said. in the case speculated that the ma-
the general election, litical act by a political court ... 'bviously, we 
would have lked the njority opinion has been assigned to
" a nn ...-- ,t ina t,,tice Antonin Scalia, one of the
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.
joined by Justices Harry A. Black-
mun and John Paul Stevens. dis-
sented in the case, Burdick v.
Takush It is not expected the rul-
ing would have any impact on Ross
Perot's undeclared, independent
campaign for the presidency be-
cause he and his supporters intend
to have his name on each state's
ballot.
w Agreed to decide whether Saudi
Arabia may be sued in U.S. courts
for allegedly torturing a U.S. citizen
for exposing safety problems at a
Riyadh hospital. The Bush admnin-
istration joined the Saudi govern-
ment in urging the court to hear the
case. Saudi Arabia . Nelson, and
overturn a federal appeals court
.ruling that allowed the lawsuit to go
forward.
The court's action on the Oper-
ation Rescue case, Comning nearly
eight months after the argument,
ceary itene tpotpone a po
litically sensitive decision, ad a
possible political firestorm for
George Bush, until after the elec-
tion*
Many observers-even those
who support abortion rights-dis-
cerned less sinister motives.
'If an action like this were taken
for political reasons, some member
of the court would have dissented
from the order" for reargument in
the fail, said Duke University law
professor Walter Dellinger, an
abortion rights advocate.
One immediate effect of the case
is to leave federal judges with the
power to issue orders against Op'
eration Rescue blockades. Opera-
tion Rescue has announced plans to
protest at the Democratic and Re-
publican national conventions this
summer, as well as in Wichita. Kan.,
and Baton Rouge, IA.
'At least for the time being, it
cour to Comte a
our favor and eliminate the injunc-
tions. but we'll continue to do ev-
erything that we have been doing
all along."
An order that a case be reargued
is unusual, but not unheard of, par-
ticularly when- a resignation has
rendered the court one justice
short, This term, three other case
have been set for reargument, coi-
pared to none in each of the previ-
ous two terms.
It is unusual that the justices
would wait eight amths before an-
nouncing a ruling would be delayed.
It could have been that there was a
majority after the preliminary vote
following oral argument, but that a
justice switched his or her vote af-
ter the majority and dissenting op.
inions were drafted and circulated.
Many observers expect that any
majority on the court, which has
adopted a narrow interpretation of
bers. of the eight justices who sat in
October, Scalia is the only one to
have written just one opinion.The law at issue in the case, pop-
ularly known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act because it was enacted in re-
sponse to attacks on blacks after
the Civil War, has been interpreted
by the court to cover "class-based"hostility. The justices have never
said whether women are protected
by the law, and the direct question
before them in the abortion case is
whether ^women seeking abortions"are covered.
The case does not necessarily
call on the court to address the
scope of constitutional protection
for abortion rights because the civil
right primarily at issue in the case
is whether the blockades interfered
with patients' constitutional right to
interstate travel.
Prayer Ruling May Not Be
Court's Last Say on Subject
By UNDA GREENNOUSE
Spe.w .v Nw~1Ti0mes
WASHINGTON, June 25 - While the theW school.".
Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed When the Supreme Court has an is-
its school prayer precedents with its sue under consideration. it typically
ruling on Wednesday on graduation hos all new cases that might be at-
prayers, the Justices are not necessar- fected by the eventual decision. Once
ily about to withdraw from the battle the decision is Issued, the Court then
over the constitutional boundary be- has three choices: to send the other
tween church and state. cases back to the lower courts, in-
Sometime before the Court es tructing those courts to reconsider
for the summer in the next few days. their rulings in light of the new Su-
the Justices will probably Indicate preme Court decision; simply to deny
whether they plan to re-enter the rview. which Agaves the lower court
church-state fray during the new term decisions standing as if no Supreme
that begins in October. They have Court appeal had ever been filed, or to
many cases from which to choose, any grant review itself.
one of which could reignite a far-reach- While it takes five votes to win a case
Ing constitutional debate with an out- In the Supreme Court, It takes only four
come thatIs far from clear in advance, votes under the Court's rules to grantFor the last 15 months, ever since the review. Given the vigorous dissent by
Court agred to decide the Providence four Justices in the commencement
school prayer case that was the subject prayer case on Wednesday, the likeli-
of Wednesdays ruling, the Court has hood that the Court will accept one of
put on hold every new appeal that the other religion cases for decision
raised my question of how to Interpret appears to be strong
the clause of the First Amendment that The likelihood is enhanced because
prohibits a governmental "establish- of the way the majority handled the
ment" of religion, prayer case on Wednesday. While the
Reflects Legal Ferment case appeared to give the Court an
By now, a dorn such opportunity for re-examining, or over-
awaiting action, an unusually high me", clase prees the estabshnumber that reflects th ft clueraeamhefie-eme
In courts and communities around the
country over church-state issues. The
cum ,am ,,om ,,eryp ' A dozen church-country, from Vroto awail, andfrom eight of the 12 geographical Fed-
eral appellate circuits. - state cases. OneThe ase a the of clasht
es sover-" eiwtious W.- may tempt thevolvement in a wide array of contexts,
from religious observance an t job, ustcesto ethnic festivals with a religious fla.
ver, to prayer In courtrooms, to reli-
gious imagery on municipal seals.
There are even disputes over 1el- majority did not take that course. Jus-
,on ic n M. Kennedy w fo
s ce e u aw le was re
decision on Wednesday. In that case, revisit the precedents because com-Lee v. Welsnan, the Court ruled 5 to 4 mencement payer #tiotated the First
that the First Amendment prohibits Amendment under any approach the
public schools from inviting members Court might take.
of the clergy to offer prayers at gradu- But several of the cases now beforeation ceremonies, the Court call the precedents directly
Would the outcome have been differ- ito question. The four dissenters in
eant if the prayer was offend not by an Wednesdays ruling - Justices An-adult clergyman but by a student vol. tonin Scalla, Clarence Thomas, Byronunteer? That is the question in a case R. Wite, and Chief Justice William H.called Jones v. Clear Creek (Tex.) In. Rehnquist - may. relish the chance todependent School District. Na 91-310. give Justice Kemnedy such a case.The United States Court of Apeals for Cases Before the Juiticesthe Fifth Circuit. in New Orleants, ruled
last year that there was no coasts. Among the other cases before the
tional violation in a student volunteer Court are ones that pose these ques-
offering a tonsectar ian Ivocation and tios:
benediction at a high school gradus. 4 Whether the display of a privately
tion, owned Hanukkah menorah in a city
Or would the constitutional analysis park that is open to other religious
be different if the issue was not prayer displays violates the First Amend-
at at, but a personal, silent form of ment. The United States Court of Ap-
religious obso.-vance in the classroom? Peals for the Second Circuit. in New
One of the cases, Roberts v. Madi. York, said it does. (Chabad-L.ubavitch
gan, No. 90-1448, is an appeal by a fifth- of Vermont v. City of Burlington, No.
grade teacher in a suburban Denver 9148).
public school who kept a Bible on i q Whether a judge violates the Con-
desk and read it during recess time and stltutioo by offering his own religious
during a 15-minute period he gave hi invocation at the start of each court
students each day for silent reading, session. The United States Court of
The school principal ordered da Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. in Rich-
eacherto.keep.the Bible out.af sight mnd. Va. sid yes. (Constangy v.during the school day. The United North*CarOinaIt tliberties Unlan,
States Court of Appeals for the 10th No 91-1178).
Circuit, in Denver, rejected the teach. q Whether it violates the Constitution
er's challenge to this order, c for a state to designate Good Friday as
that the keeping the Bible in sight sent a public holiday. as Hawaii and 12 other
"a message of endorsement of religion states hav done. The United States
in a manner that might resMoably be Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
to bear the Imprimatur or in California. said no. (Cammack v.
Wethe. No& t91-7961.
q her the v ge of Crestwooi
Ill., violated the Constitution when
sponsored r- Italiananguage Catholi
mas as part of aw an a Italia
cultural festivaL The Unit State
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Ch
cuit. In Chicago, said it did. (Crestwoo
v. John Doe, No. 901573).9 Whether the University of Ala
bama violated the Constitution b
warning a professor to stop telling tstudents about his Christian beliefs
including the assertion that the humat
body was designed by God. The Unite
States Court of Appeals for the Ilti
Circuit, in Atlanta, upheld the universi
ty. (Bishop v. Delchamps. N6. 91-28.)The Court is also being asked to
decide to rule on whether city sealthat include religious imagery violat
the Constitution. The Seventh Circut
declared the seals of two Illinis town:
to be unconstitutional for depicting
crosses, while the United States Cour
of Appeals for te Fifth Circuit, in New
Orleans, rejected a similar challenge
to the city seal of Austin. Tex., which is
a copy of the seal used since the 18th
century by the family of Stephen F.
Austin, the founder of Texas. The seal
depicts a cross flanked by a pair of
wings. (Murray v. Auston, No. 91-1462).
Supreme Court Plans to Consider
Prisoner's Right to Smoke-Free Cell
I
Cornish Hitchcock's client says
he suffers from others' smoking.
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear
arguments next term on whether prisoners
have an Eighth Amendment right to a
smoke-free cell.
Last week, the high court granted cert in
a case brought by William McKinney, a
convicted murderer serving a life sentence
in the Nevada State Prison. McKinney, a
self-described health nut, contends that he
was subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment when he was forced to share a cell,
Court to Hear Inmate's Smoke Suit
W ASHINOTN-The Supreme Cot samid Monday it willdecide whIther nonsmokers in pison have a constitutionai
right to be free from secondary tobacco smoke.
The court agreed to review a Nevada inmate's claim that
environmental tobacco smoke unlawfltly threatens his health. A
decision is expected in 199.
A federal appeals court ruled expom to secondary smoke can
be a constitutional violation if it poses an unreasionable health risk.
* But Nevada officials argue "Permiang inmates to prevail on an
Eighth Amendment claim ... that eosre to others' tobacco
smoke 'may* create a posible fature health risk takes away from
prison officials the discretion and flebility needed to properly and
safety classify and house inmates.' The Eighth Amendment to theConstitution prohibits cruel and unusal punishment. -
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals saM convicted killerWilliam MclCinney Is entitled to a trial for his lawsult. which seekI
monetary damages and to have him placed in a smoke-free
environment.
-AseedstafPress
eight feet by 16 feet, with a five-pack-a-
day smoker. The 44-year-old McKinney
claims that the secondary smoke endan-
gered his health and shortened his life.
(See "These Inmates Really Want to Kick
Butts," June 24, 1991, Page 1.)
The case, which is similar to others
pending in various circuits, could set the
ground rules for whether correctional of-
ficials have a duty to protect inmates from
secondhand smoke.
."The case will decide whether prison-
ers are second-class citizens when it
comes to the hazards of cigarette smok-
ing," says Cornish Hitchcock, an attorney
with the Public Citizen Litigation Group
who is representing McKinney before the
Supreme Court.
The Nevada attorney general appealed
the case from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit, which decided earlier
this year that McKinney ought, at least, to
have the opportunity to prove to a jury that
his health has suffered as a result of his
exposure to smoke. He must also prove
that prison officials showed "deliberate
indifference" to his health risks. Courts
have already ruled that inmates have a
constitutional right to regular outdoor
exercise and fresh air.
In appealing the case to the Supreme
Court, Nevada was joined by 34 other
states and the District of Columbia in
amicus briefs. They argue that requiring
the segregation of smoking prisoners from
non-smoking prisoners would place an
undue burden on correctional systems, as
well as open states to an avalanche of
Eighth Amendment claims brought by dis-
gruntled inmates.
Arguments are expected to be scheduled
for December.
-Linda Himelstein
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Section
Lower Court Opinions for Morning Session
Alexander v. Thornburgh
Discovery v. Cinncinati, Ohio
National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue
McKinney v. Anderson
Cases Awaiting Review: Guam v. Ada, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council
91-1526 ALEXANDER v. U.S.
Obscenity-Forfeiture under rack:*eering stat-
ute-Closure of bookstore chain-Prior re-
straint-Cruel and unusual punishment.
Ruling below (Alexander v. Thornburgh,
CA 8. 943 F2d.825):
Dcfcndant's convictions of selling obscenity,
which served as predicates for additional convic-
tions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute. 18 USC 1961-68. support-
ed forfeiture under RICO of commercial real
estate and business inventories that district court
determined to be derived from proceeds of racke-
tcering enterprise, pursuant to 18 USC
1963(a)(2): First Amendment is not violated by
RICO forfeiture when government establishes
nexus between ill-gotten gains from racketeering
activity and protected materials forfeited; use of
RICO forfeiture in this case constitutes criminal
penalty for conducting racketeering enterprise
rather than prior restraint in violation of First
Amendment; nor does forfeiture in this case im-
pose unconstitutional chilling effect on protected
expression: forfeiture order limited to profits, real
estate, and businesses directly related to defen-
dant's interstate transportation and sale of ob-
scene materials is not unconstitutionally over-
broad: sentence and forfeiture order were not
grossly excessive or disproportionate in violation
of Eighth Amendment's proscription against cru-
el and unusual punishment.
Qucstions presented: (I) Does RICO forfeiture
constitute prior restraint of kind condemned in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), or
otherwise violate First Amendment. when used to
close S25 million chain of bookstores, video
stores, and theaters, to confiscate all their proper-
ty including five years* proceeds. and to burn
their inventories, solely on basis of seven obscene
videotapes and magazines? (2) Does forfeiture of
525 million media business. in combination with
six-year prison term and fines in excess of
5200.000. all as punishment for seven obscene
videotapes and magazines, violate Eighth
Amendment?
Pctition for certiorari filed 3/16/92. by John
H. Weston. Cathy E. Crosson. G. Randall Gar-
rou. Clyde F. Dewitt. and Weston. Sarno. Garrou
& Dewitt. all of Beverly Hills, Calif.
90-985 BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S
HEALTH CLINIC
Abortion-Ban on obstructing access to clinics-
42 USC 1985(3).
Ruling below (National Organization for
Women v. Operation Rescue, CA 4, 914 F2d
582):
Abortion opponents' actions in blocking access
to abortion facilities in Washington, D.C. metro-
politan area, to which substantial numbers of
women travel interstate, infringe rights of women
seeking abortions to travel in interstate commerce
in violation of 42 USC 1985(3), which forbids
conspiracy for purpose of depriving any person or
class of persons of equal protection or equal
privileges and immunities; district court's holdingthat gender-based animus satisfies "purpose" ele-
ment of Section 1985(3) has been forecast in this
circuit by Buschi Y. Kirven, 775 F2d 1240 (1985),which held that animus against classes defined by
"race, national origin and sex" meet requirement
of class-based animus within meaning of Section
1985(3). district court therefore properly en-
joined such actions, and its award of costs and
attorney's fees is affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Do "women seeking
abortions" constitute valid class for purposes ofclass animus- requirement of 42 USC 1985(3)?
(2) Is opposition to abortion per se discrimination
against women for purposes of "class animus"
requirement of 42 USC 1985(3)? (3) Do purely
private actors who hinder access to abortion facil-
ity violate federal constitutional right to inter-
state travel merely because some patrons of facil-
ity come from out of state? (4) Are respondents'
claims under 42 USC 1985(3) so insubstantial asto deprive federal courts of subject matter juris-
diction? (5) Did court of appeals err by sustain-
ing award of attorney's fees against petitioners?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/18/90, by Jay
Alan Sekulow, Douglas W. Davis, and James M.
Henderson Sr., all of Washington, D.C., and
Thomas Patrick Monaghan, C. Peter Thomas S.
Cornell. Walter M. Weber, and James E. Mur-
phy. all of New Hope, Ky.
91-1200 CINCINNATI. OHIO v. DISCOVERY
NETWORK INC.
Ban on distribution of commercial handbills
through newsracks-First Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 6. 946 F2d 464, 60 LW
2272. 19 MedLRptr 1449):
City ordinance banning distribution of "com-
mercial handbills" through newsracks on public
property, while allowing such distribution of
newspapers, is more extensive burden on commer-
cial speech than is necessary to alleviate govern-
mcntal aesthetic and safety concerns and thus
violates First Amendment.
Qucstions presented: (1) Is decision below, af-
firming decision of district court that statutory
scheme of Cincinnati violated plaintiffs First
Amendment rights. in conflict with decisions' of
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and not justified
under this court's decision in Central Hudson
Gas d Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)? (2) Is
decision below, which requires Cincinnati to af-
ford equal First Amendment protection to both
commercial and non-commercial speech publica-
tions that are-distributed through use of boxes
placed in public right of way inconsistent with
this court's decision in Metromedia v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/9/92, by James
F. McCarthy Ill, Fay D. Dupuis, City Sol.,
William M. Gustavson. Dpty. City Sol.. and
Mark S. Yurick. Asst. City Sol., all of Cincin-
nati. Ohio.
91-1958 HELLING v. McKINNEY
Cruel and unusual punishment-Inmate's com-
plaint about environmental tobacco smoke.
Ruling below (McKinney v. Anderson, CA 9.
959 F2d 853, 60 LW 2668, S CrL 1062):
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v.
Seiter. 59 LW 4671 (1991). which held that
elements needed to establish Eighth Amendment
claim involving prison conditions include subjec-
tive intent to punish, does not undermine earlier
ruling. 924 F2d 1500. 48 CrL 1459 (CA 9 1990),
that Eighth Amendment's objective element is
satisfied by proof that prisoner has been housed
in environment that exposes him to levels of
tobacco smoke that pose unreasonable risk of
harm: case is remanded to district court for deter-
mination of whether prison officials were deliber-
ately indifferent to inmate's long-term exposure
to environmental tobacco smoke.
Question presented: Does state prison inmate
state Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and
unusual punishment by alleging, in absence of
any medical problems. that compelled exposure
to secondary tobacco smoke poses unreasonable
risk to his health, and did court below properly
address this issue on remand from this court)
constitutional and unconstitutional aggravating
circumstances, when law of state that imposed
sentence requires sentencer to weigh these aggra-
vating circumstances against mitigating circum-
stances in determining penalty?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/15/92, by Timo-
thy K. Ford and MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless.
both of Seattle. Wash., and Carla Ryan. of
Tucson. Ariz.
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,nsistent" with Fulcher's assertion 
that he
hud abandoned the laboratory.
On appeal Fulcher cites U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4
,plication note 1, arguing the district
court committed error in failing to exclude
aounts he did not intend to produce be-
cause he had abandoned the laboratory
and, in any event, was not reasonably capa-
ble of producing. We disagree. The lan-
guage in section 2D1.4 application note 1
that Fulcher relies on applies to sentencing
determinations for offenses involving nego-
dtions to traffic in a controlled sub-
stance--not to sentences for attempting to
manufacture a controlled substance when
the amount of drugs seized does not reflect
the scale of the offense. In our view, the
district court properly applied application
note 2 by calculating the quantity of am-
phetamine that Fulcher's laboratory could
have produced. See United States v. Ev-
ans, 891 F.2d 686, 687-48 (8th Cir.1989)
(court properly calculated production capac-
ity based on chemicals seized), cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2170, 109
LEd.2d 499 (1990); United States v. Wag-
ner, 884 F.2d 1090, 1097-98 (8th Cir.1989)
(court adopted expert chemist's testimony
regarding laboratory's production capacity,
rejecting defendants' argument that lower.
quantity was more reasonable given their
inexperience), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
110 S.CL 1829, 108 LEd.2d 958 (1990).
Fulcher pleaded guilty to an attempt to
manufacture amphetamine. That Fulcher
may have abandoned his efforts to manu-
facture the drug neither affected his labo-
ratory's production capacity nor altered the
fact that when he set up the laboratory he
intended to produce a large quantity of
amphetamine. Thus, the district court
properly considered the production capacity
Of Fulcher's laboratory when calculating
the total quantity of amphetamine involved.
Accordingly, we affirm Fulcher's sen-
tence.
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Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, James M. Rosenbaum, J., of tax
offenses, obscenity offenses, and Racke-
teer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) violations, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, John R. Gibson, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) application of RICO
forfeiture provisions did not violate First
Amendment, and (2) forfeiture order did
not violate Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments and
excessive fines.
Affirmed.
1. Conspiracy 048.1(1)
Whether a conspiracy is one scheme or
several is primarily a jury question.
2. Conspiracy e24(2)
General test as to whether a conspir-
acy is one scheme or several is whether
there was "one overall agreement" to per-
form various functions to achieve the objec-
tives of the conspiracy.
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3. Conspiracy e24.5
A conspirator need not know all of the
other conspirators or be aware of all the
details of the conspiracy, so long as evi-
dence is sufficient to show knowing contri-
bution to the furtherance of the conspiracy.
4. Conspiracy 047(9)
Evidence supported finding of a single
conspiracy to defraud government by de-
feating lawful functions of Internal Reve-
nue Service, rather than a series of sepa-
rate conspiracies. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371.
5. Conspiracy -43(10)
Indictment charging defendant with
conspiracy to defraud United States by de-
feating lawful functions of Internal Reve-
nue Service was not defective on ground
that it should have charged defendant with
a conspiracy to commit a specific crime
where defendants conduct was long-span-
ning, far-reaching, and involved many ac-
tivities and events. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371; 26
U.S.C.A. § 7206(1).
6. Criminal Law *-1175
Defendant was not entitled to reversal
of convictions for transporting and selling
obscene materials on grounds that verdicts
were inconsistent or the result of compro-
mise.
7. Constitutional Law 490.4(1), 274.1(3)
Legal standard of obscenity enunciated
in Miller v. California did not violate Fifth
Amendments due process clause or First
Amendments freedom of speech provision.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 5.
8. Constitutional Law 490.4(1)
Forfeitures e2
Application of Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) forfei-
ture provision to defendant, who was con-
victed of RICO charges and predicate ob-
scenity offenses, did not unconstitutionally
criminalize nonobscene expressive materi-
1. A jury convicted Alexander on one count of
conspiracy to defraud the United States by
impeding the lawful functions of the Internal
Revenue Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. J 371
(1988); two counts of filing false income tax
returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
(1988); three counts of violating 18 U.S.C.
als. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962; U.S.C.A.
Amend. 1.
9. Constitutional Law 490.4(4, 6)
Forfeitures -3
Forfeitures ordered as result of adant's conviction of Racketeer Influ'
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
predicate obscenity offenses, which
limited to profits, real estate, and busi
es directly related to defendants inters
transportation and sale of obscene ma.
zines and videos, did not result in an unom.
stitutional prior restraint, did not impos
an unconstitutional chilling effect on consg,
tutionally protected expression, and wa
not constitutionally overbroad. U.S.C.A
Const.Amend. 1; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.
10. Criminal Law 41213.13
Forfeitures ordered as result of defs.
dant's conviction of Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) chargs
and predicate obscenity offenses, which
consisted of profits, real estate, and bus-
nesses directly related to defendant's inter-
state transportation and sale of obscene
magazines and videos, did not violate
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cru.
el and unusual punishments and excessive
fines. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 8.
Michael Mayock, Pasadena, Cal., for ap
pellant.
Paul A. Murphy, Minneapolis, Minn., for
appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON and
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD
R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Following a four-month trial, a jury con-
victed Ferris J. Alexander, Sr., on 24
counts ' of a 41-count indictment. The
§ 1962 (1988) (RICO), including conspitacy to
engage in or conduct an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, receipt and use
of income derived from a pattern of racketeer"
ing activity, and engaging in the conduct of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity- twelve counts of knowingly transporting
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n included conspiracy to defraud the
the sale of obscene magazines and
voeos, tax evasion, and RICO violations.
.ecander appeals from his convictions and
, application of the forfeiture provisions
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). Alexander ar-
,es that his conviction of engaging in a
conspiracy to defraud the IRS should be
reversed because: (1) the indictment al-
kged and the evidence showed, if anything,
multple conspiracies and not one conspir-
ger and (2) the count was defective be-
cause it charged a general conspiracy rath-
e tan a conspiracy to violate a specific
statute. He also argues that his convic.
dons for transporting obscene materials
must be reversed because the jury's ver-
dicts are inconsistent. He also attacks the
district court's 2 application of the forfei-
wne provisions of RICO, arguing that the
application of RICO: (1) unconstitutionally
aiminalized non-obscene expressive materi-
al and (2) violated the first and eighth
amendments to the United States Constitu-
ion. He further argues that the obscenity
standards set forth in Miller v. Califonia,
413 U.S. 15, 93 S.CL 2607, 37 LEd.2d 419
(1973), violate his due process and first
amendment rights. He also claims that the
evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions of filing a false income tax re-
turn, violating RICO, using a false social
security number, and on all other counts.
Finally, in a separate appeal, he appeals
from the district court's 3 entry of sum-
mary judgment in his civil suit filed against
the government arguing that the use of
obscenity as a predicate to RICO violated
his first amendment rights. We affirm the
Convictions, and the orders of summary
judgment and forfeiture.
The evidence presented at the four-
month trial was far-reaching and spanned a
thirty year period. Only a brief outline of
obscene material in interstate commerce for the
Pupose of sale or distribution in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1465 (1988); five counts of engaging in
the business of selling or transferring obscene
m1aterial in violation of 18 US.C. § 1466 (1988);
and one count of falsely misrepresenting a so
5"security number for the purpose of imped-
Ing the IRS in violation of 42 US.C. § 408(g)(2)
(1988) (now codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
I 408(a)(7)(B) (West Supp.1991)).
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that evidence is necessary for our par-
poses, and we will provide further details
as required in analyzing the issues on ap-
peal.
Alexander was in the adult entertain-
ment business for more than 30 years sell-
ing magazines, showing movies, and even- .
tually selling and leasing video cassettes.
The evidence at trial established that Alex-
ander set up sham corporations and operat-
ed many of his businesses using false
names and names of employees.
For example, evidence showed that from
1959 to 1976, Alexander used the name of
an employee, Kenneth LaLonde, to conduct
his businesses under the name of Kenneth
LaLonde Enterprises. In 1969, Alexander
hired an attorney, Robert J. Milavetz, who
incorporated several corporations under the
name of Kenneth LaLonde Enterprises.
Alexander obtained licenses required for
these businesses and opened bank accounts
under LaLonde's name. Reports were also
sent to the State of Minnesota under the
name of Kenneth LaLonde Enterprises.
The businesses were reported on La-
Londe's individual tax return, and no corpo-
rate tax returns were filed.
Eventually, Milavets had a falling out
with Alexander and Alexander began using
other attorneys, including Randall Tigue.
In 1976, Tigue witnessed LaLonde's signa-
ture as the incorporator of two more corpo-
rations. Alexander consolidated the opera-
tion of his theaters and bookstores under
these corporations, and on May 1, 1977, the
name of LeRoy Wendling was substituted
as the front name used to conduct Alexan-
der's businesses. Alexander opened bank
accounts for these corporations under the
name of Wendling, another Alexander em-
ployee. These corporations were also re-
ported to state and federal agencies show-
ing Wendling as the owner. Corporate tax
2. The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum. United
States District Judge for the District of Minneso-
ta.
3. The Honorable David S. Doty, United States
District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
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returns were filed and signed with a signa-
ture stamp of Wendling's name.
Wendling filed his personal tax returns
listing Alexander's income. This arrange-
ment continued until the end of 1980, when
Wendling was fired, and the name "John
Thomas" was substituted on some of these
records and placed on the Wendling bank
account. Alexander admitted that the
name "John Thomas" was "the name [he]
used."
On December 27, 1984, In Sok Na, anoth-
er Alexander employee, executed, as incor-
porator and first director, the articles of
incorporation for ten different corpora-
tions. In Sok Na was a Korean immigrant
and spoke little English. Alexander testi-
fied that he formed these corporations to
avoid potential civil liability. The names of
six of the corporations were in Finnish and
four were in a dialect of the Philippines.'
None of these corporations filed tax re-
turns. Two of the corporations were used
to buy real estate and a bookstore.
In addition to using the names of La-
Londe, Wendling, and Na, Alexander used
a number of other names in operating bank
accounts, obtaining licenses, and complying
with various state and federal reporting
regulations.
The governments evidence showed sev-
eral examples of the lengths to which Alex-
ander went to conceal his identity as the
owner and operator of his various business-
es. During the time Alexander ran his
businesses under the name of LaLonde En-
terprises, Alexander sent Milavetz to unem-
ployment compensation hearings and in-
structed Milavetz to appear on behalf of
Kenneth LaLonde or Kenneth LaLonde En-
terprises. In one instance, LaLonde signed
a license application for one of the theatres
known as the "Flick." LaLonde appeared
before the St Paul City Council in the
licensing application proceedings acting as
the "owner" of the business. After the
City Council balked at granting the license,
Tigue advised the Council that he repre-
sented Alexander and LaLonde and a lease
existed between the two. Subsequently,
4. The translation of these corporate names was
profane, and the district court excluded the
PORTER, 2d SERIES
Tigue filed a lawsuit in the United aDistrict Court against the City of St.
and its council members on behalf o ALander and LaLonde stating that a leaseexisted between LaLonde and AlexanderThe city council subsequently grantj t
license in LaLonde's name. LaLonde t
fied that he became aware of the lawmrn
by reading about it in the newspaper, thu
he never had a lease on the business, a4
that his signature verifying the compl
notarized by Tigue, was a forgery. i
later years, licenses were issued in L,
Londe's name without his knowledge, bat
with the participation of Tigue, and contia.
ued after LaLonde left Alexander's employ.
The revenues generated from Alexas.
der's retail and rental stores were brought
to him at the central warehouse and rnain
office where the cash was commingled and
taken to various banks. Alexander deposit.
ed some of the cash in various accounts
and converted the rest into large denom-
ination bills, cashier checks, and money or-
ders. The cashier checks and money or-
ders were payable to various individuals
and entities. All expenses were paid out of
Alexander's primary bank accounts, and all
merchandise was shipped from California
to his warehouse, where it was wrapped.
priced, and boxed for distribution to Alex-
ander's retail outlets. Because of disorga-
nized and incomplete records, the govern-
ment had a difficult time attempting to
calculate Alexander's income. Neverthe-
less, the government estimated that Alex-
ander underreported his 1982 gross re-
ceipts by $1,322,135 and $1,416,883 in 1983.
Alexander testified about many of these
details. He confirmed that he used U,-
Londe, Wendling, and other individuals'
names in the operation of his businesses,
and that revenues from the businesses
were reported on LaLonde's and Wen-
dling's personal tax returns. He admitted
that he purchased properties and submitted
reports to state and federal agencies in
other people's names. He attributed many
of these decisions to Tigue and stated that
he had no knowledge of some of the vai-
translation as having more prejudicial value
than probative value.
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ous businesses. Alexander also admitted
that he signed a form on a Paine Webber
investment account using a social security
number that was not his social security
number.
The jury found four magazines and three
videos to be obscene, and these findings
were the basis for convicting Alexander of
transporting obscene material for the pur-
pose of sale, selling obscene materials, and
the RICO counts.
After the return of guilty verdicts, the
district court reconvened the same jury to
hear a portion of the forfeiture proceeding
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2). The jury
heard additional evidence, including Alex-
ander's testimony regarding the forfeitabil-
ity of his interest in the enterprise and the
property that afforded him a source of
influence over the enterprise. Thereafter,
the district court reconvened without a jury
for a further evidentiary hearing as to for-
feiture of any interest Alexander had ac-
quired or maintained in violation of section
1962 and of any property constituting pro-
ceeds obtained directly or indirectly from
racketeering activity. The government of-
fered additional evidence of 30 magazines
and 16 videos purchased or seized by the
FBI during its criminal investigation, and
an additional 418 videos and 9 magazines
were admitted through the testimony of
witnesses who had appeared as representa-
tives of Alexander's wholesale sources.
The court sentenced Alexander to terms
of imprisonment ranging from 36 to 72
months, all terms to run concurrently.
United States v. Alexander, No. 4-89-
85(1), Order and Judgment of Sentencing,
slip op. at 3 (D.Minn. Aug. 13, 1990). In
addition, the court imposed a fine of $100,-
000 and a special assessment of $950, and
ordered Alexander to pay the costs of his
incarceration ($1,415.56 per month), his su-
pervised release ($96.66 per month), and
the costs of prosecution ($29,737,84) Id. at
6-7. Finally, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(2), the court ordered forfeiture of
Alexander's interest in ten of fourteen
5. Titles to the other four pieces of real estate
Alexander used for his magazine and video busi-
nesses were held in the name of Dolores Alexan-
pieces of commercial real estate in which
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
Alexander had an interest or which afford-
ed Alexander a source of influence over the
racketeering enterprise and which the
court concluded were acquired, maintained,
or derived from proceeds of the racketeer:-
ing activity.$ Id. at 7 (incorporating Order
and Judgment of Forfeiture (Aug. 6, 1990)).
Alexander forfeited his interest in his
wholesale business and thirteen retail busi-
nesses (bookstores and video stores) that
were used in the criminal enterprise,.and
$8,910,548.10 in monies acquired, main-
tained, or constituting proceeds obtained
from the racketeering activity in the years
1985 through 1988. United States v. Alex-
ander, No. 4-89-85, Order and Judgment
of Forfeiture, slip op. at 6, 11, 1990 WL
117882 (D.Minn. Aug. 6, 1990). Alexander
also forfeited his interest in business assets
and personal property. Id. at 6-11. This
appeal followed.
I.
Alexander appeals the jury's verdict on
the conspiracy count (Count I) arguing that
the count is defective in two ways. The
indictment alleged that over the course of
twenty years, Alexander engaged in a con-
spiracy to defraud the United States by
defeating the lawful functions of the IRS.
This has become known as a Klein conspir-
acy, taking its name from United States v.
Klein, 124 F.Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y.1954),
affd, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 365, 2 LEd.2d
354 (1958).
Alexander contends that the district
court must reverse his conviction on Count
I because the indictment affeged a single
overall conspiracy and the proof at trial
showed not a single conspiracy, but a ser-
ies of separate conspiracies. Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773-74, 66
S.Ct. 1239, 1252,'90 LEd. 1557 (1946). Al-
exander argues that there was not just one
conspiracy for twenty years, pointing out
that at the time the alleged conspiracy
der and were not forfeited to the United States
as a result of the jury's forfeiture verdict.
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started some key members were in high
school. He further argues that he had
dismissed many of the members of the
alleged conspiracy and that they had no
knowledge of later transactions. He as-
serts that looking at the totality of the
circumstances, this case is a "series of
scenes of a life of hustling" and not one
conspiracy.
[1-3] Whether a conspiracy is one
scheme or several is primarily a jury ques-
tion. United States v. Wilson, 497 F.2d
602, 604 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1069, 95 S.Ct. 655, 42 L.Ed.2d 664 (1974).
As this court has stated-
The general test is whether there was
"one overall agreement" to perform vari-
ous functions to achieve the objectives of
the conspiracy.... A conspirator need
not know all of the other conspirators or
be aware of all the details of the conspir-
acy, so long as the evidence is sufficient
to show knowing contribution to the fur-
therance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 636
(8th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v.
Zemek 634 F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir.1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916, 101 S.Ct. 1359,
67 L.Ed.2d 341 (1981)), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258
(1985) (other citations omitted).
We have also stated that "[t]he existence
of a single agreement can be inferred if the
evidence revealed that the alleged partici-
pants shared 'a common aim or purpose'
and 'mutual dependence and assistance' ex-
isted." United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d
897, 918 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 LEd.2d 336 (1985)
(citations omitted).
(4] We are satisfied that the evidence
supported a jury finding of a single Klein
conspiracy, spanning many years and in-
volving numerous individuals with the com-
mon goal of impairing and impeding the
IRS in determining the nature and extent
of Alexander's businesses. We therefore
reject Alexander's argument that Count I
was defective because it failed to allege*
multiple conspiracies.
(5] Second, Alexander argues
Count I of the indictment is defective b.
cause it should have charged him wh
conspiracy to commit a specific crime unde
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1988), rather than
conspiracy to defraud under 18 C.S-C§ 371. Alexander relies on United Siowv. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.19 891
and United States v. Mohney, 723 F.Sup;'
1197 (E.D.Mich.1989).
In Minarik, the defendants were
charged with willfully conspiring to de.
fraud the United States-by impeding, irn.
pairing, obstructing, and defeating the law.
ful functions of the Department of the
Treasury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
875 F.2d at 1188. The government did not
allege a conspiracy to commit an offense
against the United States-another provi-
sion of 18 U.S.C. § 371, despite the fact
that its evidence at trial and the bill of
particulars alleged that the conspiracy was
one to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7206(4) (conceal.
ment of assets with intent to evade or
defeat assessment of tax). Id. at 1188-89.
The Sixth Circuit stated that when Con.
gress has enacted a specific statute ad.
dressing a given problem, thus creating a
specific offense, "[t]he court should require
that any conspiracy prosecution charging
that conduct be brought under the offense
clause" of 18 U.S.C. § 371, rather than
under the defraud clause of that statute.
Id. at 1193. In Mohney, a Michigan dis-
trict court dismissed the first count in an
indictment alleging conspiracy to defraud
the government because the government's
accusation in the count was essentially a
charge that defendants conspired to violate
26 U.S.C. § 7206, and therefore, under Mi-
narik the conspiracy had to be charged
under the offense clause of the.conspiracy
statute. 723 F.Supp. at 1203.
Minaik is quite limited, however, to its
facts. As that court explained:
[t]he "offense" and "defraud" clauses as
applied to the facts of this case are mutu-
ally exclusive, and the facts proved con-
stitute only a conspiracy under the of-
fense clause to violate 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(4)....
875 F.2d at 1187.
In Minarik, the defendants engaged in a
narrow course of conduct directed at one
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object-to sell a house and get the money
in an untraceable manner. This obviously
is not the circumstance in this case in
which Alexander's conduct is long-span-
ning, far-reaching, and involves many activ-
ities and events. Moreover, Alexander
does not even argue that he lacked ade-
quate notice of the charge he had to de-
fend, and at least one court has held that
this is the only holding of Minarik. Unit-
ed States v. Reynold, 919 F.2d 435, 438-39
(7th Cir.1990), cert denied - U.S. -,
111 S.CL 1402, 113 LEd.2d 457 (1991); see
also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
1285, 1301 (2d Cir.1991), pet'n for cert.
filed, No. 90-1803 (May 22, 1991). We do
not believe that Mohney is applicable or
persuasive. We reject Alexander's argu-
ment that Count I was defective because it
alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
II.
(6] Alexander next argues his convic-
tions for transporting and selling obscene
materials must be vacated because the
jury's verdicts are inconsistent, and the
inconsistency mandates a conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence to support
these convictions. Alexander contends
that the jury verdicts are inconsistent be-
cause the jury found some items obscene in
one count and not obscene in other counts.
Specifically, Alexander points out that the
jury returned a verdict of not guilty on
some of the counts involving the magazine
The Fat Book, and guilty verdicts as to
other counts involving the same magazine.
He also says a verdict inconsistency is
shown by comparing the jury's guilty ver-
dict on Count XXXIX involving the maga-
sines "Sweet" and "Party,"* and not
guilty verdicts on all counts involving the
6. The jury found some of these materials ob.
scene. and their titles insofar as they are not
descriptive of the contents, serve to create inter-
est in the contents. As the argument is directed
at the inconsistency of the evidence, and not the
sufficiency, we believe it sufficient to simply
identify the first magazine by its last word "Par-
1Y , and the other by its first word "Sweet
7. Alexander argues in his reply brief that the
court's instruction is constitutionally impermis-
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single sale of the magazine "Sweet."
(Counts XXVI, XXVII and XL).
Alexander's argument is spurious. The
court instructed the jury that when a count
alleges two different videotapes or maga-
zines to be obscene, they must find only
one of them to be obscene in order to
return a guilty verdict' The verdicts
therefore are not inconsistent.
Alexander further argues that the jury
did not apply contemporary community
standards, but instead made impermissible
distinctions based on values of taste, moral-
ity, and cultural rejection, resulting in in-
consistent or compromise verdicts. Alex-
ander's argument asks us to speculate on
how the jury reached its verdicts, which we
may not do. The district court defined
obscenity in accordance with the definition
of obscenity announced in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25, 93 S.Ct. 2607,
2614-2615, 37 LEd.2d 419 (1973). Under
its instructions, the question of obscenity is
one of fact to be determined by the jury,
and we cannot conclude that the jury's
verdicts are inconsistent or the result of
compromise. Moreover, this court has ex-
plained "'inconsistency of a verdict on sep-
arate counts of an indictment does not en-
title a convicted defendant to reversal of a
judgment of conviction.'" United States
v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 612 (8th Cir.1991)
(quoting United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d
370, 376 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1054, 106 S.Ct. 790, 88 LEd.2d 768
(1986)). We reject Alexander's argument
that his convictions for transporting and
selling obscene materials should be re-
versed because the verdicts are inconsist-
ent or the result of compromise.
III-
[7] Alexander also argues in both his
civil and criminal appeals' that the legal
sible because the instruction did not allow the
jury to make a specific finding of which item in
the two-item counts is obscene. Alexander.
however, does not say that he objected to this
instruction, and, in any event, we see nothing
impermissible about such an instruction.
8. In his civil suit. Alexander sought: 1) a declar-
atory judgment that the application of the RICO
statute to obscenity offenses violated his first
amendment rights, and 2) a permanent injunc.
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standard of obscenity enunciated in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37
LEd.2d 419 (1973), violates the fifth
amendment's due process clause and the
first amendments freedom of speech provi-
sion. He claims that the rationales ad-
vanced for criminalization of sexually ex-
plicit materials are fundamentally anti-
thetical to the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and privacy. Alexander goes
on to argue that statutes criminalizing the
distribution of obscenity are inherently
overbroad and that the Miller test fails to
provide fair notice of prohibited speech and
encourages arbitrary enforcement, which
renders the federal obscenity statute void
for vagueness and unduly chilling free
speech.
We summarily reject Alexander's argu-
ments. The district courts did not err in
rejecting Alexander's invitation to overturn
Miller. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 916,
924-925, 103 L.Ed.2d 34 (1989) (reaffirming
Miller). If this is to be done, it must be
done by the Supreme Court.
IV.
(8] Alexander argues that the applica-
tion of the forfeiture provision of 18 U.S.C.
j 1962 unconstitutionally criminalizes non-
obscene expressive material. He argues
that sexually explicit expressive materials
are not obscene until a trier of fact in an
adversarial judicial proceeding utilizing the
three-part test enunciated in Miller, 413
U.S. at 23-24, 93 S.Ct. at 2614-2615, finds
them to be obscene, and that the Miller
test must be applied to all material the
government seeks to restrain. Alexander
relies on Marcus v. Search Warrant of
Property, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6
LEd.2d 1127 (1961), and Vance v. Univer-
sal Amusement Company, 445 U.S. 308,
100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 LEd.2d 413 (1980), to
support his position. Alexander argues
that Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51
tion prohibiting the application of the RICO
statute to obscenity offenses. The district court
granted the Attorney General's motion to dis-
miss and motion for summary judgment. Alex-
ander v. Thornburgh, 713 F.Supp. 1278
(D.Minn.), appeal dismissed 881 F.2d 1081 (8th
S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), requi
that any law restricting speech be tes,
for its operation and effect on protect.
speech, and that Marcus and Vance appli.
such a test in refusing to endorse obscenity
laws that interfered with the sale of nor
obscene materials. In Marcus, the' S.
preme Court invalidated the large-scale
confiscation of expressive materials with.
out a prior adversarial hearing as an inper.
missible prior restraint. 867 U.S. at 731-
33, 81 S.Ct. at 1715-17. In Vance, the
Court prohibited the "padlocking" of busi.
nesses for up to a year for past violations
of obscenity laws as an impermissible Prior
restraint. 445 U.S. at 317, 100 S.Ct. at
1162. Alexander recognizes that these
cases involved prior restraints, but argues
that these cases show the need for an
adversarial proceeding focusing on the
question of obscenity for all of the materi.
als finally restrained.
Alexander continues in his argument fo-
cusing on section 1962(c), which requires
that an accused conduct an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.
The nub of Alexander's argument is that to
prove a criminal enterprise under RICO,
Miller requires the government to charge
and prove that: (1) all the materials sold by
the enterprise taken as a whole are ob-
scene; or (2) all the materials sold by his
enterprise considered as individual works
are obscene. He claims that the applica-
tion of section 1962(c) to this case has
created the absurd result of criminalizing
the sale of millions of dollars of non-ob-
scene materials by an enterprise that dur-
ing its 20 years of existence sold just four
magazines and three videotapes that were
later found to be obscne.
The Fourth Circuit rejected many, if not
all, of Alexander's arguments in United
States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 305,
112 L.Ed.2d 258 (1990). In Pryba, the de-
fendants were convicted on seven counts of
Cir.1989). Alexander's appeal in that case bas
been consolidated with the appeal from his
criminal convictions, and to the extent the is-
sues in his civil appeal are not moot, the issues
are discussed in this opinion.
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usasporting obscene materials in inter-
sque commerce for sale and distribution,
and these counts, coupled with prior state
obscenity convictions, were used as predi-
cae RICO offenses. The Pryba defen-
dants argued that the forfeiture order re-
sulted in "the confiscation and restraint of
a vast inventory of presumptively protect-
ed expressive material," and the application
of the forfeiture provisions resulted in an
unconstitutional prior restraint of protected
activity. They also argued that the RICO
forfeiture provisions violated the first
amendment because the provisions lacked
the procedural safeguards necessary to in-
sure that protected expression was not er-
roneously suppressed. Id. at 753.
The Fourth Circuies answer to Pryba's
arguments directly applies to the nearly
identical arguments made by Alexander.
The court stated:
The forfeiture provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1467 does not violate the First Amend-
ment even though certain materials,
books and magazines, that are forfeited,
may not be obscene and, in other circum-
stances, would have constitutional pro-
tection as free expression. There was a
nexus established between defendants' l
gotten gains from their racketeering ac-
tivities and the protected materials that
were forfeited. The forfeiture did not
occur until after defendants were con-
victed of violating various obscenity stat-
utes and of participating in a racketeer-
ing activity, and until after it was estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that
the proceeds from these criminal activi-
ties had been used to acquire the argu-
ably protected publications.
Id. at 755.
The P-yba court rejected an argument
that Fort Wayne Books required a differ-
ent conclusion and stated further.
The forfeiture of nonobscene books,
magazines and video tapes, after a con-
viction of racketeering involving the sale
of obscene goods and after the jury has
determined that the forfeited materials
were acquired or maintained in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and afforded the
Prybas a source of influence over the
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racketeering enterprise, does not violate
the First Amendment. The fact that
some of the materials forfeited are not
obscene does not protect them from for-
feiture when the procedures established
by RICO are followed, as they were in
the present case.
Md at 756.
Alexander argues that the decision of the
Fourth Circuit in Pryba is not applicable as
it dealt with a facial challenge to the RICO
forfeiture statute and not to the unconsti-
tutional application of section 1962.
We reject Alexander's distinction. As in
Pryba, a jury convicted Alexander on the
RICO charges brought under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) and predicate obscenity offenses
under 18 U.S.C. § 1465. (Here, Alexander
was also convicted under section 1466).
Like Pryba, the jury found some items
charged in the indictment obscene, some
not, and was unable to reach a verdict on
others. In both cases, after the jury
reached a verdict finding violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1962, the same jury heard addi-
tional testimony on the issue of forfeiture,
found that the defendants had an interest
in property that gave them a source of
influence over the enterprise, and ordered
that certain of the assets, including the
bookstores and video stores, be forfeited.
Pryba differed fiom the case before us in
that fifteen prior obscenity convictions of
the corporate defendant were introduced in
evidence. Id at 758. Nevertheless, with
this exception, the facts in Pryba are near-
ly identical to those here.
Furthermore, the government argues
with persuasive force that in addition to the
thirteen magazines and videos that were
introduced, it was prepared to offer addi-
tional items not named in the indictment.
On the state of this record, Alexander may
not now argue that the jury must have
found all of the materials seized in the
forfeiture proceedings obscene under Mil-
ler.
In his reply brief, Alexander asserts that
Sable Communications v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 492 U.S. 115,
109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d-93 (1989), fur-
ther supports his argument that the appli-
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cation of the RICO forfeiture provision un-
constitutionally criminalized the sale of ex-
pressive material.
In Sable, the Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of a federal criminal
statute prohibiting the sale of "indecent"
or "obscene" commercial telephone mes-
sages. Id. at 117, 109 S.Ct. at 2832. The
Court upheld the criminal prohibition
against obscene messages, but struck down
the ban on indecent messages. Id. Alex-
ander argues that based on Sable, the
government cannot criminally prosecute Al-
exander for selling non-obscene material
any more than Congress could criminalize
the sale of non-obscene messages.
Alexander's argument misses the mark.
Alexander was not prosecuted for selling
non-obscene material, and Sable has no
bearing on the facts presented in this case.
For the several reasons discussed, we re-
ject Alexander's argument that the applica-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 unconstitutionally
criminalizes non-obscene expressive materi-
als.
V.
(9] Alexander next argues in both his
civil and criminal appeals that the applica-
tion of the RICO forfeiture provisions vio-
lates the first amendment.' Specifically,
he contends that the forfeiture results in
an unconstitutional prior restraint, imposes
an unconstitutional chilling effect on consti-
tutionally protected expression, and is con-
stitutionally overbroad. The Fourth Cir-
cuit summarily rejected these same argu-
ments in Pryba, concluding that "(o]bsceni-
ty is not protected by the First Amendment
and a convicted racketeer may not launder
his dirty money by investing it in materials
that involve protected speech." 900 F.2d
at 756.
Alexander, like the Pryba defendants,
relies on Fort Wayne Books to support his
position that the application of the RICO
forfeiture provisions causes an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint. There is, however,
no similarity to the procedural posture in
this case and the pretrial seizure con-
9. The district court rejected Alexander's facial
challenge to the application of the RICO forfei.
ERIE
demned in Fort Wayne Books. 489
66, 109 S.Ct. at 929.
Alexander's convictions on a
counts may serve as a predicate to a
violation, and do not constitute a prior 1
straint. The First Amendment is not is.
lated when there is a nexus establ
between the ill-gotten gains from -a
teering activity and the protected materab
forfeited. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 755.
Here, the RICO forfeiture provisin
constitute a criminal penalty imposed fis
lowing a conviction for conducting an o
terprise engaged in racketeering activais
Courts have recognized the substantial .
ference between prior restraints and crics
nal penalties. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cod
Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705-06 & n. t
106 S.CL 3172, 3176-77 & n. 2, 92 LEd.2
568 (1986); Southeastern Promotions
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59, 9r
S.Ct. 1239, 1246-47, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (197k
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US.
436, 441-45, 77 S.CL 1325, 1327-28. 1
LEd.2d 1469 (1957).
Alexander next argues that the forfei
ture imposes an unconstitutional- chilling
effect on protected expression- The Su-
preme Court has directly addressed the
chilling effect from the application of the
RICO forfeiture provisions to obscenity of-
fenses and to first amendment protected
materials:
It may be true that the stiffer RICO
penalties will provide an additional deter-
rent to those who might otherwise sell
obscene materials; perhaps this means
that some cautious booksellers will
practice self-censorship and remove First
Amendment protected materials from
their shelves. But deterrence of the sale
of obscene materials is a legitimate end
of state anti-obscenity laws, and our
cases have long recognized the practical
reality that "any form of criminal ob-
scenity statute applicable to a bookseller
will induce some tendency to self-censor
ship and have some inhibitory effect On
the dissemination of material not ob-
ture provisions in United States v Alexander
736 FSupp. 968. 977-40 (D.Minn.1990).
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scene." The mere assertion of some pos-
sible self-censorship resulting from a
statute is not enough to render an anti-
obscenity law unconstitutional under our
precedents.
pj Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 60, 109
S.CL at 925 (citing Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 154-55, 80 S.Ct. 215, 219-20,
4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959)).
We reject Alexander's argument that the
forfeiture provisions have an unconstitu-
donally chilling effect on first amendment
rights.
We also reject Alexander's argument
that the reach of the RICO forfeiture provi-
sions is unconstitutionally overbroad.. In
Arara, the Supreme Court upheld the clo-
sure of a bookstore that had been used as a
front for prostitution. The Court stated
that criminal and civil sanctions are not
subject to " 'least restrictive means scruti-
ny"' because a particular remedy "will
have some effect on the First Amendment
activities of those subject to sanction."
478 U.S. at 706, 106 S.Ct. at 3177.
Here, the court specifically and properly
limited the forfeiture to profits, real estate,
and businesses directly related to Alexan-
dees interstate transportation and sale of
obscene magazines and videos. The forfei-
ture is not unconstitutionally overbroad.1e
VI.
Alexander argues that his sentence, pri-
marily the forfeiture order, violates the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments and excessive
fines.
The Supreme Court has set forth a three-
part test for determining whether a sen-
tence violates the eighth amendment The
test requires a comparison of: (1) the grav-
ity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty* (2) the sentences imposed for the
same or similar offenses in the same juris-
diction; and (3) the sentences imposed for
10. Alexander also argues that the court should
have applied a remedy requiring forfeiture of
Proceeds which were proportional or traceable
to the sale of obscene material. There is, how-
ever, no requirement that courts engage in such
a test in applying the RICO forfeiture provi.
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the same or similar offenses in other juris-
dictions. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009-11, 77 L.Ed.2d
637 (1983).
A sentence imposed is entitled to "sub-
stantial deference" and.we may only con-
sider "whether the sentence ... is within
the constitutional limits." Solem, 463 U.S.
at 290 and n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 3009 and n.
16.
[10] The district court imposed Alexan-
der's prison sentence based on the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988).
Alexander does not specifically attack his
prison sentence. Instead, he appeals from
the forfeiture order arguing once again
that the income "from the two patterns of
racketeering amoun(t] only to an infinites-
imal percentage of his legitimate income,"
and that when the forfeiture is combined
with the fine and prison sentence, the
"harshness" of the penalty is "amazingly
unfair."
Alexander cites one decision in which the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a de-
termination of whether the forfeiture was
grossly disproportionate or excessive,
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409,
1414-16 (9th Cir.1987), and contends that
this case should be followed here.
Nevertheless, in the only other RICO-
obscenity case in the country, the Fourth
Circuit held that the forfeiture of a busi-
ness with total annual sales of $2 million as
a result of $105.30 of material found to be
obscene did not constitute a cruel and un-
usual punishment or an excessive fine pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment. Pryba,
900 F.2d at 753, 756-57. The Fourth Cir-
cuit added that it was not even required to
conduct a proportionality review because
the defendants did not receive a sentence
of sufficient severity. Id. at 757 (citing
United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849,
860 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983,
109 S.CL 534, 102 L.Ed.2d 566 (1988);
sions. See ag., United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d
115. 119 (2d Cir.1988): United States v. Kravitz.
738 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d Cir.1984). cert. denied
470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1752, 84 LEd.2d 816
(1985).
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United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019,
1027-28 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182, 106 S.Ct. 2916, 91 LEd.2d 545
(1986)). "Solem v. Helm does not require
a proportionality review of any sentence
less than life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole." Pryba, 900 F.2d at
757 (citation omitted). We cannot conclude
that the district court abused its discretion
in sentencing Alexander.
VII.
Finally, Alexander argues that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support his con-
victions on the tax counts, social security
counts, and all other counts. He adds in
his reply brief that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his RICO convictions, ar-
guing that the government failed to show
that proceeds from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity were invested in a criminal
enterprise, or a criminal enterprise existed
as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962. We have
carefully reviewed Alexander's arguments
and record at trial. We are satisfied that
there is ample evidence to support Alexan-
der's convictions on all counts.
Having carefully considered all of Alex-
ander's arguments, we affirm Alexander's
convictions, and the orders of forfeiture
and summary judgment
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
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Defendant was convicted of assault
with dangerous weapon with intent to do
bodily harm and assault by striking b,
ing or wounding following jury . ad
defendant was sentenced using enhu"
offense level for using dangerous w
and inflicting serious bodily injury on rV.
tim by the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota, Richa I
Battey, J., and Andrew W. Bogue, Semi,
District Judge. Defendant appealed. th
Court of Appeals, McMillian, Circuit Judge
held that: (1) jury's acquittal under stab.
tory definition did not preclude finding of
serious bodily injury under Guidelines def>
nition; (2) enhancement of offense level for
serious bodily injury was supported by eri
dence; and (3) successor judge could make
factual determination for offense level en-
hancement under Sentencing Guidelines.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law 41250
Conduct which is subject of acquittal
may be used to enhance base offense level
under federal Sentencing Guidelines.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq., 18 U.S.C.A.App.
2. Criminal Law 4-1254
Jury's finding of no serious bodily inju-
ry in connection with acquittal on charge of
assault resulting in serious bodily injury
did not preclude finding of serious bodily
injury necessary for enhancement of base
offense level under federal Sentencing
Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a), (b)(3XB).
18 U.S.C.A.App.
32 Criminal Law -1254
Enhancement of offense level for sen-
ous bodily injury was justified, even
though jury did not find serious bodily
harm necessary for conviction of assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, where
victim's skull fracture required hospital-
ization and was not clearly erroneous.
U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1 et seq., 2A2-2().
(bX3XB), 5K2.10, p.s., 18 U.S.C.A.APP.
4. Criminal Law 4977(2)
Successor judge could make factual de-
terminations concerning whether assault
defendant's conduct caused serious bodily
injury, for purposes of imposing enhanced
836
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question in roughly analogous circum-
stances. See Donovan v. Civil Serv. Em-
ployees Ass'n, Local 1000, 761 F.2d 870,
874 (2d Cir.1985) (a protest sent within the
ten-day period provided by the union's con-
stitution, but not received until 3 days after
the ten-day period expired, satisfied the
ten-day requirement for purposes of sec-
tion 402(a)); Donovan v. Local 2122, Com-
munication Workers ofAmerica, 740 F.2d
860, 862 (11th Cir.1984) ("Any time require-
ment that is dependent upon the union's
receipt of the protest instead of its post-
mark becomes immediately suspect in light
of current delays in mail transmittals.");
see also Hodgson, 444 F.2d at 1349-50 (pro-
test sent within deadline but received late
due to postal strike was timely under see-
tion 402).
The order of the district court is RE-
VERSED and the case REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.'
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Commercial publishers brought civil
rights action, requesting declaratory and
Joint Council decision begins to run "from the
date the decision is placed in the mail or other-
wise transmitted to the interested parties." By
maintaining that the Joint Council must receive
members' protests within 72 hours, but that the
clock for appeals begins to run before members
receive a Joint Council decision, Local 480 urges
a construction of the Teamsters' constitution
that would impose inconsistent requirements to.
ward the consistent end of disfavoring com-
plaining union members.
injunctive relief against enforcement of
city ordinance prohibiting distribution of
commercial handbills on public property.
The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, S. Arthur Spie-
gel, J., entered judgment preventing en-
forcement of ordinance, and city appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Boggs, Circuit
Judge, held that ordinance banning distri-
bution of commercial handbills along city
streets and sidewalks in light of aesthetic
and safety concerns from proliferation of
newsracks for commercial publications did
not prescribe "reasonable fit" between
ends asserted and means chosen to advance
them, and therefore ordinance was uncon-
stitutional under First Amendment.
Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law C-90.2
"Commercial speech" only receives
lesser First Amendment protection when
governmental interest asserted is either re-
lated to regulating the commerce that
"commercial speech" is promoting, or relat-
ed to any distinctive effects such commer-
cial activity would produce. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 1.
2. Constitutional Law e-90.2
In reviewing city's regulation of com-
mercial speech, deference to city's decision
is not required merely because decision is
reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
3. Constitutional Law 90.2
Lesser value placed on "commercial
speech" only justifies regulations dealing
with content of speech itself, or with dis-
tinctive effects that content of speech will
produce. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
4. The district court did not address, and we take
no position on, the Joint Council's alternative
basis for dismissing the complainants' initial
election protest, Le., the finding that the prote-
tors failed to specify sufficiently the acts corn-
plained of and how those acts affected the out-
come of the election.
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. Constitutional Law G90.2
City ordinance banning distribution of
conmercial handbills along city streets and
sidewalks in interest of aesthetic and safe-
ty concerns from proliferation of news-
racks did not prescribe "reasonable fit"
between ends asserted and means chosen
to advance them, and therefore ordinance
was unconstitutional under First Amend-
ment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
s. Constitutional Law e-90.1(8), 90.2
City ordinance prohibiting distribution
of commercial handbills on public property,
which treated newsracks for "commercial"
publications different from newsracks for
traditional newspapers, was not content-
neutral and therefore could not qualify as
constitutional time, place, and manner re-
striction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
6. Constitutional Law 090.1(8), 92
Municipal Corporations e622
Even if city ordinance prohibiting dis-
tribution of commercial handbills on public
property was content-neutral, despite treat-
ing newsracks for "commercial" publica-
tions differently than newsracks for tradi-
tional newspapers, ordinance did not meet
constitutional requirement of being riar-
rowly tailored to serve significant govern-
mental interest, since there were many op-
tions available to city that would address
its aesthetic, safety, and newsrack prolif-
eration concerns without placing significant
burden on commercial speech of completely
banning distribution of commercial hand-
bills. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
7. Constitutional Law e90.2
Municipal Corporations 0-622
City ordinance prohibiting distribution
of commercial handbills on public property
*as not valid content-based restriction; or-
dinance placed substantially greater bur-
den on commercial speech than was neces-
4q to alleviate city's aesthetic and safety
cncerns from proliferation of newsracks
for commercial publications, as opposed to
newsracks for traditional newspapers.
t.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
'The Honorable Patrick J. Duggan, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Michi-
Marc D. Mezibov (briefed), Martha K.
Landesberg (argued), Sirkin, Pinales, Mezi-
boy & Schwartz, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plain-
tiffs-appellees.
Richard H. Castellini, City Solicitor's Of-
fice for the City of Cincinnati, Mark S.
Yurick (argued and briefed), Office of the
City Sol., Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-
appellant.
Before KRUPANSKY and BOGGS,
Circuit Judges, and DUGGAN, District
Judge.*
BOGGS, Circuit Judge.
[1] The case involves the constitutional-
ity of Cincinnati's ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of commercial handbills on
public property. This ordinance effectively
grants distributors of "newspapers," such
as the Cincinnati Post, USA Today, and
the Wall Street Journal, access to the
public sidewalks through newsracks, while
denying that same access to distributors of
"commercial handbills." The district court
rendered a judgment preventing enforce-
ment of this ordinance because it violates
the first amendment. The city appealed,
arguing that the ordinance was constitu-
tionally permissible as a regulation of
"commercial speech" because of the "less-
er protection" such speech is afforded un-
der the first amendment. Because we be-
lieve that "commercial speech" only re-
ceives lesser first amendment protection
when.the governmental interest asserted is
either related to regulating the commerce
the "commercial speech" is promoting, or
related to any distinctive effects such com-
mercial activity would produce, and neither
governmental interest is asserted here, we
affirm the district court.
I
Plaintiffs are publishers of publications
distributed throughout the Cincinnati met-
ropolitan area. Discovery Network pub-
gan, sitting by designation.
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lishes a magazine that advertises learning
programs, recreational opportunities, and
social events for adults. Harmon Publish-
ing publishes and distributes Home Maga-
zine, which lists houses and other resi-
dential real estate for sale or rent. Both
plaintiffs use newspaper dispensing devices
("newsracks") placed on public right-of-
ways to distribute their publications.
Both plaintiffs had been given permis-
sion by the city to place newsracks along
public right-of-ways to distribute their pub-
lications according to Amended Regulation
38.1 Their status changed, however, in
February 1990 when the City Council
passed a motion requiring the Department
of Public Works to enforce the existing
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
"commercial handbills" on public property.
Cincinnati Municipal Code § 714-23.2
Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, requesting declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. This case ultimately came be-
fore the district court for an evidentiary
hearing on two issues: whether the regula-
tion violated plaintiffs' first amendment
rights, and whether the city's mechanism
for appealing the administrative decision to
enforce the ordinance violated plaintiffs'
right to due process.
The court held that hearing on July 9,
1990, In that hearing, the city contended
that the newsracks pose aesthetic and safe-
1. The Amended Regulation reads in pertinent
part as follows:
1. All devices located within the public right.
of-way for the purpose of dispensing newspa-
pers must be shown on a site plan of the
immediate vicinity of the device.... The site
plan and request to place newspaper vending
device (sic] in public right-of-way (sic] must
be presented to and approved by the City
Manager or his designee prior to the place.
ment of the device....
3. Placement of the newspaper dispensing
device must be such that it is not accessible
from that part of the right-of-way normally
reserved for vehicular traffic and does not
obstruct normal pedestrian traffic, interfere
with handicap access, create driver sight dis-
tance problems or otherwise create a public
nuisance nor shall the method of attachment
allow the device to be moved after placement
to create these problems....
6. The owner/operator of newspaper dis-
pensing devices within the public right-of.way
ty problems for the city. The aesthetic
problems arise because of the non-uniform
design and color schemes of the different
types of newsracks. The safety problems
arise because the racks are placed near
busy streets, especially near crosswalks
and bus stops. They are also attached by
chains to city fixtures, such as lightpoles,
causing the fixtures to rust. However,
there are currently no city regulations es-
tablishing any safety or aesthetic stan-
dards for newsracks.
Neither the City Architect nor the City
Engineer could distinguish the commercial
from the non-commercial newsracks. In
fact, the Architect testified that the city's
aesthetic concerns would be alleviated by
an ordinance regulating the color and size
of all newsracks. Both witnesses seemed
primarily concerned about the potential
proliferation of the total number of news-
racks as a result of newsracks distributing
commercial speech. The Engineer testified
that the only areas in which commercial
newsracks differed from non-commercial
newsracks was in the potential for prolif-
eration, and in the enhanced first amend-
ment protection accorded to devices dis-
pensing non-commercial publications. He
believed such proliferation was likely be-
cause he had received four requests for
permits from commercial publishers for
newsrack permits in the prior two years,
must register a responsible contact person ...
with the City Manager.... This contact per-
son shall be able to respond in a reasonable
time to problems relative to the enforcement
of these rules and regulations.
L A "commercial handbill" is defined as:
any printed or written matter, any sample or
device, dodger, circular, leaflet, pamphlet, pa-
per, booklet or otherwise reproduced original
or copies of any matter of literature:
(a) which advertises for sale any merchan-
dise, product, commodity or thing or
(b) which directs attention to any business or
mercantile or commercial establishment, Or
other activity, for the purpose of either direct-
ly or indirectly promoting the interest thereof
by sales: or
(c) which directs attention to or advertises
any meeting, theatrical performance. exhibi-
tion or event of any kind for which an admis-
sion fee is charged for the purpose of private
gain or profit.
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the first such requests he had ever re-
ceived. 3  The Architect's testimony fol-
lowed the Engineer's, as he believed that
permitting plaintiffs' newsracks to remain
would send a signal .to other commercial
publishers that newsracks were a permissi-
ble way to distribute the publications,
thereby increasing the number of racks.
The court ruled in favor of the city on
the due process claim, but in favor of the
plaintiffs on the first amendment claim.
The court reached many conclusions of law:
that the publications were commercial
speech within the meaning of the first
amendment because they proposed com-
mercial transactions in the form of adver-
tisements; ' that commercial speech was
entitled to first amendment protection
where, as here, the activities promoted
were lawful and the speech itself not inher-
ently misleading- and that the ordinance
would be measured against the four-part
test announced by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447
C.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65
LEd.2d 341 (1980). That test provides that
a government regulation will be upheld if it
(1) regulates commercial speech; (2) pro-
motes a substantial governmental interest;
13) directly advances that interest; and, (4)
is not more extensive in its regulation of
Cincinnati Municipal Code § 701-1-C.
1 This argument rests on the assumption that
there is an infinite number of commercial pub.
lishers who might seek permits, but only a finite
number of non-commercial publishers. In light
of the growing nationalization of newspapers in
this country, that assumption is somewhat tenu-
ous at best. The city provided no direct evi-
dence regarding the increase in the number of
on"cOmmnercial publishers dispensing their
ares through newsracks. However, the Archi-
tect testified that -it was not very long ago that
e ncinnart Post and the Cincinnati Enquirer
'er the only ones with dispensing devices on
the City streets." We take judicial notice of the
ac that USA Today, the New York Timer, thehall Street Journa4 and the Business Courier allhave dispensing devices on the corner across
rorm the Federal Courthouse.
In this case, plaintiffs do not question the
con!Ours of the delineation between "commer-
thl and 'non-commercial' speech. We willa dopt and adhere to that terminology, al.though we find it somewhat anomalous to de.
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speech than is necessary to serve that in-
terest. Id.
The court focused its analysis on the last
part of that test. The court applied the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the
fourth part of the Central Hudson test in
Board of Trustees of State University of
New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct.
3028, 106 LEd.2d 388 (1989). The Fox
Court stated that a regulation is not more
extensive than necessary when it is a rea-
sonable fit between the ends directly ad-
vanced by the statute and the means cho-
sen as embodied in the regulation. Fox,
492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. at 3034. The
Court held that the government has the
burden of proving the reasonableness of
that fit. Id.
The district court's analysis led it to con-
clude that the city's ordinance did not con-
stitute a reasonable fit between its assert-
ed ends and the means chosen. The court
held that a complete ban on newsracks
distributing commercial speech violated the
Fox test. Only 62 of the between 1,500
-and 2,000 newsracks present on the city's
streets belonged to the plaintiffs. Based
on the city's concession that newsracks dis-
pensing "non-commercial" papers caused
the same problems as those distributing
commercial papers, the court held that the
nominate as "non-commercial" institutions such
as the New York Times and Gannett (publisher
of the Cincinnati Post). each of which has assets
and revenues in the billions of dollars, and
profits in the many millions of dollars.
Obviously, a quite significant part of the space
in "newspapers" is devoted to purely commer-
cial activities, while publications such as plain-
tiffs' may (and certainly could easily) contain
some editorial material, such as comments or
articles on education or real estate matters.
The first amendment by its terms does not make
this distinction; it protects "speech." An analo-
gous practice, deciding on content-based
grounds which beliefs merit classification as
.religion" protected by the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment,
has been severely limited by courts to avoid
impermissible government interference into
protected activity. See United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163. 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 LEd.2d 733
(1965); United States v. Ballar4, 322 U.S. 78. 64
S.Ct. 882. 88 LEd. 1148 (1944). See also G.
Stone. L Seidman, C. Sunstein. and M. Tushnet.
Constitutional Law 1369-73 (1986).
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regulation was an excessive means to ac-
complish the stated ends.
Cincinnati timely appealed the court's de-
termination.5
II
A
Both parties agree on the legal contours
within which this case must be decided.
Both parties agree that this case requires
the application of the four-part Central
Hudson test, and the interpretation given
by the Supreme Court to the fourth part of
that test in Fox. Both parties agree that
this ordinance satisfies the first two parts
of the test: in this case it regulates purely
commercial speech,' and Cincinnati's inter-
ests in street safety and city aesthetics are
substantial. As it is clear that the ordi-
nance directly advances the purposes as-
serted, we have only one issue before us:
Does Cincinnati's ordinance- banning the
distribution of commercial handbills along
city streets and sidewalks prescribe a "rea-
sonable fit" between the ends asserted and
the means chosen to advance them? We
hold that it does not.
B
In establishing the "reasonable fit" re-
quirement, the Court in Fox attempted to
draw a middle ground between greater and
lesser review of a regulation of commercial
speech. The Court expressly rejected im-
posing either a "least restrictive means" or
a "rational basis" standard of review on
regulations of commercial speech. Foz
492 U.S. at 479-81, 109 S.Ct. at 3034-35.
The Court rejected the least restrictive
means approach as inconsistent with its
prior commercial speech jurisprudence, and
rejected the rational basis approach be-
cause "[t]here it suffices if the law could
be thought to further a legitimate govern-
mental goal, without reference to whether
S. The plaintiffs have not cross-appealed from
the court's judgment for the city on the due
process claim.
6. However, it should be noted that the ordi-
nance can also be applied to "newspapers." All
newspapers advertise products for sale, or direct
it does so at inordinate cost." Fox, 492
U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. at 3035. The Court
described its "reasonable fit" approach as
one "that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope
is 'in proportion to the interest served'....
Here we require the government goal to be
substantial, and the cost to be careflly
calculated." Id. We presume that the cost
referred to by the Fox Court is that which
would accrue because of the burden placed
on the commercial speech, and that the Fox
test requires that such costs must be out-
weighed by the benefits of the asserted
regulation. We can only make that calcula-
tion if we know what value the Court has
placed on commercial speech, and it is to
that consideration that we now turn.
C
Commercial speech has unquestionably
been protected by the first amendment
since the Supreme Court in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy r. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96
S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), held that
the Court's prior offhand statement in Val-
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62
S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), that "purely
commercial advertising" was not protected
did not establish an exception to first
amendment protection. The Court recog-
nized in Virginia Citizens that commercial
speech, though it may not touch upon the
highest topics of human existence (indeed,
much protected speech does not), is impor-
tant to the public welfare. The Court not-
ed in Virginia Citizens that speech uttered
solely for economic motives has high value
to those who listen to it. "As to the partic-
ular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at
763, 96 S.Ct. at 1826. In recognizing the
attention to business establishments for the pur.
pose of directly or indirectly promoting the
sales thereof (restaurant or theater reviews). or
direct attention to events of any kind for which
an admission fee is charged for the purpose of
private profit (Reds or Bengals games).
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rtance of commercial speech to private
isn1 mic activity, the Court was once
ecoin affirming that the "right of the indi-
vidual to contract, to engage in any of the
cmmon occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge" is "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." Board
of Rgents of State College v. Roth, 408
L.S. 564, 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33
LEd.2d 548 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.CL 625, 626,
67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)). The Court recog-
sized that having made this decision, one
with which we have no quarrel, commercial
advertising is essential because it conveys
information that permits each person to
decide which trades and economic decisions
are best for that person. See Virginia
Citizens, 425 U.S. at 764, 96 S.CL at 1821.
-Therefore, even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument
to enlighten public decisionmaking in a de-
mocracy, we could not say that the free
flow of information does not serve that
goal." Id. at 765, 96 S.Ct. at 1827. As
such, commercial speech also has a high
value to the society as well.
The Court did not mean to free commer-
cial speech from all regulation and create
some sort of an advertiser's paradise. The
Court noted that time, place, and manner
restrictions could be applied to commercial
speech, provided that such restrictions are
content-neutral Virginia Citizens, 425
t.S. at 771, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. False and
misleading speech could also be regulated
or banned, id., including types of commer-
cal speech that may merely be likely to
deceive the public. Also, speech proposing
"'PI commercial transactions may be
baned. Id at 772, 96 S.Ct. at 1831. As at
t. Serninel Comsmunications Co. v. Wat 936
M 1189, 1196-97 (11th Cir.l991), and cases
and therein.
L Cncinnati also argues that we should defer to
Ow city's decision so long as it is reasonable. It
dr"" this conclusion from two sentences in
lax that 'we have been loath to second-guess
0* overnment's judgment." Fox, 492 U.S. at
*109 S.Ct. at 3034, and that '[wlithin those
nds (the reasonable fit testl we leave it to
governmental decisionmakers to judge what
%1ner of regulation may best be employed."
492 US. at 480, 109 S.CL at 3035. We do
least the prior regulation of speech con-
sidered potentially false or misleading
would be impermissible if applied to politi-
cal speech, the Court's decision effectively
left commercial speech with lesser protec-
tion than that afforded to other types of
speech. The Court has continued to adhere
to these principles in its subsequent com-
mercial speech jurisprudence. See Cenitral
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64, 100 S.Ct. at
2350.
[2] This "lesser protection" afforded
commercial speech is crucial to Cincinnati's
argument on appeal. Cincinnati argues
that placing the entire burden of achieving
its goal of safer streets and a more harmo-
nious landscape on commercial speech is
justified by this lesser protection. The city
correctly notes that many courts have held
that a city cannot ban newsracks contain-
ing traditional newspapers that comment
on current affairs, thereby precluding it
from alleviating its problem by completely
banning newsracks from the city.' It asks
us to hold that, in light of that restriction,
its policy of banning only newsracks dis-
tributing commercial speech is a cost-effec-
tive way of alleviating its problem, and
therefore meets the Fox test.
8
[3] The fact that commercial speech is
owed less protection than is political speech
does not lead to Cincinnati's conclusion that
commercial speech has a low value in first
amendment jurisprudence. "While (the
plaintiff's] speech is primarily commercial
in nature, and thereby not subject to all of
the traditionally stringent protections of
the first amendment, it is nevertheless enti-
tled to substantial protections." American
Motors Sales Corporation v. Runke, 708
F.2d 202, 208 (6th Cir.1983). Our examina-
tion of that jurisprudence shows us that
not believe that these statements command us to
give the city the benefit of the doubt in close
cases, as Cincinnati would have it. Rather, they
are meant to distinguish the Court's test in Fox
from the least restrictive means test urged on
the Court by the defendant. A least restrictive
means test can be satisfied by only one method
of regulation, while the Fox test can be satisfied
by many different methods. If the Court's
words mean what Cincinnati argues they do,
then the Fox Court's subsequent rejection of the
fourteenth amendment rational basis test would
be a glaring inconsistency.
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the lesser value placed on commercial
speech only justifies regulations dealing
with the content of the speech itself, or
with distinctive effects that the content of
the speech will produce. In every commer-
cial speech case but one,9 a regulation up-
held as constitutional by the Court fell into
one of two groups. In the first, the regula-
9. That one case is Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.CL 2882. 69
LEd.2d 800 (1981). In Metromedia, the Court
overturned an ordinance that banned outdoor,
off-site advertising displays as an attempt to
increase traffic safety and enhance appearance.
These interests are very similar to those ad-
vanced by Cincinnati in defense of its ordi-
nance. The ordinance at issue in Metromedia is
also the only regulation of commercial speech
that has yet come before the Court where a
government attempted to do what Cincinnati is
trying so here, regulate a manner of conveying
commercial speech in order to combat per-
ceived evils wholly unrelated to the commercial
content of that speech. Thus, if the majority of
the Court had upheld San Diego's statute as a
permissible regulation of commercial speech,
we would be compelled to reverse the district
court. However, only a plurality of the Court
found that the San Diego ordinance co-istitu-
tionally regulated commercial speech. The con-
currence specifically-and vehemently-disa.
greed with that conclusion. See Merromedia,
453 US. at 536, 101 S.Ct. at 2907 (Brennan. J.,
concurring). The Court's judgment rested on
the ground that San Diego's ordinance was an
impermissible content-based restriction on non-
commercial speech because it only permitted
on-site signs with certain types of speech. Me-
tromedia, 453 US. at 521, 101 S.Ct. at 2899. As
the Court has stated that "when no single ratio-
nale commands a majority. 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judg-
menit] on the narrowest ground.' " City of Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750, 764 n. 9, 108 S.Ct 2138. 2148 n. 9, 100
LEd2d 771 (quoting Marks v. United States 430
US. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 LEd.2d 260
(1977)), we do not view the plurality dicta in
Merromedia as controlling the outcome of this
case.
10. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 US. 626, 105
S.Ct. 2265, 85 LEd.2d 652 (1985) (regulation
banning the use of illustrations in lawyer adver-
tising and banning statements in such advertise-
ments offering legal advice and information as
misleading unconstitutional; regulation requir-
ing disclosure that legal "fees" and "costs" are
distinct financial obligations in retaining a law.
yer to avoid misleading public constitutional);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1. 99 S.Ct. 887, 59
LEd.2d 100 (1979) (statute prohibiting the ad-
tion sought to ban speech believed to be
inherently false or misleading. 0 In the
second group, the regulation sought to al-
leviate distinctive adverse effects allegedly
caused by and directly flowing from the
type of commercial speech regulated.t It
is clear that Cincinnati's ordinance does not
attempt to regulate plaintiffs' speech be-
vertisement of optometry practices through
trade names as misleading constitutional). The
Court also ruled many regulations to be uncon.
stitutional in this group. See Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of fL, -
US. - , 110 S.Ct. 2281. 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990)
(regulation banning lawyer advertisement of
certification by the National Board of Trial Ad-
vocacy as misleading unconstitutional); In re
R.MJ., 455 US. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 LEd.2d 64
(1982) (regulations limiting the precise names
of practice areas lawyers can use in ads and
identifying the jurisdictions lawyer is licensed
in as misleading unconstitutional); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz.. 433 U.S. 350. 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53
LEd.2d 810 (1977) (regulation banning lawyer
advertisement of prices for routine legal servic-
es as misleading unconstitutional).
11. See Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 106
S.CL 2968, 92 LEd.2d 266 (1986) (statute ban-
ning advertising of casino gambling directed to
Puerto Rico residents to prevent bad effects on
morals of residents constitutional); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912,
56 LEd.2d 444 (1978) (regulation banning in-
person solicitation of accident victims for legal
business because victims may be coerced into
hiring lawyer constitutional); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc,. 427 US. 50, 96 S.Ct.
2440, 49 LEd.2d 310 (1976) (regulation setting
different zoning regulations for pornographic
theatres or bookstores to prevent neighborhood
deterioration and crime increases constitution-
al). The Court has also declared many regula-
tions to be unconstitutional that fall into this
category. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 US. 466. 108 S.CtL 1916, 100 LEd.2d 475
(1988) (regulation banning solicitation for legal
business mailed on a personalized or targeted
basis to prevent potential clients from feeling
undue duress to hire the attorney unconstiu
tional); Bolger, er aL v. Youngs Drug Product
Corp., 463 US. 60. 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 LEd-2d
469 (1983) (statute banning unsolicited mailingP
advertising contraceptives to aid parental au-
thority over teaching their children about birth
control unconstitutional); Central Hudson (stat
ute preventing promotional advertisement by
electric utility to conserve energy unconsutu
tional); Bares v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350.
97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 LEd.2d 810 (1977) (regulatiol
banning advertisement of prices for routine 1c
gal services because of concern that legal PI
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,,use it is false or misleading. Therefore,
pantiffs' speech receives lesser first
amendment protection only if Cincinnati's
raon for regulating it falls into the sec-
ond group of cases. -We can best demon-
state what sort of rationale for regulation
i included in the second group by listing a
few examples.
In each case where the Court upheld a
regulation on commercial speech that at-
tempted to burden that speech because of
perceived adverse effects on the communi-
ty, those effects flowed naturally from per-
sonal actions fostered by the commercial
content of the speech itself. In Young v.
4merican Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50. 96 S.CL 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976),
Detroit passed a zoning ordinance requir-
ing sexual entertainment establishments to
be at least 1000 feet apart from one anoth-
er. The city believed that permitting such
establishments to be closer would foster
crime, prostitution, and neighborhood de-
cay. However, the adverse effects of in-
creased crime, prostitution, and neighbor-
hood decay would allegedly occur because
of the sort of person attracted to the loca-
tion of these businesses. Also, in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.CL
268, 92 LEd.2d 266 (1986), the Common-
wealth banned advertising of casino gain-
bng that was directed at or detectable by
Puerto Rican citizens. The reason given
Is that fostering gambling among Puerto
Ricans would disrupt moral and cultural
patterns, increase crime and prostitution,
ad foster organized crime and corruption.
These problems, however, would all arise
becuse Puerto Ricans would be more like-
17 to frequent casinos and gamble if they
were exposed to casino advertising. In
ech ease, the adverse effect would occur
u a direct result of persons acting upon
'he commercial content (availability of sex-
Ual entertainment, availability of casino
r.'nbling) of the speech regulated.
141 These observations destroy Cincin-
"ll's argument in favor of its ordinance.
eionalism will decline unconstitutional); Lin-
"k Associates Inc. v. Township of Willing-
4319U7 S 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 LEd.2d 155
lkefS i uthon banning placement of "forsigns in the front lawns of houses in order
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The defense of that ordinance rests solely
on the low value allegedly accorded to com-
mercial speech in general. However, we
observe that the Court actually accords a
high value to commercial speech except in
the two specific circumstances outlined
above. Neither of them are present here.
Cincinnati is not regulating the content of
plaintiffs' publications. Neither is Cincin-
nati attempting to alleviate a harm caused
by the content of the publications. Cincin-
nati is attempting to place a burden on a
particular type of speech because of harms
caused by the manner of delivering that
speech. "We review with special care reg-
ulations that entirely suppress commercial
speech in order to pursue a non-speech
related policy." Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 566 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 2351 n. 9. Cincin-
nati's non-speech related policy does not
survive that special review.
If commercial speech has a high value in
the Fox calculus absent the two specific
circumstances, then Cincinnati's ordinance
cannot be a "reasonable fit." Plaintiffs
will bear a very heavy burden by being
completely deprived of access to the city
streets. Discovery currently distributes
33% of its magazines through newsracks
banned by the ordinance; Harmon, 15%.
The benefit gained by the city, on the other
hand, is miniscule. Plaintiffs own only 62
of the between 1,500 and 2,000 newsracks
currently on city streets. As commercial
speech has public and private benefits
apart from the burdens directly placed on
Discovery Network and Harmon, the bur-
den placed on it by Cincinnati's ordinance
cannot be justified by the paltry gains in
safety and beauty achieved by the ordi-
nance. While Cincinnati argues that this is
the best option open to it in light of the
protection afforded to newsracks dispens-
ing traditional newspapers, "the First
Amendment does not permit a ban on cer-
tain speech merely because it is more effi-
cient" than other alternatives. Shapero,
486 U.S. at 473, 108 S.Ct. at 1921.
to prevent the town from losing its integrated
racial status unconstitutional); Virginia Citizens
(statute banning price advertising by pharma-
cists because of concern that pharmacists' pro.
fessionalism would decline unconstitutional).
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In contrast to Cincinnati's fears, it has
many options open to it to control the per-
ceived ill effects of newsracks apart from
banning those dispensing commercial
speech. To the extent that the use of
chains to fasten the newsracks is unsafe, a
regulation requiring that all newsracks be
bolted to the sidewalk would solve the
problem. To the extent that aesthetics are
a concern, a regulation establishing color
and design limitations upon all newsracks
would fit the bill. In fact, counsel for
Cincinnati admitted at oral argument that
it is currently working on an ordinance of
this sort with representatives of traditional
newspapers. To the extent that the num-
ber of newsracks is disturbing, the city can
establish a maximum number of newsracks
permitted on city sidewalks, and distribute
them either through first-come, first-serve
permit rationing or by selling permits to
the highest bidder. We are confident that
many more options exist for the city, so
long as they do not treat newsracks differ-
ently according to the content of the publi-
cations inside.
III
15] We also write briefly to explain why
Cincinnati's ordinance does not pass consti-
tutional muster on other grounds. The or-
dinance treats newsracks differently on the
basis of the commercial content of the pub-
lications distributed. Cincinnati's ordi-
nance, therefore, cannot qualify as a consti-
tutional time, place, and manner restriction
12. Nor does Cincinnati's ordinance qualify as
content-neutral under the "secondary effects"
doctrine promulgated by the Court in Playtime
Thuetrar. There, the city enacted a zoning ordi-
nance keeping sexual entertainment movie the-
aters 1,000 feet apart from a residential zone.
church, or park, and one mile from any school.
The Court in Playtime Theatre stated that the
ordinance was content-neutral, and therefore
reviewable under the time, place, and manner
regulation standard, because the primary con-
cern of the city in enacting the ordinance was to
control the secondary effects caused by the the-
aters. Playtime Theare 475 U.S. at 48, 106
S.Ct. at 929. While Cincinnati is attempting to
control effects on the city's landscape and fix-
tures, these effects are neither secondary nor
caused by the speech being regulated. In Play-
time Theatres, the effects-increased crime and
decreased neighborhood quality, among oth-
because it is not content-neutral. See Hef
fron v. International Societyfor Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct.
2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Rzadkoollow-
ski v. Village of Lake Orion, 845 F.2d 653
(6th Cir.1988); Wheeler v. Commissioner
of Highways, Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, 822 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir.1987)
("the Billboard Act and regulations apply
evenhandedly to commercial and non-com-
mercial speech; they discriminate against
no view or subject matter"). A content-
neutral speech regulation is one 'justified
without reference to the content of the
regulated speech," City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106
S.CL 925, 929, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Cin-
cinnati's argument on appeal, in contrast,
relies on the lesser protection allegedly ac.
corded to commercial speech."
(6] Cincinnati could argue that its ordi-
nance is content-neutral because it was not
"adopted . .. because of disagreement with
the message [the regulated speech] con-
veys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2754, 105
L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Cincinnati could argue
that its enforcement of the ordinance is
directed solely at the aesthetic and safety
problems caused by newsracks, and there-
fore is not a content-based decision. How-
ever, we cannot accept that argument for
two reasons. First, Cincinnati's position is
based on the argument that it can treat
newsracks distributing commercial speech
differently than those distributing commen-
tary on public affairs. Given the wide
ers-were secondary to the primary effect of the
theaters; the dissemination of sexually explicit
entertainment. Here, the very existence of dif
ferent types of newsracks causes aesthetic prob'
lems for the city. Additionally, in Playtime 1Te
aTer, the effects were caused by the nature of
the speech disseminated in the theaters. Here.
the effects newsracks may have on the citi
aesthetic and safety interests are the same for
all newsracks, whether the publications inside
are commercial or non-commercial speech.
Had Cincinnati produced evidence that the
types of newsracks distributing commercia
speech caused effects distinct from newsracks
distributing newspapers, such as the clogging d
downtown streets caused by auto buffs crowd
ing around to obtain the latest issue Of Au"'
World. the ordinance may have been constitu
tional. under the secondary effects doctrine
This, however, is not the case.
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range of options open to the city to control
ue perceived ill effects of newsracks with-
out completely banning those distributing
comrnercial speech, we find it hard to be-
Beve that the city does not in fact favor the
distribution of newspapers such as the Cin-
inati Post and the Cincinnati Enquirer
on its street corners over that of Home
Magazine. The failure of the city to even
include representatives of plaintiffs-and
other publishers of commercial publica-
dons-in its ongoing discussions with
newspaper representatives regarding
sesthetic and safety regulations governing
newsrack appearance and fastening pro-
vides further proof of an unadmitted bias
against commercial speech.'3 Second, Cin-
cinnati's hypothetical argument only ad-
dresses the enforcement of the ordinance.
The ordinance itself was on the books long
before this problem supposedly arose.
There is no argument advanced that the
ordinance's ban on distribution of commer-
cial handbills, by any method, not merely
by newsracks, was not directed against
commercial speech based on its content. 4
(7] Nor can the ordinance pass muster
as a valid content-based restriction. "Con-
tent based restrictions 'will be upheld only
if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compel-
ling governmental interest'" Barnes v.
Clen Theatre, Inc., - U.S. , 111 S.CL
456, 2474, 115 LEd.2d 504 (White, J., dis-
Wting) (quoting Sable Communications
e. Cal, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829,
236, 106 LEd.2d 93 (1989)). This stan-
dard has been interpreted to require a
tL The Architects testimony is illuminating on
thiS point.
0' Does the City have means to deal with the
Proliferation of non commercial publishers
*ho are seeking City permits?
L The City is attempting to work coopera-
tely with the non commercial publishers to
place the devices in an orderly manner and in
some cases to agree to certain standard de-
I-!es. particularly in the center business dis-
0: Can't those very same regulations be ap.
91aed to commercial publishers?
A They could if commercial publications
ere considered legal.
Cincinnati's ordinance would not pass mus.
even if it met the requirement that it be
government to choose the least restrictive
means to further the governmental inter-
est. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at
126, 109 S.Ct. at 2829. The ordinance is
clearly not the least restrictive means, as it
places a substantially greater burden on
commercial speech than is necessary to al-
leviate the city's aesthetic and safety con-
cerns.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED.
WORLDSOURCE COIL COATING, INC.;
General Electric Capital Corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Hancock County, Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Intervening
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
McGRAW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-5250.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued July 15, 1991.
Decided Oct 16, 1991.
Developer and financer of development
sued general contractor in state court for
content-neutral. The second part of the time,
place, and manner standard is that the regula-
tion be "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.'" Rock Against Racism,
491 US. at 796 109 S.CZ. at 27 (quoting Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288. 293, 104 S.CL 3065, 3068, 82 LEd.2d 221
(1984)). The ordinance is not narrowly tailored
because there are many options available to the
city that would address its aesthetic, safety, and
proliferation concerns without placing the sig-
nificant burden on commercial speech that the
ordinance does. See supra, at p. 471. None of
these options would be less effective in promot-
ing the asserted interests than is the complete
ban on distribution of commercial handbills.
See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799-800,
109 S.CL at 2757-59.
914 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
shire Hathaway may be more apparent
than real. Given the difference in the for-
mulas at issue, the First Circuit's applica-
tion of the "equally plausible and perhaps
more intuitive," see 874 F.2d at 56, inter-
pretation of the PBGC is not necessarily at
odds with the conclusion we reach. Unde-
niably, the Berkshire Hathaway court be-
lieved that the PBGC position was entitled
to deference. See 874 F.2d at 55. How-
ever, the court's decision ultimately rested
upon its conclusion that the PBGC's posi-
tion comported with the statutory language
at issue in the case before it. See id.
("Perhaps most importantly, PBGC's in-
terpretation is consistent with the statutory
language, and Congress expressly delegat-
ed substantial regulatory authority to
PBGC relating to withdrawal liability.")
(emphasis added). Accordingly, our conclu-
sion will not be shaken by the fact that the
First Circuit, in another context, deferred
to a PBGC notice of interpretation to which
we, in a different context, choose not to
defer.12 And, of course, our detailed treat-
ment of Berkshire Hathaway should not
detract attention from the fact that the
Eighth Circuit interpreted the direct alloca-
tion method in the same manner in which
we interpret the modified presumptive
method, albeit without the PBGC opinion
before it. See Ben Hur (decided prior to
the PBGC's shift in positions).
V
For the foregoing reasons, the judg-
ments of the district court are
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.1
3
12. Our comments here should not be construed
as an endorsement of the ultimate conclusion
reached in Berkshire Hathaway. Nor, of course,
do we mean to imply that the Berkshire Hatha-
way court definitely would endorse the result
we reach here. Because neither issue is
presented, our comments as to each are merely
dicta, relevant here only insofar as they address
the apparent tension between the two opinions.
13. Almont and Stevedores, who won below but
now have lost on appeal, have appealed the
district court's refusal to award them attorney's
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN; 51st State National Orga.
nization for Women; Maryland Nation.
al Organization for Women; Planned
Parenthood of Metropolitan Washing.
ton, DC, Inc.; Commonwealth Women's
Clinic; Nova Women's Medical Center
Prince William Women's Clinic; Gyne.
care Associates; Metro Medical Center,
Inc., d/b/a Annandale Women's Center
Virginia National Organization for
Women; Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
National Abortion Federation; Capitol
Women's Center, Inc.; Hillcrest Wom-
en's Surgi--Center; Metropolitan Fami-
ly Planning Institute, Plaintiffs,
V.
OPERATION RESCUE; Randall Terry;
Patrick Mahoney; Clifford Gannett;
Michael McMonagle; Michael Bray;
Jayne Bray, Defendants-Appellants,
and
Project Rescue; the D.C. Project;
Veterans Campaign for Life,
Defendants (Two Cases).
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN; 51st State National Orga-
nization for Women; Maryland Nation-
al Organization for Women; Planned
Parenthood of Metropolitan Washing-
ton, DC, Inc.; Commonwealth Women's
Clinic; Capitol Women's Center, Inc.;
Nova Women's Medical Center; Prince
fees. Given the nature of the controversy be-
fore us. we affirm that refusal.
Because the district court made no findings
on the matter, we leave for the district court On
remand the issue of whether the GAI Fund and
the Escrow Fund, even assuming, as herein indi-
cated, that vesting is not computed on the basis
of a single prior year, are "employers.
Also, the district court will have to make
findings in both cases as to the amount of with-
drawal liability owed.
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William Women's Clinic; Gynecare As-
sociates; Metro Medical Center, Inc.,
d/b/a Annandale Women's Center,
Hillcrest Women's Surgi-Center; Met-
ropolitan Family Planning Institute;
Virginia National Organization for
Women; Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
National Abortion Federation, Plaintiff,
V.
OPERATION RESCUE; Randall Terry;
Patrick Mahoney; Clifford Gannett;
Michael McMonagle; Michael Bray;
Jayne Bray, Defendants-Appellees,
and
Project Rescue; the D.C. Project;
Veterans Campaign for Life,
Defendants.
Nos. 90-2606, 90-2607 and 90-2651.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued July 18, 1990.
Decided Sept. 19, 1990.
Abortion clinics and abortion rights or-
pnizations applied for permanent injunc-
in to enjoin pro-life organization and its
members from trespassing on, impeding, or
obstructing ingress to or egress from facili-
tis providing abortion services and related
ounseling. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Thomas Selby Ellis, III, J., 726 FSupp.
1483, granted permanent injunctive relief,
and both sides appealed. The Court of
Appeals held that (1) women qualified as
potected class under civil rights conspir-
ay statute; (2) injunction prohibiting pro-
Ife organization and its members from
respassing on, blockading, impeding, or
Obstructing access to or egress from medi-
tal clinics at which abortions were per-
formed, was not abuse of discretion; but
0) injunction could not be broadened in
scope, in order to prohibit any intimidation,
harassment, or disturbance of clinics' pa-
tients or potential patients.
Affirmed.
1. Conspiracy <=7.5
Women qualified as protected class un-
der civil rights conspiracy statute. 42 U.S.
C.A. § 1985(3).
2. Federal Courts <e=814 -
Court of Appeals reviews entry, scope,
and duration of injunction under abuse of
discretion standard.
3. Injunction <-46
Injunction prohibiting pro-life orga-
nization and its members from trespassing
on, blockading, impeding or obstructing ac-
cess to or egress from medical clinics in
northern Virginia at which abortions were
performed was not abuse of discretion.
4. Civil Rights < 262 *
Constitutional Law <:90.1(1)
Injunction prohibiting pro-life orga-
nization and its members from blocking or
obstructing clients' entrance into clinics
where abortions were performed could not
be broadened iti scope, to prohibit any in-
timidation, harassment or disturbance of
clients or potential clients, as this would
infringe upon activities clearly protected by
First Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
1.
Jay Alan Sekulow, Christian Advocates
Serving Evangelism, Washington, D.C., ar-
gued (Douglas W. Davis, James M.
Henderson, Sr., Christian Advocates Serv-
ing Evangelism, Washington, D.C.; Thom-
as Patrick Monaghan, C. Peter Thomas S.
Cornell, and Walter M. Weber, Free Speech
Advocates, New Hope, Ky., on brief), for
defendants-appellants.
John H. Schafer, Covington & Burling,
Washington, D.C., argued (Laurence J. Ei-
senstein, Richard H. Seamon, Pamela S.
Passman, Covington & Burling; and Sarah
E. Burns, and Alison Wetherfield, Now Le-
gal Defense and Educ. Fund, Washington,
D.C., on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before CHAPMAN and WILKINSON,
Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, United
States District Judge for the District of
South Carolina, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal of a permanent injunc-
tion entered against six individuals and Op-
eration Rescue, an unincorporated associa-
tion whose members oppose abortion and
its legalization. The district court enjoined
them, inter alia, from "trespassing on,
blockading, impeding or obstructing access
to or egress from" the premises of plain-
tiffs, facilities that provide abortions or
abortion counseling. The court held that
defendants' blockading of abortion facili-
ties infringed the right to travel of women
seeking to obtain abortions at clinics in the
Washington metropolitan area, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and certain of their
rights under state law. Nat'1 Org. For
Women (NO9 v. Operation Rescue, 726
F.Supp. 1483 (E.D.Va.1989). Operation
Rescue and the six individual defendants
appeal. NOW cross-appeals, along with
nine abortion facilities and four other orga-
nizational plaintiffs. We reject both ap-
peals and affirm the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
I.
Plaintiffs are nine clinics in the Washing-
ton metropolitan area and Northern Virgi-
nia that provide various abortion-related
services, and five organizations that seek
to preserve a woman's right to obtain an
abortion. Defendant Operation Rescue is
an organization whose purpose is to pre-
vent abortions and to oppose their legaliza-
tion. One of the ways Operation Rescue
seeks to effectuate these goals is to stage
"rescue" demonstrations at abortion facili-
ties. At these demonstrations, the partici-
pants "intentionally trespass on the clinic's
premises for the purpose of blockading the
clinic's entrances and exits, thereby effec-
tively closing the clinic" and "'resculing]'
... fetuses scheduled for abortion." 726
F.Supp. at 1487. The individual defendants
are persons who oppose abortion and its
legalization, and who seek to advance their
views in part by "planning, organizing and
participating in 'rescue' demonstrations un-
der the banner and auspices of Operation
Rescue." Id. at 1488.
On November 8, 1989, plaintiffs filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order in
United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, seeking to enjoin
defendants from, among other things,
physically impeding access to certain facili-
ties that offer abortion and related servic-
es. The impetus for this action was defen-
dants' alleged plans for meetings, rallies,
and "rescue" demonstrations on November
10-12 and 18-20, 1989 in the Washington
metropolitan area. No rescue activities
took place in Northern Virginia during that
period. However, clinics in Maryland and
the District of Columbia were closed due to
demonstrations on those dates.
The district court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order after
an expedited hearing on November 8-9,
1989. The trial of the action on the merits
and the hearing on the application for a
preliminary injunction were consolidated
and scheduled to be heard on November 16,
1989. After a two day trial in which plain-
tiffs presented testimony from nine wit-
nesses and defendants elected to present
no evidence, the district court granted the
request for a permanent injunction. The
court enjoined defendants from "trespass-
ing on, blockading, impeding or obstructing
access to or egress from the [isted] prem-
ises." Id. at 1497. The court refused on
First Amendment grounds to extend the-
injunction to enjoin rescue activities that
tend to "intimidate, harass or disturb pa-
tients or potential patients." Id.
The district court concluded that defen-
dants' activities operated to deny to women
seeking abortions and abortion-related ser-
vices the right to travel interstate in search
of medical services in violation of 42 US.C.
§ 1985(3). The court noted that the ele-
ments of a cause of action under § 1985(3)
are:
"(i) conspiracy; (ii) for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectlY'
any person or class of persons of the'
equal protection-of the laws, or of equAl
NOW v. OPERATION RESCUE
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privileges and immunities under the
laws; (iii) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; (iv) whereby a person is ei-
ther injured in his person or property or
deprived of any right or privilege of 
a
citizen of the United States."
Id. at 1492 (quoting Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03, 91 S.CL 1790,
1798-99, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)). The court
held that defendants had violated § 1985(3)
by entering into a conspiracy to deprive
women, whom it found to be a protected
class within the meaning of § 1985(3), of
their constitutional right to travel. It rea-
soned, citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973), that the
rescue demonstrations interfere with the
right to travel because substantial numbers
of women seeking the services of clinics in
the Washington metropolitan area travel
interstate to obtain these services.
The court further found that permanent
injunctive relief was appropriate because:
(i) there was no adequate remedy at law;
(ii) the balance of equities favored plain-
tiffs; and (iii) the public interest was
served by granting the injunction. The
court found that women seeking abortions
and counseling were likely to suffer irrepa-
rable physical and emotional harm as a
result of defendants' blockading of abor-
tion facilities. The court noted, for exam-
ple, that some women require insertion of a
pre-abortion laminaria to achieve cervical
dilation. Women prevented from entering
the clinics for timely removal of this device
may risk bleeding, infection, or other possi-
ble serious complications, or may be forced
to seek services elsewhere. Similarly, the
court referenced testimony to the effect
that preventing access to abortion clinics
could cause clients to experience stress,
anxiety, and mental harm. 726 F.Supp. at
1489. The court concluded that since plain-
tiffs' actions were lawful, although morally
objectionable to defendants, the balance of
equities weighed in favor of guaranteeing
the public protection of the constitutional
right to travel.
Operation Rescue now appeals, and the
National Organization for Women cross-ap-
peals the district court's refusal to extend
the scope of the injunction.
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II.
11] We have reviewed the record and
the reasoning of the district court in grant-
ing the injunction. We affirm the judg-
ment because the district court found that
the activities of appellants in furtherance
of their beliefs had crossed the line from
persuasion into coercion and operated to
deny the exercise of rights protected by
law. See 726 F.Supp. at 1489, 1492-93.
The legal premises under which the district
court operated are also consistent with the
law of the circuits. The court's holding
that gender-based animus satisfies the
"purpose" element of § 1985(3) has been
forecast by this circuit in Buschi v. Kirven,
775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir.198 5) (animus
against classes defined by "race, national
origin and sex" meet requirement of class-
based animus within meaning of 1985(3)).
At least six circuits have so held. See New
York Nat'l Org. for Women (NOW) v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir.1989),
cert denied, - U.S. - , 110 S.Ct. 2206,
109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845
F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir.1988); Stathos v.
Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1984);
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir.
1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S.
366, 99 S.CL 2345, 60 LEd.2d 957 (1919);
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591
F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1979); Conroy v.
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir.1978).
But cf Mississippi Women's Medical
Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th
Cir.1989). The Second Circuit has held un-
der similar facts that blocking access to
medical services provided by abortion facili-
ties which serve an interstate clientele vio-
lates the constitutional right to travel. See
New York NOW, 886 F.2d at 1360-61.
(2-4] Moreover, we review the entry,
scope, and duration of an injunction under
an abuse of discretion standard. See Pren-
dergast v. New York TeL Co., 262 U.S. 43,
50-51, 43 S.Ct. 466, 469, 67 L.Ed. 853
(1923). We find that the district court op-
erated in conformity with other circuits on
the relevant questions of law, and we are
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unable to conclude that the court abused its
discretion in entering an injunction of this
scope and duration against the respective
parties. Specifically, we reject the argu-
ment of Operation Rescue that there was
insufficient evidence to grant relief against
defendants Bray, McMonagle and Gannett.
We also reject NOW's contention that the
district court abused its discretion in limit-
ing the injunction to Northern Virginia and
in declining to extend the injunction indefi-
nitely. In addition, we affirm the district
court's refusal to broaden the scope of the
injunction to include activities that tend to
"intimidate, harass or disturb patients or
potential patients" because to do so would
risk enjoining activities clearly protected by
the First Amendment. In addition to the
actions enjoined by the district court, the
members of Operation Rescue also sought,
through verbal means, to persuade women
not to seek the services of abortion clinics
and to "impress upon members of society"
the moral rightness and intensity of their
opposition to abortion. 726 F.Supp. at
1488. The district court was within its
discretion in declining to extend the injunc-
tion in a manner that would interfere with
such expressive activity. In view of our
disposition of the federal question raised
by appellants we also decline to disturb the
district court's refusal to dismiss the state
law claims, and we uphold as well its award
of costs and attorneys fees. The district
court did not, and we do not, reach the
question of whether § 1985(3) can encom-
pass violations of a right to privacy.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed in all respects for the
reasons stated in its opinion.
AFFIRMED.
(OIy MwuRtSSI1
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Bonnie A. MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 89-1851.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 8, 1990.
Decided Sept. 21, 1990.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ap-
pealed from judgment of the United States
Tax Court, Wells, J., that settlement pro-
ceeds of Maryland lawsuits for defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress were not subject to federal income
tax. The Court of Appeals, Murnaghan,
Circuit Judge, held that (1) Internal Reve-
nue Code provision excluding from gross
income settlement proceeds received "on
account of" personal injuries or sickness
was ambiguous as to whether it suggested
but-for or sufficient causation; punitive
damages in Maryland defamation action did
not fall within that exclusion and were thus
includable in taxpayers gross income; and
(3) remand to tax court was warranted to
determination of what portion of gross
amount of settlement was properly alloca-
ble to punitive damages.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Internal Revenue 4-3124
Internal Revenue Code provision ex-
cluding from income damages received "on
account of" personal injuries or sickness
was ambiguous as to whether it suggested
but-for or sufficient causation. 26 U.S.
C.A. § 104(aX2).
2. Internal Revenue <s3124
Portion of settlement in Maryland def-
amation action that was properly attributa-
ble to punitive damages was not excludabk
from gross income as damages received or
account of personal injturies; punitive dam-
ages were . windfall and did not serve tc
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Cite as 959 F.2d
William McKINNEY, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
V.
Pat ANDERSON, Carol Ployer, H.L
Whitley, George W. Sumner, John
Nye, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-16589.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
March 27, 1992.
Inmate brought civil rights action
against prison officials alleging violation of
Eighth Amendment due to his exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke. The United
States District Court for the District of
Nevada, Edward C. Reed, Jr., Chief Judge,
directed verdict for prison officials, and
inmate appealed. The Court of Appeals,
924 F.2d 1500, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded, and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court. 112 S.Ct.
291, vacated and remanded. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals held that inmate sat-
kihed objective component of Eighth
Amendment claim, but would have to es-
tblish subjective component on remand.
Reinstated and remanded.
Cr1inal Law 41213.10(3)
Housing prisoner in environment that
eposed him to levels of environmental to-
bseco smoke that posed unreasonable risk
f harming his health satisfied objective
cmponent of Eighth Amendment claim of
ruel and unusual punishment; however,
h5£te would have to establish subjective
omponent of claim on remand by showing
t4 Prison officials showed deliberate in-
' aerece to inmate's long-term exposure
b environmental tobacco smoke. U.S.C.A.
CtAmend. 8.
On Remand from the United States Su-
Pfte Court
. ANDERSON 853
853 (9th CIr. 1992)
Before BROWNING, PREGERSON and
TROTT, Circuit Judges.
William McKinney, a Nevada state pris-
oner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d
1500 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Helling v. McKinney, - U.S. -,
112 S.Ct. 291, 116 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991).
Anderson appealed our decision. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of its decision in
Wilson v. Seiter, - U.S. -, 111 S.CL
2321, 115 LEd.2d 271 (1991). Helling v.
McKinney, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 291,
116 LEd.2d 236 (1991). We reinstate our
decision and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with it and with Seiter.
In McKinney we held that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to house a prisoner in
an environment that exposes him to envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") at such
levels and under such circumstances that it
poses an unreasonable risk of harm to his
health. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1503-1504.
We reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings on McKinney's Eighth Amend-
ment claim to allow him an opportunity to
present evidence on the level and degree of
his exposure to ETS and on whether that
degree of exposure is sufficient to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to his health.
Id. at 1509. Although we held that McKin-
ney had stated a cause of action for injunc-
tive relief, we found that he was not enti-
tied to damages on that cause of action
because the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law. Id.
We also held that Nevada's anti-smoking
law applies to prison libraries and remand-
ed for further equitable proceedings. Id
at 1510.
We affirmed the directed verdict for the
defendants' on the issue of their alleged
deliberate indifference to McKinney's seri-
ous existing medical needs. Id. at 1511.
We also affirmed the denial of McKinney's
motion for a trial transcript to be produced
at the Government's expense. Id. at 1512.
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On remand from the Supreme Court we
are asked to consider the effect of Seiter
on McKinney. The issue in Seiter was
"whether a prisoner claiming that condi-
tions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment must show a culpable
state of mind on the part of prison officials
and, if so, what state of mind is required."
Seiter 111 S.Ct. at 2322. The Court held
that "[ilf the pain inflicted is not formally
meted out as punishment by the statute or
the sentencing judge, some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer
before it can qualify" as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2325. The
Court held that the appropriate standard is
"deliberate indifference." Id at 2327. In
reaching its decision, the Court discussed
its previous decision in Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69
LEd.2d 59 (1981). The Court noted that its
decision in Rhodes "turned on the objective
component of an Eighth Amendment prison
claim (was the deprivation sufficiently seri-
ous?), and ... did not consider the subjec-
tive component (did the officials act with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind?)."
Seiter, 111 S.Ct. at 2324. Thus, in Seiter
the Court expands the requirements for an
Eighth Amendment claim by adding a sub-
jective component.
The Court's establishment in Seiter of a
subjective component for an Eighth
Amendment claim does not vitiate our de-
termination of what satisfies the objective
component. Our holding that it is cruel
and unusual punishment to house a prison-
er in an environment that exposes him to
levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable
risk of harming his health constitutes the
objective component of McKinney's Eighth
Amendment claim. Seiter simply adds an-
other element to an Eighth Amendment
claim that McKinney must prove.
In our opinion we agreed with the magis-
trate's ruling that directed a verdict on the
issue of defendants' deliberate indifference
to McKinney's serious existing medical
symptoms. As McKinney points out, indif-
ference to current medical problems is dis-
tinct from indifference to the problem of
involuntary, long term exposure to unrea-
sonable levels of ETS. Accordingly, we
remand for further proceedings to deter.
mine whether the prison officials showed
deliberate indifference to McKinney's long
term exposure to ETS. We also repeat our
recommendation that the district court ap-
point an expert witness or witnesses.
We reinstate the judgment of. this court
and remand for further proceedings con.
sistent with this court's previous opinion
and with Seiter. We understand that a
local attorney in Reno, Nevada has agreed
to represent McKinney in district court pro-
ceedings. If this does not prove to be the
case we also repeat our recommendation
that the district court appoint an attorney
to represent McKinney.
REINSTATED AND REMANDED.
David L ADAMS, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
R.S. PETERSON, Superintendent of
O.S.C.I., Respondent-Appellee.
No. 87-4191.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
March 27, 1992.
Before WALLACE, Chief Judge, TANG;
PREGERSON, NORRIS, WIGGINS, :
BRUNETTI, KOZINSKI, O'SCANNLAIN,
TROTT, FERNANDEZ, and KLEINFELD,
Circuit Judges.
ORDER
The opinion of the panel in Adams'
Peterso, 939 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir.1991),
withdrawn.
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am convinced that a mistake has been
made that cannot be cured by the mere
change of nomenclature represented by the
majority's amendments to the opinion. To
alleviate what the judge- and prosecutor
deemed the victim-witness's distress at hav-
ing to go through the ordeal of recounting
her experience before the defendants fami-
ly members, the judge expelled the family
members from this portion of the proceed-
ings. From some experience, I share the
judge's concern. But I know also that a
trial judge has many means of controlling
the behavior of spectators short of banish-
ment from the public courtroom.
The majority's amendments to the opin-
ion in response to this concern are a nost-
rum premised. on a faulty conclusion: "The
closure order was narrowly tailored to pro-
tect Bennally and elicit her information." I
disagree, and the summary application of
this label ignores the principles which call
for a. forewarning by the trial judge-an
effort to maintain order through less dras-
tic means than the expulsion of friends and
family. . Attendees cannot be simply
thrown out of the courtroom unless the
judge can make supportable findings that
order can not be maintained through less
drastic means. Waller. v. Georgia, 467
US. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d
31 (1984).
Charley's family members were given no
admonishment about maintaining the requi-
site decorum,. no second chance. In fact,
they were given no sign that the judge felt
any need to demand order before expul-
sion. There is no indication that decorum
could not have been maintained by some
less drastic step and, contrary to.the major-
ity's amendments, no indication that the
judge considered less drastic alternatives.
There was not the slightest effort to con-
fine sanctions or threats of sanctions to the
specific individuals who might be deemed
the responsible actors. An experienced
judge should be expected to use all mea-
sures necessary for order and decorum-
and no more.
Finally, in its examination of the proce-
dural propriety of the closure order the
majority cites to Press Enterprise, Brook-
lier and Sacramento Bee, all of which;
volve the exclusion of the press from
The press brings to the absent public" it
narrative of the trial. The family &Q
friends of the defendant are .part of
very public whose interest in presenceu
protected. Thus, the considerationsw
must be serviced in admitting the pr
public and family are similar but not ide. s.
cal, and stem from different sources. Our
case law treatment of free press/fair trial
in no way explains why unwarned family or
friends, spectators from the body publi
should be ousted from an otherwise pube
trial.
Because the expulsion order in thise
was precipitous,. not supported by the
record, and shut off access where access is
vital, not only to the miscellaneous defen-
dant or spectator but to the institution, I
respectfully dissent from the majority's
amended opinion.
GUAM SOCIETY OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS; Guam Nur-
es Association; The Reverend Milton
Cole, Jr.; Laurie Konwith; -Edmund -A.
Griley, M.D.;. William S. Freeman,
.D.; John Dunlop, MD.; on behalf of
themselves and all others similarlysidtu
ated, and all their women -patients,
Plaintiffe-Appellees,
V.
Joseph F. ADA, Governor of Guam, in
his official capacity, Defendant-
Appellant
No. 90-16706.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1991.
Decided April 16, 1992.
As Amended June 8, 1992.
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists and others sued Governor of Guam in
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,i-dividual and official capacities alleg-
that Guam's anti-abortion statute vio-
.id right to privacy under due process
use of Fourteenth Amendment, as de-
(4fd by United States Supreme Court Roe
V ade decision. The United States Dis-
,fit Court for the District of Guam, Alex
iloson, Chief. Judge, 776 F.Supp. 1422,
ently enjoined enforcement of stat-
M. Governor appealed. The Court of Ap-
j, ., Canby, Circuit Judge, held that (1)
cappealed from provisions of anti-abortion
statute declared unconstitutional under
.rust Amendment were severable; (2) Mink
Amendment expressly extended to Guam
protections of.due process clause of Four-
enth Amendment upon which holding of
Bo v. Wade. was based; (3) Governor of
Guam was "person," within meaning of
.j 1983, when sued in his official capacity
for prospective relief; and (4) anti-abortion
statute was unconstitutional under Roe v.
Wade.
* Affirmed.
. Statutes 464(6)
- Provisions -of Guam's anti-abortion
statute which District Court held were in
Ailation of First Amendment were severa-
Ile from other parts of statute so that
Guam's failure to appeal from such ruling
did not preclude appeal' from ruling that
i1her provisions violated Fourteenth
,Amendment,- absent evidence of contrary
legislative intent US.C.A Const.Amend
t Statutes 064(6)
Provision of Guam's anti-abortion stat-
ate that, if majority. of voters voted to
repeal statute; statute shall be repealed in
is entirety, was insufficient to overcome
presumption of severability of provisions of
-statute which district court had held:to be
in violation of First Amendment U.S.C.A.
.!Cnst.Amend 1.
. Statutes 464(6)
Mere suggestion that Guam legislators
wanted comprehensive anti-abortion statute
was not sufficient to overcome presump-
tion of severability of provisions of statute
declared unconstitutional under First
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
4. Territories -8
Mink Amendment expressly extended
to Guam due process clause of Fourteenth
Amendment, upon which holding of United
States Supreme Court Roe v. Wade deci-
sion was founded, and thus, Roe v. Wade
applied to Guam as it applied to states.
Organic Act of Guam, § 5(u), as amended,
:48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(u); U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.
5. Civil Rights 4207(1)
Governor of Guam was "person," with-
in meaning of § 1983, when sued in his
official capacity for prospective reliet 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Abortion and Birth Contr6l -130
Guam's anti-abortion statute was un-
constitutional, where statute made no at-
tempt to comply with United States Su-
preme Court,. Roe v. Wade . decision.
-U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14.. .-
7. Abortion and Birth Control *L30
United States Supreme Court Roe v.
Wade decision continued to be. valid prece-
dent so as to require Guam to comply with
Roe v. Wade decision when enacting anti-
abortion statute. US.C.A ConstAmend.
14.
Paul B. Linton, Amdricans United for
Life, Chicago, Ill., Arnold H. eiIitz,
Cameron & Horabostel,. Washington, D.C.,
for defendant-appellant.
Anita P. Arriola, Arriola, Cowan & Bor
dallo, Agana, Guam, Lynn 3. Paltrow, Si-
mon Heller, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, New York City, for plaintiffs-
appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Guam.
Before: CHOY, D.W. NELSON and
CANBY, Circuit Judges. . -
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CANBY, Circuit Judge:
On March 19, 1990, the Territory of
Guam enacted a statute ("the Act") outlaw-
ing almost all abortions.' The only excep-
tions were abortions in cases of ectopic
pregnancy, and abortions in cases where
two physicians practicing independently
reaspnably determined that the pregnancy
would endanger the life of the mother or
"gravely impair" her health. All other
abortions were declared to be crimes, both
1. The final version of Guam Public Law 20-134
states:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE
TERRITORY OF GUAM:
, Section 1. Legislative findings. The Legisla-
ture finds that for purposes of this Act life of
every human being begins at conception, and
that unborn children have protectible interests
in life, health, and well-being. The purpose of
this Act is to protect the unborn children of
Guam. As used in this declaration of findings
the term 'unborn children" includes any and all
unborn. offspring of human beings from the
moment of conception until biith at every stage
of biological- development.
Section 2. § 31.20 of Title 9, Guam Code
Annotated, is repealed and reenacted to read-
§.31.20. Abortion: defined. "Abortion"
means the purposeful termination of a human
pregnancy after implantation of a fertilized
ovum by any person including the pregnant
--woman herself with an Intention other than
to produce a live birth or to remove a dead
unborn fetus. "Abortion" does not mean the
medical intervention in (I) an ectopic preg-
nancy, or (ii) in a pregnancy at any time after
the commencement of pregnancy if two (2)
physicians. who practice independently of
each other reasonably determine using all
available means that there is a substantial risk
that continuance of the pregnancy would en-
danger the life of the mother or would gravely
impair the health of the mother, any such
termination of pregnancy to be subsequently
reviewed by a peer review committee desig-
nated by the Guam Medical licensure Board.
and in either case. such an operation is per-
formed by a physician licensed to practice
medicine in Guam or by a physician practic.
ing medicine in the employ of the government
of the United States, in .an adequately
equipped medical clinic or in a hospital ap-
proved or operated by the government of the
United States or of Guam.
Section 3. § 31.21 of Title 9, Guam Code
Annotated, is repealed and reenacted to read.
§ 31.21. Providing or administering drug
or employing means to cause an abortion.
Every person who provides, supplies, or ad-
ministers to any woman, or procures any
woman to take any medicine, drug, or sub-
stance, or uses or employs any instrument or
on the part of the women submitting j7
abortions and on the -part of the
procuring or causing them.
The validity of the Act was imm*
challenged in this class action brouItg
the Guam Society of Obstetricians
cologists and others against Joseph F.
the Governor of Guam. The district o
accurately viewed the Act as a direct:
lenge to the regime of Roe v. Wadk n
U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 LEd.
other means whatever, with intent th
cause an abortion of such woman as d
in § 31.20 of this Title is guilty of a thi
degree felony. In addition, if such person Is
licensed physician, the Guam Medical
sure Board shall take appropriate disciplinaq
action.
Section 4. § 31.22 of Title .9, Guam -
Annotated, is repealed and reenacted to
§ 31.22. Soliciting and, taking drigs r
submitting to an attempt to cause an.abortion
Every woman who solicits of any person any
medicine, drug, or substance whatever and
takes the same, or who submits to any op.
tion, or to the use of any means whatever
with intent thereby to cause an abortion as
defined in § 3120 of this Title is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Section S. A new I31.23 is added to Titlek,
Guam Code Annotated, to read:
§ 31.23. Soliciting to submit to operat,
etc., to cause an abortion. Every perso itlo
solicits any woman to submit to any op"
tion, or to the use of any means whatevet, to
cause an abortion as defined in § 3120 ofthis
Title is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 6. Subsection 14 of Section 3107,
Title 10, Guam Code Annotated. is repealed.
Section-7. Abortion referendum. (a) Theire
shall be submitted at the island-wide general
election to be held on November 6, 1990, the
following question for determination by the
qualified voters of Guam, the question to appear
on the ballot In English and Chamorro
"Shall that public law derived from Bill 848,
Twentieth Guam Legislature (PL. 2041341),
which outlawed abortion except in the cases
of pregnancies threatening the life of the
mother be repealed?[]
In the event a majority of those voting vote
"Yes," such public law shall be repealed in its
* entirety as of December I, 1990.
(b) There is hereby authorized to be appro-
priated to the Election Commission (the
'Commission') sufficient funds to carry out
the referendum described in this Section 7,
including but not limited to the cost of print-
ing the ballot and tabulating the results. In
preparing the ballot, the Commission shall
include in the question the number of- the
relevant public law.
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41973), in the Territory of Guam. The dis-
trict court held that Roe v. Wade applied,
and granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, permanently enjoining enforce-
,sent of the Act.2 776 F.Supp. 1422. We
iffirm.
The plaintiffs in this case are the Guam
Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists;
the Guam Nurses Association; physicians
Edmund A. Griley, William S. Freeman,
and. John Dunlop; the Reverend Milton H.
Cole, Jr;;. and Laurie Konwith. The health
care providers in this group clearly have
standing to bring this action. See Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62,
96 S.Ct. 2831, 2837,'49 LEd.2d 788 (1976);
Abele v.Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d
ir.1971). Because some of the plaintiffs
have standing, it is not necessary to deter-
aine whether the others do. See Doe v.
-Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-49, 93 S.Ct. 739,
746, 35 LEd.2d 201 (1973); see also Watt v.
-nergy Action Educ. Found., 454 US.
151i 1601 102 S.Ct. 205, 212,70 LEd.2d 309
(1981); Grove v. Mead School Dist: No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 826, 106 S.Ct. 85, 88
L.Ed.2d 70 (1985).
Thedistrict court held that the plaintiffs
could maaintain their ction under 42 U.S.C.
1983, and awarded them relief under.the
due process guarantees recognized in Roe
v. Wade.. The court. determined that those
guarantees applied in Guam, under the pro-
visions.of the Mink Amendment .to the
Guam- rganic Act, 48 U.S.C. I1421b(u).
The .Territory of. Guam in the person of
Governor.Ada ("Guam") challenges all of
.these ruilings onappeal, and urges. as well
that the authority of Roe v. Wade has been
undermined by later decisions of the Su-
preme Court. Before we address these
points, however, we must deal with a
threshold issue raised by the plaintiffs.
2. The district court also held that Sections 4 and
5 of the statute, which make criminal the "soli-
citing" of abortions, violated the First Amend-
ment. That ruling has not been appealed.
A. Severability of the Unappealed Sec-
tions
(1] The district court held that Sections
4 and 5 of the Act violated the First
Amendment, and Guam did not appeal from
that ruling. The plaintiffs now argue that
these sections are not severable from the
remainder of the Act. The result, they
contend, is that the entire Act has been
invalidated, in effect, by the district court's
unappealed ruling, leaVing nothing to be
decided on this appeal. We reject this con-
tention because we conclude that Sections 4
and 5 are severable from the other parts of
the Act.
The standard for determining the sever-
ability of an unconstitutional provision is
well established. "'Unless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have en-
acted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operative as a law."'
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, .1480, 94 LEd.2d
661 (1987) (citations omitted). The sections
of the Act that remain if Sections 4 and 5
are severed clearly are fully operative as a
law. Unless there is evidence of contrary
legislative intent, the remainder of the Act
should therefore survive the invalidation of
Sections 4'and 5..
( (2] The plaintiffs put forward two relat-
ed arguments suggesting a legislative in-
tent against severability. First, they con-
tend that Section 7, which provides for a
referendum to determine..whether the en-
tire Act should be repealed, demonstrates
that the Guam Legislature intended the
Act to stand or fall as a whole. Second,
they argue that the Legislature's intention
was to pass a comprehensive antiabortion
statute, and that removal of Sections 4 and
5 creates a weaker and less comprehensive
statute.
With respect to the first argument, the
fact that there was to be a referendum on
the entire Act reveals very little about leg-
3. The provision for a referendum did not delay
the effective date of the Act. There is accord-
ingly no issue of ripeness.
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Guam's Organic Act, codified at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-1424b (1988), so provides. The
plain laiguage of the 1968 Mink Amend-
ment to the Organic Act, codified at 48
U.S.C. § 1421b(u) (1988), belies their claim.
The Mink Amendment. states that
The following provisions of and amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United
States are hereby extended to Guai ...
and shall have the same force and effect
there as in the United States or in any
State of the United States: ... the first
to ninth amendments inclusive; the thir-
teenth amendment; the second sentence
of section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
4. The Mink Amendment also extends to Guam
every other conceivable constitutional source of
the right of privacy. See Roe, 410 US. at 152,
93 S.C. at 726 (sources relied on by the Court or
individual Justices have included the .First
Amendment, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Our disposition of this question on the basis of
the Mink Amendment makes it unnecessary for
C. Prospective Relief Under 42 T.S.C
/ 1983 - .
.(5] Guam next argues that the plain-
tiffs cannot maintain this action against
Governor Ada under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be-
cause he is not a "person" within the niten-
ing of that statute. We hold that-he is':
"person" when sued in his official capacity
for prospective relief. :
Section 1983 creates liability for' "er-
sons" who, while acting "under "color" of
state or territorial law, deprive citizens or
other persons of rights,' privileges; or'im-
munities secured by the Constitution-or
us to address the.further contention..of. the
plaintiffs that the right of privacy-autonomy
protected by Roe v. tade qualifies as a "funds-
mental" constitutional right applicable to an un-
incorporated territory by its own force. .See
e.g., Ecamining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426
US. 572, 599 n. 30. 96 S.CL 2264, 2280 n. 30, 49
LEd.2d 65 (1976) (only 'fundamental" constitu-
-tional rights apply in unincorporated territory).
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islative intent regarding severability. The ment; and the fifteenth and nineteerth
plaintiffs place undeserved emphasis on the amendments. i.
words "in its entirety." That part of the 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(u) (emphasis iddesection provides that, if a majority of the The Mink Amendment thus expressl ix.voters vote to repeal the law, "such public tends to Guam the Due Process Claiugse
law shall be repealed in its entirety." An the Fourteenth Amendment, upon %liichentire repeal is the obvious and logical re- the holding of Roe was founded.' See Roesult of a vote to repeal in a referendum; v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at 726.the words in question signify no more than It may be true, as Guam argues, that thethat. Supreme Court requires a clear indicaton
(3] While the plaintiffs' second argu- of congressional intent before interpreting
ment is not wholly implausible, they a congressional action as extending a right
present no evidence to support it. The to the people of Guam. See Guam ti. o.
mere suggestion that legislators wanted a sen, 431 U.S. 195, 97 S.Ct.. 1774, 52 LEd.2d
comprehensive Act is not sufficient to over- 250 (1977). We canscarcely imagine, how-
come the presumption of severability that ever, any clearer indication of intent than
is implicit in the Alaska Airlines standard. the language of the Mink Amendment the
We therefore reject the plaintiffs' sever- _trelevant .constitutional amendments "have
ability arguments, and proceed to the argu- the same force and effect" in Guam asin a
ments that Guam raises on thappeal. state of the United States. --There is -no
need, therefore, to -go.-further. See.Ngi.
Wade raingas v. SanchezA.95 U.S. 182, 188-87,B. Applicability of Roe a 110 SCt. 1737, 1740,109 LEd.2d 163 (190)
Guam (resorting to legislative history only after
(4] Guam contends that the substantive determining. that the. statutory
due process guarantee enforced in Roe 'v. was uncle). Accordingly, we hold4hat
Wade and subsequent abortion cases does Roe v. Wade applies to Guam as itappi
not apply to Guam because nothingin toatthe .states.to.
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.Ife deral law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Ngi-
. ingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 110 S.Ct.
*137, 109 L.Ed.2d 163 (1990), an action for
aimages, the Supreme-Court held that ter-
'itories are not "persons" within the mean-
g of § 1983. The Court also stated:
.'ipetitioners concede, ... and we agree,
Stat if Guam is not a person, neither are its
cofficers acting in their official capacity."
*Id at 192, 110 S.Ct. at 1743. Guam seizes
upon this language. It contends that, be-
.cause Governor Ada is being sued to pre-
.-ent him from enforcing a statute of
.Guam, he is necessarily being sued in his
.fficial capacity. Therefore, Guam asserts,
he cannot be considered a "person" subject
to suit under section 1983.
Guam's argument overlooks the distinc-
-tion between suits against governmental
*6fficials for damages, such as Ngiraingas,
and those for injunctive relief. The distinc-
tion has been spelled out in cases involving
state officials. Like territories, states are
..not "persons" for purposes of section 1983.
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
US. .58, 63-65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2307-08, 105
LEd.2d 45 (1989). In addition, state offi-
cers, when sued for damages in their offi-
cial capacities,. are likewise not "persons"
within the meaning of 1983. Id. at 71, 109
S.Ct. at 2311. Any other conclusion would
render meaningless the ruling that states
are not "persons"; a judgment against a
state official in his or her official capacity
.runs against the state and its treasury.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, .166,
105 S.Ct 3099, 3105, 87 LEd.2d 114 (1985).
The rule is entirely different, however,
when the suit is. for injunctive relief. "Of
course a state official in his or her official
capacity, when sued for injunctive relief,
would be a person under § 1983 because
'official-capacity actions for prospective re-
lief. are'not treated as actions against the
State.' " Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109
S.Ct at 71 n.. 10 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at
3106 n. 14); see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 454, 52 L.Ed. 714
(1908). We can see no reason why the
same distinction between injunctive and
damages actions against officials should
not apply to a territory.
Guam attempts to distinguish Will by
arguing that Guam is a "federal instrumen-
tality" rather than a sovereign entity like a
state. Because Congress maintains control
over the Territory, -Guam contends that
there.is no need to apply § 1983 to Guam
or its officials.
Guam's argument proves too much. Un-
der its approach, .section 1983 would not
apply at all in any territory-not even to
municipalities or officials acting in their
* individual capacities. Such a result would
totally nullify the provision of .section 1983
imposing liability upon.persons acting un-
der color of law of "any State or. Territo-
ry. " Accordingly, we conclude that Gov-
ernor Ada, when sued as he is here in his
official capacity for injunctive relief, is a
person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Having determined that the. plaintiffs
may maintain this action under .section
1983, we turn to the substantive due
process claim. Two issues arise: (1)
whether Guam's Act violates, the right of
privacy protected by Roe v. Wade, and (2)
whether subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions, particularly Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492. US. 490, 109 .S.Ct.
3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), have so erod-
.ed Roe v. Wade that Roe cannot now be
applied to invalidate Guam's Act.
A. Validity of the Act under Roe v.
Wade
[6] The first issue is not hard to re-
solve. Guam's Act makes no attempt to
comply with Roe. In Roe, the Supreme
Court recognized that the right of privacy
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy," and that for the state to deny
this choice "may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future," along with oth-
er harms. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at
727. The Court further recognized that
limitation of the woman's fundamental
right of choice could be justified only by a
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"compelling state interest." Id. at 155, 93
S.Ct. at 728.
The Court in Roe rejected the state's
argument, renewed by Guam here, that the
state has a compelling interest in protect-
ing fetal life from the moment of concep-
tion. Id. at 159, 93 S.Ct. at 729. Thus Roe
recognized the superior right of choice by
the woman during the first trimester of
pregnancy, and her right during the second
trimester limited only by the state's com-
pelling interest in protecting her health.
I& at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 731. Only after the
point of viability did the state's interest in
fetal life become bompelling and permit the
state to proscribe abortion entirely. I& at
163-64, 93 S.Ct. at 732.
The Guam Act gives not a nod toward
Roe. With two narrow exceptions, it sim-
ply negates the rights and interests ofthe
pregnant woman and forbids her to termi-
nate her pregnancy from the moment of
conception. It is difficult to imagine a
more direct violation of Roe Even the
exceptions for abortion to save the moth-
ers life or to prevent grave impairment to
her health are hedged with crippling re-
strictions. The pivotal determination must
be made by two physicians "who practice
independently of each other"; they must
make'their determination "using all avail-
able means," and subject to subsequent
review by a peer review committee. Act, 9
Guam Code Ann.' § 31.20. Less cumber-
some two-physician and peer review re-
quirements rere struck down by the Su-
preme Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 739, 751, 35 LEd.2d
201 (1973), decided with Roe, and in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-
71, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2182-84, 90 LEd.2d 779
(1986).
If the core of Roe remains good law,
then, the Act is clearly unconstitutional.
Guam contends, however, that subsequent
6. Guam also contends that Roe's requirement of
a "compelling interest" on the part of the state
was reduced to that of a "rational basis" in Ohio
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497
U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 11 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990)
(Akron H7), and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 US.
417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 LEd.2d 344 (1990).
decisions have so eroded the analysis o'
Roe that Guam's Act should be held tojW
constitutional under the current state 9f
the law. We now address that contention.
B. The Status and Applicabilit,6r
Roe Today
[71 Guam contends that Roe has no
force after Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct
3040, 106 LEd.2d 410 (1989). -Putting Web.
ster together with non-majority opinions in
other cases, Guam contends that the clasaj.
fication of competing interests has
changed. Guam relies particularly upon
Justice O'Connor's dissents in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 814, 106 S.Ct. at
2206, and Akron v. Akron Center for -Re-
productive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,452,
103 S.Ct. 2481, 2504, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983).
According to Guam, five Justices of:the
Supreme Court now recognize the state's
compelling interest in potential human ike
throughout pregnancy, and no longer .
here to the Roe analysis. In Webster, ia
three-Justice plurality stated that it'did
"not see why the State's interest ir protect-
ing potential human life should comehito
existence only at the point of viability'"
Webster, 492 U.S. at 519, 109 S.Ct. at 3057.
It also characterized the. woman's interest
as a "liberty interest," as distinguishid
from a "fundamental right." Id. at 520,
109 S.Ct. at 3058. Guam would put these
statements together with Justice Scalia's
view that Roe should be overruled. Id. at
532, 109 S.Ct. at 3064. It would then add
Justice O'Connor's view that regulations
that do not impose an "undue burden'' on a
woman's right to seek an abortion are sus-
tainable if rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose. Id. at 529-30, 109 S.Ct. at
3062-63; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828,106
S.Ct. at 2214.6 Finally, it would include
Akron H1 and Hodgson dealt with minor women,
however, and the Court has recognized that "the
State has somewhat broader authority to regu-
late the activities of children than of adults.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52, 74,
96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843,,49 LEd.2d 788 (1976).
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O'Connor's position elsewhere ex-
that the state's compelling interest
throughout pregnancy. See Akron,
U'S.:at 459, 103 S.Ct. at 2507; Thorn-
, 476 U.S. at 828, 106 S.Ct. at 2214.
i this 'mix, Guam derives the conclu-
,W that its interest in fetal life can over-
0zne the woman's right to choose whether
1 have an abortion, and that Guam's Act is
jtbrefore not unconstitutional on its face.
* e reject Guam's construct. The bits
pieces assembled by Guam fallshort of
conpelling us to do that which the Su-
preme Court itself has. declined to do-
overrule Roe v. Wade In Webster, the
Court modified Roe only to the extent nec-
essary to uphold Missouri's requirement of
testing for viability. Webster, 492 U.S. at
.521, 109 S.Ct. at 3058. The plurality opin-
ion stated that the case afforded no occa-
sion to revisit Roe, "and we leave it undis-
turbed." Id. Justice O'Connor found no
conflict between Missouri's statute and
Roe, and similarly concluded that there was
no need to reexamine Roe. Id. 492 U.S. at
525-26, 109 S.Ct. at 3060-61. Three dissen-
ters opined that Roe survived Webster, al-
though it was not secure. Id at 537, 109
S.Ct at 3067 (dissenting opinion of Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall). Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence chastised the Court for failing to
overrule.Roe Id. at 532, 109 S.Ct. at 8064.
In the face of these pronouncements, it
would be both wrong and presumptuous of
as now to devlare that.Roe v. Wade is
dead.?
7. In its most recent abortion-related case, Rust
X Sudvan, - U.S. I I S.CL. 1759, 114
I.Ed.2d 233 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld
certain federal regulations against a challenge
that they violated a woman's due process right
to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy.
The Court held that the regulations dealing with
activities of federally-funded programs did not
violate Roe v. Wads. I 111 S.Ct. at 1777. It
did not suggest that Roe v. Wade was no longer
the law.
& Because Justice O'Connor's -undue burden"
test is of no assistance to Guam. we need not
decide what authoritative effect, if any, it must
be given. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947
F.2d 682, 687-98 (3d Cir.1991) (Justice O'Con.
We also have severe difficulty accepting
the conclusions that Guam draws from the
existing mosaic of decisions. In the first
place, it is hard to see how Justice O'Con-
nor's view helps Guam: surely an outright
criminalization of abortion places an "un-
due burden" on the exercise of the wom-
an's right.' Second, a view of the state's
interest in potential life as "compelling"
throughout pregnancy does not necessarily
mean that it sweeps all other interests out
of the way.' There is a countervailing
right in issue here, although we find little
reflection of it in Guam's briefs. No mat-
ter how it is characterized, the right of a
woman not to be forced to endure a preg-
nancy and birth is an extremely important
one. Pregnancy entails "profound physi-
cal, emotional, and psychological conse-
quences." Michael M. v. Superior Court
of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471, 101
S.Ct. 1200, 1205, 67 LEd.2d 437 (1981).
"Few decisions aii more personal and inti-
mate, more properly private, or more basic
to individual dignity and autonomy, than a
woman's decision-with the guidance of
her physician and within the limits speci-
fied in Roe-whether to end her pregnan-
cy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772, 106
S.CL. at 2184. The individual's interest in
exercising control over intimate personal
decisions has been recognized in decades of
Court precedent See id.; Akron, 462 U.S.
at 419, 103 S.CL at 2487; Roe, 410 U.S. at
167-70, 93 S.Ct. at 733-36 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 92 S.CL 1029, 31 LEd.2d 349 (1972).
nor's standard is now the law of the land, cert.
grnt4 - US..-, 112 S.CL 931. 117 L.Ed.2d
104 (1992)).
9. There clearly must'be limits to the ability of a
state's interest in potential life, whether or not
characterized as compelling, to override all con-
flicting Interests. Potential human life exists in
the ovum and sperm. See Webster, 492 U.S. at
565-66, 109 S.Ct. at 3082 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). A state
could maximize that potential by forbidding
contraception, or even by requiring regular sex-
ual intercourse by all fertile persons.' The pros-
pect is absurd, of course, because there are
highly important constitutional rights that
would be interfered with by such a measure.
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We would not lightly conclude that it could
be overcome wholesale at any stage of
pregnancy by Guam's interest in potential
life.
The balancing of these vital individual
interests against the state's interest in po-
tential life is not an exercise in mathemat-
ics. These forces present a constitutional
clash of the first order. Its outcome can-
not be predetermined by adopting in the
abstract various assembled character-
izations of the interests at stake or formu-
lae for'weighing them. A more fundamen-
tal process is at work. Roe worked
through that process and came to a result
that has affected the lives and rights of
millions of people. It is not for this court
to discard'that.precedent.o
III-
The judgment of the district court perma-
nently . -enjoining the enforcement of
Guam's Public Law 20-134 is
AFFIRMED.n
10. We find it unnecessary to address the plain-
tiffs' arguments that Guam's Act is void for
vagueness and overbreadth. We also decline to
address the plaintiffs arguments based on the
Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses, the Eighth and Thirteenth
Amendments, and comparable provisions of the
Guam Bill of Rights, 48 U.S.C. § 1421b.
11. The plaintiffs have requested attorneys' fees
in connection with this appeal. They will be
entitled to them if they ultimately prevail in this
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see Hutto v. FAn-
Sheri LIPSCOMB, By and Through=N
Next Friend, Carolyn DeFER;P.,
tumn Scalf, & William Scalf, .-By .
Through Their Next Friend Gloria
on Behalf of Themselves and.All
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-.Ape
lants,
V.f
Dan SIMMONS, Individually and In*R
Official Capacity as Acting Director,
Department of Human Resources of the
State of Oregon, & Jess Armas, IndivId.
nally and in His Official Capacity ii
Acting Assistant Director, Department
of Human Resources of the State -of
Oregon and Acting Administrator, Chil.
dren's Services Division, Department of
Human Resources of the State of. Or..
gon, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 87-4079.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued En Bane and Submitted
Nov. 15, 1990.
Decided April 27, 1992.
Children in foster care brought action
challenging Oregon statutes under which
state-funded foster care benefits were pro-
vided to all children placed by state with
nonrelatives, but not provided for children
placed with relatives. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon,
Helen J. Frye, J., rendered judgment for
state, and children appealed. .The Court of
Appeals reversed, 884 F.2d 1242, and re-
hearing en bane was granted, 907 F.2d 114.
On.rehearing, the Court of Appeals, Good-
ney, 437 U.S. 678, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2565,.2574, 57
I.Ed.2d 522 (1978). If the plaintiffs apply for
fees In this court, we will transfer their applica-
tion to the district court for a determination of
the recoverable amount In those proceedings,
Guam will have the opportunity to contest the
standing of the plaintiffs, who are not health
care providers, to the extent that that issue has
any effect on recoverable fees.
Fees at the trial level were granted in a sepa-
rate proceeding, separately appealable.
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thought he was powerless to depart; he
simply did not believe the situation merited
a departure. When defense counsel first
asked for a departure, the judge said, "I'm
not inclined-in this case, I'm not inclined
to go below 240 months which is-which is
barely above the minimum guideline
range.... The guideline is 235 to 293. I
mean, would you have me depart below
that?" When defense counsel answered
yes because he believed there was entrap-
ment, the judge stated that there was no
entrapment because the defendants were
involved in an ongoing business.
Additionally, the judge's remarks indi-
cated that he thought appellant deserved
the sentence he got based on his criminal
history. "The facts are terrible for
you.... The gentleman has about eight
prior convictions ... and I can't rewrite his
biography." The transcript shows that the
judge considered counsel's pleas to reduce
the sentence because of entrapment or be-
cause appellant's criminal history was over.
stated. He simply chose to reject both.
We therefore affirm the judge's decision
not to depart from the sentencing guide.
lines.
The judgment of the district court is in
all respects AFFIRMED.
Larry ZOBIIREST; Sandra Zobrest, hus-
band and wife; James Zobreat, a minor,
by Larry and Sandra Zobrest, hie par-
ents. Plaintiffs-Appellanta,
v.
CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Defendant-
Appellee.
No. 89-16035.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted Dec. 12, 1990.
. Decided May 1, 1992.
Parents of profoundly deaf student
brought suit under Federal Education of
ORTER, 2d SERIES
the Handicapped Act to compel pubfs
school to provide state-paid sign language
interpreter while student attended Catholi
high school. The United States Distrid.
Court for the District of Arizona, Rlcharl
M. Bilby, J., ruled that providing sign lam'
guage interpreter would violate establish
ment clause. Parents appealed. Th
Court of Appeals, Fletcher, Circuit Judge,
held that- (1) establishment clause wood
be violated since primary effect of provid
ing interpreter was to advance religion, sd
(2) denying assistance of interpreter did not
infringe on free exercise clause.
Affirmed.
Tang, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Schools 4148(2).
States and school districts provide
handicapped students services necessary Ib
meet special educational needs under Fed
eral Education of the Handicapped Act
Individuals with Disabilities Education Ad,
I Gl3(aX4XA), as amended, 20 U.S.CA.
I 1413(aX4)(A).
2. Schools 4-154(4)
Federal Education of the Handicapped
Act does not require state to pay children's
tuition when parents* voluntarily enrol
their handicapped children in private
school. Individuals with Disabilities Ed&'
cation Act, I 613(a)(4XII), as amended, 20
U.S.C.A. I 1413(a)(4)(B).
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
4:229
Schools 6-155.5(3)
Exhaustion of the Federal Educatien
of the Handicapped Act's administrative
procedures is not required when exhaustios
is futile.
4. Federal Courts 4=776
District court's grant of suinmid
judgment is reviewed de novo; Court of
Appeals must determine, viewing evidence
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST. 1191
Cile. eNJ .3d 1190 (9ir M. 1992
Is the light most favorable to nonmoving William Bentley Ball, Ball, Skelly, Mur-
larty, whether genuine issues of material ren & Cornell, Harrisburg. Pa., Thomas J.
iet exist and whether district court cor- Berning, Ariz. Center for Law in the Public
uorly applied the law. Interest, Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiffa-appel-
L federal Courts C-776 lants.
Court of Appeals reviews questions of John C. Richardson. DeConcini, Me-
testitutional law de nova. Domlld, Brammer Yetwin & Lacy, Tucson,
L Conalitutional Law 4-84() Ari, for defendant-appellee.
Statute does not violate the establish- Appeal from the United States District
sent clause if statute has secular legisla. Court for the District of Arizona.
fire purpose, statute's principle or primary
effect is one that neither advances nor inhi-
ti religion, and statute does not foster Before: TANG, FLETCHER, and
hxcessive government entanglement with REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
aligmon. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14.
L Constltutlonal Law 4=84.6(4) OPINION
Schools 8 FLETCHER. Circuit Judge:
Providing state-paid sign language in-
arpreter to profoundly deaf student while 7he Zobresta appeal the district courts
ilending Catholic high school would vio- ruling that provision of a state-paid sign
bte establishment clause, even though Fed- language interpreter to James Zobrest
sal Education of the Handicapped Act had while be attends a sectarian high school
a secular purpose, since primary effect would violate the Establishment Clause.
would be to create impermissible "symbolic The Zobreata also argue that denial of such
ahon"; interpreter would attend religion assistance violates the Free Exercise
daises and masses which school encour- Clause.
aled student to attend. Individuals with We affirm.
Disabilities Education Act. I 613(aX4XB),
t amended, 20 U.S.C.A. # 1413(a)(4)(B);
ilSC.A. ConstAmends. 1, 14.
L Constitutionat Law 4=84(1) (1' James Zobrest is a student at Sal.
Imposition on individual's free exercise pointe Catholic High School. lie is pro.
Irights by government violates free exer- roundly deaf, qualifying him as a handi.
ise clause unless burden is justified by capped child under the Federal Education
eme compelling state interest U.S.C.A. of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C.
Amend. 1401(aX), and Ari.ltev.Sat. § -
LConstitutional Law 84.5(4) 761(6; also 
34 C.F.R. 300.. The
L Contltuinna aw4=8414)EllA lirovides federal funds to state said
Schools 4-8 local governments for the purpose of edu-
Refusing to provide profoundly deaf cating handicapped childien: Bonrd of
student with state-paid sign language inter- Educ v. Rowle, 458 U.S. 176, 179. 102
peter while student attended sectarian S.Ct. 3034, 3037, 73 L.Ed.2d (90 (1982). it
igh school did not violate free exercise order to obtain federal funds, a state must
clause since government had compelling in- offer alt handicapped children within its
lerest in insuring that establishment clause jurisdiction a "free appropriate public edit
as not violated and there were no "less cation." 20 U.S.C. 1 1412(l). Under the
iestrictive means" by which it could accom- program, states and school districts provide
plish t at goal. Individuals with Disabili- handicapped students the services neces
ties Education Act, I 613(aX4XB), as ary to meet their special educational
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(aX4)B); needs. 20 U.S.C. § 14t3(a)(4)(A). Arizona
AS.C.A. ConstfAmends. In 14. has enacted a statutory scheme desiged to
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meet the educational needs of its handi-
capped students and to qualify it for feder-
al assistance under the EHA. Ariz.Rev.
Stat. i 15-761 to 15-772.
12) Both EHA and state funds are
available to provide sign language inter-
preters. See 34 C.F.R. 9 300.13. The par-
ties do not dispute that James needs the
assistance of a sign language interpreter in
the classroom. The parties have also
agreed that, if James attended either a
public or a non-religious private school in
Arizona, the Catalina Foothills School his-
trict ("School District") would assume full
financial responsibility for the employment
of a sign language interpreter for James.$
Salpointe High is a private Roman Catho-
lic school, operated by the Carmelite Order
of the Catholic Church. Salpointe is a per-
vasively religious institution; religious
themes permeate the classroom. Accord-
ing to the parties' stipulation of facts,
"Itihe two functions of secular education
and advancement of religious values or be-
liefs are inextricably intertwined through-
out the operations of Salpointe." Salpointe
"encourages its faculty to assist students
in experiencing how the presence of God is
manifest in nature, human history, in the
struggles for economic and political justice,
and other secular areas of the curriculum."
Religion is a required subject for students
enrolled at Salpointe, and the students are
strongly encouraged to attend the Mass
celebrated there each morning. As a re-
sult, a sign language interpreter would be
called upon to translate religious precepts
and beliefs during the course of James's
education.
1. The bulk of EllA benefits are targeted for
students enrolled in public schouls or placed in
rivale schools by seale or local oficials. Swe
u S. I 1413(a)(4)(li). When parents vln-
tarily ceirutf their handicapped children in pri.
vale school. the state need not pay ahose chil-
drens tuition. 34 c.l.a. u 300.403(a). The
state and local school district. however. still
must provide -spccial education and related ser-
vices" to the private school children. 34 C.F.R.
I 300.42(a). For purposes of this litigation.
the parties do not dispute that sign language
interpretation is one of the "special education
and related services" to which James is entitled.
The parties agree that, if Jamess parents en-
rolled him in a non-seclarian private school or
DETER 3d ERIE ZOBREST v CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST. 19
O R T E R , 2 d S E R I E S 
C s 1 0 t . l s,1 9
Sandra and Larry Zobrest, James's par- of a sign language interpreter would in COnIwLl u. Connec t, 310 S 19,ents, feel compelled by their religious con- fact offend the first amendment. The 303, 60 SC o c 900 c 903, d3victions to enroll James in a Catholic high -mart noted that- 84 LEd. 1213 1940
school.T
(3 or. t The interpreter would act as a conduit A. The Lemon v. Kurtman Test(31 Prior to their son's enrollment at -for the religious inculcation of James- 161 To "guide" the EstablishmientSalpointe, the Zobrests requested that the thereby promoting James's religious de- Clause inquiry, the Supreme Court hasSchool District supply James with a certi velopment at government expense. That fashioned a three-part test. hfcller . Al-fied sign language interpreter for his kind of entanglement of church and let, 463 U.S. 388, 394. 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3066,classes at Salpointe, beginning in August State is not allowed. n L.Ed.2d 721 (1983). In general terms, a1988. The School District petitioned the lhrest . Catalina Foothills School Dis. statute will be upheld if: the statute has aPima County Attorney for. an opinion as Wric, No. CIV-88-616 (DAa. Oct. D, secular legislative Purpose"; the statute'sthe constitutionality of providing such a 11S9) (order granting summar. Oct)I, n legiary efoect he tatsevie Th euyCut tonysb or i o gsrmry judgment). 'principal or Primary effect Iis) one thatservice. The Deputy County Attorney sh-,, whetcortli ula01 the qmpestion of nt n nithetr advances or inhtibits religin,,. and,acquently advised that furnishing an inter ethe the espoyn of a qsin of nither taut es ot "nibt essive
preter would offend both state and federal Puage interpreter would also violate the govern ent entanglement with religion."constitutional prohibitions against a state Arizona Constitution. The soesvioaepea I (citne entanglemn ith ii."qestablishment of religion. See U.S. CoDB* J 0g 8 order. 602, 613, 91 SC. 2105, 2111, 29 L.E.2damends. 1, XIV; Aris. Const. art. 2 I It o74 (1971)). .25 1In June 1988, the Arizona Attorney Gene STANDARD O REVIEWal concurred in the Deputy County Attor: i f. Secular Legislative Purposeney's opinion. i e t court's grant The Supreme Court has noted it "relu.Iflummary judgment de novo. Kruso vt. lance to attribute unconstitti~onal motives",In August 1988, the Zobrests initiated s tlnatr onal Tel. d el. Corp., 872 F.2d to a statute's drafters, "particularly whencivil action under the EHA, 20 U.SC. IlS. 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied I 1415(e), seeking an injunction requiring: 01--- 110 S.Ct ), cer d d 6 a Plausible secular purpose for the nro-the School District to provide James with 0). We must d e217, 110 L tEd.2 664 gram] may be discerned from tth fae oftheSchol istictto r vde ame VA Of Wemus deermneviewing te the statute." Mmicltcr it Allent, 463 U.S. atan interpreter. Pending the outcome of: alence in the light most favorable to the 394-95, 103 S.CL at 3067. The statutes atthis litigation, the Zobrests have employd Usmoving party, whete genuine tosue issue 103 Sice as pursen
an interpreter for their son at their Os dinaterial fact exist an e e e issue here evince a secula se
expense. On August IS, 1988, the distrk court correctly applied the law. enacting the EHA, Congressecourt denied the Zobreats' request for A S. clea eacting poheE made
preliminary injunction. The court fod A Stale Farm . 3 re and Casualty secular purpose:
that the Zobrests hadl not four too 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.I18). It is the purpose of this Chapter to as-ta h orsshdntdemonatratal 5 sure that all handicalpped children havelikelihood of success on the merits, becses , Il Whether the provision of a state- available to them ... a free appropriatethe provision of an interpreter would lilhe1 haned sign language interpreter to a stu- public education which emphasizes spte.offend the first amendment's establishinst .ot enrolled in a private sectarian school cial education and related services de-clause. 4"aes the establishment clause is a ques- signed to meet their unique needs toOh Ofeconstitutional law that we review de assure that the rights of handicappeded the School District's motion for s . See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, children and their parents or guardiansmary judgment, holding that the furnish -iF2d 1039, 1042 n. 2 (9th Cir.1985). We are protected Io
public school, the School District wul to
obliged to provide a sign language lnt
for him.
2. The pries agreed that, In light of the 0County Anorney's and Attorney Genera't
sions, cshaistion of the IlA's admiah"V,
review procedure, 34 C.F.R. IS 300.5t is e
510. would be futile. Exhaustion of [he EMi1
administrative procedures Is not required
It is futile. Ioni v. Doe, 484 US. 303, 111.0,
S.Ct. S92, 606, 98 LF.d.2d 686 (1988); a
Wion . Maran hniied School Dis., 5 14
1178. I1t (9th Cir.1984).
mesa review de novo the constitutionali.
401 the school district's decision to with.
11 aid from the Zohresta. Id.
DISCUSSION
She Establishment Clause
III firat amendment provides: "Con-
s shall make no law respecting an es-
Arment of religion, or prohibiting the
he exercise thereof.. U.S. Const.
0"d. I. This prohibition extends to the
'ila lhrough the fourteenth amendment.
,. asas Mates and Locali
ties to Provide for the education of tll
handicapped children, and to assess ail
asstre te effectiveness of efforts to etducate handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
The Arizona counterpart to the EllA re-veals a similar goal of Providing the stales
handicapped ctildren with the assistatnce
they might need to enjoy full anld equaleducational opportunities.
Thus, the ElHA antd the correspondingArizona statutes pass the first iart of the
Leption test. However, we find teir pro-
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posed application cannot survive the second
part of that test.'
C. Statutes' Primsary Effect
(71 In Grand Rapids School District e.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373. 105 S.CL 3216, 87
L.Ed.2d 261 (1985), the Supreme Court held
that programs under which public school
employees provided classes in private
schools violated the Establishment Clause,
where all but one of the private schools
involved were sectarian in nature. The
Court frund that the programs "may im-
permissibly advance religion in three
ways." Grand Rapids. 478 U.S. at 386,
105 S.Ct. at 8223. One of the impermiss-
ble effects the Court cited was that "the
programs may provide a crucial symbolic
link between government and religion,
thereby enlisting-at least in the eyes of
impressionable youngsters-the powers of
government to the support of the religious
denomination operating the school." Id.
The Court noted, "Government promotes
religion as effectively when it fosters a
close identification of its powers and re-
sponsibilities with those of any-or all-
religious denominations as when it at-
tempts to inculcate specific religious doc-
trines." ld., 473 U.S. at 389, 105 S.CL at
3225. The Court cited a lower court opin-
ion, which stated that, "Under the City's
plan public school teachers are, so far as
appearance is concerned, a regular adjuncl
of the religious school.... The religious
school appears to the public as a joint en
terprise staffed with some teachers paid by
its religious sponsor and others by the pub
3. The Supreme Cousrt has generally considerci
She validity snf a challenged 332tuie "on Its faice.
Bowen s Kendrick, 457 U.S. 519. 600. sol S.C1
356z. 2569, lot LEd.d 520 (1985). lloweve,
"Iher is .. 0 precedent for distinguishing h4
tween the validity of a statute on its face and it
validity in particular applications." id.. 487 U.,
at 602. l08 SC. at 2570. Foe excleisc in Hu'
v. MfcNaimr, 413 U.S. 714. 93 S. 286A. I
L.lid.2d 913 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled e
the validity of South Carolina's aid under
revenue bond act to an individual college. rat
er than on the constitutionality of the act as
whole. The court stated: "lo identify 'prima
BoeS, we narrow our focus from hi statute
a whole so She only transaction presently bela
us.' flums. 403 U.S. at 742.93 S.Ct. at 2874.
Bowens. while ihe court found the challeng
lic." Id, 413 U.S. at 392, 105 S.CL at 3221
(quoting Felton v. Secretary, United
States Dcpt of Ed., 139 F.2d 48, 67-48
(1984)). The Supreme Court concluded that
"the symbolic union of government and
religion in one sectarian enterprise ... a
an impermissible effect under the Estab-
lishment Clause." Grand Rapids, 473 US.
at 892, 105 S.Ct. at 3227; see also Goodall
by Goodall . Stafford County Sch. BA,
930 F.2d 363.; 370-72 (4th Cir.) (provision of
sign language interpreter to sectariant
school student under EllA and Virginia
implementing regulations would violate Es-
tablishment Clause). cert densied, - U.S.
,112 S.CL. 188, 116 LEd.2d 149 (1991l.
Were we to sanction the aid the 7obrests
seek, a public employee would he at James
Zobreat's side in each of his classes at a
sectarian school. With James, the employ-
ee would attend religion classes, the no
inally "secular" subjects, in which as the
parties stipulate. Salpointe faculty are eo-
couraged to "assist students in experiene'
ing how the presence of God is manifest,"
and the masses at which Salpointe encour.
ages attendance. The interpreter would be
the instrumentality conveying the religious
message and experience. This presence
and function of an employee paid by the
government in sectarian classes would ce
ate the "symbolic union" Grand Rapids
found impermissible. By placing its em
- ployee in the sectarian school to perform
this function, the government would create
the appearance that it was a "joint spo-
I statute so be facially valid, Is dlirected the dslasi
court to acemsider on remoasd Whethser Pa tis
. lar ALFA grants have had the primary effeckd0
, advancing religion." h 487 US. at 6 1
l05Ss. as 2580. in this cas. wecontsidrA
s the validity of one very specific proposed asplt
S. cation of the statutes at issue. Considerationd a
It the statutes "as applite seems particularly IP
1 proprlate, because their descriptions of the sil
,n to be provided are extremely broad. Set 20
a U.S.C. S 1413(a)(4)(A) (requiring states to essul
h- lish policies and procedures to ensure "by pra
a viding for such children special education sad
ry related services' that children with disabiliia
as participate in aid programs); Ari.RevSS
re S H-764 (requiring educational authorities Is
In "provide special education and relatcd services
cd for .11 handicapped cildrens').
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4. One might attempt to distinguish Grand Rap-
ids on the grounds that all but one of the
courses at issue in that case were taught in
elementary school. while the Zobrests seek aid
for their son while he attends a Catholic high
school. However, while the Supreme Court in
Grand Rapids expressed special concern for
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST.
Che as 94 Fd itS" 1th Or. 1992)
sor" of the school's activities. provision to sectarian school
Two lines of cases the Zobresta cite in the "purely secular content
support of their appeal are distinguishable and services provided" was
from the case at hand. First, this case (nable." Goodall, 930 F.2
does not involve "the sort of attenuated phasis original). "It is, of co
financial benefit, ultimately controlled by as part of general legialio
the private choices of individual parents, able to all students, a State
that eventually flows to parochial schools church-related schoola in pro
from (a] neutrally available ... bene- Ing bus transportation, schoo
fit...." Aluellerv. Allen, 463 U.S. at 400, public health lacilities-sec
103 S.CL at 3070. In blueller v. Allen, the deological services unrelate
Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota pro- mary, religion-oriented edues
gram under which all parents were entitled of Lhsaectarian school." l
to tax deduction for the cost of their chil- g 421 US. 349, 364, 95 S.
dren's "tuition, textbooks and transpora 44LEd2d 217 (95) see
tion." The Court noted that, "by channel- Kurtrman, 403 U.S. at 61r
ing whatever assistance it may provide to 2113 ("Our decisions . It
parochial schools through individual par. the States to provide church-s
ents, Minnesota has reduced the Establish- with secular, neutral, or noni
ment Clause objections to which its action vices, facilities or materials.'
is subjecL" Id., 463 U.S. at 399, 103 S.CL Ing such aid to sectarian se
st 3069. Similarly, in lVitters s. Wasal. preme Court has been carefu
Dept of Serus. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, the secular nature of this si
106 S.CL 748, 88 LEd.2d 846 (1986). the pie, in Board of Educ. v. A
Court held that the award of special edu. 236 88 S.CL 1923, 20 LEd.2
cation assistance to a visually handicapped the Court upheld the provis
student who sought to use that assistance subject textbooks to all seb
at a sectarian college did not violate the sectarian schools, in New Yor
Establishment Clause. Again, the Court observed, "Although the boo
emphasized the private individual's decision those required by the pared
In directing state provided aid: "In this use in specific courses, eac
case, the fact that aid goes to individuals must he approved by the pu
means that the decision to support religious thorities; only secular book
eduestion is made by the individual, not by Approval." Allen, 392 U.S. a
the State." Witters, 474 US. at 488, IoG At 1927. In Wolnan vs. 4a
S.CL at 762. 229. N S.CL 2593, 63 LEd.
Were we to grant the Zobrests the relief prvan toset shldof
they request, public aid would not be chan- posto stariae 
st
neled to the sectarian school through the services, speech and hearing
decision of an individual. Instead, the vices and off-site therapeutic
government would be required to place its services. In discussing each
own employee in the sectarian school. On genes, the Court emphasize
the facts before us, these cases are unavail- nature of the aid provided an
ing.for its complete separation
Nor can the Zobrests rely on cases in glement; for example, with
which the Supreme Court has upheld the dardized tests, eue Court not
"children of lender years," 473 U.S. as 390. l5
S.CI. at 3226, It did not limit its holding Sn
elementary schools. Further. the Zobrests "feel
is particularly essential that. as cite ime of ade
lescence. James be enrolled in a religions
school.' They thus implicitli - kr ledge the
vulnerability of young pco. J1 . nes' age.
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s of aid where
of the goods
"easily ascer-
d at 371 (em-
urse. true that
n made avail-
may include
grams provid-
I lunches, and
ular and noni-
d to the pri-
tional (saction
ck sn l'itten-
Ct. 1753, 1763,
also Lemson .
. 91 S.CL. at
ave permitted
elated schools
deological ser-
"). In approv-
hools, the Su-
I to emphasize
d. For exam-
lien, 392 US:
d 1060 (1968),
ion of secular
ools, including
'k. The Court
its loaned are
hial school for
h book loaned
blic school ass-
s may receive
t 244, 88 S.CL
tier, 433 U.S.
2d 714 (1977),
siding for the
Is of secular
s and scoring
diagnostic ser-
and remedial
of these cate-
d the secular
d the capacity
osn any entan-
egard to stan-
ed: "The non-
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public school does not control the content
of the test or its result. This serves to
prevent the use of the test as a part of
religious teaching...." Wolman, 433 U.S.
at 240, 97 S.Ct. at 2601. However, in Wol-
man the Court did not permit funding for
the purchase of instructional materials for
loan to parents or for field trip services;
with regard to the latter category, the
Court stated, "The field trips are an inte-
gral part of the educational experience, and
where the teacher works within and for a
sectarian institution, an unacceptable risk
of fostering of religion is an inevitable by-
product" Id., 433 U.S. at 254, 97 S.CL at
2608.
Here, as the parties stipulate, the inter-
preter would be required to act in a school
enviroiment in which "the two functions of
secular education and advancement of reli-
gious values or beliefs are inextricably in-
tertwined." Unlike the aid approved in
Allen and Wolman, then, the assistance
the state would provide in this case cannot
be said to be of a clearly secular and sepa-
rable nature.'
Thus, if applied as the Zobresta propose,
the statutes at issue fail to survive the
second part of the Lemon test. We there-
fore find that state provision of the aid the
Zobrests seek would violate the Establish-
ment Clause.
I. Free Exercise Clause
We turn now to the second issue the
Zobreata raise: does denial of the assist-
ance of a sign language interpreter uncon-
stitutionally infringe on their rights under
the Free Exercise Clause? We find that it
does not.
3. I could be argued that we might uphold the
statutes insofar as they permit James Zobress to
receive the services of a state-paid Interpreter
during 'secular" subjects, prohibiting only the
presence of the interpreter during religion
classes and mass. While we do not find it
otherwise necessary to discuss the third part of
the Lemon test, we do note that such a solution
would place this case within the "Catch 22" in
which "the very supervision of the aid to assure
that it does not further religion renders the
statutc invalid." Bouren . Kendrick. 487 US.
59. 615. I0 S.C1. 2562. 257. 101 I d.2d 520
(1988). Were we to uphold aid to the Zobrcsts
181 The government places a burden on
an individual's free exercise rights when it
forces the individual to choose betwees
adhering to her religion, thus forgoing
state provided benrefits, and abandoning a
religious precept in order to receive those
benefits. Sherbert i. Verner, 3174 U.S.
398, 404, 83 S.CL 1790, 1794, 10 LEd.2d
965 (19631). The imposition of such a bur.
den violates the Free Exercise Clause un
less it is justified by some compelling state
interest. Id., 374 U.S. at 406, R3 S.Ct. at
1795. Thus, in Sherbert v. Verner, the
Supreme Court held that South Carolinsa
could not deny unemployment compeass.
tion (o a member of the Seventh Day Ad-
ventist church because she refused to as
cept any job which required her to work o
Saturday, her faith's Sabbath. it, 374
U.S. at 404, 83 S.CL at 1794. South Car
olina sought to justify its restriction ea
benefits as a means of conbatting fraud;
however, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument, noting that there was no e4
dence of fraud, nor had the state demon-
strated that it could not accomplish its goal
by some less restrictive means. Id., 314
U.S. at 407. 83 S.Ct. at 1705-96.
191 Here. denial of aid to the Zobresta
does impose a burden on their free exercise
rights. They will have either to forgo a
sectarian education for James in order to
receive the assistance of a sign language
interpreter for him at school, or they will
have to pay the cost of the interpreter's
services themselves, while keeping him at
Salpointe.
However, a compelling state interest
justifies the imposition of this burden. The
government has a compelling interest Is
under these conditions. ihe government wouls
be required to monitor closely the interpreta's
activities to ensure that assisiance was not pre
vided at prohibited times. Moreover, ss l-
glous instruction at Salpoinle is not limiled ie
specific classes. but pervades the entire currk-
ulum. this monitoring would be the kind df
*comprehensive, discriminating and contisuing
state surveillance." Lemon, 403 US. at 619 91
S.Ci. at 2114. the Establishment Clause con
demns. See Mee& r. ittenger, 421 US. at 369-
72. 95 S.CI. at 1765-67 (discussing enanglemee
problems created by need so ensure that "Icach-
ers play a strictly nonlieological role").
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ensuring that the Establishment Clause is
not violated. Goodall, 930 F.2d at 370; see
also Doe V. Village of Crestwood, Ill., 917
F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.1990) (affirming grant of
injunction against mass during public festi-
val held in public park; government cannot
convey the message that it in endorsing
religion). It is difficult fo imagine a more
eompelling interest than avoiding a viola-
tion of the Constitution. Likewise, here,
there is no "less restrictive means" by
which the state may accomplish that goal.
Thus, the refusal to provide James Zo-
brest with a state paid sign language inter-
preter while he attends a sectarian high
school does not violate the Free Exercise
clause.,
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
TANG, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
"Justice," Judge Learned Hand once ob-
served, "is the tolerable accommodation of
the conflicting interests of society." Few
cases more aptly demonstrate the truth of
Judge Hand's words than the appeal before
as now. For the efforts of the Zobreat
family to educate their deaf son in a man-
ner compelled by their religious faith re-
quire us to engineer a delicate constitution-
al balance between the competing goals of
freedom of religion, separation of church
and state, and equal educational opportuni-
ties for the handicapped. The Zobrests
have presented us with a ponderous consti-
tuitional conundrum, made worse by the
opacity of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Given the competing values at stake, I can-
not fault the majority's resolution of this
csse. I can state only that I disagree. I
believe that the state's provision of a sign
language interpreter to James Zobrest for
his studies in a Catholic high school would
not transgress the First Amendment's pro-
hibition against the establishment of reli-
6. The Zobrests also argue that denying James
Zobrest the assistance of a sign language inter-
preter would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. As our analysis above makes clear, In
this contet the Free Exercise clause does not
provide a fundamental right for the Zobests:
they have no entillement to slate suppori for
James' religious education In the form they
FOOTHlILLS SCHOOL DIST. 1197190 (9ihCar. 1992)
gion. I would therefore reverse the judg-
ment of the district court.
DISCUSSION
I. The Establishment Clause
State action impacting religion will sur-
vive an Establishment Clause challenge if
the action (1) has a secular legislative pur-
pose; (2) has a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) does not excesdively entangle
government with religion. leron r.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct.
2105, 2110-11 (1971).
A. Secular Legislative Purpose
I agree with the majority's conclusion
that the federal Education of the Handi-
capped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C.
I 1401(a)(1), and its Arizona counterpart,
Ariz.Rev.Stat J 15-761(G), pass the first
leg of the Lemon test because they have
secular legislative purposes. That the aid
provided under the program would on this
occasion benefit religion or religious exer-
cise does not preclude a finding of secular
purpose. In Wittcrs v.a Washington Dept
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481. 485-
86, 106 S.Ct. 748, 750-51, 88 L.Ed.2d 846
(1986), the Supreme Court held that edu-
cational assistance provided by the state to
visually handicapped students served a val-
id secular purpose, despite its application in
that particular instance to a religious insti-
tution. Washington's effort "to promote
the well-being of the visually handicapped
through the provision of vocational rehabil-
itation services" constituted a legitimate
governmental interest and goal. Id. The
fact that some small portion of the state's
funds ultimately flowed to a religious insti-
tution did not undercut the laudatory sec-
ular purpose of the law. Id. at 486, 106
S.CL at 751.
seek. Nor can the Zobrests show that the staes
treatment of James Zobrest is subject to stiici
scrutiny because he is a member of a protected
class. The slate's refusal to send a stai-paid
interpreter Into a religious school is rationally
related to Its goal of avoiding a violation of the
First Amendmteot. Thus. the Zobresis Equal
Protection argument must fail.
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Similarly, in Mueller v. Alen, 463 U.S.
388, 103 S.CL 3062, 77 L.Ed.Zd 721 (1983),
the Supreme Court held that a state's deci-
alon to defray by means of a tax deduction
educational expenses incurred by parents
"evidences a purpose that is both secular
and understandable." Id. at 395, 103 S.CL
at 3067. The Court reasoned that:
An educated populace is essential to the
political and economic health of any com-
munity, and a State's efforts to assist
parents in meeting the rising cost of
educational expenses plainly serves this
secular purpose of ensuring that the
State's citizenry is well-educated.
Id.; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.7134,
741, 93 S.CL 2868. 2873, 37 LEd.2d 923
(1973) (the issuance of revenue bonds to
assist all colleges in constructing and fi-
nancing projects has a valid secular pur-
pose because the legislature intended to
provide its youth "'the fullest opportunity
to learn and to develop their intellectual
and mental capacities' ") (quoting S.C.Code
Ann. J.22.41 (Supp.1971)).
Because government has a valid secular
interest in cultivating the talents and skills
of handicapped children and in removing
harriers to the achievement of their full
academic potentii, I agree that neither the
lf1A nor its companion Arizona law has as
its purpose the endorsement or promotion
of religion.
B. Primary Effect
State actions run afoul of the second
branch of the Lemon test if they "result( I
in the direct and substantial advancement
of religious activity." Meek . Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 360, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 1764, 44
LEd.2d 217 (1975). On the other hand, the
Establishment Clause will tolerate mea-
sures that only indirectly impact upon reli-
gion. Committee for Pub. Edur. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 766,
771, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965, 37 LEd.2d 948
(1973) ("[NIot every law that confers an
'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit
upon religious institutions is, for that rea-
son alone, constitutionally invalid.").
The majority holds that the provision of a
sign language interpreter to James Zobres
ORTER, Id SERIES
is unconstitutional because it would have
the primary effect of advancing religion.
The majority raises the specter of a sym-
bolic union of church and state, and dis-
misses as inapplicable cases in which sim-
ilar general educational welfare programs
have passed constitutional muster.
I strongly disagree with the majority's
interpretation of the relevant precedents
and fear that they have exalted form over
substance at the expense of handicapped
children.
In arguing that the provision of an inter-
preter would have the primary effect of
advancing religion, the majority erroneous-
ly focuses on the specific use to which the
aid will be put in this case. The proper
query is whether the program as a whole
has the proscribed primary effect of ad
vancing religion. In Witters, a blind stu-
dent sought to apply Washington's voca.
tional rehabilitation assistance to his reli'
gious studies at a private Christian college.
The Supreme Court held that the primary
effect prong of the Lemon test did not
forbid the aid. In so holding, the Supreme
Court analyzed the entirety of Washing-
ton's educational assistance for the handi-
capped program. Wilters, 474 U.S. at 481-
88. 100 S.Ct at 761-62; see also id. at 492,
106 S.CL at 764 (Powell, J., concurring)
(analysing whether program aids religion
only in context of particular case before
the court "conflicts both with common
sense and precedent").
Similarly, in Mueller, the Supreme Court
focused not on whether the tax exemption
at issue actually permitted the particular
parents to send their children to religious
schools. Rather, the Court looked to the
broad class of beneficiaries of the exemp-
tion, which included all parents of school-
age children, whether enrolled in public or
nonpublic schools, and concluded that
" ft]he provision of benefits to so broad a
spectrum ... is an important index of see
ular effect.'" 463 U.S. at 397, 103 S.CL st
3068 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S
263, 274, 102 S.Ct. 269, 271, 70 b.Ed.2d 440
(198 1)); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243-44, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 1926-
t 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (the provision of
ZODREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST.
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secular textbooks does not have as its nec-
essary effect the advancement of religion
because the overall benefits of the program
extend to all school children; the Court
does not analyze the particular effect of
the textbook grant on religious students
alone); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 17-18, 67 S.CL 504, 512-13, 91 LEd.
711 (1947) (same-with respect to transpor-
tation to school). Indeed, the use of the
word "primary" in the test connotes a sur-
vey of the legislation's total operation.
rather than its particular application in the
pending case.
I recognize, as does the majority, that
the Supreme Court has not always been
consistent in applying the primary effecte
leat. In Hunt, 413 U.S. at 742, 93 S.CL at
2874, the Supreme Court considered the
particular application of a governmental
program, rather than its general operation,
in assessing primary effect. See also Doro-
en v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602, 108 S.Ct.
2562, 2570-71, 101 L.Ed.2d 520(1988). Giv-
en how closely analogous the Witters case
is to the one at hand-both involve the
monastitutionality of general educational
benefits programs for the handicapped
when applied to religious schools-the pri-
mary effects test Villers prescribes should
govern this case. But even assuming that
the narrow primary effect test imposed hy
the majority were correct, I would still hold
that the provision of a sign language inter-
preter to James Zobrest does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion. In
holding otherwise, the majority and district
court misread and misapply the Supreme
Court's opinions in School Dist of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 105 S.CL
3218, 87 LEd.2d 267 (1985) and Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.CL 1763.
Those cases differ in four significant ways
from the one at hand.
First, the legislation at issue in Grand
Rapids and Meek was not the type of gen-
eral welfare legislation involved here.
Grand Rapids and Meek involve aid pro-
grams targeted solely to private schools-
the vast majority of which, the Supreme
Court emphasized, are sectarian. Grand
Rapids, 473 U.S. at 384, 105 S.CL at 3222
(forty out of forty-one of Grand Rtapids's
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nonpublic schools "are identifiably reli.
gious schools"); Meek, 421 U.S. at 364, 95
S.CL. at 1762-63 (more than 75 percent of
Pennsylvania's nonpublic schools "are
church-related or religiously affiliated edia-
cational institutions"); sec also Public
Funds for Public Schools r Marburger.
358 F.Supp. 29 (D.N.J.1973) (three-judge
court), affd memt., 417 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct.
3163, 41 LEd.2d 1134 (1974). In other
words. the Supreme Court considers the
identification of legislation's primary hene-
ficiary to be a critical consideration ins de-
termining whether a statute's primary ef-
fect is to benefit religion. See Texas
Monthly, Inc. w Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-
It. 109 S.Ct 890, 897-98, 103 L.El.2d 1
(1989) (plurality) (general programs of gov-
ernmental assistance promoting legitimate
secular goals do not have the primary ef-
fect of advancing religion even if they re-
lieve religious groups of costs they would
otherwise incur programs targeted exclu-
sively to religious entities, however, are
probably unconstitutional).
General welfare programs neutrally
available to all children, in both public and
private schools, do not suffer the same
ronstitutional disability becanuse Iheir her-
fits diffuse over the entire popsulation. Ite-
ligious institutions are incidental, not pri-
mary, beneficiaries of such statutory
schemes. In Witters, the Supreme Court
emphasized that Washington's program
provided educational assistance to all hand-
icapped students in the state "'without re-
gard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited,'" Id. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 752
(quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n. 38.
93 S.Ct. at 2970 n. 38). The broad reach of
Washington's vocational assistance pro-
gram guaranteed that no "significant por-
tion of the aid expended tinder the Wash-
ington program as a whole will end up
flowing to religious education." lWitters,
474 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 762.
Likewise, the EHlA is a general welfare
program providing benefits such as sign
language interpretation to all handicapped
children, whether they are enrolled in pub-
lic or private school. Furthermore, the ex-
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pansive scope of the EHA and its Arizona
counterpart ensures that the bulk of the
aid provided will be used in nonsectarian
schools. Handicapped children across the
country enrolled in public and private
schools, not religious institutions, are the
"primary beneficiaries" of the EHA's and
Arizona law's benefits.
Indeed, in evaluating the constitutionali-
ty of educational aid given only to private
schools, the Supreme Court has been at
pains to distinguish cases like the one at
hand, where the state provides assistance
broadly to all schools, all school children, or
all parents. In Meek, the Court specifically
stated:
The appellants do not challenge and we
do not question, the authority of the
[state] to make free auxiliary services
available to all students in the [state]
including those who attend church-relat-
ed schools. Contrary to the argument
advanced in a separate opinion filed to-
day, therefore, this ease presents no
question whether the Constitution per.
mits the States to give special assist.
ance to some of its children whose
handicaps prevent their deriving the
bene/it normally anticipated from the
education required to become a produc-
tive member ofsociety and, at the same
time, to deny those benefits to other
children only because they attend a Lu-
theran, Catholic, or other church-spon-
sored school.
Id. at 368 a. 17, 95 S.Ct. at 1764 n. 17
(quotation emitted) (emphasis added); see
also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248
& n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 2603 & n. 11, 53
L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
782-83 n. 38, 93 S.CL at 2970 n. 38. Be.
cause the benefits provided by the EHA
and Arizona law do not benefit religiout
institutions primarily or even significantly
those cases holding unconstitutional vari
ous forms of aid given only to private
schools are not controlling here.
Second, Grand Rapids and Meek in
voIved educational assistance that eithe
directly or indirectly compensated religiou
institutions for costs they bore in th
course of educating their students. I
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Grand Rapids, state-financed teachers ap
peared in private schools offering classes
to private school students, thus relieving
religious institutions of the responsibility
(financial and otherwise) of teaching see-
ular subjects. 473 U.S. at 395-97, 105 S.CL
at 3229. In Meek, the school received in-
structional materials and equipment direct-
ly from the state, disburdening the school
of an otherwise necessary cost of perform-
ing its educational function. 421 U.S. at
8654, 95 S.CL at 1763-64.
The provision of a sign language inter-
preter, on the other hand, would not result
in state funds directly or even indirectly
flowing to Salpointe. The public School
District, not the private school, employs
and pays the interpreter. The provision of
an Interpreter, moreover, would not rollers
Salpointe of any preexisting financial or
educational obligation. Nothing in the
record or argument suggests that, without
state aid, Salpointe Itself will undertake the
burden of employing an interpreter for
James. To the contrary, James's parents
have independently hired an interpreter
pending the outcome of this litigation.
Third, in Grand Rapids and Meek, the
state, by virtue of its legislation, affirms-
tively directed educational assistance to re
ligious institutions. By contrast, to the
extent Salpointe benefits at all from the
EHA program, it does so only as a conse-
quence of independent decisionmaking by
the Zobrests. It is because the Zobresta'
chose to enroll James in a Catholic high
school, and not because of any legislative
decree, that EHA benefits will be employed
in a sectarian environment "The historic
purposes of the [Establishmenti Clause
simply do not encompass the sort of attenu-
ated financial benefit, ultimately con-
srolled by the private choices of individu-
al parents, that eventually flows to paro-
chial schools from the neutrally available
... benefit at issue in this case." Mueller,
463 U.S. at 400, 103 S.CL at 3070 (emphasis
added).
r In Witters, the Supreme Court found
a constitutionally significant the fact that re-
e ligious institutions would receive vocational
s assistance "only as a result of the genuine-
ZOllREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST.
Cli. " 963 1F.d I190 (9d t r. 1992
ly independent and private choices of aid (1990) (public high school fac
recipients" to attend a religious educational used for meetings of religiou
institution. 474 U.S. at 487, 106 S.CL at because "scndary school
751. The Supreme Court noted that Wash- mature enough and are uk
ington's vocational assistance program stand that a school does n
made funds available generally. Id. The support speech that it merely
pupil-not the state-determined whether nondiscriminatory basis").
a religious institution would receive any of The majority places undue
the available funds. There, as here, the the fact that the interpreter
state created no incentives for students to employee, will perform.hcr
select sectarian schools and played no role sectarian classroom. The
in the decisionmaking process that ulti- ment, however, does not aban
mately determined where the funds would te placement of state-paid
be spent Id. at 488, 106 S.CL at 751-52. religious schools. See Woll
Under the EHA and Arizona law, neither at 241-44, 97 S.ct. at 2602-
the state nor religious bodies can dictate provide health diagnostic ted
whether, or how much, aid will benefit sec- rocial schools). Nor do
tarian institutions. According to the rele' Amendment strictly foreclose
vant statutory provisions, the sign lan- of classroom services by te
guage interpreter is an employee of the upheld the provision of text
local school district. The sectarian school chial school children despite
never receives or even sees the funds used the books' themes would prov
to hire the interpreter. The only persons for religious lessons. 392 U
directly benefiting from the aid are the 88 S.Ct at 1926-27. Witte
parents, who are relieved of the financial further and authorized the
obligation of paying for a sign language funds to pay a student's tui
Interpreter out of their own pockets, and of ious institution, thereby c
course the deaf student Any indirect ben-
efit enjoyed by Salpointe would be attribut- the salaries of sectarian ins
able solely to the Zobresta' independent True, the money in I'itters
decision to apply neutrally available state the student and then to the sc
Otid to their son's education in a sectarian in this case the money goesI
schrool, and not to any "State action spon- directly to the interpreter
soring or subsidizing religion." Id. at 488- Amendment rights should n
89, 106 S.CL at 751-s2 (emphasis in origi t how circuitous a money tra
as). ment constructs. Rather, el
Fourth, unlike Grand Rapids, 473 U.S.
at 385, 105 S.CL at 3223, no symbolic union
of church and state inheres in the simple
act of paying the salary of a sign language
interpreter. The role played by the inter-
preter is narrow, isolated, and unique. Pri-
vate teachers ani students, not the inter-
preter, will be the source of religious doc-
trine. The state, for its part, is simply
facilitating the education of handicapped
students on a general and nondiscriminato-
ry basis. That the state's resources will be
used to convey sectarian as well as secular
ideas does not necessarily create an imper-
missible union of church and state. Cf
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 2372, 110 L.Ed.2d 191
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ot depend on
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ality of extending generally-available bene-
fits to parochial students should be deter-
mined by reference to the substantive na-
ture and quality of the aid provided. Func-
tional analysis, not formalistic line-draw-
ing, must be undertaken. A careful study
of the nature of the sign language inter-
preter's task belies the majority's concerns
about a symbolic union of church and state.
A sign language interpreter performs a
mechanical service, changing words from
one language into another. An interpreter
neither adds to nor detracts from the mes-
sage she conveys, nor does she interject
personal views and philosophies into the
translation. Unlike teachers and thera-
pists, the sign language interpreter is a
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technical facilitator of communication, not
a potential fount of religious doctrine.
I do not understand the majority to say
that the First Amendment would be offend-
ed by the state's provision of a hearing aid
or eyeglasses to a parochial school student.
Yet these products, like an interpreter,
make it possible for a physically-impaired
student to receive and decipher religious
messages. Perhaps we *re not far from
the time when machines will be able to
translate oral communications into visual
cues for the hearing impaired. But we are
not there yet Consequently, because of
the nature of his handicap, James Zobrest
requires human, rather than purely me-
chanical, assistance in the classroos. But
this distinction should not obscure our eval-
uation of the nature of the service being
performed. A sign language interpreter
remains, like a hearing aid, a conveyor, and
not an Independent source, of communica-
tion. Under the circumstances of this case,
I do not consider the step from a hearing
aid to a sign language interpreter to be a
difference of constitutional magnitude.
Further undercutting the majority's sym-
bolic union concern is a recognition that the
interpreter's role in the classroom touches
only one student She will not be involved
at all in the education of the rest of the
student body. Students and the public are
thus not likely to be confused by or to have
trouble understanding where the state ser-
vice ends and the religious begins. Cf
Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 391, 105 S.CL
at 3226 ("[S]tudents would be unlikely to
discern the crucial difference between the
religious school classes and the 'public
school' classes.").
That the interpreter's appearance in a
Catholic school is wholly attributable to the
independent decisionmaking of the parents,
rather than the actions of the state, further
undercuts any symbolic union of the two
entities. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89, 106
S.CL at 762 ("Nor does the mere circum-
stance that petitioner has chosen to use
neutrally available state aid to help pay for
his religious education confer any message
of State endorsement of religion."). In
fact, the withholding of vital assistance
from a handicapped child solely because of
his sincere religious desire to be educated
in a Catholic school would evince hostility,
not neutrality, towards religion. "The Es-
tablishment Clause does not license govern-
ment to ... subject (religious practitioners]
to unique disabilities." Mergens, 496 U.S.
at 248, 110 S.CL at 2371 (quoting McDaniel
t. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641, 98 S.CL 1322,
1335, 55 1.Ed.2d 693 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
Rather than suggest an impermissible
connection between church and state, the
provision of an interpreter would simply
demonstrate to the public the government's
desire to equalize the educational opportu-
nities of all its students and to help handi-
capped students overcome barriers to their
full academic development Such aid is
religion-blind.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold
that the provision of a sign language inter-
preter, under the EHA and Arizona law, to
a student enrolled in a religious school does
not have the primary effect of advancing
religion.
C. Escessive Entanglement
The third inquiry prescribed by Lemon is
determining whether excessive entangle-
ment results from the government's pro.
gram. To decide whether the provision of
a sign language interpreter would suffi-
ciently enmesh the government in religious
matters to offend the Establishment
Clause, one must assess carefully the in-
terrelationship of church and state that re-
suits when such assistance is provided a
student
The district court ruled that state super-
vision of the interpreter and the nature of
her task would unconstitutionally entangle
the state in Salpointe's sectarian education-
al process. The district court noted that,
like the therapists whose services were de-
clared unconstitutional in Wolman, 433
U.S. 229, 97 S.CL 2593, the sign language
interpreter enjoys close, day-to-day contact
with the student in a pervasively religious
atmosphere. Id at 247-48, 97 S.CL it
2605. The Supreme Court in Wolman fell
that this created a danger that "the pres-
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DIST.Oat*96 F.d I190 (91Cir. 19) 1203
lures of the environment might alter [the Such supervision standing alone does not
therapist's) behavior from its normal create constitutionally intolerable levels of
course" and result in the transmission of state/church involvement. The Constitu.
Ideological view. i at 247, 97 S.Ct at tion will tolerate limited supervisory itter
s~a0ml. Th~en itirictscourt pterceived the actions between public officials and private'sie rsk n tis ase Athough the ma- schools. In l~oltuan, the Suptremte Court
jority does not reach the entanglement held that the state's rovision of diagnostic
stage of the Lemon test, I discuss it to health services to private school students
demonstrate the constitutional propriety of slid not transgress the Establishment
affording ElA benefita to parochial ptu- Clause because the. program resulted inl
dents. only limited contact between public offi-In reviewing the district court's deciaion, cials, religious officials, anti students. 4:13I turn first to the question whether super U.S. at 244, 97 S.Ct. at 2603. Likewise, invision of the interpreter's job performance Mueller, the Supretme Court sustained awill require the government to intrude un- tax exemption despite thte fact that it re-constitutionally upon Salpointe's religious quired public officials to determine whetheraffairs. Next, I address whether the textbooks promoted religious thenes. 463process of sign language interpretation it. U.S. at 403, 103 S.Ct. at 3071. Such care-self impermissibly involves a state-paid em. fully channeled interactions do not rise toployee in matters of religious doctrine. It the level of excessive entanglement. Seeshould be emphasized at the outset that the also Hernandes v. Commissioner, 490mere existence of some interrelationship U.S. 680, 696-97, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2147, 104and cooperation between the School Dis. L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) ("[R11outine regulatorytrict and Salpointe will not run afoul of the interaction which involves no inquiries intoFirst Amendment. It is only "excessive" religious doctrine, no delegation of Stateentanglement that the Constitution con- power to a religious body, and no detaileddemns. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.CL monitoring and close administrative contactat 2111; ef Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10, between secular and religious bodies does09 S.CL at 897 ("Government need not not of itself violate the nonentanglement
resign itself to ineffectual diffidence be- command.") (quotation and citations omit-ause of exaggerated fears of contagion of ted); Allen, 392 U.S. at 245. 88 S.Ct. at
r by religion, so long as neither intrudes 1927 (officials may label textbooks as sec-
nduly into the affairs of the other.") ular or sectarian).
1
(emphasms added).
I Supervision
Both parties recognsize that the provision
of a publicly-funded Sign language inter-
Preter necessarily carries with it the bag-
gage of supervision by public officials.
The interpreter will receive periodic evalua-
tions of the quality of her work. TheSchool Distriet's special education officials
will also need to review at least annually
James's educational progress.
L The supervisory entanglemeni concerns raised
bY this case thus do not follow She norm. Timesupervision at issue in an entanglement Inquiry
frequently perlains to the government's at.
tempts to ensure that its aid is being used onlyfor secular purposes. See, e.g., Aglaitar P. Fehon473 U.S. 402, 411, 105 SCi. 3232, 3237. 87Ld.2d 290 (1985); Mueller 463 U.S. at 403.
Supervision limited to evaluating the signlanguage interpreter's job performance
does not involve the type of day to day."comprehensive, discriminatory and con-
tinuing state surveillance" that Lcnon pre-
cludes. 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114.The School District does not suggest that
public officials will appear daily, weekly, oreven monthly in the classroom as part of
their supervisory work. No extra snpwrvi-sion is needed simply because the interpet.
er works in a sectarian school.'
103 Sd3. at 3071; Icnon, 403 U.S. at 616, 91
s. lates. Ini tis casc, however. the sttvi.
seon relates only to review of a public employ.
es performance. As in Winers, it is a given in
his case that the states assisiance cannot be
confined to a wholly secular role and inll. in
instr Penit the recipient to rceve vcligimo
'tstvcliun The sui~ervisiott at isinibuns
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Evaluations of the interpreter's work,
moreover, will not routinely or necessarily
involve the supervising officials in religious
matters. Nor does the supervision involve
the sheer number of public officials Inun-
dating religious establishments that oc-
curred in other cases. The services at is.
sue here, after all, will not be provided to
the entire student body. The number of
deaf children enrolled in a single parochial
school at any given time will be sufficiently
low to avoid visiting large numbers of state
officials upon the institution. Thus the su-
pervision of James's interpreter will not
implicate religious concerns to the same
extent as other Establishment Clause cases
have.
I would therefore hold that the church/
state contacts involved in supervising a
sign language interpreter's job perform-
ance are sufficiently contained and abbrevi-
ated to prevent excessive entanglement
2. Nature of the Job
The second entanglement inquiry con-
cerns the nature of the sign language Inter-
preter's task. The parties stipulated that,
as a general matter, the interpreter's code
of ethics obliges her to translate communi-
cations completely, without altering, edit-
ing, or revising in any manner the content
of the message. It is conceded that at
times the interpreter will be unable to af-
fect a literal translation of a communica-
tion, including religious messages. In such
circumstances, the interpreter must use her
own Judgment and, to the beat of her abili-
ty, convey the message as accurately as
possible.
The nature of the interpreter's role in the
classroom does not entail excessive entan-
glement between a state-paid employee and
the church. As noted earlier, the First
Amendment does not strictly forbid the
placement of any public employee in a paro-
chial school classroom. Wotman, 433 U.S.
at 241-44, 97 S.Ct. at 2602-03. While the
Court has ruled that the presence of state-
avoids ihe Catch-22 that occurs when the Esat-
lishment Cladise, on the one hand. requires as-
surances thai aid does not promote sectarian
purposes and, on lite other hand, uses thai very
financed teachers and therapists or coun-
selors in parochial schools offends the First
Amendment, Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at
387, 105 S.CL at 3224; Meek, 421 US. at
369-71, 95 S.CL. at 1766-66, the concerns
animating those holdings do not obtain In
this instance.
The primary entanglement concern artic
ulated by the Supreme Court in Grand
Rapids and Meek is an apprehension that
the pervasively religious atmosphere In
which the professionals work is likely to
infuse their teaching or advice with some
religious content Grand Rapids, 473 U.S
at 387, 105 S.CL at 3224 ("(Tlhere is a
substantial risk that, overtly or subtly, the
religious message they are expected to con-
vey during the regular schoolday will in-
fuse the supposedly secular classes they
teach after school. The danger arises 'not
because the public employee [is) likely de-
liberately to subvert [her or] his task to the
service of religion, but rather because the
pressures of the environment might alter
[her or] his behavior from its normal
course.'") (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at
247, 97 SC.CL at 2605); Meek, 421 U.S. at
371, 95 S.Ct. at 1766; see also Wolmon,
433 U.S. at 247, 97 S.CL at 2605 ("[U]nlike
the diagnostician, the therapist may estab-
lish a relationship with the pupil in which
there might be opportunities to transmit
ideological viiews."); Lemon, 403 U.S. at
618-19, 91 S.CL at 2114 ("We simply recog.
nize that a dedicated religious person ...
will inevitably experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral.... With
the best of intentions such a teacher would
find it hard to make a total separation
between secular teaching and religious doc.
trine.").
Unlike teachers and thernpists, a sign
language interpreter's job admits of few, if
any, opportunities for the transmission or
fostering of personal sectarian sentiments.
While recognizing that working as a sign
language interpreter is both difficult and
challenging, the Interpreter's services are
distinctly more cabined than those of a
supervision to Invalidate the program on enlan-
glement grounds. See Bowan, 487 U.S. at 615,
108 S.C. at 2577.
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teacher or therapist. James's interpreter
simply takes a message conceived and ut-
tered by one person and neutrally trans-
lates it into a comprehensible form for a
second person. The expressions and in-
struction, religious or not, neither originate
nor terminate with the interpreter. As the
district court noted, she is just a conduit
Unlike teachers and therapists, her func-
tion does not entail the discretion to intro-
duce her own independent or subjective
judgments and opinions, to speak her own
words, or to transmit her own ideas. Ratl-
er, the interpreter performs the more me-
chanical and objective'task of searching for
signs that equate with spoken words, ani
vice versa. The scientific, technical nature
of sign language interpretation thus more
closely approximates the services of a
speech and hearing diagnostician, than of a
teacher.
Occasionally, it is true, non-literal trans-
lations will have to be made. But even in
these narrow instances, the interpreter's
role remains confined to a technical search
for words and signs that closely approxi-
mate each other. I do not believe that the
minimal discretion inhering in such deci-
sions creates an unconstitutional risk that
the interpreter will use the opportunity to
convey her own religious ideas, in violation
of her professional ethical obligation to
translate accurately.
In sum, I believe that the provision of a
sign language interpreter to James Zobrest
under the EHA and Arizona law would not
unconstitutionally entangle the state in reli-
gious affairs. A careful review of the con-
cerns animating the Supreme Court's First
Amendment precedents, a thoughtful study
of the nature of an interpreter's services,
and due respect for the purpose and effects
of educational assistance to handicapped
children dictate the conclusion that the pro-
vision of a sign language interpreter to a
deaf child enrolled in parochial school does
not result in an unconstitutional fusion of
the secular and the sectarian.
L The panies have not argued tha the (cderal
governmnms desire to separate church and
state constitutes a compelling interest over-
riding lhe Zobrcsts' free exercise rights. Ac
cordingly. I do not address either the applicabil
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II. The Free Exercise Clause
I agree with the majority's conclusion
that denying the Zobrests a sign language
interpreter unconstitutionally burdens their
free exercise of religion.
However, because I do not believe that
the provision of a sign language interpreter
in this case violates the Establishment
Clause of the federal Constitution, I would
hold that no compelling intgrest justifies
the state's withholding of benefits. To the
extent the School District has an interest in
separating church and state further than
required by the First Amendment, that in-
terest must yield to the Zohrests' free exer-
cise rights. "ITIhe State interest asserted
here-in achieving greater separation of
Church and State than is already ensured
under the Establishment Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution-is limited by the Free
Exercise Clause." Widmar, 454 U.S. at
276, 102 S.Ct. at 277. The Zobrests' free
exercise rights would also override any ad-
ditional anti-establishment constraints im-
posed by the Arizona constitution. Id. at
276-76, 102 S.Ct. at 277-78. The School
District has articulated no other reason or
interest in withholding aid from the Zo-
breats.'
CONCLUSION
Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme
Court observed that
the transcendent value of free religious
exercise in our constitutional scheme
leaves room for "play in the joints" to
the extent of cautiously delineated ser-
ular governmental assistance to religious
schools, despite the fact that such assist-
ance touches on the conflicting values of
the Establishment Clause by indirectly
benefiting the religious schools....
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469, 93
S.CL 2804, 2813, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973).
ily or constitutionality in this coniexi of the
federal prohibilion on the use of EIIA funds for
religious "worship, instruction. or proselymra-
lion." 34 C.F.R. § 76.532 (1991)
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With this statement, the Court capsulized
the lessons of nearly two centuries of expe-
rience interpreting the First Amendment's
religion clauses. Rigid enforcement of one
clause generally comes at the expense of
the other. Only through the careful ac-
commodation of evolving constitutional
concerns and values-through "play in the
joints"--can these competing precepts
achieve their common goal of preserving
freedom of religion.
I believe that the provision of a sign
language interpreter to a deaf child en-
rolled in parochial school constitutes such
"cautiously delineated secular governmen-
tal assistance." Governments provision of
this general welfare benefit to all qualify-
ing school children equally does not create
an impermissible establishment of religion.
On the other hand, singling out for exclu-
sion from this benefit program only those
students engaged in religious conduct com-
pelled by conscience does offend the Free
Exercise Clause.
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF CIIAN-
DLER, INC., an Arizona Corporation,
d/b/a Chandler Regional Hospital.
Plaintiff-Appellant.
T.
Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., In his official
capacity as Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-16331.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 11, 1992.
Decided May 4, 1992.
Hospital sought review of administra-
tive decision by Health Care Finance Ad-
ministration determining that hospital was
'ORTER, 2d SERIES
not entitled to Medicare reimbursement
payment under new "federal" rate. Tbe
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Arizona. Earl H. Carroll, J., 744
F.Supp. 203, granted motion for summary
judgment by Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services. Hospital appealed. The
Court of Appeals, D.W. Nelson, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) Department's determi-
nation that new state-of-the-art facility to
which hospital's operations had been trans.
ferred was not a "new hospital" within
meaning of regulation did not frustrate
congressional intent to ease hospitals' tran-
sition from cost-based reimbursement to
Prospective Payment System (PPS); (2)
Medlicare Act definition of "hospital" and
provisions dealing with PPS reimbursement
anticipated that hospital could be "facility"
for some purposes and "institution for oth-
ers"; and (3) Secretary should have adjust
ed hospital's base year costa to take into
consideration the radical shift in its operat-
ing costs.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Federal Courts 4-776
District court's grant of summary
judgment is reviewed de novo.
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
4386
Agency's regulations must be consist
ent with overall intent behind statute.
. Soctal Security and Public Welfare
4-241.10
Determination of Secretary of Health
and Human Services, that new state-of-the-
art facility to which hospital's operations
were transferred was not a "new hospital"
within meaning of regulation for Medicare
reimbursement purposes, did not frustrate
congressional intent to ease hospitals' tran-
sition from cost based to Prospective Pay.
ment System (PPS) reimbursement. Social
Security Act, J 1801 et seq., as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. I 1396 et seq.
4. Social Security and Public Welfare
*=241.5
Medicare Act definition of "hospital"
and provisions of Act dealing with Prospec.
COMMUNITY HOSP. OF CII
Chm.e Fad I
live Payment System (PPS) reimbursement
anticipate that hospital can be "facility" for
some purposes and "institution" for others.
Social Security Act, It 1801 et seq..
1861(e), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. I§ 1395 et
seq.. 1395x(e).
L Social Security and Public Welfare
-241.10
Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices should have adjusted base year cost
of hospital seeking Medicare reimburse-
ment tn take into consideration the radicl
shift in its operating costs resulting from
transfer of its operations to new state-of.
the-art facility. Social Security Act,
I 18R(b)4)(A), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
I 13Diww(b)4XA).
Patrick K. O'Hare, Amy E. Hancock,
McDermott, Will, & Emery, Washington,
D.C., and Douglas Gerlach, Brown & Bain,
Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant
Stuart Gerson. AssL Atty. Gen., James
P. Loss, Asst. U.S. Atty., Phoenix, Aria.,
Lawrence M. Meister, Office of the Gen.
Counsel, Dept. of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Baltimore. Md., for defendant-appel-
lee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona.
Before: FLETCHER, D.W. NELSON
and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
Until 1984. Chandler Community Hospi-
tal operated in a single-istory. 46-hed.
small-scale facility. That year, the original
facility was closed down and the operation
was transferred to a brand-new, four-story,
120-bed, state-of-the-art facility that had
been constructed at a nearby location. The
new facility was renamed "Chandler Re-
gional Hospital," but it kept the same ti-
censes as the old facility; it was also
owned and operated by the same individu-
als. The new facility had substantially
higher per-patient operating costs than the
old facility.
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This case raises two questions. First, we
must decide whether, for the purpose of
calculating Medicare reimbursements, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services'
("the Secretary") determination (iat the
new facility is not a "new hospital" within
the meaning of 42 C.P.R. § 412.741a)(1)
frustrates the Congressional intent behind
the Medicare Act. Second, we must deter-
mine whether, if the interpretation of the
new hospital regulation was valid, the See-
retary was nonetheless required. under 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(4)(A), (o otherwisne :l
just Chandler's reimbursement rate to lake
into consideration the radical shift in ils
operating costs.
We hold that neither 42 C.Fit. ( 412.-
74(a)(1) nor the Secretary's interprelalion
of that regulation to exclude Chandler
from characterization as a new hospital
frustrate Congressional intent. However,
we find that the Secretary erred in not
adjusting Chandler's base year costs as
required by 42 U.S.C. I 1305ww(bX4)(A),
Therefore, we reverse the district court and
remand this case so that the Secretary may
have an opportunity to determine whether
and to what extent Chandler is entitled to
adjustments under that provision. 744
F.Sopp. 203. (D.Ariz.1990).
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ov'ervieto of the Aedicarc Program
In 1983, Congress amended the Social
Security Act to change the way it reini-
burses hospitals for the costs of treating
Medicare patients. Before 1983, hospitals
were reimbursed according to the actual
costs they expended in treating each Medi-
care patient. Concluding that this comt-
based system was inefficient because hos-
pitals had no incentive to provide services
at lower costs, Congress introduced tie
Prospective Payment System (PPS). Un-
der PPS, hospitals receive a fixed. standard
amount for each Medicare inpatient they
treat The amount of the payment is ad-
justed for each patient by using "diagnosis-
related groups" (DRGs), a classification
system based on the patient's condition and
treatment. This amount is theoretically
August 1, 1992
A-82 McNary, Commissioner. Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc. The application for stay, presented
to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the
Court, is granted, and it is ordered that the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, case No. 92-6144, filed
-July 29, 1992, and the subsequent July 29, 1992,
order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, case No. 92 CV
1258, are stayed pending the filing of a petition
for a writ of certiorari on or before August 24,
1992. Should the petition be filed on or before
that date this order is to remain in effect pending
this Court's action on the petition. If the petition
for a writ of certiorari is denied, this order is to
terminate automatically. In the eveiL e petition
is granted. this order is to remain in effect pend-
ing the sending down of the judgment of this
Court.
Should the Solicitor General so file a petitiqn
for a writ of certiorari. respondents' response is to
be flied on or before September 8, 1992.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens
joins, dissenting.
An applicant for a stay pending the disposition
of a petition for certiorari faces a heavy burden.
The applicant must demonstrate (1) a likelihood
of irreparable harm if the judgment below is not
stayed. (2) a reasonable probability that certiora-
ri will be granted; (3) a significant possibility that
the judgment below will be reversed; and (4) that
the balance of the equities tilts clearly in its
favor. I do not think the government has met the
latter two conditions.
Eight federal judges have now considered the
territorial reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Four have
concluded that the statute does not apply in
international waters, and four have concluded
that it does. Given the thorough and careful
reasoning of the majority and concurring opinions
below, I do not see how the Court can conclude at
this stage that the government's likelihood of
success on the merits is any better than even. This
is not fatal to the government's application, for if
each party's chance of succeeding is equal, a
strong showing on the equities can still carry the
day for the applicant. But no such showing has
been made. While the government has offered a
vague invocation of harm to foreign policy, immi-
gration policy, and the federal treasury, the plain-
tiffs in this case face the real and immediate
prospect of persecution, terror, and possibly even
death at the hands of those to whom they are
being forcibly returned. So determined the dis-
trict court. to whose findings we should defer
where the balance of equities is highly factual in
nature. Block v. North Side Lumber Co.. 473
U.S. 1307 (1985) (Rehnquist. J.. in chambers).
I would deny the application for a stay.
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Dunnigan v. United States
Montana v. Imlay
Williams v. Withrow
Death Penalty Cases: Herrera v. Collins, Arave v. Creech, Graham
v. Collins, Richmond v. Lewis
91-1300 U.S. v. DUNNIGAN
Sentencing-Federal guidelines-Sentence en-
hancement based on perjury.
Ruling below (CA 4, 944 F2d 178, 60 LW
2179, 49 CrL 1505):
Provision of federal Sentencing Guidelines that
enhances sentence if defendant is found to have
obstructed justice in course of his prosecution.
Section 3C1.1. unconstitutionally burdens defen-
dant's constitutional right to testify in his own
defense as applied to defendant's trial testimony
that adverse jury verdict implies is false.
Question presented: Does Constitution prohibit
court from enhancing defendant's sentence under
Sentencing Guidelines Section 3C1.L if court
finds that defendant committed perjury while
testifying at trial?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/10/92. by Ken-
neth W. Starr. Sol. Gen., Robert S. Muelier III,
Asst. Atty. Gen.. William C. Bryson. Dpty. Sol.
Gen.. Paul J. Larkin Jr.. Asst. to Sol. Gen., and
Andrew Levchuk. Justice Dept. Atty.
91-687 MONTANA v. IMLAY
Probation-Suspended sentence conditioned upon
admission of guilt to offense of conviction-Self-
incrimination.
Ruling below (Mont SupCt, 813 P2d 979):
Trial court order revoking sex offender's sus-
pended sentence on basis of his failure to enroll in
sex-offender treatment program, which would not
admit defendant unless he admitted guilt to of-
fense. violated defendant's Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination by sub-
jecting him to additional punishment because of
his failure to admit guilt: notwithstanding convic-
tion of sex offense, following trial in which de-
fendant testified and denied guilt, trial court's
order required defendant to surrender rights to
.challenge conviction on basis of newly discovered
evidence. or by collateral attack, and required
him to abandon self-incrimination privilege with
respect to offense of conviction and also for crime
of perjury; defendant's sentence is vacated.
Question presented: Was state probationer's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation violated by revocation of his probation for
failure to comply with condition that he complete
sex-offender therapy, in view of fact that success-
ful completion of therapy requires probationer to
accept responsibility for crime of which he was
convicted?
Petition for certiorari filed 10/21/91, by Marc
Racicot. Mont. Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth L.
Griffing, Asst. Atty. Gen.
91-1030 WITHROW v. WILLIAMS
Habeas corpus-Review of state conviction-Vol-
untariness of confession.
Ruling below (CA 6. 944 F2d 284):
Federal district court correctly decided, con-
trary to findings of state courts, that habeas
petitioner suspected of murder was "in custody"
for interrogation purposes when police officers
came to his house, searched him, transported him
in unmarked police car to police station, and
repeatedly conveyed to him that his options were
to cooperate or go to jail: inculpatory statements
petitioner made after this point but before advice
of rights was given to him should have been
suppressed because of failure of police to give
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966): further inculpatory statements
petitioner made after receiving warnings were
result of police officers' promises that he would
be freed and treated with leniency if he talked
and their threats of imprisonment if he did not
and, therefore, should have been suppressed as
involuntary. under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985): error in admitting statements was
not harmless beyond reasonable doubt, and,
therefore. district court's grant of habeas relief is
affirmed: rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976). which held that Fourth Amendment
claims are not cognizable on federal habeas re-
view if petitioner had full and fair opportunity to
litigate claim in state court, does not extend to
Fifth Amendment claims,
Qucstions prcscntcd: (I) Do federal courts on
habeas corpus review of state court convictions
have jurisdiction to find habeas petitioner's state-
ment involuntary. in case in which sole Fifth
Amendment issue raised in state court. and in
habeas petition, was whether statement was ad-
mitted in violation of prophylactic Miranda rules.
state court having found that petitioner was not
in custody? (2) In case in which premise of Fifth
Amendment ruling is finding of Miranda viola-
tion. and petitioner has had one full and fair
opportunity to raise Miranda claim in state court,
should collateral review of same claim on habeas
corpus petition be precluded? (3) If collateral
review is available in such case, is confession
following warnings involuntary merely because
police indicate possibility of lenient treatment if
accused tells truth, and would adoption of such
rule on habeas corpus violate principles of Saw-
yer v. Smith. 58 LW 4905 (1990), and Teague v.
Lane. 489 U.S. 288, 57 LW 4233 (1989)?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/12/91. by John
D. O*Hair. Pros. Atty. for Wayne Cty., Mich..
Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research.
Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky,
Asst. Pros. Atty.
91-7328 HERRERA v. COLLINS -
Death penalty-Claim of innocence-Habeas cor-
pus-Stay of execution.
Ruling below (CA 5. 2/18/92):
Claim of actual innocence, based on newly
discovered evidence, by state prisoner convicted
of murder and sentenced to death does not, stand-
ing alone, state claim upon which habeas relief
can be granted by either federal habeas court or
Texas habeas court, in absence of legal basis for
granting relief to prisoner on second or subse-
quent petition for habeas corpus, district court
may not stay execution in order to hold hearing
on prisoner's claim of innocence. which is based
on alleged confessions that prisoner's now-de-
ceased brother gave to his son and others admit-
ting commission of murder of which prisoner
stands convicted.
Questions presented: (I) Does it violate Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to execute person
who has been convicted of murder but who is
innocent? (2) If so. must state courts provide
meaningful mechanism for hearing claims of ac-
tual innocence in death penalty cases? (3) What
procedures are necessary in federal court for
adjudicating claims of actual innocence in death
penalty case?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/19/92, by Mark
E. Olive, of Tallahassee. Fla.
91-7580 GRAHAM v. COLLINS
Capital punishment-Habeas corpus-Sentenc-
ing-Mitigation.
Ruling below (CA 5 (en banc), 950 F2d 1009,
50 CrL 1385):
Texas statutory sentencing scheme for capital
cases that permits jury to consider only three
statutory questions and that makes death sen-
tence automatic if all three are answered "yes"
by jury permits evidence of mitigating factors-
such as defendant's youth at time of offense and
good character traits cited by defense in case
before court-to be adequately accounted for.
particularly by consideration of second statutory
issue. i.e.. whether there is likelihood that defend-
ant would be continuing threat to society: there is
no substantial evidence that conduct of habeas
corpus petitioner. in this case was attributable to
disadvantaged background, or to emotional or
mental problems.
Questions presented: (1) May state limit cap-
ital sentencing jury's consideration of 17-year-old
defendant's youth, recognized repeatedly by this
court as powerful mitigating factor, to answering
whether he acted "deliberately" and might be
dangerous in future, and afford no other basis for
taking youth into account? (2) May state similar-
ly limit jury's consideration of such defendant's
positive character and unfortunate circumstances
of his family background?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/9/92, by Michael
E. Tigar and Robert C. Owens, both of Austin,
Texas, and Jeffrey J. Pokorak, of San Antonio,
Texas.
91-1160 ARAVE v. CREECH
Capital punishment-Aggravating circum-
stances-Vagueness-Mitigating evidence-Good
prison behavior.
Ruling below (CA 9, 947 F2d 873, 49 CrL
1078):
Provision of Idaho capital punishment statute
that makes defendant's "utter disregard for hu-
man life" aggravating factor is unconstitutionally
vague: state supreme court's limiting construction
that defines aggravator as "reflective of acts or
circumstances surrounding the crime which ex-
hibit the utmost, callous disregard for human life,
i.e.. the cold-blooded pitiless slayer" fails to suffi-
ciently objectify and channel sentencer's discre-
tion as required by Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356. 56 LW 4501 (1988): state trial judge's
failure to expressly find "specific intent" in rela-
tion to two other aggravating circumstances as
required by state law requires vacation of convic-
tion despite evidence to support such finding.
capital defendant must be given opportunity at
rescntencing to present mitigating evidence of his
good conduct in prison following initial
sentencing.
Questions presented: (1) Is Idaho's statutory
aggravating factor that authorizes death penalty
for murders committed with utter disregard for
human life unconstitutionally vague because
limiting construction announced by Idaho Su-*
preme Court does not require that factor be
defined with reference to occurrence of specifical-
ly defined acts? (2) May federal court of appeals
vacate death sentence by interpreting state stat-
ute to require sentencing judge to make express
finding of existence of particular factual compo-
nents of statutory aggravating circumstance? (3)
When death sentence is vacated by state appeals
court to correct procedural defect of state law,
does U.S. Constitution require that sentencing
proceedings be reopened to receive evidence of
prisoner's post-sentencing conduct in prison?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/14/92, by Larry
EchoHawk. Idaho Atty. Gen., and Lynn E.
Thomas, Dpty. Atty. Gen.
91-7094 RICHMOND v. LEWIS
Habeas corpus-Death - penalty-Aggravating
circumstances.
Ruling below (CA 9, 948 F2d 1473):
Although statutory aggravating circumstance
found and relied upon by judge who sentenced
federal habeas corpus petitioner to death-his
commission of crime in "especially heinous. cruel
or depraved manner"-is vague on its face, Ari-
zona Supreme Court, in reviewing petitioner's
death sentence, provided narrowly tailored and
"obviously sufficient limiting construction" of
vague aggravating circumstance when it defined
cruel as "disposed to inflict pain especially in a
wanton, insensate or vindictire manner," heinous
as "hatefully or shockingly evil," and depraved as
"marked by debasement. corruption, perversion
or deterioration." and further noted that factors
that lead to finding of heinousness or depravity
include infliction of gratuitous violence and need-
less mutilation of victim: under such definition,
rational factfinder could have found "heinous" or
"depraved" murder of victim who was beaten
unconscious and then run over by car twice,
crushing his skull.and killing him first time and
then dragging him 30 feet second time: even if
Arizona Supreme Court had not provided suffi-
cient limiting construction for such aggravating
circumstance, habeas petition would still be re-
jected because state .court rested its affirmance
upon finding of two additional aggravating cir-
cumstances and insufficient showing of mitigat-
ing circumstances; in context of Arizona death
penalty statute. which separates sentencing
court's findings on aggravating circumstances
from its findings on mitigating factors. U.S.
Constitution does not require remand for resen-
tencing when one aggravating factor is eliminated
from analysis if record reveals that, in terms of
statute. one or mrre aggravating factors are
present and thee are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficietly substantial to call for
leniency.
Questions prse nted: (1) Does petitioner's
death sentence cont,-avene Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments b.catuse it was upheld by Arizona
Supreme Cour. on basis of application of Ari-
zona's "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
aggravating ci-cumst.ance that either extends cir-
cumstance to jet of facts that no rational fact-
finder could conclude fall'within it or arbitrarily
assumes set of facts that no actual factfinder has
ever found in :his case? (2) May federal habeas
corpus court apply rule of "automatic affir-
mance" to death sentence that was based on both
occurs during sidebar conference convened to
discuss lack of unanimity among jurors, polled
pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(d). when jurors'
numcrical division is known?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/8/92, by Michael
D. Rossi. and Guarnieri & Secrest. both of War-
rcn. Ohio.
91-794 HARPER v. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT
OF TAXATION
State tax on federal retiree pensions-Refunds-
State taxation of military retiree pensions.
Ruling below (Va SupCt, 60 LW 2342):
Upon remand from U.S. Supreme Court forfurther consideration in light of James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 59 LW 4735 (1991)court reaffirms in all respects its prior decisionthat, because Davis v, Michigan Departmen, of
Treastdi,rp, 489 U.S. 803, 57 LW 4389 (1989),docs not apply retroactively federal government
retirees are not entitled to refund 'of Virginiaincome tax on their pensions for years in which
retired state employees' benefits were exempt
from same tax.
QuCStion presented: May this court's decision
in Davis L. Michigan Department of Treasurrunder any circumstances be "applied" non-retro-
actively so as to defeat federal retirees' entitle-ment to refunds of unconstitutional state taxesimposed upon their federal annuities?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/15/91. by Mi-chael J. Kator, Stephen Z. Chertkof. and Kator,Scott & Heller. all of Washington. D.C.
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if the jury thinks only one was, that's-
the jury may think as they see fit from
this evidence, but the issue before this
jury with respect to this defendant is was
he personally involved?
In addition, Stamper urges that trial de-
fense counsel excacerbated the error by
strenuously objecting to the initial response
proposed by the court that "similar charges
are pending against another defendant,"
when in fact such a response would have
bolstered the defense's theory that some
other person had actually committed the
crimes. Stamper contends that such an
"error" cannot be justified on the basis of
strategy or tactics.
Here we must ask "whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the er-
rors, the factfinder would have had a rea-
sonable doubt respecting guilt" Strick-
land 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.CL at 2068-69.
Stamper's logic is difficult to follow or
accept His theory of defense, simply stat-
ed, has been that he was not at the scene
of the crime, as demonstrated by the pres-
ence of fingerprints and a footprint which
were not his.' Apparently, the prosecution
-favored the court's proposed initial re-
sponse-"similar charges are pending
against another defendant"-in order to
weaken the import of the nonmatching fin-
gerprints and footprint by demonstrating
the existence of an accomplice. Defense
counsel successfully prevented such weak-
ening by preventing any suggestion of the
existence of an accomplice from reaching
the jury. Those tactics were reasonable.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct.
at 2065. Stamper's recasting of the pros
and cons of trial counsel's decision amounts
to Monday morning quarterbacking.
Moreover, returning again to Strick-
land's second prong-prejudice-the Virgi-
nia Supreme Court ruled on the merits of
an objection to the response for the first
time on appeal, despite the fact that no
objection had been made at trial. The
4. In fact, trial defense counsel made a pre-trial
motion to keep Stamper's association with one
Tyrone Bowling out of the case.
5. Finding no error, we leave to another day
consideration of the Commonwealth's assertion
court found that "there is no merit to the
objection. The instructions adequately in-
formed the jury that they must find that
Stamper killed the victims to convict him of
the capital murders." Stamper v. Com-
monwealth, 220 Va. 260, 275, 257 S.E.2d
808, 819 (1979).
Accordingly, our having considered the
contentions Stamper has made, and dis-
covering no error,s the judgment is
AFFIRMED. *
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Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of West Virginia, John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., J., of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, K.K. Hall, Circuit Judge, held that
(1) indictment was sufficient; (2) admission
of bad acts evidence was not plain error;
and (3) enhancing defendant's sentence un-
der guidelines for obstruction of justice
based on finding that defendant testified
untruthfully at trial placed intolerable bur-
that reversal would constitute the enunciation
of a "new rule" in violation of Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 LEd.2d 334
(1989), and its progeny.
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den on defendant's right to testify on her
own behalf.
Conviction affirmed; sentence vacated
and remanded.
1. Conspiracy <=43(1)
Indictment and Information G=110(10)
Indictment was sufficient where it
identified time frame of conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine, place, coconspirator, al-
leged substance involved, and statutes vio-
lated and tracked statutory language defin-
ing offense and apprised defendant that
other unnamed coconspirators, whose iden-
tities were known and unknown to grand
jury, were involved.
2. Criminal Law <-369.1
Ordinarily, proof of crimes or bad acts
other than those charged are inadmissible
to show that defendant acted in conformity
with character traits; however, evidence of
those acts is admissible for limited collat-
eral purposes such as knowledge, intent,
motive, absence of mistake, and common
scheme or plan. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404,
28 U.S.C.A.
3. Criminal Law **1036.1(8)
Admission of testimony that defendant
helped her daughter use and sell crack
cocaine was not plain error in prosecution
for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; all of
"similar acts" evidence presented on rebut-
tal was invited by defendant who had de-
nied using cocaine or knowing that anyone
sold cocaine out of her house and district
court's sua sponte gave limiting instruction
on testimony in Government's case in chief
about defendant giving her daughter co-
caine to "rock up." Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
404, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Criminal Law 4700(3)
Only where Brady evidence is so mate-
rial that its nondisclosure undermines con-
fidence in verdict is reversal necessary due
to failure of prosecution to disclose that
evidence to defendant.
5. Criminal Law 6700(5)
Any Brady error due to fact that
Government did not disclose before trial a
witness' schizophrenia was harmless; de-
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fendant did not request continuance and
did not ask a single question on cross-
examination about witness' condition, and
although exculpatory evidence may not
have been presented as fully as defendant
would have liked, jury did not in fact hear
it.
6. Criminal Law e-1253
Witnesses <-88
Enhancing defendant's sentence under
guidelines for "obstruction of justice"
based on finding that defendant testified
untruthfully at trial placed intolerable bur-
den on defendant's right to testify on her
own behalf. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 18
U.S.C.A.App.
Brent E. Beveridge, Morgantown, W.Va.,
argued for defendant-appellant.
Michael M. Fisher, Asst. U.S. Atty., ar-
gued (Michael W. Carey, U.S. Atty., Hunter
P. Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty., on brief),
Charleston, W.Va., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HALL and PHILLIPS, Circuit
Judges, and WILLIAMS, District Judge for
the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by
designation.
OPINION
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Sharon Dunnigan appeals her conviction
and sentence for conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. We affirm her conviction; how-
ever, we vacate her sentence and remand
for resentencing.
I.
The cocaine distribution conspiracy in
this case is not complex. Freddie Harris
was a notorious cocaine dealer in the
Charleston, West Virginia, area. His ring
was broken up in the late summer of 1988.
Harris pled guilty to cocaine distribution
charges, as did his coconspirators John
Dean, Doris Casto, Wynema Brown, and
Tammy Moore. Several others went to tri-
al, including Andre Charlton and, later, ap-
pellant Sharon Dunnigarr.
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Dunnigan was charged March 7, 1989, in
a one-count indictment, with conspiracy to
distribute cocaine with Harris and un-
named others during the summer of 1988.
She filed pretrial motions to dismiss the
indictment, for a bill of particulars, and for
disclosure of exculpatory and Jencks Act
material.
At a hearing on the motions, the govern-
ment agreed to provide Jencks Act materi-
al, notice of "similar acts" evidence, and
information regarding any confidential in-
formants. The defendant withdrew her
motion for a bill of particulars. The dis-
trict court denied the motion to dismiss the
indictment.
Between the hearing on motions and tri-
al, the government furnished grand jury
transcripts, plea agreements and rap
sheets for proposed government witnesses,
and notice of one "similar act"-a con-
trolled sale of crack cocaine by Dunnigan
to a cooperating witness, Edward Dicker-
son, on July 12, 1988.
Trial was held January 3-4, 1990. The
government presented five witnesses in its
case-in-chief. Harris, the ringleader, was
first. He testified that Dunnigan was his
source of supply in Cleveland, and that she
had travelled to Cleveland alone and with
him to obtain cocaine during the summer of
1988. Harris also stated that Dunnigan
had accompanied Dean to Cleveland for the
same purpose at least once. Harris admit-
ted distributing the cocaine in the Charles-
ton area.
Dean took the stand next. Dean met the
appellant when, on Harris' instructions, he
picked her up at the Charleston bus termi-
nal and took her home. Harris had de-
scribed Dunnigan to Dean as his "connect."
Later that evening, Dean accompanied Har-
ris to Dunnigan's apartment; Harris went
inside and obtained cocaine, which Dean
then helped package for resale. Dean also
testified that he went to Cleveland with
Dunnigan on several occasions to purchase
cocaine and dilaudid. At the close of
Dean's direct examination, the government
elicited from him that he was a paranoid
schizophrenic and heroin addict.
Dunnigan's counsel was surprised by
this revelation. He protested to the court
that his cross-examination would be ham-
pered by the government's failure to pro-
vide this information before trial notwith-
standing a specific discovery request. The
government argued that the grand jury
transcripts revealed that Dean was -a her-
oin addict, and that it had no docum- tary
evidence to substantiate Dean's mental ill-
ness. The district court advised the defen-
dant that Dean's schizophrenia could be
inquired into on cross-examination. Dunni-
gan's trial counsel nonetheless asked no
cross-examination questions about Dean's
addiction or mental disorders.
Charlton testified next. He said that he
had gone with Harris to Duniigan's apart-
ment to test and package cocaine Dunnigan
had brought from Cleveland. He also re-
counted one occasion on which he had re-
ceived cocaine from Dean. This cocaine
had been picked up in Cleveland on one of
Dean and Dunnigan's trips together.
Moore was the fourth coconspirator wit-
ness. She told of conversations with Dun-
nigan during which Dunnigan extolled the
superior quality of Cleveland cocaine and
attempted to solicit Moore to drive her to
Cleveland.
Finally, the government called Brown.
She stated that Dunnigan had told her of
the Cleveland cocaine-purchasing trips, and
that she had seen cocaine in Dunnigan's
apartment. On four or five occasions,
Brown observed Dunnigan's daughter
"rocking up" powder cocaine (i.e. making it
into crack) for Dunnigan. Dunnigan would
later return the crack cocaine to her daugh-
ter to sell. Brown also stated that Dunni-
gan kept cocaine in a little tin case. The
defendant made .no objections to any of
Brown's testimony and pursued no cross-
examination. Notwithstanding this lack of
protest, the district court gave a "similar
acts" instruction-if the jury believed the
cocaine that Dunnigan's daughter "rocked
up" was part of the conspiracy, it could
consider it for that purpose; however, the
court stated, Dunnigan was not charged
with distributing crack, and if the cocaine
from which it was made was outside the
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conspiracy, the jury could only consider the
evidence for the limited purposes of Fed.
R.Evid. 404(b): motive, intent, preparation,
lack of mistake, and knowledge.
The government rested, and Dunnigan
presented a simple defense. She took the
stand and denied everything. She testified
that she did not buy, sell, or use cocaine
during the time she knew Harris. She said
that she did not know anyone in Cleveland
who used cocaine.
She admitted going to Cleveland, but
only to visit relatives. She said that she
went to Cleveland with Harris once, be-
cause she knew her way around, but she
did not know whether Harris bought or
tried to buy any cocaine on that trip. She
flatly denied the trips and transactions de-
scribed by Dean and Charlton, and she had
no knowledge of anyone making cocaine
into crack at her apartment.
On cross-examination, the government
asked her about a specific transaction:
whether she had sold crack to Edward
Dickerson on July 12, 1988, at her apart-
ment. She denied it.
The defense rested, and the government
began a devastating rebuttal. Dickerson
was the first witness. He testified that he
had been arrested in early 1988 and had
become an informant. On July 12, 1988, in
a monitored transaction, he bought crack
from Dunnigan at her apartment. Dunni-
gan did not object to this testimony.
Moore then retook the stand to describe
her purchases of crack cocaine from the
defendant. She had also seen Dunnigan
give crack and powder cocaine to her
daughter. Finally, Moore said that she and
Dunnigan's daughter sold crack together
and returned part of the money to Dunni-
gan. Again, the defendant did not object
to any of Moore's story. Again, the dis-
trict court gave the jury a "similar acts"
limiting instruction.
The jury found Dunnigan guilty. Her
base offense level for sentencing was 22.
She did not receive the two-level acceptance
of responsibility reduction, because she
continued to maintain her innocence.
Moreover, the district court increased the
offense level by 2 to 24 for "obstruction of
178 (4th Cir. 191)
justice," based on its finding that Dunni-
gan testified untruthfully at her trial. She
was sentenced to 51 months, the lowest end
of the guideline range.
II.
Dunnigan first argues that the district
court erred by denying her motions to dis-
miss the indictment and for a bill of partic-
ulars. These arguments are related, be-
cause a bill of particulars is a defendant's
means of obtaining specific information
about charges brought in a vague or broad-
ly-worded indictment. United States v.
Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378, 74 S.CL 113,
115, 98 LEd. 92 (1953).
(1] An indictment may simply be a
short, plain statement of the charge, suffi-
ciently precise to notify the defendant of
the accusation he must meet and to protect
him from double jeopardy. United States
v. American Waste Fiber Co., 809 F.2d
1044, 1046 (4th Cir.1987). The indictment
of Dunnigan was sufficient. It identified
the time frame of the activity (early to late
summer of 1988), the place (at or near
Charleston), a coconspirator (Harris), the
controlled substance involved, and the stat-
utes violated. The indictment tracked the
statutory language defining the offense
and apprised Dunnigan that other unnamed
coconspirators, whose identities were
known and unknown to the grand jury,
were involved. '
Among her pretrial motions, Dunnigan
moved for a bill of particulars. She want-
ed the names of those to whom she had
allegedly sold cocaine, notice of any "sim-
ilar acts" the government planned to use,
and the like. At a pretrial hearing on the
motions, Dunnigan's counsel was satisfied
with the governments proposed disclo-
sures and specifically dropped the request
for a bill of particulars. Waivers are rare-
ly more explicit. In any event, Dunnigan
was given the names of the government's
witnesses and received grand jury tran-
scripts. The denial of a bill of particulars
did not leave her facing a trial unaware of
the nature of the charges against her.
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III.
[2.31 Ordinarily, proof of crimes or bad
acts other than those charged is inadmissi-
ble to show that the defendant acted in
conformity with a character trait. How-
ever, evidence of such acts is admissible for
limited collateral purposes such as knowl-
edge, intent, motive, absence of mistake,
and common scheme or plan. Fed.R.Evid.
404.
Dunnigan now argues that she was hope-
lessly prejudiced by admission of the testi-
mony that she helped her daughter use and
sell crack cocaine. We do not doubt that
this testimony was very damaging; how-
ever, Dunnigan made no objections to this
evidence at trial, and the court may reverse
only if admission of the evidence was plain
error.
All of the "similar acts" evidence
presented on rebuttal was invited by Dun-
nigan. She denied using cocaine or know-
ing that anyone sold cocaine out of her
house. The government was entitled to
rebut these assertions.
A closer issue is Brown's testimony in
the government's case-in-chief about Dun-
nigan giving her daughter cocaine to "rock
up." Nonetheless, Dunnigan did not ob-
ject, and the district court sua sponte gave
a limiting instruction. Admitting the testi-
mony with a limiting instruction does not
rise to plain error, if error at all.
IV.
[4,5] The government now admits, al-
beit equivocally, that it should have dis-
closed Dean's schizophrenia before trial.
"If Dean's mental condition was such that
it would have reflected adversely on his
credibility, the United States should have
provided this information to the defen-
dant" Brief of the United States, at 39.'
However, every Bradylt violation does not
1. The Assistant U.S. Attorney on appeal did not
represent the government at trial. The trial
prosecutor interpreted her duty to disclose ex-
culpatory information to apply only to docu-
mentary evidence.
warrant reversal. G.dy where the evidence
is so material that its nondisclosure under-
mines confidence in the verdict is reversal
necessary. United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985).
Dunnigan did not request a continuance
and did not ask a single question on cross-
examination about Dean's condition. More-
over, though the exculpatory evidence may
not have been presented as fully as Dunni-
gan would have liked (though she does not
say what else she would now offer), the
jury did in fact hear it. Dunnigan would
have a better argument if the government
had withheld the information from the jury.
Finally, Dean was one of a half-dozen
government witnesses telling the same sto-
ry-, his testimony was important, but not
vital.
Our confidence in the verdict is not un-
dermined by the nondisclosure of Dean's
mental problems. Therefore, any Brady
error was harmless.
V.
A.
[61 The district court found that Dunni-
gan had testified untruthfully at trial, and
so enhanced her offense level by two for
"obstruction of justice." Committing or
suborning perjury has always been identi-
fied as "obstruction of justice" in the
Guidelines Commentary. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.1(c)) (Nov.1989); Id., comment
(n.3(b)) (Nov.1990).
At the time Dunnigan was charged, con-
victed, and sentenced, Application Note 3 to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 stated: "This provision is
not intended to punish a defendant for the
exercise of a constitutional right. A defen-
dant's denial of guilt is not a basis for
application of this provision." Further-
more, Application Note 2 stated that "sus-
2. Brady v. Maryland 373 US. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 LEd.2d 215 (1963).
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pect testimony and statements should be
evaluated in a light most favorable to the
defendant."
All circuits that have considered the is-
sue have upheld the constitutionality of
similar enhancements under § 3C1.1.
These decisions are based on the premise
that a defendant's right to testify in his
own behalf is not a license to commit perju-
ry. United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927
F.2d 14, 22 (1st Cir.1991); United States v.
Matos, 907 F.2d 274, 276 (2nd Cir.1990);
United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d
945, 953 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S.
899, 110 S.Ct. 255, 107 L.Ed.2d 204 (1989);
United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216
(8th Cir.), cert denied, - U.S. -, 111
S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); United
States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct.
394, 112 LEd2d 403 (1990); United States
v. Keys 899 F.2d 983 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -, 111 S.CL 160, 112
LEd.2d 125 (1990); United States v. Wal-
lace, 904 F.2d 603, 604-605 (11th Cir.1990).
B.
Our sense of justice requires us to dis-
agree. We of course have no desire to
condone or encourage perjury. On the oth-
er hand, we fear that this enhancement will
become the commonplace punishment for a
convicted defendant who has had the au-
dacity to deny the charges against him.
The government maintained at oral argu-
ment that every defendant who takes the
stand and is convicted should be given the
obstruction of justice enhancement. Cer-
tainly, if the guidelines are to be applied
consistently, the government would be
right. Nearly all testifying defendants tell
3. Effective November 1. 1990. the substance of
former Application Notes 2 and 3 were amalga-
mated into new note 1:
This provision is not intended to punish a
defendant for the exercise of a constitutional
right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other
than a denial of guilt under oath that consti.
tutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or pro-
vide information to a probation officer, or
refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis
for application of this provision. In applying
a story that, if believed in full, would result
in acquittal. The jury's verdict implies a
disbelief of some material aspect of the
defendant's testimony.
It disturbs us that testimony by an ac-
cused in his own defense, so basic to ju*-
tice, is deemed to "obstruct" justice unless
the accused convinces the jury. The facile
logic of hindsight deems such disbelieved
testimony a lie; inasmuch as there is no
right to lie, there is no harm in sanctioning
it. Hindsight, however, does not help the
accused when he must decide whether to
take the stand. He already knows that he
faces the possibility of conviction, and that
he is much less likely to be acquitted if he
remains silent, despite his right to do so
and even in the face of instructions to the
jury to draw no adverse inference from his
silence. Kassin, The American Jury:
Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51
Ohio St.LJ. 687, 700 (1990), citing Shaffer
& Case, On the Decision Not to Testify in
One's Own Behalf: Effects of Withheld
Evidence, Defendant's Sexual Preferences,
and Juror Dogmatism on Juridic Decisions,
42 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 335,
344 (1982); Note, The Influence of the De-
fendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 Yale L.J. 204, 212 n. 36 (1956).
See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340
n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1095 n. 10, 55 L.Ed.2d
319 (1978) (adverse inference from silence
"may be inevitable"). Moreover, the dilem-
ma does not arise solely when the defen-
dant is guilty; there are many reasons
unrelated to guilt that may militate against
testifying. Chief among these is the prose-
cution's power to impeach the defendant's
credibility with prior convictions under Fed.
R.Evid. 609. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
this provision, the defendants testimony and
statements should be evaluated in a light most
favorable to the defendant.
The primary purpose of the 1990 amendment
was to add a new guideline governing "reckless
endangerment during flight." The other
changes, including the one described above,
were intended only for clarification. United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Man-
ual. Appendix C. amendment 347 (Nov.1990).
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288, 300 n. 15, 101 S.CL 1112, 1119 n. 15, 67
LEd.2d 241 (1981); Wilson v. United
States, 149 U.S. 60, 66, 13 S.Ct. 765, 766, 37
L.Ed. 650 (1893); Bradley, Griffin v. Cali-
fornia: Still Viable After All These Years,
79 Mich.L.Rev. 1290, 1295 n. 25.1 We can-
not help but note that an innocent defen-
dant with prior convictions must weigh the
jury's likelihood of drawing one impermissi-
ble inference (guilt by silence) against an-
other (guilt by criminal propensity) in decid-
ing whether to testify. With an automatic
§ 3C1.1 enhancement added to the ante,
the defendant may not think testifying
worth the risk.s
C.
Several of our fellow circuits have relied
upon United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S.
41, 98 S.Ct 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978), a
preguidelines case, as controlling and per-
mitting this enhancement. Some have ex-
plicitly stated that the guidelines have not
altered the analysis. E.g., Barbosa, 906
F.2d at 1369; United States v. Beaulieu,
900 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3252, 111 LEd.2d 762
(1990). We believe that a close look at
Grayson's rationale reveals that the guide-
lines have removed important underpin-
nings of the Court's analysis.
The most basic difference in Grayson is
the stated justification for enhancing sen-
tence. The guidelines deem a denial of
guilt on the stand "obstruction of justice."
There is no such rationale in Grayson.
Grayson rejected an argument that due
process prohibits consideration at sentenc-
ing of the defendant's untruthfulness, be-
cause it amounts to punishment for perjury
without indictment and trial for perjury.
The Court acknowledged that punishment
for perjury to save the government the
time and expense of prosecution would be
"impermissible," but refused to prohibit
the "otherwise perissible practice of con-
4. Bradley cites statistics from Kalvin & Zeisel.
The American Jury 146 (1966), that defendants
without prior records are 37% more likely to
testify than those with previous convictions. Id.
sidering a defendant's untruthfulness for
the purpose of illuminating his need for
rehabilitation and the society's need for
protection." 438 U.S. at 53, 98 S.Ct. at
2617.
The Court was speaking during the long
period of our judicial history when district
courts enjoyed broad discretion in imposing
any sentence within statutory limits. It
found that the very uncertainty of a defen-
dant's supposedly untrue trial testimony
being considered at sentencing was a de-
fense against Grayson's constitutional at-
tack:
Nothing we say today requires a sentenc-
ing judge to enhance, in some wooden or
reflex fashion, the sentences of all defen-
dants whose testimony is deemed false.
Rather, we are reaffirming the authority
of a sentencing judge to evaluate careful-
ly a defendant's testimony on the stand,
determine-with a consciousness of the
frailty of human judgment-whether
that testimony contained willful and ma-
terial falsehoods, and, if so, assess in
light of all the other knowledge gained
about the defendant the meaning of that
conduct with respect to his prospects for
rehabilitation and restoration to a useful
place in society. Awareness of such a
process realistically cannot be deemed to
affect the decision of an accused but
unconvicted defendant to testify truthful-
ly in his own behalf.
Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2618.
The guidelines supply precisely the "wood-
en or reflex" enhancement disclaimed by
the Court A defendant who stands trial
has already probably passed up an opportu-
nity, through a negotiated plea, for a lesser
charge and sentence. At trial, he must
choose between remaining silent, with a
heavy risk of conviction, and testifying on
pain of facing an enhanced sentence. At
5. For example, the enhancement increased Dun-
nigan's guidelines range from 41-51 to 51-63
months. At the highest offense levels, the in-
crease is more drastic, from 292-365 months to
360-life.
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every turn, he is encouraged to forfeit his
rights, and is subjected to increased punish-
ment for refusing to do so. When deciding
to testify, he is not simply "aware" of a
"process" that might take his untruthful-
ness into account, he is (and ought to be
advised by his counsel) aware that the very
fact of his testifying will be used against
him if he is convicted.
We are not satisfied that there are
enough safeguards in place to prevent this
enhancement from unfairly coercing defen-
dants, guilty or innocent, into remaining
silent at trial. Other circuits have re-
viewed the district court's finding of un-
truthfulness under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at
22; Matos, 907 F.2d at 276; Wallace, 904
F.2d at 605; Beaulieu, 900 F.2d at 1540;
O'Meara, 895 F.2d at 1220. Of course, in
light of the jury's verdict of guilt, the dis-
trict court's finding will never be "clearly
erroneous" where the verdict is sustaina-
ble; if the verdict cannot be supported, the
sentencing finding will of course be moot
Our review of these enhancements would
therefore be an empty ritual.
We are similarly unimpressed with the
guidelines' admonition to district courts to
view the defendants testimony "in a light
most favorable to the defendant" What-
ever light is held to it, a defendant's testi-
mony that has been apparently rejected in
material respects by a jury will almost al-
ways compel a finding of untruthfulness.
If the district court does not so find, the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review
may actually be tested, but, of course, on
the governments appeal.
D.
We who have been schooled and im-
mersed in our system of law are perhaps
too quick to make the jury an infallible icon
and a witness' oath a sacred rite; we ig-
nore the human infirmities that flaw both.
In short, our love of our system easily
produces a chauvinistic faith in its perfec-
tion.
UNNIGAN 185
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Nearly twenty years ago, in announcing
this circuit's rule permitting, as Grayson
later did, consideration of a defendant's
perjury in setting an indeterminate sen-
tence, Judge Butzner cautioned us to re-
member these frailties.
[S]entencing judges should not indiscriin-
inately treat as a perjurer every convict-
ed defendant who has testified in his own
defense. Witnesses induced by sordid
motives or fear have been known to fa-
bricate accusations with such guile that
even conscientious triers of fact have
been misled. Moreover, some essential
elements of proof of criminal conduct,
such as knowledge, intent, malice, and
premeditation are sometimes so subjec-
tive that testimony about them cannot be
readily categorized as true or false.
Judges must constantly bear in mind
that neither they nor jurors are infallible.
A verdict of guilty means only that guilt
has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, not that the defendant has lied in
maintaining his innocence.
United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284,
1287-1288 (4th Cir.1973).
The rigidity of the guidelines makes the
§ 3C1.1 enhancement for a disbelieved de-
nial of guilt under oath an intolerable bur-
den upon the defendant's right to testify in
his own behalf. Consequently, though we
affirm Dunnigan's conviction, we remand
for resentencing without the enhancement
for obstruction of justice.
CONVIC7ON AFFIRMED; SEN-
TENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.
ARNnsyM
STATE v
Cie as 813 P.2d
that such endorsements do not impose pri-
mary liability as a matter of law on the
insurer of the licensed carrier under whose
permit a vehicle is in use at the time of an
accident Truck Ins. Exchange v. Trans-
port Indemnity Co. (1979), 180 Mont 419,
430, 591 P.2d 188, 194. Furthermore, as
noted above, the intent of the parties is
controlled by the clear, explicit and unam-
biguous language of the contract in this
case.
(7] Finally, USF & G urges this Court
to consider the difference in the respective
premiums paid by Bunday to Canal ($30,-
180.00) and USF & G ($1,890.00) to insure
the different aspects of Bunday's business
as evidence that the parties intended for
this type of accident to be covered by Ca-
nal's policy rather than USF & G's. The
District Court noted that
The pertinent part of the applicable
USF & G policy is Part II, "Business
Autos." Part II, Letter C, states that
trailers with a load capacity of two thou-
sand (2,000) pounds or less, designed to
travel on public roads, are covered autos.
This language would exclude a semi-trail-
er ... as was involved in the North case.
Unfortunately for USF & G, it made an
underwriting error on the declaration
page of its policy, thereby extending cov-
erage to "any auto" rather than business
automobiles specifically described on the
attachment to the policy.
A fair reading of the two policies clear-
ly reflects that USF & G was not insur-
ing Bunday's over-the-road hauling oper-
ation, but that Canal was.
The size of the premium may be a factor
considered "in construing doubtful clauses
in a policy." 2 Couch on Insurance 2d,
f 15.52 (1984); see also Pan American
World Airways v. Aetna Casualty &
Sarety (2d Cir.1974), 505 F.2d 989, 1001, at
A. 10. Here, the clause is not "doubtful,"
ambiguous, or uncertain, and we need not
look beyond the language of the contract
Purthermore, USF & G is arguing that it
should not be held liable due to a technical
Olistake in underwriting when the contracts
taken together indicate that Canal was in-
suring the liability at issue here. We note
. IMLAY Mont 979
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that if USF & G had not made that mis-
take, its policy definitions would be orga-
nized in a manner similar to Canal's policy,
and it would not be liable. Canal should
not be faulted for USF & G's mistake in
underwriting.
[81 This Court has the power to reverse
the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment and order it to enter summary judg-
ment in favor of the other party as a mat-
ter of law only when it is clear that all the
facts bearing on the issues are before this
Court. Hereford v. Hereford (1979), 183
Mont. 104, 110, 598 P.2d 600, 603; citing
Swecker v. Dorn (1979), 181 Mont. 436,
441, 593 P.2d 1055, 1058-9; 6 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice 1 56.12, p. 56-337. There are
no genuine issues of material fact in this
case. We conclude that the trailers were
not "owned automobiles" within the cover-
age of Canal's policy and direct that judg-
ment be entered in favor of Canal. The
order of the District Court is
REVERSED. Summary Judgment is or-
dered in favor of Canal.
TURNAGE, Ci., and HARRISON,
GRAY, HUNT and WEBER, JJ., concur.
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The Supreme Court, Trieweiler, J., held
that criminal defendant cannot, as condi-
tion of suspended sentence, be compelled to
admit that he is guilty of crime of which he
has been accused and convicted.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Criminal Law e-982.5(2)
Criminal defendant cannot, as condi-
tion of suspended sentence, be compelled to
admit that he is guilty of crime of which he
has been accused and convicted; overruling
State v. Donnelly, 244 Mont. 371, 798 P.2d
89.
2. Criminal Law e982.9(1)
Sexual assault defendant's suspended
sentence, conditioned upon his completion
of sexual therapy program, could not be
revoked where basis for his failure to com-
plete program was his refusal to admit
guilt.
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TRIEWEILER, Justice.
Following a jury trial, the defendant,
Donald Glenn Imlay, was convicted in Dis-
trict Court of sexual assault, a felony, in
violation of § 45-6-502, MCA. Based on
that conviction, he was sentenced by the
District Court to five years in the Montana
State Prison. However, all but 35 days of
that sentence were suspended, and the de-
fendant was placed on formal probation,
under certain conditions, including the con-
dition that he enroll in and complete a
sexual therapy program. When the defen-
dant enrolled in, but was unable to com-
plete the sexual therapy program, his sus-
pended sentence was revoked and he was
ordered imprisoned at the Montana State
Prison for the remainder of his five-year
term. The defendant appeals from the Dis.
trict Court's order revoking his suspended
sentence. We reverse the order of the
District Court.
On appeal, the defendant raises several
issues. We find the following issue, as
restated by this Court, to be contyolling-
Can a criminal defendant, as a condition
of a suspended sentence, be compelled to
admit that he is .guilty of the crime of
which he has been accused and convicted?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 9, 1989, the State of Montana
was granted leave to file an Information
charging the defendant with three counts
of sexual assault, a felony. On September
5, 1989, that Information was amended so
that the acts complained of were combined
into one count The basis for the Informa-
tion was the allegation that on April 11,
1989, the defendant fondled the vaginal
area of a seven-year-old girl while she was
present at his Great Falls grocery store.
The Information was based on statements
made by the girl to her teacher after she
arrived at school several hours late.
This case went to trial on September 11,
1989, and the jury returned its verdict on
September 13, 1989, finding the defendant
guilty of the crime charged.
Prior to sentencing, the usual pre-sen-
tence investigation was conducted, includ-
ing a psychological evaluation of the defen-
dant. As a result of that investigation, the
District Court found that the defendant
was a 56-year-old widower who had raised
four adult children and had.an exteniv
history of full-time employment. He had
no prior criminal record, nor was there a
prior history of any complaints of similar
conduct by the defendant.
The psychologist who examined the de-
fendant, as part of the pretrial investiga-
tion, concluded that he was suffering from
post-traumatic stress syndrome and was a
a severely depressed state of mind- 0*
recommended that the defendant not- b
incarcerated, but that he be involved in s
mental health therapeutic program w
psychiatric work and counseling.
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Based upon its pre-sentence investiga-
tion, the District Court found that the de-
fendant was not a dangerous person, that
his offense was an isolated incident, and
that it would not be repeated in the future.
The court also found that the defendant
was suffering from medical problems, and
that incarceration in the State Prison was
not an appropriate penalty.
The defendant's sentencing hearing was
held on October 17, 1989. On that same
date, the District Court sentenced the de-
fendant to five years in the Montana State
Prison. However, execution of the sen-
tence was suspended, except for the 35
days he had already served in the Cascade
County Jail. He was placed on formal
supervised probation under the rules and
regulations of the Adult Probation and Pa-
role Bureau and was ordered to enroll in a
sexual therapy program at his own ex-
pense, and to continue in that program
until it was no longer deemed necessary by
his therapist The specific sentence provi-
sion regarding sexual therapy was as fol-
lows:
The defendant is to immediately enroll in
a sexual therapy program at his own
expense and continue said program until
his therapist deems further counseling
and therapy unnecessary. The Court
would recommend that the defendant ob-
tain his therapy at the sexual offender
treatment program located in Helena,
Montana.
As conditions of his suspended sentence,
the defendant was also ordered to pay any
counseling costs incurred by the victim and
prohibited from being around children un-
less another adult was present
On June 8, 1990, the County Attorney
petitioned the District Court for revocation
of the defendant's suspended sentence for
two reasons: (1) the State contended that
the defendant was not gainfully employed;
and (2) the State alleged that the defendant
had not completed the sexual treatment
Program which was a condition of his sus-
pended sentence.
The defendant denied violating the terms
of his suspended sentence, and an eviden-
tiary hearing was conducted on August 31,
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1990. At that hearing, the defendant's pro-
bation officer, and the counselor to whom
he had been referred for sexual therapy,
testified. The defendant also testified on
his own behalf.
The defendant testified that at that time
he was living with his mother in Absarokee -
where he had moved following trial be-
cause he no longer had a business, a job, or
any income.
He had interviewed for and sought work
as an electrician, and as a custodian, but
was unable to satisfy the physical require-
ments for either job. He suffered from
high blood pressure and degenerative joint
disease.
When unable to find employment, the
defendant had applied for vocational reha-
bilitation through the State Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services. After
an independent medical examination, he
had apparently qualified for those services
and was being retrained by SRS to do
leather work which he was performing at
his mother's home. He had sold some of
the work and had orders for more items
which he had been unable to complete.
He testified that in order to comply with
the court's order regarding enrollment in a
sex offender program he contacted his pro-
bation officer, who referred him to Mike
Sullivan, a counselor in Billings, Montana.
He scheduled and attended a number of
counseling sessions, but was finally ad-
vised that he did not qualify for Sullivan's
treatment program because he would not
admit that he was guilty of the crime of
which he had been charged and convicted.
He then talked to Ron Silvers, the director
of the sexual offender program in Helena,
and was told that he would not be admitted
to that program either.
Michael Sullivan testified that he is a
licensed clinical social worker practicing in
Billings, and was director of a program
known as South Central Treatment Associ-
ates. He has a bachelor's degree in psy-
chology, a master's degree in associate
work, and is a licensed social worker in the
State of Montana. At the time of the de-
fendant's hearing, Sullivan had been.in-.
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volved in the treatment of sexual offenders
for approximately five years.
The defendant first saw Mr. Sullivan, by
referral from his probation officer, on No-
vember 20, 1989, and saw him on five sub-
sequent occasions over the next six
months. Each appointment was scheduled
by the defendant. The defendant attended
every scheduled appointment. He was de-
scribed by Sullivan as pleasant, friendly,
never angry or abusive, and always punctu-
al.
Sullivan performed a series of tests on
the defendant There were no indications
in those tests that the defendant was capa-
ble of violent conduct However, from
those tests and his contacts with the defen-
dant, Sullivan formed the impression that
the defendant was not amenable to outpa-
tient sexual offender treatment because he
did not admit that he committed a sexual
offense. Sullivan testified that the defen-
dant's denial made it impossible for him to
treat him in their program. He also testi-
fied that there was no other outpatient
sexual therapy program in the State of
Montana which would treat a sexual of-
fender who denied that he was guilty of
sexual misconduct.
He confirmed that after the defendant
had been rejected from his program, the
defendant had sought treatment from Ron
Silvers at the sexual therapy program in
Helena, and that he (Sullivan) had been
contacted by Silvers to determine why the
defendant had been unacceptable for the
Billings program.
Sullivan recommended a form of inpa-
tient treatment, which is more structured
and continuous, because in such a program
it is more difficult for a patient to maintain
defensive postures, such as denial. He tes-
tified that the only inpatient treatment pro-
gram in the State of Montana was the one
at the Montana State Prison.
Based upon the foregoing evidence, the
District Court found that the State's com-
plaint about the defendant's lack of em-
ployment was not well founded. The court
found that the defendant was making a
bona fide effort to maintain employment
and was actively pursuing vocational reha.
bilitation.
However, regarding the State's second
basis for its petition to revoke the suspend.
ed sentence, the court made the following
conclusion:
The Court concludes that the defendant
has violated the condition of his suspend-
ed sentence by not enrolling (not being
amenable to -treatment and hence, not
acceptable into an out-patient treatment
program) in a sex offender treatment
program and said violation was proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.
... Because the only viable alternative is
an inpatient treatment program, the
Court concludes that the defendant's sus-
pended sentence must be revoked and
the defendant ordered to serve FIVE (5)
years in the Montana State Prison with
credit for 35 days.
It is recommended to the Warden of the
Prison that the defendant not be eligible
for parole until he has completed the
sexual offender treatment program at
the Prison. However, it is also recom-
mended that upon completion of the pro-
gram, the defendant be considered for
parole. The defendant is designated as a
non-dangerous offender for parole eligi-
bility purposes.
The defendant, through his attorney, ob-
jected at the time that the sentence was
revoked on the grounds that the District
Court was conditioning suspension of the
defendant's sentence on an admission of
guilt, and cited authority to the District
Court that it could not force the defendant
to plead guilty. The issue previously stat-
ed, therefore, was properly preserved for
appeal.
DISCUSSION
While the District Court's order revoding
the defendant's suspended sentence a
predicated upon the defendant's failure to
enroll in a sex offender treatment program,
it is clear that the defendant's incarceration
at the Montana State Prison is directlY
related to his refusal to admit that he com.
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mitted a crime. The defendant made every
other effort possible to enroll in and com-
plete a sex offender treatment program.
He sought a referral from his probation
officer. He followed up that referral by
scheduling not one, but six consecutive ap-
pointments. He attended every appoint-
ment in a timely fashion, and other than
admitting his guilt, cooperated in every
manner possible while at those appoint-
ments. When he was rejected by the coun-
selor with whom he had spent six months,
he tried to find another sex offender treat-
ment program that would admit and treat
him, and was rejected a second time. Fi-
nally, he was advised that there was no
outpatient sex offender treatment program
in Montana that would accept him.
It is clear that the only thing the defen-
dant has failed to do is admit that he com-
mitted the crime for which he was convict-
ed. Whether or not punishment can be
augmented because of a defendants refus-
al to admit guilt, even after he has been
convicted, is a question on which the feder-
al courts are not in agreement. Further-
more, this Court has made contradictory
statements in answer to that same issue.
The majority of federal courts of appeal
which have addressed this issue follow the
decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1966).
In that case, prior to imposing sentence,
the district court judge advised the defen-
dant that if he confessed his guilt the court
would take his confession into considera-
tion in determining the length of his sen-
tence, but that if he persisted in his denial
of guilt, that denial would also be taken
into account. Because the defendant chose
to continue denying guilt, he was sentenced
to the maximum term permitted by law.
That sentence was vacated by the Fifth
Circuit, based on its conclusion that the
alternatives presented to the defendant vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment right not to be
a witness against himself. The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the defendant
had already been convicted, but pointed
out
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It must be remembered that, at the time
of his allocution, Thomas had not been
finally and irrevocably adjudged guilty.
Still open to him were the processes of
motion for new trial (including the oppor-
tunity to discover new evidence), appeal,
petition for certiorari, and collateral at-
tack. Indeed, appeal is now an integral
part of the trial system for finally adjudi-
cating the guilt or innocence of a defen-
dant
The two "ifs" which the district court
presented to Thomas placed him in a
terrible dilemma. If he chose the first
"if," he would elect to forego all of the
above-noted post-conviction remedies and
to confess to the crime of perjury, how-
ever remote his prosecution for perjury
might seem. Moreover, he would aban-
don the right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to choose not to be a witness
against himself, not only as to the crime
of which he had been convicted, but also
as to the crime of perjury. His choice of
the second "if" was made after the warn-
ing that the sentence to be imposed
would be for a longer term than would
be imposed if he confessed. From the
record, it is clear that an ultimatum of a
type which we cannot ignore or approve
confronted Thomas. Truly, the district
court put Thomas "between the devil and
the deep blue sea."
Thomas suffered the consequences for
choosing the second "if" ... in the form
of a longer prison term. When Thomas
received harsher punishment than the
court would have decreed had he waived
his Fifth Amendment rights, he paid a
judicially imposed penalty for exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Upon this ground alone, we think that his
sentence is "subject to collateral attack,"
and have little doubt as to the authority
and duty of the district court to vacate
the sentence.
Thomas, 368 F.2d at 945-46. In accord
with Thomas, are Scott v. United States,
419 F.2d 264 (D.C.Cir.1969); United States
v. Laca, 499 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.1974); Unit-
ed States v. Wright 533 F.2d 214 (5th
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Cir.1976). In Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d
393 (3d Cir.1975), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded
that augmentation of a post-conviction sen-
tence based on refusal to admit guilt violat-
ed the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.
In the past, this Court has given appar-
ent approval to the Thomas rule. Al-
though the case of In the Matter of Jones,
176 Mont 412, 578 P.2d 1150 (1978), was
decided on other grounds, we cited with
approval the following rule of law in that
case:
While the sentencing judge may take into
account his belief that the defendant was
not candid with the court this is to be
distinguished from the rule that a sen-
tence may not be augmented because a
defendant refuses to confess or invokes
his privilege against self-incrimination.
Fox v. State, (1977 Alaska), 569 P.2d
1335, 1338. See: United States v. Gar-
cia, (3rd Cir., 1976), 544 F.2d 681, 685;
United States v. Acosta, (5th Cir., 1975),
509 F.2d 539, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891,
96 S.CL 188, 46 LEd.2d 122 (1975);
United States v. Rogers, (5th Cir., 1974),
504 F.2d 1079, 1085, cert. denied, 422
. U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct 2655, 45 L.Ed.2d 693
(1975).
The only Federal Circuit which appears
to have arrived at a contrary conclusion is
the Ninth Circuit.
In Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d
520 (9th Cir.1969), the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the Thomas decision
and chose not to follow it. In that case,
the defendant was also given a stiffer sen-
tence because of his refusal to admit guilt
after he was convicted, and challenged that
sentence as a violation of his Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit, on balance, placed
greater importance on the criminal justice
system's objective of rehabilitation, than on
a defendant's continued right to deny guilt.
In rejecting the Thomas rationale, the
Ninth Circuit has stated:
This case presents a dilemma which ev-
ery trial judge faces at the time of sen-
tence. It is almost axiomatic that th&first step toward rehabilitation of an of
fender is the offender's recognition thahe was at fault. In the present state ofthe criminal law, there is no doubt that
punishment is still a consideration in the
imposition of sentence, especially wher
non-violent or economic crimes are i6.
volved. But to the extent that rehabilita.
tion is the objective, no fault can be
found of the judge who takes into conzid.
eration the extent of a defendant's reha.
bilitation at the time of sentence.
Gollaher chose to insist upon his imo.
cence. The judge, bound by the jury's
verdict and apparently also being firuly
convinced by the evidence that Gollaher
was guilty, proceeded accordingly. He
had before him a man unwilling to take
the first step toward rehabilitation and
he imposed sentence accordingly. Gol-
laher's Fifth Amendment rights were not
infringed.
Gollaher, 419 F.2d at 530-31.
Our prior decision in State v. Donnelly,
244 Mont. 371, 798 P.2d 89 (1990), appears
to be in accord with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Gollaher. In Donnelly, we
were asked to decide whether a defendant,
who was already imprisoned at the Mon-
tana State Prison, was denied his right to
avoid self-incrimination when he was de-
nied parole until he completed a sex offend-
er course at the Prison. Interestingly, the
evidence in that case was that in order to
be accepted into the inpatient sexual of-.
fender program at the Prison, that defen-
dant also had to admit that he committed
the crime of which he was convicted.
(Therefore, if the trial court's objective in
this case was to obtain treatment for Don-
ald Imlay, imprisonment does not appear to
be the solution.) At any rate, we found
that denying probation under those circum-
stances did not violate the defendant's priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. Our deci-
sion appears to have been based on the
following conclusion: .
Here, defendant's decision to remaih si-
lent is a tactical one, not a compelled one.
Defense counsel argues that, in reality,
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defendant's testimony is in fact com-
pelled since it is a prerequisite for parole.
It is possible the defendant may be pa-
roled sooner if he admits to incest than if
he remains silent. However, defendant
may remain silent if he so chooses, and
still possibly be paroled at some future
date based on good behavior.
Furthermore, failure to admit to incest
will not result in certain penalty to defen-
dant, it will only result to preserve his
current ineligible parole status. In this
case, the district court ordered that the
defendant was ineligible for parole until
the satisfaction of a condition subse-
quent. The condition subsequent is par-
tially satisfied by defendant's successful
completion of the sexual offender pro-
gram at Montana State Prison. Failure
to satisfy this condition subsequent, i.e.,
failure to satisfactorily complete the sex
offender program, will not result in a
penalty, but will merely result in defen-
dant's continued ineligibility for parole.
Donnelly, 244 Montat 382, 798 P.2d at 96.
Without debating the merits of the fore-
going conclusion from Donnelly, it is clear
that in this case the defendant is being
subjected to a penalty that he would not
otherwise be subjected to if he would sim-
ply admit his guilt. That penalty is that he
serve time in the Montana State Prison.
Even though the defendant has already
been convicted of the crime that he denies,
our system still provides, as noted in the
Thomas decision, for opportunities to chal-
lenge that conviction. For example, the
defendant still had the right to challenge
his conviction, based on newly discovered
evidence, or by collateral attack. -These
are important rights guaranteed to every
defendant under our criminal justice sys-
tem, but would be rendered meaningless if
the defendant could be compelled to admit
guilt as a condition to his continued free-
dom. Furthermore, while such a defendant
would be foreclosed from invoking the pro-
tection of such procedures to establish his
innocence, the reliability of an admission of
guilt under such circumstances would be
highly suspect. In addition, by admitting
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guilt in this case, the defendant would have
to abandon his right guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment, not only as to the crime
for which he has been convicted, but also to
the crime of perjury. He testified in his
own defense during his trial and denied
committing the offense with which he was
charged.
(1, 2] Under these circumstances, and
absent any grant of immunity, we believe
that the better reasoned decisions are those
decisions which protect the defendant's
constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion, and which prohibit augmenting a de-
fendant's sentence because he refuses to
confess to a crime or invokes his privilege
against self-incrimination. To the extent
that our decision in Donnelly is inconsist-
ent with this opinion, that part of the Don-
nelly decision is overruled.
The sentence of the District Court is
vacated and this case remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.
TURNAGE, CJ., and HARRISON,
HUNT and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
MEYUMNSMM
Thomas OWENS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
V.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
a corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 90-530.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs May 10, 1991.
Decided June 25, 1991.
Buyer of pickup truck sued manufac-
turer, alleging breach of express warranty
and breach of implied warranty of mer-
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"If the account of the evidence is plau-
sible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, (the reviewing) court may not
reverse it even though convinced that
had it been sitting as the trier of fact it
would have weighed the evidence differ-
ently. Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous. 450 U.S. at 574 (105 S.Ct. at
1511-12]. (emphasis supplied). See
also, Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493 (6th
Cir.1987); Brown, supra."
Second, it is indeed ironic that, like the
Magistrate, Judge Boggs finds the compa-
ny's excuse for Ms. Galbraith's termination
"unworthy of belief" which necessarily es-
tablishes the prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination. US. Postal Service Bd. of
Gov. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct.
1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). As the Ai-
kens court explained "the plaintiff ... may
succeed ... either by directly persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more.
likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Id.
at 716, 103 S.Ct. at 1482 (citing Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.) The
plaintiff here chose the second method of
proof and the magistrate concluded in his
findings that the defendants committed an
unlawful termination. Following the Bur-
dine analysis, the defendant here had the
burden of production to "clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evi-
dence, the reasons for the plaintiffs" ter-
mination. Burdine at 255, 101 S.Ct. at
1094-95. Moreover, as the Court noted,
"an articulation not admitted as evidence
will not suffice." Id. at n. 9. In light of
the defendant's insistence that the termi-
nation was based on their so-called "volun-
tary termination" policy deemed by the
Magistrate and this court as "unworthy of
belief," there is simply no legal justifica-
tion to rule in their favor.
Yet, instead of affording the plaintiff her
rightful remedy under the law, Judge
Boggs supposes some other legitimate rea-
son existed for the termination, one un-
related to racial discrimination. There is
absolutely no admitted evidence of some
other valid reason for the defendant's acts.
In effect, then, this decision compounds
error with error and in the process turns
disparate treatment analysis on its head.
In one breath he admonishes the company
for its lack of candor, but, in the next
implies that, despite the incredible nature
of the explanation, the termination was
somehow legitimate.
Judge Guy, in his concurrence, is trou-
bled with these impermissible factual find.
ings. I, instead, am distressed by the
choice of a judicial tongue-lashing as the
sole remedy for this aggrieved plaintiff.
Once she established the pretextual pre-
sumption, Northern Telecom had the com-
plete burden to demonstrate a factually
legitimate reason for Ms. Galbraith's termi-
nation, not merely articulate a "sham" ex-
cuse. This is the essence of the Title VII
pretext analysis. Because Northern Tele-
com clearly refused to do this, I would
uphold the Magistrate that the defendant
should be held fully liable under the reme-
dial provisions of Title VII. Accordingly, I
dissent.
Robert Allen WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Petitioner-Appellee,
V.
Pamela WITHROW, Respondent-
Appellant.
No. 90-2289.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued May 16, 1991.
Decided Sept. 11, 1991.
Inmate petitioned for writ of habeas
corpus. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, Bar-
bara K. Hackett, J., granted petition.
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Warden appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) under totality of circumstances,
petitioner's statements during interroga-
tion were coerced and should have been
suppressed; (2) admission of those state-
ments was not harmless error- and (3) cus-
todial interrogation was appropriate issue
for collateral review on petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
1. Habeas Corpus Q842, 846
Court of Appeals renders de novo re-
view of habeas corpus proceeding in dis-
trict court to determine whether petitioner
received a fundamentally fair trial; how-
ever, court must give complete deference
to state court's findings of fact and render
clearly erroneous review to district court's
factual findings. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).
2. Criminal Law e412.1(2)
Individual suspected of being involved
in murders was in custody at time of pre-
Miranda warning round of questioning at
police station, during which police officers
repeatedly conveyed to him the seriousness
of his situation and gave him the choice of
cooperating with them or going to jail.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
3. Criminal Law 'e412.2(5)
Inculpatory statements following Mi-
randa warning may be admissible even
though they follow on heels of unwarned
statements if they are determined to be
uncoerced and voluntary. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 5.
4. Criminal Law e-412.1(2)
Inculpatory statements made by sus-
pect during custodial interrogation were
coerced, under totality of the circum-
stances; defendant had been threatened
with imprisonment if he did not cooperate
and promised leniency if he did. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
5. Courts c100(1)
In general, new rules are only applica-
ble to habeas corpus cases in two narrowly
defined instances: (1) new rule that places
entire category of primary conduct beyond
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reach of criminal law or (2) new "water-
shed" rules of criminal procedure neces-
sary to criminal proceeding's fundamental
fairness.
6. Courts *-100(1)
Fulminante decision of the United
States Supreme Court, holding that admis-
sion of involuntary confession is subject to
harmless error analysis, applied retroac-
tively in habeas corpus case; prior to that
decision, use of involuntary confession to
support conviction was due process viola-
tion regardless of whether evidence apart
from confession existed, so decision altered
court's understanding of bedrock procedur-
al elements. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
14.
7. Habeas Corpus 0490(3)
Admission of involuntary confession
was harmful error warranting habeas re-
lief; no lawful confessions had been admit-
ted and the other trial evidence against
petitioner, while substantial, was not mas-
sive or overwhelming.
8. Habeas Corpus e=490(3)
Custodial interrogation is appropriate
issue for collateral review on petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
Daniel P. O'Neil, Traverse City, Mich.
(argued and briefed), for petitioner-appel-
lee.
Robert Allen Williams, pro se.
Timothy A. Baughman, John D. O'Hair,
Pros. Atty., Jeffrey W. Caminsky (argued
and briefed), Detroit, Mich., Becky M. La-
miman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Suzanne L Wil-
helm, Office of Atty. Gen., Habeas Div.,
Lansing, Mich., for respondent-appellant.
Before JONES and RYAN, Circuit
Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Pamela Withrow, the warden
of the Michigan Reformatory, appeals from
an order of the district court granting the
habeas corpus petition of Robert Allen
Williams, Jr. As we discern no error in the
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district court's grant of Williams' habeas
corpus petition, we affirm.
I
On April 6, 1985, police officers in Romu-
lus, Michigan discovered two males shot to
death in a parked car. Responding to a
rumor, Detective Sgt. David Early of the
Romulus Police Department went to
Williams' house to question him on April
10, 1985. At the house, Williams was
searched but not handcuffed, and was
asked to accompany Sgt. Early to the police
station. When Williams arrived at the po-
lice station, he was questioned by Sgt. Ear-
ly and his partner, Sgt Ondejko. Williams
was not given Miranda warnings before
this first round of questioning. After
Williams denied having any information
about the murders, Early told Williams
that "the main thing on this is we want the
shooter. We're not real interested in who
was there or who was along for the ride or
anything else. We get the shooter on this
and we're gonna pretty well be content."
Williams continued to deny being present
at the scene, prompting Early to state:
You know everything that went down.
You just don't want to talk about it.
What it's gonna amount to is you can
talk about it now and give us the truth
and we're gonna check it out and see if it
fits or else we're simply gonna charge
you and lock you up and you can just tell
it to a defense attorney and let him try
and prove differently. We're not play-
ing. We've been chasing around on this
too fuckin' long.
Sgt. Early then gave Williams the choice of
answering his questions or being formally
charged. Sgt. Early also told Williams that
he had "big problems", that the police were
close to issuing an arrest warrant for him,
and that the police knew of witnesses who
would testify against Williams. At this
point, Williams admitted that he had pro-
vided the murder weapon because he want-
ed to sell the gun, and that the murderer
had called him after the crime and told him
he had discarded the gun and his clothes in
the river. Questioning continued, with the
police again insisting that they were only
interested in finding the shooter. Williams
again denied being present at the scene of
the crime. Sgt. Early later testified that
the April 10 interrogation proceeded for
"approximately 35 to 40 minutes" before
Williams was read his Miranda rights.
Williams was questioned a second time on
April 10, 1985, and again on April 12. Mi-
randa warnings were given prior to the
second session on April 10, and before the
April 12 session, and Williams indicated his
understanding of his rights.
At the second interrogation on April 10,
the following exchange took place between
Williams, Sgt. Early, and Sgt. Ondejko:
Ondejko: Do you wish to change your
story?
Williams: What difference is it going to
make?
Ondejko: It's gonna make a lot of differ-
ence to you.
Early: I told you. If you told the truth
Williams: I've been telling you the truth.
Early: Oh, you've been making up fairy
tales ever since you've been in here.
You're giving us, like he says, parts of
the truth, parts of what you want us to
believe, and part of what really hap-
pened.
Williams: If I tell you everything that
happened, I'm gonna walk outta here,
huh?
Ondejko: Someday you may stand a
chance of walking.
Early: I'll make you a deal. You tell us
everything that happened and you tell us
the truth and I confirm it on a polygraph
that you're telling us the truth. Yeah,
you walk.
Following this exchange, Williams admit-
ted driving Mark Sennett, identified as the
shooter, to the scene of the murders follow-
ing behind the victims' car. He also admit-
ted that he turned his car around at the
request of Sennett, that he heard shots and
muzzle flashes, and that he drove Sennett
away from the scene and helped dispose of
Sennett's clothing and the murder weapon.
Williams denied knowing that Sennett was
going to kill the two victims.
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Officer Early then elaborated on the deal
with Williams:
Early: You're worried now about us
turning this around on you and charging
you too. We've said that basically we
want you as a witness. Right?
Williams: Yes.
Early: Alright, I'm gonna tell you right
now, at the start of the recording, if we
use this recording against you, it's got to
be in its entirety. We can't edit it or cut
it. We told you if you are a witness to
this and if you are telling the truth, and
if you are willing to testify, then we are
not going to charge you as a co-defen-
dant. That's what we told you, right?
Williams: Yes.
Early: Alright. We're still gonna go by
that agreement. And I don't. (Abrupt
stop.] You've been around, but if,
whether you're up on the law, if a police
officer makes an agreement like that it's
got to be honored. You can go to court
and say we made that agreement and we
backed down on it and we can't present
these tapes and use anything else we've
got. So it's an agreement we have to
stick to by law. I can't promise you
anything and then turn around and back
out of it and use it against you.
Williams: O.K.
Early: Right now you're a witness to the
crime. But we want the truth. If you
start lying to us and you start playing
games, yeah, we're gonna charge you.
A witness doesn't do us any good unless
he tells the truth. We're not trying to
hang anybody with any made up testimo-
ny or anything but the truth. After
you're done with this, we still gonna put
you on a polygraph and you're gonna
have to show us you're telling the truth.
So that's the deal. You're telling the
truth and you're not being charged.
That fair enough?
Williams: Yeah.
On October 29, 1985, Williams was con-
victed of two counts of first-degree murder
and two counts of felony firearm charges
in the Circuit Court of Wayne County. The
state trial court excluded the statements
from April 11 and 12 as "improperly ob-
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tained" under Michigan caselaw because
the delay in actually arresting Williams
was "used as a tool to extract the state-
ments". On September 7, 1988, the Court
of Appeals of Michigan affirmed Williams'
conviction. People v. Williams, 171 Mich.
App. 234, 429 N.W.2d 649 (1989). The
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 493 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 369, 107
L.Ed.2d 355 (1989). On January 31, 1990,
Williams filed a petition for a writ of habe-
as corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan.
The district court first found that
Williams was in custody as of the moment
on April 10 when Sgt. Early gave him a
choice between answering questions or be-
ing charged. As a result, Williams should
have been given his Miranda warnings at
that point. Instead, however, the police
continued their questioning without giving
Miranda warnings, and Williams made in-
culpatory statements. Williams made fur-
ther inculpatory statements after Miranda
warnings were finally given some forty
minutes into the interrogation.
The district court evaluated the admissi-
bility of these post-Miranda statements
under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105
S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Elstad
held that there is no presumption of coer-
cion when a suspect makes incriminating
statements following earlier, unwarned
statements. In that situation, "the rele-
vant inquiry is whether; in fact, the second
statement was also voluntarily made. As
in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must
examine the surrounding circumstances
and the entire course of police conduct with
respect to the suspect in evaluating the
voluntariness of his statements." Elstad,
470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1297.
Focusing on whether Williams' admis-
sions were induced by a promise of lenien-
cy, the district court concluded that:
In the context of this uncounseled in-
terrogation, following a session where
police had obtained unwarned admissions
and repeatedly suggested that they were
only interested in finding out who the
actual shooter was, this Court finds that
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the statement that petitioner would
"walk" if he told the truth constituted a
promise of leniency sufficient to over-
come petitioner's will and render his ad-
missions involuntary. As Justice White
indicated in Brady [v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747
(1970) J, "[i]n such circumstances, even a
mild promise of leniency (may be] suffi-
cient to bar the confession, not because
the promise was an illegal act as such,
but because defendants at such times are
too sensitive to inducement and the possi-
ble impact on them too great to ignore
and too difficult to assess." Brady, su-
pra, at 754, 90 S.Ct. at 1472.
The district court declared that Williams'
inculpatory statements on April 10 ob-
tained after the Miranda warnings were
given violated the dictates of Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) because of the coercion.
See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568
(1897) (to be admissible, a confession must
be "free and voluntary: that is, must not
be extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or im-
plied promises, however slight, nor by the
exertion of any improper influence.").
The district court also considered the
statements under harmless error analysis.
United States v. Wolf 879 F.2d 1320, 1323
(6th Cir.1989) ("Appellate courts, including
our own, have applied the harmless error
analysis to [otherwise voluntary] confes-
sions admitted in violation of the related
rules of Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 LEd.2d 378 (1981) ]
and Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 LEd.2d 694 (1966) ]."). The
district court found that sufficient evidence
to convict independent of the confession did
not exist; therefore, admission of the con-
fession was not harmless error.
On October 29, 1990, the district court
granted Williams' petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and gave Michigan ninety
1. The government's brief argued that the federal
grounds for relief were never fairly presented to
the state court for review. At oral argument,
days to "take steps to provide" Williams
with a new trial. This appeal followed.
II
(1] This court renders de novo review
of a habeas corpus proceeding in the dis-
trict court to determine whether the peti-
tioner received a fundamentally fair trial.
See Lundy v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 467, 469-
70 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 110 S.Ct. 2212, 109 LEd.2d 538
(1990). However, this court must give
complete deference to the state court's
findings of fact, and render clearly errone-
ous review to the district court's factual
findings. Id
(21 The principal issue in this appeal is
whether the record discloses a fifth amend-
ment violation sufficient to warrant habeas
relief.' Withrow argues that there was no
violation of Williams' fifth amendment
rights because Williams was not in custody
until he made an inciiminating statement,
at which point he was Mirandaized. This
argument is supported by the state trial
court and the Michigan Court of Appeals,
which both found that Williams "was not in
custody until he was read his rights."
Williams, 429 N.W.2d at 651. Thus, con-
tends Withrow, because the federal habeas
statute "requires the federal courts to
show a high measure of deference to the
factfindings made by the state courts",
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598, 102
S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (per
curiam), the district court exceeded its
mandate by not explaining in sufficient de-
tail why "the record in the State court
proceeding, considered as a whole, does not
fairly support such factual determination."
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
The district court did-recognize its obli-
gation to defer to the state court's factual
findings. With respect to the crucial "in
custody" determination, however, the dis-
trict court recognized that "the overall
question of whether petitioner was in cus-
tody is a mixed question of fact and law
which requires an independent federal de-
the government conceded that this position was
without merit.
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termination." Even if custody is a factual
determination entitled to a presumption of
correctness, however, the district court
found that "this particular state court find-
ing is so completely devoid of support in
the record that the presumption is over-
come.
We find that the district court correctly
decided that Williams was "in custody"
when Sgt. Early told him "you can talk
about it now and give us the truth and
we're gonna check it out and see if it fits
or else we're simply gonna charge you
and lock you up [.]" (Emphasis added.)
Two police officers came to Williams'
house, searched him, put him in an un-
marked police car, and transported him the
police station. The officers repeatedly con-
veyed to Williams the seriousness of his
situation, and threatened him with arrest.
Williams was given the choice of cooperat-
ing with the police or going to jail. The
district judge, who listened to an audio tape
of the interrogation, found the officers'
tone to be "severe and accusatory." Clear-
ly, a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave; therefore, Williams was in custo-
dy. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966) ("[C]ustodial interrogation ... [is]
questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way.").
(31 Williams' inculpatory statements af-
ter he was given Miranda warnings could
be admissible, even though the statements
followed on the heels of unwarned state-
ments, if the statements are determined to
be uncoerced and voluntary. Oregon v.
Elsta4 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285,
1293, 84 LEd.2d 222 (1985). "'[Tlhe ulti-
mate issue of "voluntariness" is a legal
question requiring independent federal de-
termination."' Arizona v. -Fulminante,
- U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252, 113
LEd.2d 302 (1991) (citations omitted).
Withrow contends that the district court
incorrectly concluded that Williams' state-
Tnents were involuntary under Oregon v.
Elstad because there was no overreaching
or coercion by the police. The police mere-
ly offered Williams a conditional incentive
to tell the truth, and the fact that Williams
did not fulfill his part of the bargain by
telling the truth should not lead to the
suppression of his statement. The police,
asserts Withrow, intended to live up to
their part of the bargain. Officer Early
testified that "I told Mr. Williams that if he
was a witness, and he had no active part in
the crime, and that could be confirmed by
polygraph, that he would not be charged."
(4] The district court relied on the "the
surrounding circumstances and the entire
course of police conduct with respect to the
suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of
his statements." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318,
105 S.Ct. at 1298. We believe that an
evaluation of "the entire course of police
conduct" in this case establishes that
Williams' statements were not voluntary.
His statements were conditioned on his be-
lief that he would be released if he talked.
The officers' promises of leniency were in-
tended to induce Williams' admissions.
We recognize that the success of a crimi-
nal investigation often hinges on obtaining
information from uncooperative individu-
als. Indeed, niany otherwise unobtainable
convictions are secured through extending
immunity in exchange for a defendant's
testimony against more culpable co-defen-
dants. The necessity *of foregoing the
prosecution of an informant in order to
convict the ringleaders is an altogether dif-
ferent situation from the deliberate induce-
ment of inculpatory statements through il-
lusory promises of leniency. Even in situa-
tions where immunity is not envisaged, we
have no doubt that effective interrogation
techniques require, to some extent, a car-
rot-and-stick approach to eliciting informa-
tion from an uncooperative suspect. How-
ever, when promises of leniency, coupled
with threats of immediate imprisonment,
have a coercive effect on a suspect, we are
obliged to inquire whether "the 'coercion'
in question was sufficient to overbear the
will of the accused." McCall v. Dutton,
863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1744, 104 LEd.2d
181 (1989) (three factors of voluntariness
test are (1) objectively coercive police activi-
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ty which (2) was sufficient to overbear the
will of the accused, and (3) petitioner's will
was overborne as a result of the coercion).
We find that, under the totality of the
circumstances of this case, Williams' state-
ments during the April 10 interrogation
were coerced in violation of the fifth
amendment and should therefore be sup-
pressed.
III
The district court granted the writ of
habeas corpus based on its conclusion that
the incriminating statements on April 10-
12 should be excluded as involuntary.
However, the state trial court had already
excluded the statements made on April 11
and 12 in September 1985, one month be-
fore Williams' bench trial. The trial judge
based the exclusion on Michigan law:
Defendant was lodged in jail, and was
questioned twice more in addition to un-
dergoing a polygraph examination before
he was arraigned on the afternoon of
April 12. Statements obtained during an
unnecessary delay in arraignment, where
the delay is used as a tool to extract the
statements, are not admissible. People
v. Mallory, 421 Mich. 229, 241; 365
NW2d 673 (1985); People v. Blade4 421
Mich. 39, 70; 365 NW2d 56 (1985).
No facts have been offered to explain the
delay in this case. The Court finds that
the delay was for the purpose of extract-
ing inculpatory statements. The state-
ments made by Defendant on April 11
and April 12 were improperly obtained
and must be excluded.
The opinion of the district court inexplic-
ably does not mention that the April 11 and
12 statements had already been excluded
by the state trial court. Withrow argues
that Judge Hackett was "completely un-
aware" that the April 11 and 12 statements
had already been excluded and were never
introduced into evidence at the bench trial.
Although the statements made on April 11-
12 were not admitted against Williams at
trial, our conclusion that the inculpatory
statements made on April 10 should have
been excluded still mandates a new trial.
Furthermore, we are convinced that the
other evidence against Williams-without
the April 10 statements-was insufficient
to support a conviction.
The district court considered the applica.
bility of United States v. Wolf 879 F.2d
1320 (6th Cir.1989), which held that "the
erroneous admission of an otherwise volun.
tary.confession obtained in violation of the
prophylactic rules of Miranda and its prog-
eny can be harmless." Id. at 1323 (cita-
tions omitted). As Wolf was not a habeas
corpus case, the district court was not re-
quired to address the harmless error issue.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Arizona v. Fulminante, - U.S. -, 111
S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), how-
ever, harmless error analysis is applicable
to the instant case. Fulminante held that
the admission of an involuntary confession
is subject to harmless error analysis. Id.,
111 S.Ct. at 1265.
[5,61 It is unclear, however, whether
Fulminante should be applied retroac-
tively to this case. In general, new rules
are only applicable to habeas corpus cases
in two narrowly defined instances: (1) if
the new rule places an entire category of
primary conduct beyond the reach of the
criminal law- or (2) new "watershed" rules
of criminal procedure necessary to a crimi-
nal proceeding's fundamental fairness.
Sawyer v. Smith, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct.
2822, 2331, 111 LEd.2d 193 (1990). Before
Fulminante, the use of an involuntary con-
fession to support a conviction was a due
process violation whether or not evidence
apart from the confession existed. It
seems clear, then, that Fulminante "al-
ter(s] our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements", 110 S.CL at 2831,
therefore harmless error analysis must be
applied.
(7] The district court applied harmless
error analysis to the involuntary confes-
sion, and concluded that:
There were no lawful confessions admit-
ted in this case. Moreover, the other
evidence against petitioner at trial, while
substantial, was not massive or over-
whelming. No witness was able to iden-
tify petitioner as being present at the
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scene of the murders. Petitioner was
linked by testimony to the murder weap-
on and to the victims. If, arguendo,
harmless error analysis did apply to the
admission of petitioner's inculpatory
statements, this court could not find that
admission of those statements was
"harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt." Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d
705 (1967).
We are in agreement with the district
court that the admission of the April 10
statements was not harmless error.
IV
(8] Finally, Withrow argues 'that custo-
dial interrogation is not an appropriate is-
sue for collateral review on petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Withrow cites to
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct.
3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), which held
that collateral relief in a habeas proceeding
was not available for defendants raising
fourth amendment search and seizure
claims, when those defendants have had a
full and fair opportunity to raise those
claims in state court. Both in his brief and
during oral argument, counsel for Withrow
evinced considerable hostility toward the
entire habeas system of review, but provid-
ed no support for extending Stone v. Pow-
ell to fifth amendment claims. Neither the
Supreme Court nor any Courts of Appeal
has ever indicated a willingness to do so.
Moreover, it is extremely unlikely the Su-
preme Court will do so anytime soon, given
its statement in Funlminante that "'the
ultimate issue of "voluntariness" is a legal
question requiring independent federal de-
termination.'" 111 S.Ct. at 1252 (citation
omitted).
V
The district court's grant of Williams'
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.
Len MARTUCCI, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Avery JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-
Appellees.
No. 89-6574.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit
Argued May 2, 1991.
Decided Sept. 12, 1991.
Former pretrial detainee filed § 1983
action alleging various constitutional viola-
tions by sheriffs department officials in
concert with State Bureau of Investigation
agent. The United States District Court,
Eastern District of Tennessee, James H.
Jarvis, J., entered summary judgment
against detainee, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Krupansky, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) detainee's placement
in segregated confinement did not consti-
tute "punishment," and, thus, did not, in
and of itself, violate due process; (2) lack
of hearing at which detainee could contest
reasons for his confinement did not violate
his procedural due process rights; (3) de-
tainee was not denied access to courts; and
(4) jailers' decision to withhold detainee's
incoming and outgoing mail did not violate
detainee's First Amendment rights.
Affirmed.
1. Civil Rights 0135
Court sitting in judgment of constitu-
tionality of jail officials' conduct must
guard against temptation to second-guess
jailers by concluding that they had less
restrictive way of solving problem at hand.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
2. Constitutional Law W272(2)
Prisons el3(5)
Conditions imposed on pretrial detainee
during his segregated confinement were
reasonably related to legitimate govern-
mental objectives of aborting his escape
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it must be assumed that at the time the tax
gfunds were received, Perez was aware
ta the BUE was attempting to collect
money from him."
When asked how he divided the tax re-
fund, Perez testified, that he "gave [his
wife] her share." He later acknowledged
that the distribution amounted to a 50/50
split. In response to a question inquiring
why he had divided the check 50/50, he
testified: "because she's on this check
here, August and Cheryl Perez, III, so
she's entitled to half of that" When asked
whether he consulted anyone regarding the
ownership of the tax refunds, he stated
that he could not recall.
The finding of intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor is a factual one which
must be reviewed under the clear error
standard. In re Olivier, 819 F.2d 550, 552
(5th Cir.1987); Matter of Reed, 700 F.2d
986, 992 (5th Cir.1983). Although "evi-
dence of actual intent to defraud creditors
is required to support a finding sufficient
to deny discharge," Reed, 700 F.2d at 991,
"(a]ctual intent may be inferred from the
actions of the debtor and may be proven by
circumstantial evidence." Matter of Chas-
tant, 873 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.1989). The
evidence in this case, although circumstan-
tial, supports the bankruptcy court's find-
ing of actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud.
Although, faced with the same evidence,
we might have arrived at a different con-
clusion, we cannot say that the bankruptcy
court's finding is clearly erroneous. See
Norris v. Hartmarc Specialty Stores,
Inc., 913 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir.1990). Con-
sequently, we must-affirm the bankruptcy
court's denial of a discharge under
§ 727(a)(2)(A). Since the outcome of this
Proceeding would not be affected by our
discussion of the satisfactory explanation
claim, we decline to reach that issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since we find no clear error in the bank-
ruptcy court's finding of intent to hinder,
v. COLLINS 1029
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delay, or defraud, we AFFIRM the judg-
ment of the district court.
X1Y NUMBSTEM
Leonel Torres HERRERA,
Petitioner-Appellee,
V.
James A. COLLLNS, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institu-
tional Division, Respondent-Appellant
No. 92-2114.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 18, 1992.
Petitioner, whose conviction of capital
murder and sentence of death had been
affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, 682 S.W.2d 313, and who had been
denied habeas corpus relief by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, 819 S.W.2d 528,
sought federal habeas corpus relief. Deni-
al of first petition was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, 904 F.2d 944, and peti-
tioner filed second petition. The United
States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas, Ricardo N. Hinojosa, J.,
granted stay of execution pending eviden-
tiary hearing, and director of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice appealed.
The Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis,
Circuit Judge, held that (1) petition, as
amplified by exhibits, was not sufficient to
require hearing on Brady claim that state
withheld information that petitioner was
innocent, and (2) petitioner's claim of actual
innocence of capital murder was not a
ground upon which habeas relief could be
granted.
Stay of execution vacated.
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1. Habeas Corpus -745
Habeas corpus petition, as amplified
by exhibits, was not sufficient to require
hearing on Brady claim that state knew
that petitioner was innocent of charged
capital murder but withheld information
from petitioner before his trial; petitioner
relied on affidavits and posttrial newspaper
clippings to suggest that prosecutor knew
that petitioner's brother, rather than peti-
tioner, committed murder, but nothing sug-
gested that prosecutor could have known
that at time of trial.
2. Criminal Law e=700(3)
Exculpatory evidence indicating that
brother of convicted defendant rather than
defendant, committed murder was available
equally to defense and prosecution, and
thus, prosecution's alleged failure to sup-
ply such information prior to trial was not
Brady violation; defendant's brother alleg-
edly committed murder in car which defen-
dant normally drove, so that information
was likely more available to defense than it
was to prosecution.
3. Habeas Corpus Qm462
Petitioner's claim of actual innocence
of murder of which he had been convicted,
supported by several affidavits, including
affidavit from petitioner's nephew, indicat-
ing that petitioner's brother had committed
that murder did not allege a ground upon
which habeas relief could be granted.
4. Criminal Law e1219
Although in nonabuse of habeas cor-
pus context, movant in capital case seeking
stay of execution need not always show
probability of success on merits, he must
present substantial case on merits when
serious legal question is involved and show
that balance of equities weighs heavily in
favor of granting stay; however, balance
of equities cannot weigh in favor of stay in
absence of substantial legal claims upon
which relief may be granted.
5. Habeas Corpus 0462
Claim of "actual innocence" is not
ground upon which habeas corpus relief
can be granted.
6. Habeas Corpus -494
Claims of newly discovered evid 4
casting doubt on petitioner's guilt, are
cognizable in federal habeas corpus.
ceeding.
7. Criminal Law 6-998(1)
Right to collaterally attack a conic.,
is not a right guaranteed by Constituk
8. Criminal Law 6938(1), 998(10)
Under Texas law, claim of innomm
based on newly discovered evidence i.
ground for new trial, but will not suppy
collateral review.
9. Habeas Corpus e*818, 896
Claims asserted by petitioner in second
petition for habeas corpus challenging cap.
tal murder conviction were barred for
abuse of writ, and thus, no substantl
grounds existed upon which relief might b,
granted so as to warrant certificate of
probable cause.
Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Joan C. Barton.
Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respoo.
dent-appellant.
Mark Evan Olive, Tallahassee, Fla.. for
petitioner-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before KING, DAVIS and JONES,
Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
James A. Collins, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, appeals the dis-
trict court's order staying the execution of
Leonel Torres Herrera. Herrera's execo-
tion is scheduled for February 19, 1992.
between midnight and dawn.
I.
The district court's thorough memore
dum opinion and order of February 17 out
lines in detail the critical steps which hae
been taken in this case. In summary.
Herrera was sentenced to death on Jan*
ary 21, 1982, following his conviction for
capital murder. The Texas Court of Crim"
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.Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction
I death sentence, Herrera v. State, 682
%v.2d 313 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (en banc).
he United States Supreme Court denied
rtiorari, Herrera v. Texas, 471 U.S. 1131,
: s.Ct. 2665, 86 L.Ed.2d 282 (1985). Peti-
* oner filed a petition for writ of habeas
wvrpus in the 197th District Court of Cam-
eron County, Texas. The convicting court
rcommended that relief be denied, and, in
August 1985, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied relief. Ex parte Herrera,
Application # 12,848-02-Texas Criminal
Appeals 1985. Thereafter, on August 7,
1985, Herrera filed his first federal petition
for habeas corpus, and the district court
stayed Herrera's scheduled execution. In
October 1989, the federal district court re-
jected Herrera's habeas petition and dis-
solved the stay of execution. Herrera ap-
pealed that judgment to this court. On
June 25, 1990, we affirmed the district
court judgment and vacated Herrera's stay
of execution, Herrera -v. Collins, 904 F.2d
944 (5th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari, Herrera v. Collins, - U.S.
-, 111 S.Ct. 307, 112 L.Ed.2d 260 (1990).
Herrera filed his second application for
state writ of habeas corpus on December
12, 1990. On January 14, 1991, the trial
court withdrew an earlier order, entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
denied habeas relief. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals denied relief on May 29, 1991,
on the basis of the trial court's finding and
conclusions and vacated a stay of execu-
tion, Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528
(Tex.Crim.App.1991).
. Herrera raises the following claims in the in-
stant habeas petition:
1. The State's failure to reveal exculpatory
evidence resulted in the conviction and sen-
tence of an innocent person, in violation of
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Petitioner is innocent, another person
has confessed to the crime, and the Petition-
er's execution would violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
2. Petitioner was tried and sentenced to
death for the murder of two police officers by
a jury whose members included a police offi-
cer detective in an office that investigated the
case, in violation of the Petitioner's Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
3. During trial, recesses, and juror delibera-
tions, juror-police officer Bressler was armed,
v. COLLINS 1031
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On December 17, 1991, Herrera filed a
petition for writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court, which is still pend-
ing. Herrera filed the instant application
for federal writ of habeas corpus in the
district court on February 16, 1992, raising
five claims for relief.' The claims that
Herrera asserts in his present petition are
not duplicative of the claims he asserted in
his first petition.
The district court denied all relief on
claims 2, 3, 4 and 5 on grounds of writ
abuse. The court initially denied petition-
er's Brady claim, (which was included as
part of his first claim) on grounds that
insufficient facts were presented to sup-
port this claim. On reconsideration, the
district court, however, concluded that suf-
ficient facts were presented to require a
hearing, which it scheduled for February
21, 1992. The district court granted a stay
of execution pending that hearing. The
district court also granted petitioner's mo-
tion for a stay of execution to permit peti-
tioner to further litigate in state court the
second prong of his first claim-actual in-
nocence. Alternatively, the court granted
a stay pending rendition of an opinion by
this court in May v. Collins, No. 91-6273.
The district court also signed a Rule 54(b)
judgment dismissing claims 2-5 and issued
a certificate of probable cause as to these
claims. Collins filed an appeal from the
district court's order granting a stay of
execution and moved this court for an or-
der vacating the stay of execution.
and at least one juror noticed; in addition,
and contrary to his sworn statements during
voir dire, this officer knew one of the victims.
These facts reveal that Petitioner's conviction
and death sentence occurred in violation of
his Sixth. Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
4. Petitioner's sentencers were precluded
from considering evidence which counseled
in favor of a sentence less than death, in
violation of Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
5. The trial judge wrongfully refused to al-
low Petitioner to speak at all during Petition-
er's trial and capital sentencing proceeding,
thereby violating Petitioner's federal Constitu-
tional rights.
0'
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II.
For reasons stated by the district court,
it correctly rejected petitioner's claims 2, 3,
4 and 5 because the petitioner has clearly
abused the writ as to those claims. See
McCleskey v. Zant, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct.
1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).
[1] On the Brady prong of petitioner's
first claim, we agree with the district
court's initial conclusion that petitioner nei-
ther proffered evidence nor alleged particu-
larized facts that demonstrate that the
state withheld any favorable evidence from
Herrera before his trial. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). As stated above, the
district court, on reconsideration, concluded
that the pleadings and affidavits were suf-
ficient to require a hearing on one issue:
whether the state knew that petitioner was
innocent of the murder of Officer Carrisa-
lez and withheld that information from
Herrera before his trial. We are not per-
suaded that Herrera's petition, as amplified
by his exhibits, states specific facts that
"point to a 'real possibility of constitutional
error.'" Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 75 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1630 n. 7, 52
L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). (quoting Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 4, Rules Governing
Habeas Corpus Cases, 28 U.S.C. (1977
Supp.), p. 337).
Herrera never identifies any specific evi-
dence that he contends was withheld by the
prosecutor before trial. Instead, he relies
on affidavits and newspaper clippings to
suggest that the prosecutor knew that
Raul Herrera, rather than Leonel Herrera,
committed the murders. Nothing in any of
the exhibits suggests, however, that the
prosecutor could have known of the infor-
mation contained within them at the time
of Herrera's trial.
The newspaper clippings upon which
Herrera relies make no reference at all to
the instant case and do not refer to police
corruption in connection with drug activity
in South Texas prior to 1985-three years
after Herrera's trial. Further, they con-
tain nothing to suggest that anyone who
testified at his trial or any officials in Cam-
eron County, where Herrera was convicted,
have ever been involved in any wrong,,
ing. The affidavit of Raul Herrera, Jrstates that he told a police officer that hisfather committed the murders rather thanPetitioner, but he does not say when or to
whom this information was conveve.
Consequently, Herrera has not pled With
sufficient particularity the elements of his
Brady claim to require a hearing. Id.
[2] Moreover, the exculpatory evidence
on which Herrera relies is a claim that
someone else, and not he, committed the
offenses of which he was convicted. The
person at whom he points the finger is his
brother, Raul, now deceased. Particularly
in light of the fact that his brother alleg.
edly committed the offense in the car which
Petitioner normally drove, this information
clearly was not only available to the de.
fense, but was likely more available to the
defense than it was to the prosecution.
"Brady does not oblige the government to
provide the defendants with evidence that
they could obtain from other sources by
exercising reasonable diligence." United
States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th
Cir.1985) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 861, 88 L.Ed.2d 900
(1986). "When evidence is available equal.
ly to the defense and the prosecution, the
defendants must bear the responsibility for
their failure to diligently seek its dis-
covery." Id., citing United States v. Mil-
stead, 671 F.2d 950,. 953 (5th Cir.1982).
Herrera's attempt to couch this claim in
terms of a Brady violation therefore is
disingenuous.
(31 We therefore turn to the second is-
sue which the district court concluded re-
quired it to grant a stay of execution. As a
part of his first claim, Herrera contended
that he was actually innocent of Carrisa-
les's murder. Herrera filed a substantially
identical claim in the state habeas court
In support of his state habeas claim, Herr-
era attached two affidavits. First, he at-
tached the affidavit of attorney Hector J.
Villareal, who had represented petitioner's
brother, Raul Herrera, on a charge of at-
tempted murder. Villareal asserted that
Raul Herrera confessed to him that Raul,
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--at Petitioner, murdered both Rucker and
.rrisalez. Herrera also submitted the af-
j. 3,it of Franco Palacios, one of his broth-
.r Raul's cell mates. Palacios stated that
F.Aul confessed to him that Raul had mur-
.ered Rucker and Carrisalez.
When Herrera filed his federal habeas
tiion, he attached two additional affida-
,is. The most significant affidavit he at-
uached is the affidavit of his nephew, Raul
Herrera, Jr., the son of Raul Herrera.
Raul Herrera, Jr. stated that he was with
his father on the date of the murders and
that he saw his father kill both Rucker and
Carrisalez. According to Raul Herrera,
Jr., the petitioner was not present when the
murders occurred. Raul, Jr. also stated
that he told a police officer what occurred
but the officer told him never to repeat it.
Raul, Jr. did not suggest when this conver-
sation occurred. Raul, Jr. stated that no
attorney representing the petitioner had
ever asked him about the events until re-
cently. His affidavit is dated about two
weeks ago, January 29, 1992. Petitioner
also included the affidavit of an old school-
mate of the Herrera brothers, who related
that Raul, Sr. made a confession to him
similar to the one attorney Villareal assert-
ed that Raul had made.
In his federal habeas petition, Herrera
asserted that he was entitled to a hearing
on his actual innocence claim, particularly
in light of Raul Herrera, Jr.'s affidavit.
The district court concluded that petitioner
should have an opportunity to present the
affidavit of the alleged eye witness, Raul
Herrera, Jr. The district court then grant-
ed the petitioner's stay of execution and
retained jurisdiction of the petitioner's "ac-
tual innocence" claim until noon, February
21, 1992. The district court directed that it
would dismiss that claim without prejudice
on February 21, 1992, provided petitioner
had filed a successive state habeas petition
so that he could present the additional evi-dence to that court.
(4] We begin our analysis of the propri-ety of the district court's stay with the
recent admonition of the Supreme Court:
"A stay of execution pending disposition of
a second or successive federal habeas peti-
v. COLLINS 1033
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tion should be granted only when there are
'substantial grounds upon which relief may
be granted.'" Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S.
320, 110 S.Ct. 1880, 1881, 109 L.Ed.2d 325,
328 (1990) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 895, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3396, 77
L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)). This court has held
that a court should consider four factors in
deciding whether to grant a stay of execu-
tion:
(1) whether the movant has made a
showing of likelihood of success on the
merits, (2) whether the movant has made
a showing of irreparable injury if the
stay is not granted, (3) whether the
granting of the stay would substantially
harm the other parties, and (4) whether
the granting of the stay would serve the
public interest
Byrne v. Roemer, 847 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th
Cir.1988) (quoting Streetman v. Lynaugh,
835 F.2d 1521, 1524 (5th Cir.1988)). Al-
though in a non-abuse context the movant
in a capital case "'need not always show a
probability of success on the merits, he
must present a substantial case on the mer-
its when a serious legal question is in-
volved and show that the balance of the
equities [i.e., the other three factors]
weighs heavily in the favor of granting the
stay.'" Celestine v. Butler, 823 F.2d 74,
77 (5th Cir.) (quoting O'Bryan v. McKas-
kle, 729 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir.1984)), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 6, 97
L.Ed.2d 796 (1987). However, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Delo v. Stokes,
makes it clear that, in a case involving a
second or subsequent petition, the latter
three factors cannot weigh in favor of a
stay in the absence of substantial legal
claims upon which relief may be granted.
(5-7] Herrera's claim of "actual inno-
cence" presents no such substantial claim
for relief. The rule is well established that
claims of newly discovered evidence, cast-
ing doubt on the petitioner's guilt, are not
cognizable in federal habeas corpus. See
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317, 83
S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Texas has
adopted a similar rule. See Ex parte Bind-
er, 660 S.W.2d 103, 104-106 (Tex.Crim.App.
1983) (en banc). Moreover, the right to
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collaterally attack a conviction is not a
right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107
S.CL 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987).
In Townsend, the Court held that a fed-
eral habeas court must grant an evidentia-
ry hearing on an allegation of newly discov-
ered evidence only when the evidence
"bearfs] upon the constitutionality of the
applicant's detention; the existence merely
of newly discovered evidence relevant to
the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground
for relief on federal habeas corpus." 372
U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759. We have
recognized the above statement as the
Court's holding in at least two cases, Arm-
stead v. Maggio, 720 F.2d 894, 896 (5th
Cir.1983) (per curiam) and Boyd v. Puckett,
905 F.2d 895, 896 (5th Cir.), cert, de-
nied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 526, 112
L.Ed.2d 537 (1990).
(8] Thus, once Herrera's Brady claim is
rejected, Herrera's "actual innocence"
claim does not allege a ground upon which
habeas relief can be granted. Under Texas
law, a claim of innocence based on newly
discovered evidence is grounds for a new
trial, but such a claim will not support
collateral review. See, e.g., Ex parte Bind-
er, 660 S.W.2d at 105-06. Herrera, there-
fore, has presented no claim for collateral
relief under Texas law. Consequently, we
can find no legal justification to permit him
to present, in piecemeal fashion, additional
affidavits to the state court. We conclude
that the district court erred in granting a
stay of execution for this purpose.
May v. Collins relied upon as an alter-
nate ground for a stay, is inapposite. The
question in May concerns whether a find-
ing of fact by a state habeas court, based
upon affidavits alone, is entitled to the
presumption of correctness. But the facts
at issue in May implicated a constitutional
defect in May's conviction. No such ques-
tion is presented in this case.
III.
[9] The district court issued a certifi-
cate of probable cause (CPC) with respect
to claims 2-5 although it rejected any relief
on these claims. This certificate implies
that the district court found that
had made a substantial showing 3
denial of a federal right with res, .
these claims. Barefoot v. Estelle, 4& U.S880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 Il4Ordinarily a stay of execution accomrpar
such a finding, and we are unce
whether the district court inadverte.
failed to grant a stay on these clai.,
Because of the ambiguity of the grat 4CPC on claims 2-5 and the failure to 4
a stay, the press of time requires us t
address the propriety of the district cour.
issuance of CPC.
For reasons stated by the district cour,
we fully agree that claims 2, 3, 4, and 5 ar
barred because petitioner abused the wr.*
We find no substantial grounds upon which
relief might be granted on these claims.
Accordingly, we vacate the certificate of
probable cause as improvidently granted.
See Cuevas v. Collins, 932 F.2d 1078, io2
(5th Cir.1991).
In sum, on claim 1, we conclude that
Herrera has failed to present a substantial
ground upon which relief might be granted.
See Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 110 S.CL
1880, 1881, 109 L.Ed.2d 325 (1990). As we
stated above, the petitioner failed to allege
sufficiently particularized facts to entitle
petitioner to relief on his Brady claim.
The "actual innocence" claim standing
alone does not state a claim upon which
habeas relief can be granted by either a
federal habeas court or a Texas habeas
court. We therefore find no legal justifics
tion to stay the execution to allow petition*
er to litigate further in state court. Ac-
cordingly, we grant Collins's motion to va-
cate the stay of execution entered by the
district court.
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298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291, 84 L.Ed.2d
222 (1985) (prosecution may show "a suffi-
cient break in events to undermine the in-
ference that (a] confession was caused by
(a] Fourth Amendment violation"); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496, 86
S.CL 1602, 1639, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (re-
quirement of a break in the stream of
events).
It is conceded that Minnick constitutes
no bar to questioning about a crime occur-
ring subsequent to the invocation of the
right to counsel. Far short of that, a num-
ber of cases have recognized that where a
suspect has been released from custody
and subsequently again detained, even for
the same crime, an invocation of the right
to counsel during the original confinement
does not prevent the police from seeking a
waiver of such a right upon the new con-
finement. See, e.g., Dunkins v. Thigpen,
854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988), cert. de-
nied, 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct 1329, 103
L.Ed.2d 597 (1989); United States v. Skin-
ner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3569,
77 LEd.2d 1410 (1983).2
Similarly, I believe that the government
is correct in its assertion that when a de-
fendant has pled guilty to the charge which
prompted the invocation of the right to
counsel, circumstances have so significant-
ly changed that any coercive effect created
by the original confinement must be
deemed to have been dissipated, certainly
with respect to questioning about an entire-
ly separate and distinct crime. A suspect's
concern about self-incrimination that may
exist during pre-trial detention must be
dramatically affected once, with the advice
and assistance of counsel and subject to the
elaborate protections provided by Rule 11,
he has appeared in court and been convict-
ed from his own mouth. Such an event
entailing a knowing, voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and its conse-
496, but that interpretation does not, of course,
speak for the full court.
2. Here, for several months following his invoca-
tion of the right to counsel, appellant as a juve-
nile was apparently held not in any jail or
prison as such but rather was in the custody of
quent concerns-the very right that ed.
wards seeks to protect-should underrnir
any irrebuttable presumption that a subs.
quent waiver directed toward an entirely
unrelated crime is the product of contin'.
ing police coercion. I would so hold.
Kl UMlR systEm
Terrence L INGRAM, Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 88-1345.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Jan. 22, 1991.
Decided June 5, 1991.
As Amended June 21, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, District of Columbia, Reggie B.
Walton, J., of armed robbery, and he ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Ferren, J.,
held that (1) denial of severance was not
abuse of discretion; (2) evidence supported
conviction as accomplice; and (3) Govern-
ment's alteration of its theory of aiding and
abetting did not violate defendant's consti-
tutional rights.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law e622
When two defendants are charged
with jointly committing criminal offense,
there is strong presumption that they will
be tried together. Criminal Rule 8(b).
juvenile authorities. Nonetheless, the govern-
ment for purposes of this appeal assumes that
the appellant was in continuous custody for
purposes of the Edwards prophylactic rule. and
I deal with the appeal on that basis.
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After state prisoner's first-degree mur-
der conviction and death sentence was up-
held on appeal, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463,
he petitioned for writ of habeas corpus.
The United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, Harold L. Ryan, Chief
Judge, denied petition. Petitioner appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, 928 F.2d 1481,
affirmed in part; reversed in part and re-
manded. On denial of rehearing en banc,
the Court of Appeals, Cynthia Holcomb
Hall, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) petitioner
was not denied effective assistance of coun-
sel at time he entered guilty plea; (2) peti-
tioner failed to show that he was incompe-
tent to plead guilty; (3) remand was re-
quired for state court to hold resentencing
hearing at which time defendant was enti-
tled to present any and all mitigating evi-
dence existing at time of hearing; (4) Ida-
ho's limiting construction of utter dis-
regard aggravating circumstance was un-
constitutionally vague; and (5) remand was
required so state court could balance re-
maining constitutionally valid aggravating
and mitigating factors before determining
whether defendant should be sentenced to
death.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and
remanded.
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Trott, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion joined by Kozinski and T.G.
Nelson, Circuit Judges.
1. Criminal Law e641.10(3)
Defendant was not unfairly deprived
of assistance of counsel with regard to
guilty plea, where defense counsel told de-
fendant that his advice was to not change
plea to guilty and that counsel needed more
time, and nevertheless, defendant informed
court that he wished to proceed and plead
guilty. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
2. Criminal Law C273(4)
Defendant's statements during plea
colloquy that he intended to kill victim and
that he took action to kill victim after vic-
tim was no longer threat to defendant es-
tablished that defendant understood that
malice of forethought was element of first-
degree murder charge so as to preclude
invalidation of guilty plea on this ground.
3. Criminal Law e=1167(5)
Defendant's ignorance of possible de-
fense of "imperfect self-defense" was
harmless beyond reasonable doubt with re-
spect to defendant's guilty plea to first-
degree murder, where it was inconceivable
if not merely improbable that defendant
would have gone to trial on defense of
imperfect self-defense or that, if he had
done so, he either would have been acquit-
ted or, if convicted, would nevertheless
have been given shorter sentence than he
actually received.
4. Criminal Law <-273(2)
Defendant failed to show that he was
incompetent to plead guilty based on psy-
chological evaluations so as to require
guilty plea to be set aside.
5. Criminal Law e-662.40
Defendant's right to confrontation was
not violated at sentencing hearing due to
defendant's inability to cross-examine
sources of information contained in presen-
tence report, where defendant had opportu-
nity to rebut, deny or explain information
contained in report, other than through
cross-examination. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
6.
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6. Homicide 8-358(1)
Defendant was entitled to present new
mitigating evidence at resentencing hear-
ing about defendant's good behavior pend-
ing review of death sentence which was
vacated on appeal.
7. Homicide e357(5)
State court was required to find specif-
ic intent to cause death of human being
beyond reasonable doubt prior to applying
aggravating circumstances that defendant
was under sentence for murder of first
degree at time of actions and that defen-
dant committed murder on fellow inmate
while both were incarcerated at state cor-
rectional institution. I.C. §§ 18-4003(c, e),
19-2515(g)(7).
8. Homicide -351
. Idaho limiting construction upon ag-
gravating circumstance of exhibiting utter
disregard for human life, which called for
subjective determination of whether defen-
dant was cold-blooded pitiless killer, was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to de-
fendant, where court found defendant was
initially justified in defending himself and
that murder evidenced excessive violent
rage. I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6, 7).
9. Homicide *-357(4)
State court was required, after rever-
sal of one statutory aggravating factor, to
balance remaining, constitutionally valid
aggravating and mitigating factors in or-
der to determine whether defendant should
be sentenced to death for murder. I.C.
§ 19-2515(c); U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 8,
14.
10. Jury 624
Defendant had no constitutional right
to jury trial on existence of aggravating
circumstances which might result in imposi-
tion of death sentence for murder.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
11. Criminal Law w1206.1(2)
Idaho sentencing scheme was not in-
valid because it mandated that court apply
death penalty unless mitigating circum-
stances outweighed aggravating circum-
stance; requirement of individualized sen-
tencing in capital cases was satisfied by
allowing jury to consider all relevant
gating evidence. I.C. § 19- 2515(c).
12. Habeas Corpus 0864(1)
Defendant had full and fair OPPOrtur
ty to present relevant facts of his claims
habeas corpus petition and was not entit
to remand for evidentiary hearing on pe.
tion on such grounds, where defendart,
death sentence was affirmed it was r
until eight months later that defendant was
ordered to make his final postconviction
challenges.
13. Habeas Corpus e747
Evidentiary hearing was not required
on petitioner's habeas corpus claim that
state court did not issue written findings
on his assertions that he was suicidal when
he entered guilty plea and that his plea was
motivated by threats against his family
requiring plea to be invalidated, where it
appeared from state court's denial of de-
fendant's motion to withdraw his plea that
state court implicitly rejected factual cir-
cumstances that defendant alleged invali-
dated his plea, and state Supreme Court, in
affirming state trial court, ruled that de-
fendant offered no evidence other than his
own assertions to support either of his
arguments.
14. Habeas Corpus e-689
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying defendant continuance in
order to prepare for evidentiary hearing on
habeas corpus petition with regard to
"medication issue," where defendant was
given one week's notice of nature and
scope of evidentiary hearing, and defen-
dant's own delinquency culminated on limit-
ed period of time for defendant to prepare
his case between deadline for briefing and
hearing date.
Cliff Gardner, Fiedler & Gardner, San
Francisco, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.
Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen. for the State
of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, for respondents*
appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho.
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ORDER
The opinion filed on March 27, 1991, 928
F.2d 1481, is hereby amended as follows:
In 928 F.2d at 1487, the following is
deleted: "Creech has not pointed to any
evidence to support his claim. The only
.evidence' purported to buttress his claim
of incompetency contains no citations to the
record."
The following is inserted in lieu thereof:
"Contrary to Creech's assertion, Dr. Hey-
rend did not conclude that Creech could not
appreciate the consequences of decisions
such as waiving legal rights. When asked,
"Do you have any information or evidence
to indicate to your satisfaction that at the
time of the defendant's plea in this case,
that he did not intend to plead guilty or did
not recognize the consequences of that le-
gal act?," Dr. Heyrend replied, "I really
have no information in that area." While
Dr. Stoner was more supportive of
Creech's position, even he admitted, "I
think there's room to be more certain than
I am in this case." Creech failed to show
that he was incompetent to plead guilty."
In 928 F.2d at 1491, at the end of the
third full paragraph, add the following
footnote after the citation to Osborn, 631
P.2d at 201:
"The Idaho Supreme Court also noted
that,
To properly define (the "utter dis-
regard"] circumstance, it is important to
note the other aggravating circum-
stances with which this provision over-
laps. The second aggravating circum-
stance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(2), that the de-
fendant committed another murder at
the time this murder was committed, ob-
viously could show an utter disregard for
human life, as could the third aggravat-
ing circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(3),
that the defendant knowingly created a
great risk of death to many persons.
The same can be said for the fourth
aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-
2515(f)(4), that the murder was commit-
v. ARAVE 875
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ted for remuneration. Since we will not
presume that the legislative intent was
to duplicate any already enumerated cir-
cumstance, thus making I.C. § 19-
2515(f)(6) mere surplusage ... , we hold
that the phrase "utter disregard" must
be viewed in reference to acts other than
those set forth in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(2),
(3), and (4).
Rather than explaining what "utter dis-
regard for human life" means, this passage
merely recognizes that the legislature must
have meant it to mean something other
than the preexisting aggravating circum-
stances. Since none of these aggravating
circumstances are at issue, this language
does not help us to determine the meaning
of "utter disregard."
In 928 F.2d at 1492, at the end of subsec-
tion C, the words ", as applied to Creech, to
have been" are deleted and the word "is" is
inserted in lieu thereof.
In 928 F.2d at 1492, the second para-
graph of footnote 16 is deleted.
The panel has voted to deny appellant's
petition for rehearing and to reject the
suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court was advised of the sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc. An active
judge requested a vote on whether to re-
hear the matter en banc. The matter failed
to receive a majority of the votes of the
nonrecused active judges in favor of en
bane consideration. Fed.R.App.P. 35.
With these amendments the petition for
rehearing from the appellant and the peti-
tion for rehearing from the appellees are
DENIED and both suggestions for rehear-
ing en banc are REJECTED.
OPINION
CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit
Judge:
Petitioner Thomas E. Creech appeals
from the district court's denial of his peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. Creech is
currently incarcerated at the Idaho State
Correctional Institution ("ISCI") on the ba-
sis of three Idaho murder convictions. The
conviction which gives rise to this appeal is
based on Creech's 1981 murder of David
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Jensen, a fellow inmate at ISCI. Creech
pleaded guilty to first degree murder and
was sentenced to death.
I
The facts and proceedings in this case
are adequately described in opinions ren-
dered by the Idaho Supreme Court after
Creech's direct appeal, State v. Creech, 105
Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463, 465-66 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327,
79 LEd.2d 722 (1984) ("Creech I"), and
after his efforts to obtain post-conviction
relief, State v. Creech, 109 Idaho 592, 710
P.2d 502, 502-07 (1985) ("Creech II"). Ad-
ditional facts will be discussed where rele-
vant to the issues we must decide in this
appeal.
II
We review de novo the district court's
denial of a petition for habeas corpus.
Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375
(9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870,
108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). We
review any factual findings made by the
district court for clear error. Hayes v.
Kincheloe, 784 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 871, 108 S.Ct.
198, 98 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).
III
[1] Creech initially contends that he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea. This contention rests upon two argu-
ments. First, Creech argues that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel be-
cause his attorney failed to provide him
with certain information prior to the mak-
ing of his guilty plea. Second, Creech ar-
gues that in the absence of such informa-
tion, his plea was not "voluntary and intelli-
gent" and therefore cannot be allowed to
stand. We find these arguments differ
merely in form, not in substance, Evans v.
Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir.1984), and
therefore we will discuss them together.
A guilty plea must represent "a volun-
tary and intelligent choice among the alter-
native courses of action open to the defen-
dant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 16,
(1970). "The assistance of counsel receiv(ed
by a defendant is relevant to the question
of whether a defendant's guilty plea wu
knowing and intelligent insofar as it at.
fects the defendant's knowledge and under.
standing." United States v. Frye, 7:.i
F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1984).
Although the Supreme Court has four.d
that ineffective assistance of counsel can
apply to guilty pleas, Hill v. Lockhart, 4%
U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.:i
203 (1985), most cases that have dealt with
such challenges have involved attorney ree.
ommendations that the defendant plead
guilty. Here, however, Creech's attorney
Rolf Kehne, told the court in Creech's pre*-
ence that he believed Creech should contin.
ue to plead not guilty. Creech himself
acknowledged that "my attorney advised
me not to plead." Thus, the alleged error
is not that Kehne misled Creech by recom.
mending the wrong plea, but that he failed
to provide Creech with certain information.
Specifically, Creech claims Kehne failed ad-
equately to discuss the elements of the
crime or possible defenses with him before
he pleaded guilty.
To establish that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, Creech must show:
(1) his attorney's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
and (2) that the deficient performance prej
udiced the defense. Strickland v. Wash-
in gton, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In reviewing
alleged deficiencies in representation, "a
court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assist-
ance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-
Creech pleaded not guilty at his initial
arraignment on June 19, 1981 before Judge
Newhouse of the Idaho state district court.
On August 28, 1981, Judge Newhouse con-
vened a plea hearing in response to a letter
from Creech stating that he wished to
plead guilty. Kehne stated by way of afr
davit that he had "absolutely no advance
notice" that Creech was going to change
his plea, and he was allowed "less than
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fifteen minutes" to attempt to change his
client's mind.
The district court found "as a matter of
fact. that Kehne did not discuss with
Creech the "specific elements of the of-
fense with which he was charged or possi-
ble defenses to these charges." Neverthe-
less. the district court reviewed counsel's
performance throughout the state court
proceedings and held that "lKehne's] repre-
sentation did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness."
To establish that Kehne's representation
fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness, Creech must show "that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.CL at
2064. In support of his claim that Kehne's
failure to inform him of the elements of the
crime and possible defenses were omissions
which fell below this standard, Creech re-
lies on Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938 (5th
Cir.198 7), and United States v. Bigman,
906 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.1990). In Brown, the
Fifth Circuit held that counsel's failure to
inform the defendant of a venue defense
prior to his guilty plea rendered counsel's
performance below the objective standard
of reasonableness. Because of this omis-
sion, the court believed the defendant was
unable to make an informed and conscious
choice with respect to his plea. Brown,
811 F.2d at 942. In Bigman, this circuit
required remand for an evidentiary hearing
due to uncertainty whether the defendant
had been apprised of the intent element of
the crime to which he pleaded guilty.
Unlike Brown and Bigman, however,
any omission on Kehne's part was not the
result of his incompetence as counsel.
. Creech now characterizes his actions as a
waiver of the right to counsel and argues that
under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817, 95
S.CL 2525, 2532, 45 LEd.2d 562 (1975), his
waiver cannot stand since he was not advised of
the "dangers and disadvantages of self-represen-
tation." We believe the issue here is more prop-
erly seen as whether Creech voluntarily and
knowingly pleaded guilty, not whether he
waived counsel.
At the hearing, Judge Newhouse attempted to
ensure that Creech was aware of the dangers of
Creech simply did not allow his counsel to
inform him of the elements of the offense
or possible defenses. The transcript of the
August 28 plea hearing shows that Kehne
explicitly told the court in Creech's pres-
ence that the guilty plea was against his
advice. As the district court properly not-
ed, "a defendant may not be forced to
abide by the advice of counsel." I Further-
more, at that hearing Creech told the court
that he had discussed the plea with coun-
sel, that he believed he had sufficient time
to discuss his plea with counsel, that he
was satisfied with his attorney's represen-
tation, and that he understood that by
pleading guilty he was giving up any de-
fense to the charge.
Kehne told Creech that his advice was to
not change the plea. He also told Creech
that he needed more time. Nevertheless,
Creech informed the court that he wished
to proceed and plead guilty. We cannot
now accept the claim that Creech was
therefore unfairly deprived of the assist-
ance of counsel. Kehne's actions were rea-
sonable under the circumstances.
Creech has also failed to show that he
was prejudiced. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d
203 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
requiring a showing of prejudice serves
"the fundamental interest in the finality of
guilty pleas." The Court noted that,
Every inroad on the concept of finality
undermines confidence in the integrity of
our procedures; and, by increasing the
volume of judicial work, inevitably delays
and impairs the orderly administration of
justice. The impact is greatest when
new grounds for setting aside guilty
pleas are approved because the vast ma-
jority of criminal convictions result from
pleading guilty. In response to the judge's ques-
tions, Creech acknowledged that he understood
that by pleading guilty he was admitting the
crime, giving up any defenses to the charge, and
forgoing his constitutional rights to trial by jury
and to confront his accusers, as well as the
privilege against self-incrimination. Creech
also acknowledged that he understood that the
maximum penalty for first degree murder was
death.
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such pleas. Moreover, the concern that
unfair procedures may have resulted -in
the conviction of an innocent defendant is
only rarely raised by a petition to set
aside a guilty plea.
Id. (quoting United States v. Timmreck,
441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087, 60
LEd.2d 634 (1979)).2
[2] First, with respect to Creech's claim
that he did not understand the elements of
the offense of first degree murder, Creech
contends that the "malice" element was not
adequately explained to him. The Supreme
Court has stated that a plea may be invol-
untary "because [the defendant] has such
an incomplete understanding of the charge
that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent
admission 'of guilt." Henderson v. Mor-
gan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253,
2257 n. 13, 49 LEd.2d 108 (1976). "With-
out ... proof that [the defendant] in fact
understood the charge, the plea cannot be
voluntary ... " Id.
The district court correctly rejected
Creech's argument that his ignorance of
the elements of first degree murder should
invalidate his plea. It found that "Creech
understood that malice or intent was an
element of first degree murder at the time
he pled guilty."
The state trial judge's colloquy with
Creech at his August 28, 1981 plea hearing
supports the district court's decision. In
particular, the trial court asked Creech the
following:
Q (by the Court): What, as you under-
stand it, does a person have to do to be
guilty of the charge of first degree mur-
der? What does it mean to you?
A: He has got to think about doing it.
Q: And killing someone.
A. And killing someone.
2. See also Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371 (7th
Cir.1984). In Evans, the court, in holding that
prejudice must be shown in cases where the
defendant claims ineffective assistance of coun-
sel due to counsel's failure to inform him of a
defense, stated,
Among other objections to holding [other-
wise] is that it would create an exquisite con-
flict between the lawyer's duty to his client
and to justice: for by holding back from his
client some unimportant information about
PORTER. 2d SERIES
Moreover, shortly after this exchange. theprosecution inquired as follows:
Q (by Mr. Harris): Mr. Creech, did
intend to kill Mr. Jensen? ...
A: When I first had the fight with h
no. But the second time, yes, I did
tend to kill him.
Q: That was later in the day?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you take action to kill him at
he was no longer a threat to you? w
in no condition to hurt you?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What did that include?
A: I kicked him in his throat and hu
head.
Q: Was that after he was unconscious,
A: He wasn't all the way unconscious,
but he was down on the floor.
Therefore, on the basis of Creech's own
testimony the district court correctly con-
cluded thqt Creech understood that malice
aforethought was an element of the
charge.3
[3] Second, with respect to Creech's
claim that neither the court nor his attor-
ney explained the defense of "imperfect
self-defense," Creech argues that without
such an explanation he did not have a full
understanding of the law in relation to the
facts. This issue was not addressed by the
district court, although it found as a matter
of fact that counsel did not discuss with
Creech possible defenses to the murder
charge.
In Sober v. Crist, 644 F.2d 807, 809 n. 3
(9th Cir.1981), we held that "[t]he accused
should be made aware of possible defenses.
at least where the attorney or court is
made aware of facts that would constitute
such a defense." Because Creech arguably
litigation options, the lawyer would guarani
that the client could get his guilty ple2 set
aside as involuntary if he was dissatisfied
with the sentence he received after pleading
guilty.
Id. at 374.
3. Creech concedes that the quoted colloquy
"[alrguably ... shows that Mr. Creech under-
stood that premeditation was required for first
degree murder."
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could have claimed imperfect self-defense,
he may have been prejudiced by his lack of
knowledge.
The state argues, however, that the fail-
ure of counsel or the court to explain this
defense constituted harmless error. See
L.nited States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685
(9th Cir.1978) (where a constitutional error
is found, an appellate court's duty is to
reverse unless it is "able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.") (quoting Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.CL 824, 828, 17
LEd.2d 705 (1967)).
The State points to Creech's earlier mur-
der convictions and his repeated attempts
to interpose self-defense as a defense to
those crimes as evidence that Creech knew
of the possible defenses to the crime.
Creech counters that nothing in the record
shows that, relative to the Jensen murder,
he had an understanding of this defense.
Appellees also argue that any error was
harmless because such a defense would
have been contrary to the "overwhelming"
evidence against Creech. In Evans v. Mey-
er, 742 F.2d 371 (7th Cir.1984), the court
opined that where uncontested facts make
it inconceivable that a jury would acquit on
the proposed defense, a plea entered with-
out the defendant's knowledge of the de-
fense can nevertheless be voluntary. See
also Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370
("[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a
failure to advise the defendant of a poten-
tial affirmative defense to the crime
charged, the resolution of the 'prejudice'
inquiry will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have suc-
ceeded at trial").
After conducting our own review of the
record in this case, we find it "inconceiva-
ble ..., and not merely improbable ... that
(Creech] would have gone to trial on a
defense of (imperfect self-defense], or that
4. Respondent's assertion that this claim was not
raised below is without merit.
3. It is unclear whether a state court's determina-
tion of competency to plead guilty is entitled toa presumption of correctness under 28 US.C.
§ 2254(d). Cf. Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853,
856 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871.109 S.Ct. 182, 102 LEd.2d 151 (1988) (trial
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if he had done so he either would have been
acquitted or, if convicted, would neverthe-
less have been given a shorter sentence
than he actually received." Evans, 742
F.2d at 375. Even assuming his attorney's
performance was not reasonable, we be-
lieve Creech's ignorance of the possible de-
fense of "imperfect self-defense" was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV
[4] During his August 28, 1981 plea
hearing, at Kehne's insistence, Creech re-
served the right to withdraw his guilty plea
if psychological evaluations showed Creech
incompetent to plead guilty. Creech claims
in his petition that the testimony of Doc-
tors Stoner and Heyrend substantiate his
claim of incompetence; consequently, he
argues that he should be allowed to with-
draw his plea.'
A defendant is not competent to plead
guilty if "mental illness has substantially
impaired his or her ability to make a rea-
soned choice among the alternatives
presented to him and to understand the
nature and consequences of his plea."
Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th
Cir.1973).s The district court found that
Creech failed to show that he was incompe-
tent at the time he entered his guilty plea.
Creech's central contention is that the dis-
trict court erred in this finding because it
applied the wrong standard. Contrary to
Creech's assertion, however, it is apparent
from the opinion below that the district
court simply concluded that there was no
evidence that Creech was incompetent to
plead guilty.
We affirm the district court's conclusion
regarding Creech's competency to plead
guilty. Contrary to Creech's assertion, Dr.
Heyrend did not conclude that Creech could
not appreciate the consequences of deci-
court's conclusion of competence to waive coun-
sel subject to de novo review); with Evans v.
Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir.1986) (compe-
tence to stand trial is a factual issue entitled to
the presumption). Regardless of whether the
presumption of correctness attaches here,
Creech's claim is without merit.
947 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
sions such as waiving legal rights. When
asked, "Do you have any information or
evidence to indicate to your satisfaction
that at the time of the defendant's plea in
this case, that he did not intend to plead
guilty or did not recognize the conse-
quences of that legal act?," Dr. Heyrend
replied, "I really have no information in
that area." While Dr. Stoner was more
supportive of Creech's position, even he
admitted, "I think there's room to be more
certain than I am in this case." Creech
failed to show that he was incompetent to
plead guilty.
V
[5) Creech next claims that his right to
confrontation was violated because he had
no meaningful opportunity to cross-exam-
ine the sources of information contained in
his presentence report. At Creech's Janu-
ary, 1982 sentencing hearing, Judge New-
house took judicial notice of the presen-
tence report, which included reports from
several Idaho psychiatrists, a previous pre-
sentence report from an Ohio conviction
containing reports from Ohio psychologists,
psychiatric evaluations from Oregon doc-
tors, and numerous newspaper articles and
editorials. The Idaho Supreme Court in
Creech I found that all the material in the
presentence report was considered by the
sentencing judge. 670 P.2d at 468.
The trial judge at sentencing may appro-
priately conduct a broad inquiry largely
unlimited as to the kind of information to
be considered or the source of such infor-
mation. United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d
582 (1978). The Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69
6. The Idaho Supreme Court in Creech I held that
Creech had no right under Idaho law to a pre-
sentence report containing only testimony from
live witnesses subject to cross-examination. 670
P.2d at 466-469.
7. Although Creech is correct in asserting that in
Williams the sentencing judge stated the facts
upon which it was relying in open court, the
opportunity to rebut, explain or deny the infor-
mation contained in the presentence report was
nevertheless available both in Williams and in
this case. In fact, Creech had more time in
which to examine the report and refute its inac-
S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), exprt..Iapproved of a sentencing court's relianc,on information contained in a presenta,-
report in imposing a death sentence. 7%
Court wrote that "most of the informatoo
now relied upon by judges to guide them 4
the intelligent imposition of sent,.c.
would be unavailable if information wert
restricted to that given in open court by
witnesses subject to cross-examination.*
Id. at 250, 69 S.Ct. at 1084.6
Neither the district court nor the Idaho
Supreme Court addressed the claim that
Creech was denied an opportunity to rebut
or explain the testimony contained in the
presentence report. The only reference to
this issue is Judge Huntley's dissent in
Creech I which stated that Creech could
not rebut the information in the presen-
tence report through the device of cross.
examination. 670 P.2d at 480 n. 1 (Hunt.
ley, J., dissenting). It is apparent, how.
ever, that Creech had the opportunity. oth-
er than through cross-examination, to dis-
pute the accuracy of the presentence report
prior to and at his January, 1982 sentenc-
ing hearing because his counsel was given
the report prior to the sentencing hearing.
Because Creech had the opportunity to
rebut, deny or explain the information con-
tained in the presentence report, this case
is distinguishable from Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349, 356, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1203.
51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), and is in line with
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69
S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949).T In Gard-
ner, the Court ruled that the defendant
was denied due process of law when the
death sentence was imposed on the basis of
information never disclosed to him. 430
U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1207 (plurality opin-
curacies than did the defendant in Willia-.
who learned of the information at the sentenc-
ing hearing itself. The state trial court in this
case specifically found that Creech had access to
the report for at least seven days prior to his
sentencing hearing, as required by Idaho law.
Creech argues that due to Gardner, Williaa
is no longer good law. Although Gardner stated
that standards of procedural fairness had
evolved since Williams was decided, it distin-
guished rather than overruled Williamss hold.
ing. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 356, 97 sCt. at 1204.
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ion). Gardner relied on the absence of
any opportunity for counsel to challenge
the accuracy of information contained in a
presentence report. Id at 356, 97 S.CL at
1203 (distinguishing Williams), 430 U.S. at
358-62, 97 S.Ct. at 1204-07. We conclude
that Creech's right to confrontation was
not violated in this case.
VI
Creech claims that he is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing due to the trial court's
unconstitutional application of the Idaho
sentencing statute, Idaho Code § 19-2515.
Creech alleges three errors: (1) the trial
court refused to allow him to present any
mitigating evidence at his March 17, 1983
resentencing hearing in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) at
his sentencing hearing, the court found two
aggravating circumstances without making
a required finding beyond a reasonable
doubt; and (3) one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances applied by the trial court, that
Creech demonstrated an "utter disregard
for human life", is unconstitutionally
vague. Creech argues that due to these
errors, an improper balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances resulted.
We address each contention in turn.
A
(6] The Idaho Supreme Court vacated
Creech's original sentence of death because
the trial judge failed to pronounce the sen-
tence in the presence of the defendant as
required by Idaho law. The court ordered
resentencing to occur within fourteen days
from the date of its order. Creech argues
that he did not have an opportunity to
introduce mitigating testimony relating to
his .conduct during the fourteen months
between his sentencing and resentencing
hearings. This new mitigation evidence
would have included testimony by prison
guards and spiritual advisors about
Creech's good behavior in prison, his per-
sonal growth and increased sensitivity, and
his writing and recording of a song for a
young girl badly injured in an automobile
accident.
v. ARAVE 881
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Upon remand, the trial court simply read
the sentence of death to Creech. This sec-
ond sentence of death was affirmed in
Creech 1, 670 P.2d at 476. The district
court found "no constitutional provision
which would require the state courts to
again conduct the full sentencing hearing
at which Creech could present mitigating
circumstances."
Creech asserts that although he was al.
lowed to present any and all mitigating
evidence at his initial sentencing hearing,
because the Supreme Court of Idaho voided
that sentence and ordered resentencing,
constitutionally he must be allowed another
opportunity to do so. He argues that the
resentencing hearing was not ordered sim-
ply to correct a procedural defect In addi-
tion, he contends that in capital resentenc-
ing hearings, a defendant must be allowed
to present mitigating evidence to ensure
the reliability of death sentences.
This argument appears to be correct. In
Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 192 (Idaho 1986),
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the pre-
cise claim presented here. The court found
that an order identical to the one at issue
here, issued to the same judge (Judge
Newhouse), and based on the same error
as present here mandated that the trial
judge permit the introduction of new miti-
gating evidence at the resentencing hear-
ing.
The Sivak court held that evidence of a
defendant's good behavior and peaceful ad-
justment while in prison was mitigation
evidence, id. at 196-97, and that the princi-
ples of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98
S.CL 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.CL 869,
71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90
L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), required that a defendant
be allowed to offer such mitigating evi-
dence at resentencing. Sivak, 731 P.2d at
197. The Idaho Supreme Court's discus-
sion is highly persuasive.
Like the Idaho Supreme Court, id, we
see no rational basis for distinguishing the
evidence of a defendant's good conduct
while awaiting trial and sentencing, and
evidence of a defendant's good conduct
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pending review of a death sentence which
is vacated on appeal. On this basis, we
reverse and remand with instructions to
grant the petition. The writ shall order
Creech's release if, within a reasonable
time set by the district court, Idaho fails to
vacate Creech's sentence and provide
Creech with a resentencing hearing at
which he can present any and all mitigating
evidence that exists at the time of the
hearing.
B
(71 Creech claims that the trial court
applied two aggravating circumstances
without making a -required finding. The
trial court found as aggravating circum-
stances that "defendant was under a sen-
tence for Murder of the First Degree at the
time of his actions" and that "defendant
committed the murder on a fellow inmate
while both were incarcerated in the Idaho
State Correctional Institution." Each is an
element of the crime of first degree murder
for which Creech was charged. See Idaho
Code § 18-4003(c), (e) (1987).
To properly constitute aggravating cir-
cumstances under Idaho law, the elements
contained in sections 18-4003(c) and (e)
must be combined "with the specific intent
to cause ... death of a human being."
Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(7) (1987). Creech
argues that Judge Newhouse failed to find
such an intent beyond a reasonable doubt;
therefore, he asserts, the judge listed these
aggravating circumstances without deter-
mining if they should apply.'
We find that there is evidence by which
Judge Newhouse could have concluded that
Creech had specific intent. At the time he
pleaded guilty, Creech admitted that he
8. Creech originally argued, relying on Collins v.
Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.). cart. denie4
474 U.S. 1013. 106 S.CL 546, 88 1.Ed.2d 475
(1985). that the sentence was unconstitutional
because these two aggravating factors were
nothing more than elements of first degree mur-
der. Acknowledging that Collins has been over-
ruled, see Peny v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1392
(8th Cir.). cart. denie4 493 U.S. 959, 110 S.CL
378, 107 LEdid 363 (1989), Creech no longer
makes this argument.
intended to kill Jensen.' Neverthel,
Judge Newhouse's Findings fail to indicat,
that he found specific intent beyond a re4,
sonable doubt before applying section I5..
2515(g)(7).10 On remand, the district cour,
shall grant the petition. The writ sha
order Creech's release if the state judz at
resentencing applies the aggravatinL c..
cumstances under this section without
making a finding of specific intent.
C
18] Creech claims that the statutory ag-
gravating circumstance, that "the defen-
dant exhibited utter disregard for human
life," Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(6), is uncon-
stitutionally vague. Recently, the Supreme
Court announced the process by which we
review such a challenge. In Walton t.
Arizona, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3047,
3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), the court
held:
When a federal court is asked to re-
view a state court's application of an
individual statutory aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance in a particular case.
it must first determine whether the stat-
utory language defining the circum-
stance is itself too vague to provide any
guidance to the sentencer. If so, then
the federal court must attempt to deter-
mine whether the state courts have fur-
ther defined the vague terms and if they
have done so, whether those definitions
are constitutionally sufficient, iUe..
whether they provide some guidance to
the sentencer.
Applying Walton, we first conclude that
the aggravating circumstance listed in see
tion 19-2515(g)(6) is unconstitutionally
vague. Idaho defines murder as "the un-
9. In response to the State's question of whether
he intended to kill Jensen, Creech replied.
"When I first had the fight with him. no. But
the second time, yes, I did intend to kill him-
10. Not only did Judge Newhouse fail 
to mention
specific intent in his listing of these aggravating
circumstances, he also found that Jensen instu
gated the fight and that Creech's actions o-
denced "an excessive violent rage. His only
findings of intent were '"The murder, once com-
menced, appears to have been an intentional.
calculated act." (emphasis added).
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lawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought." Idaho Code § 18-4001
(1987). In section 18-4003, Idaho separates
murder into first and second degrees.
Only those convicted of first degree mur-
der are statutorily eligible to be sentenced
to death. Idaho Code § 18-4004 (1987).
Given that some defendants who kill with
malice aforethought are not even eligible to
be sentenced to death, we fail to see how
the aggravating circumstance of "the utter
disregard for human life" permits "the sen-
tencer to make a principled distinction be-
tween those who deserve the death penalty
and those who do not" Lewis v. Jeffers,
- U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 111
L.Ed.2d 606 (1990).
In State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631
P.2d 187 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court
also recognized the infirmity of section 19-
2515(g)(6). The court held, "it is ... appar-
ent under Godfrey that this court must
place a limiting construction upon (the "ut-
ter disregard"] aggravating circumstance(]
so as to avoid the possibility of [its] applica-
tion in an unconstitutional manner." 631
P.2d at 200 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398
(1980)). We therefore analyze, under the
second step of Walton, whether the aggra-
vating circumstance, as construed by the
Idaho Supreme Court at the time Creech
II. Creech argues that we may not review the
limiting construction because it was not explicit-
ly applied by the trial judge. The Supreme
Court's words in Walton, however, are instruc-
tive:
When a jury is the final sentencer, it is essen-
tial that the jurors be properly instructed re-
garding all facets of the sentencing process.
It is not enough to instruct the jury in the
bare terms of an aggravating circumstance
that is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
That is the import of our holdings in Maynard
and Godfrey. But the logic of those cases has
no place in the context of sentencing by a trial
judge. Trial judges are presumed to know the
law and to apply it in making their decisions.
Walton, 110 S.CL at 3057. Although the trial
judge used the language of the statute, we fol-
low the Supreme Court's lead and presume that
he applied the limiting instruction.
12. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that.
To properly define [the "utter disregard"] cir-
cumstance, it is important to note the other
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was sentenced, was unconstitutionally
vague."
The Supreme Court has found that ag-
gravating circumstances must "channel the
sentencer's discretion by clear and objec-
tive standards that provide specific and de-
tailed guidance and that make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sen-
tence of death." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64
L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (quotations and foot-
notes omitted). "[The channeling and lim-
iting of the sentencer's discretion in impos-
ing the death penalty is a fundamental
constitutional requirement for sufficiently
minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Maynard v. Cart-
wright, 486 U.S. 356, 362, 108 S.Ct. 1853,
1858, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).
Given this standard, we find that the
narrowing construction of section 19-
2515(g)(6), as applied to Creech, was uncon-
stitutionally vague. Having concluded that
the statutory language "the defendant ex-
hibited utter disregard for human life" was
too vague, the Idaho Supreme Court limit-
ed it by stating "the phrase is meant to be
reflective of acts or circumstances sur-
rounding the crime which exhibit the high-
est, the utmost, callous disregard for hu-
man life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slay-
er." Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201.12
aggravating circumstances with which this
provision overlaps. The second aggravating
circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(2). that the
defendant committed another murder at the
time this murder was committed, obviously
could show an utter disregard for human life,
as could the third aggravating circumstance,
I.C. § 19-2515(f)(3), that the defendant know-
ingly created a great risk of death to many
persons. The same can be said for the fourth
aggravating circumstance. I.C. § 19-
2515(f)(4), that the murder was committed for
remuneration. Since we will not presume
that the legislative intent was to duplicate any
already enumerated circumstance, thus mak-
ing I.C. § 19-2515(f(6) mere surplusage ....
we hold that the phrase "utter disregard" must
be viewed in reference to acts other than
those set forth in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(2). (3),
and (4).
Rather than explaining what "utter disregard
for human life" means, this passage merely rec-
ognizes that the legislature must have meant it
to mean something other than the preexisting
aggravating circumstances. Since none of these
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This limiting construction gives no more
guidance than the statute. Rather than
defining "utter disregard," the court in Os-
born merely emphasized it. But the prob-
lem with the "utter disregard" standard is
not that it is too low a threshold, it is that
it is unclear. Idaho's limiting construction
does not resolve this infirmity. Just as it is
difficult to determine what constitutes "ut-
ter disregard for human life," it is unclear
what constitutes "the highest, the utmost,
callous disregard for human life." The
Supreme Court noted in Cartw-right, 486
U.S. at 364, 108 S.Ct. at 1859, that the
"contention that the addition of the word
'especially' somehow guides the jury's dis-
cretion, even if the term 'heinous' does not,
is untenable." Cartwright's reasoning ap-
pears to -apply here.
Godfrey speaks of "clear and objective"
standards. The Court has approved limit-
ing constructions that have defined the
terms of the statutory aggravating circum-
stance through objective standards. In
Walton v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct.
3047, 3057, 111 LEd.2d 511 (1990), the
Court upheld an aggravating factor of "es-
pecially heinous, cruel or depraved" when
it noted that the aggravating factor had
the following limitations: "(A]n especially
cruel manner [is] when the perpetrator in-
flicts mental anguish or physical abuse be-
fore the victim's death," id. 110 S.Ct. at
3057, and "an especially 'depraved' manner
[is] when the perpetrator 'relishes the mur-
der, evidencing debasement or perversion,'
or 'shows an indifference to the suffering
of the victim and evidences a sense of
pleasure' in the killing." Id. at 3058.
In Cartwright, the Court affirmed the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Oklahoma's
aggravating circumstance of "especially
aggravating circumstances are at issue, this lan-
guage does not help us to determine the mean-
ing of "utter disregard."
13. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
holding in Cartwright in the context of an iden-
tical Mississippi aggravating factor with the
same limiting constructions. Shell v. Missitsip-
p - U.S. -, Ill S.CL 313, 112 L.Ed.2d I
(1990).
14. See also, Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253,
96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 LEd.2d 913 (1976) (ap-
heinous, atrocious or cruel" was still u
stitutionally vague even though Oklahor.
had defined "heinous" as "extremely
wicked or shockingly evil" and had defi
"atrocious" as "outrageously wicked a
vile." 13 According to the circuit coum"Vague terms do not suddenly becone
clear when they are defined by reference to
other vague terms." Cartwright v. .1ao,.
nard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir.197,
The Court agreed with the Tenth Circust
however, that a limiting instruction of
"some kind of torture or physical abuse"
while not the only permissible construction.
would have made the aggravating circum.
stance constitutional. t '
Unlike those cases, where the sentencer
could make an objective determination of
whether specific acts occurred, the Idaho
limiting construction calls for a subjective
determination of whether the defendant is
a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." The limit.
ing construction therefore fails to channel
the sentencer's discretion.
The vagueness of the Osborn limiting
construction is apparent by its application
in this case. In his Findings in sentencing
Creech to death, Judge Newhouse found
that Creech "did not instigate the fight
with the victim, but the victim, without
provocation, attacked him. He was initially
justified in protecting himself." While he
found that "(a]fter the victim was helpless
the defendant killed him," Judge New-
house also noted that the murder "evi-
denc(ed] an excessive violent rage." 1s Giv.
en these factual findings, we cannot agree
with the conclusion that by the murder
itself, or circumstances surrounding its
commission, Creech demonstrated that he
was a cold-blooded, pitiless killer." We
proving "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel'
limited to "the conscienceless or pitiless crime
which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim").
1. Judge Newhouse also found that The mur-
der, once commenced, appears to have been an
intentional. calculated act." (emphasis added).
16. In its briefs. the State argues that "utter dis-
regard" is sufficiently specific, as it applies only
to calculated murders. According to the State.
"[Mlurders that result from a strong provoca-
tion or objectively reasonable emotional distress
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therefore find the Idaho limiting construc-
don is unconstitutionally vague.
D
(91 We have found that one of the five
statutory aggravating circumstances cited
by Judge Newhouse, that Creech exhibited
utter disregard for human life, is unconsti-
tutionally vague. Second, we have found
that two additional aggravating circum-
stances were applied without the required
finding of specific intent. Finally, we have
found that Creech must be given an oppor-
tunity to provide any additional mitigating
evidence.
Idaho Code section 19-2515(c) holds that
a sentence of death may not be imposed
unless the court finds at least one statu-
tory aggravating circumstance. Even with
our findings today, this requirement has
been met- Section 19-2515(c) goes on,
however, and requires a balancing of miti-
gating and aggravating circumstances.
Given our findings, the weight of both
types of factors is apt to change. Thus, we
cannot rely on the trial court's conclusion
that. Creech deserved the death penalty.
See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,
110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d 725
(1990); Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d
1477, 1483 (10th Cir.1987) ("A death sen-
tence that is imposed pursuant to a bal-
ancing that included consideration of an
unconstitutional aggravating circumstance
must be vacated under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."), aff'd 486 U.S.
356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 LEd.2d 372 (1988).
We therefore reverse and remand with
instructions to grant the petition. The writ
shall order Creech's release unless, within
a reasonable time set by the district court,
the Idaho court balances the remaining,
constitutionally valid aggravating and miti-
gating factors in order to determine wheth-
er Creech should be sentenced to death.
are not comprehended by (the section]." If this
is what the limiting construction means, then it
was improperly applied to Creech. While the
State argues that "Creech cold-bloodedly con-
trived the murder of David Jensen". this was not
the finding of the trial court. See Creech 1 670
VII
(101 Creech claims that the Constitution
guarantees a jury trial on the existence of
aggravating circumstances which may re-
sult in the imposition of a sentence of
death. Creech draws the following analo-
gy: some of the aggravating circumstances
found by the state court are facts analo-
gous to elements of the crime of "capital
murder" and must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; therefore, a jury must
determine their existence.
In rejecting Creech's claim, the district
court relied on Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 104 S.CL 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340
(1984). In Spaziano, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that "placing re-
sponsibility on the trial judge to impose the
sentence in a capital case is unconstitution-
al." Id. at 464, 104 S.Ct. at 3164. Creech
attempts to distinguish Spaziano and sim-
ilar Supreme Court cases by asserting that
while the exercise of discretion in sentenc-
ing may remain with the trial judge, the
jury must find the existence of facts, such
as aggravating circumstances.
Creech's argument has been fully reject-
ed by the Supreme Court. In McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct.
2411, 2419, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the Court
wrote that "[s]entencing courts have tradi-
tionally heard evidence and found
facts...." The Court further opined that
the claim that a jury must find sentencing
considerations "merits little discussion."
Id at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420. The Court
ultimately held in McMillan that "there is
no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentenc-
ing, even where the sentence turns on spe-
cific findings of fact." Id. (citing Spazi-
ano).
More recently, the Court specifically held
in Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109
S.Ct. 2055, 2057, 104 LEd.2d 728 (1989),
that "the Sixth Amendment does not re-
quire that the specific findings authorizing
P.2d at 465 ('"There is some evidence in the
record indicating that Creech had been enticed
by other inmates to 'do Jensen in,' but the dis-
trict judge did not decide or find that the mur-
der had been performed on contract or by
plan.")
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the imposition of the sentence of.death be
made by the jury." See also Walton v.
Arizona, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3047,
3054, 111 LEd.2d 511 (1990). We there-
fore find that consistent with these cases,
Creech had no constitutional right to a jury
trial on the existence of aggravating cir-
cumstances.
VIII
(11] Creech claims that the Idaho capi-
tal sentencing scheme violates the Eighth
Amendment because it provides a mandato-
ry sentencing formula. Specifically,
Creech argues that Idaho Code § 19-
2515(c) is unconstitutional. Section 19-
2515(c) provides:
"(w]here a person is convicted of an of-
fense which may be punishable by death,
a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the court finds at least one (1)
statutory aggravating circumstance.
Where the court finds a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to death unless the
court finds that mitigating circumstances
which may be presented outweigh the
gravity of any aggravating circumstance
found and make imposition of death un-
just."
Idaho Code § 19-2515(c) (1987) (emphasis
added).
The basis of Creech's contention is that
the Idaho courts shall apply the death pen-
alty unless mitigating circumstances out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances and
make the imposition of death unjust. Ida-
ho Code § 19-2515(c) (1987). Creech claims
this removes an "individualized determina-
tion" and a "moral response" in sentencing.
Appellees argue that the Idaho sentenc-
ing scheme is valid because it permits the
sentencing court to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence, consistent with Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 602-08, 98 S.Ct at
2963-47. In addition, appellees note that
the statute places upon the state the bur-
den of proof to show at least one statutory
17. Under Townsen4 372 U.S. at 313. 83 S.Ct. at
757:
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing to a habeas applicant under the fol-
aggravating circumstance beyond a re
able doubt, thus fulfilling the "narron,
function" required by Zant v. Stephe
462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2.42. -
L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). As construed by th"
Idaho Supreme Court, moreover, appelk-e
point out that the defendant's burden With
respect to mitigating circumstances Ls not
one of persuasion but, rather, one a
"rais(ing] any factors which might Possibly
tend to mitigate his culpability for the of.
fense." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 40S.
631 P.2d 187, 199 (1981).
This issue has been recently resolved by
the Supreme Court. In Blystone v. Penn.
sylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078. Ios
LEd.2d 255 (1990), the Court rejected a
challenge to a similar requirement, holding
that such a statute is not "impermissibly
mandatory", id. 110 S.Ct. at 1082, and that
"[t]he requirement of individualized sen-
tencing in capital cases is satisfied by al.
lowing the jury to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence." Id. at 1083. Similar
statutes have been upheld in other cases.
See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110
S.Ct 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); Walton.
110 S.Ct. 3047. We therefore find that
section 19-2515(c) is constitutional.
IX
(12] 'Creech finally claims that we
should remand this case to the district
court because the district court improperly
limited its evidentiary hearing on his peti-
tion. Under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 312-13, 83 S.Ct. 745, 756-57, 9 L.Ed.2d
770 (1963), a district court must hold an
evidentiary hearing if (1) the petitioner's
allegations, if proved, would entitle him to
relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact
has not, after a full and fair hearing, reli-
ably found the relevant facts. An eviden-
tiary hearing must be held if, for example.
state court fact-finding procedures were
inadequate, or the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state court
hearing. Id. at 313, 83 S.Ct. at 757.11
[owing circumstances: If (1) the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination s
not fairly supported by the record as a w
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Creech's claim with respect to the legal
requirement of an evidentiary hearing is
two-fold.
First, although Creech admits that he
addressed each factual issue in his Febru-
ary 1984 state post-conviction plea with-
drawal hearing, he claims that hearing was
inadequate because he was given only two
weeks to file all his post-conviction collat-
eral state proceedings and two additional
weeks to fully prepare for the hearing.
Consequently, Creech argues that an evi-
dentiary hearing under Townsend was re-
quired on several claims presented to the
district court.
The district court's opinion does not ad-
dress this claim. Further, Appellees do not
address Creech's allegations and the only
evidence on this claim is the self-serving
affidavit of Creech's counsel. The Idaho
Supreme Court opinion in Creech II, 710
P.2d 502 (1985), however, addresses the
precise issue raised by Creech. Creech's
death sentence was affirmed by the Idaho
Supreme Court on May 23, 1983 and it was
not until January 24, 1984 that Creech was
ordered to make his final post-conviction
challenges. Id. at 507. Consequently,
counsel's complaint that he had only four
weeks to prepare his case is not accurate.
In justifying the limited time afforded
Creech to make his final post-conviction
challenges, the Idaho Supreme Court in
Creech II relied on Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 889, 103 S.CL 3383, 3392, 77
LEd.2d 1090 (1983), for the proposition
that "the use of summary procedures for
the expeditious resolution of collateral pro-
ceedings in death penalty cases" is proper.
710 P.2d at 507. In Barefoot; the Supreme
Court cited its prior cases which approved
the summary procedures adopted by the
Circuit Courts of Appeal for the disposition
of habeas appeals on the merits before the
scheduled date of execution. 463 U.S. at
889, 103 S.Ct. at 3392.
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by
the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing* (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence: (5)
the material facts were not adequately devel-
Creech has had a full and fair opportuni-
ty to present the relevant facts of his
claims. Counsel had more than enough
time between the affirmance of Creech's
death sentence and the deadline for filing
of post-conviction challenges to prepare
any post-conviction claims for relief. Con-
sequently, we hold that Creech is not enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing on this basis.
(13] Creech's second argument is that
the state court did not issue written find-
ings on his claims that he was suicidal
when he entered the guilty plea and that
his plea was motivated by threats against
his family. Therefore, Creech argues the
district court could not have concluded that
these issues were reliably determined by
the state trier of fact and an evidentiary
hearing is required.
The district court found that "[t]here is
nothing in the record to suggest Creech
was suicidally depressed at the time he
entered his plea of guilty," and that
Creech's "self-serving testimony" with re-
spect to threats against his family was
insufficient to invalidate his plea. Al-
though the district court did not make this
point clear, it must have made these deter-
minations without an evidentiary hearing
based on the implied findings of the state
trier of fact. Under Townsend, state court
factual determinations may be implied
from the actions taken by the state court.
See Tounsend, 372 U.S. at 314, 83 S.Ct. at
758; Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373,
376 (9th Cir.1985). For example, "(w]hen a
state trial court holds a hearing to sup-
press evidence and rules on the motion, a
federal district court may assume that the
state court found the facts necessary to
support the state court's decision, unless
there is some indication that the state court
applied an incorrect legal standard."
Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 727
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867, 107
S.Ct. 228, 93 L.Ed.2d 155 (1986).
oped at the state-court hearing- or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact
did not afford the habeas applicant a full and
fair fact hearing.
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In the instant case, it appears from the
state trial court's February, 1984 denial of
Creech's motion to withdraw his plea that
Judge Newhouse implicitly rejected the fac-
tual circumstances that Creech alleges in-
validate his plea and that Creech asserts
require an evidentiary hearing. Moreover,
although the state trial court did not issue
written findings concerning the February,
1984 withdrawal hearing,s the Idaho Su-
preme Court, in affirming the state trial
court in Creech II, held that Creech offered
no evidence other than his own assertions
to support either of his arguments. Cf
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546--47, 101
S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981) (28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) presumption of correct-
ness of state court findings applies equally
to state trial court and state appellate court
fact-finding). We affirm the district
court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on
these issues.
(14] Creech also contends that a re-
mand is required because he did not have
an opportunity to present evidence on the
medication issue to the district court.
Creech argues he should have been granted
a continuance in order to prepare for an
evidentiary hearing. A district court's de-
cision regarding a motion for a continuance
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Un-
gar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct.
841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964).
The district court found that Creech did
not "advise the court that notification of
the parties on May 22, 1986, as to the
nature and scope of the May 29th hearing
would not provide counsel with adequate
time to prepare for that hearing." More-
over, the district court found that Creech's
own delinquency culminated in the limited
period of time between the deadline for
briefing and the May 29th hearing date.
Further, Creech's counsel admitted as
much at the May 29th hearing, stating "I
frankly am not prepared to present medical
evidence today and ... that was my confu-
sion and it was all my fault...."
18. The state trial court found only that it would
not be manifestly unjust to deny Creech's mo-
Creech was given one week's notice ofthe nature and scope of the evidentiayhearing. In conjunction with Creechs de
linquency and the amount of time fo,
Creech to prepare his case between the
filing of the habeas petition on January 2
and the May 29 hearing (not to mention the
four years between Creech's initial sent,,,.
ing on January 25, 1982 and the filing of
his petition), we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denving
Creech a continuance.
X
We AFFIRM the district court on
Creech's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, incompetence to plead guilty, in-
voluntary and unknowing guilty plea, deni-
al of his right to confrontation, and need
for an evidentiary hearing. We also AF.
FIRM the district court's conclusion that
Creech had no right to a jury trial on the
existence of aggravating factors and that
he was not sentenced pursuant to a manda.
tory death penalty formula. We RE.
VERSE and direct the district court to
grant the petition on Creech's claim that
the state trial court relied on improper ag-
gravating circumstances, and that prohibit-
ing him from introducing evidence of miti-
gating circumstances at his resentencing
hearing violates the Constitution.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.
TROTI, Circuit Judge dissenting from
the order denying rehearing en banc.
KOZINSKI and T.G. NELSON joining.
I respectfully dissent from the court's
refusal to rehear this case en banc, and I
do so because I disagree with the panel's
analysis in Part C.
Thomas Creech is a killer. He personi-
fies an "utter disregard for human life."
In this case, with the intent to kill, he beat
a fellow inmate to death while serving a
life sentence in Idaho for murder. The
Idaho Supreme Court has made the follow-
ing statement about him:
tion to withdraw the guilty plea.
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The defendant here committed murder
at least four times prior to the instant
offense, twice in Idaho and also in Ore-
gon and in California. There presently
exist other pending charges of murder in
the first degree against him. The testi-
mony of an eyewitness to one of Creech's
previous murders, coupled with psychiat-
ric evidence, tends to prove that the ap-
pellant is violent and vengeful and that
he experiences no remorse for his ac-
tions. Letters written by Creech to law
enforcement personnel detail numerous
alleged murders beyond those for which
he has already been convicted and inti-
mate his intentions to kill in the future.
Creech's own statements claim responsi-
bility for approximately 40 murders.
However vague the statutory language
might be argued to be in the ordinary
case (which assertion we have already
rejected), nevertheless, as applied in the
instant case, we hold beyond any doubt
whatsoever that the appellant here has
exhibited a propensity to commit murder
which will probably constitute a continu-
ing threat to society.
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d
463, 472 (1983).
My concern, however, is not so much
that Creech's sentence is being returned to
Idaho's courts to be redone as it is with a
serious and possibly irremediable error
made by the panel in holding that one of
the statutory aggravating factors relied on
by Idaho to sentence him to death is uncon-
stitutionally vague. The error may effec-
tively be irremediable because if Creech is
resentenced to death in state court in ac-
cord with the orders of the panel's opinion,
and the case then resurfaces in federal
court, which is probable, it will most cer-
tainly do so on the basis of different aggra-
vating circumstances. Thus, unless the er-
ror is attended to now, Idaho may be
blocked from ever bringing this error-
which now becomes the binding law of our
circuit as to this aggravating circum-
stance-to the attention of any court for
correction. This is also true if Creech is
not resentenced to death and the question
'* Section 19-2515(f)(6) is now section 19-
v. ARAVE 889
873 (9th Cir. 1991)
of capital punishment disappears from fu-
ture federal actions filed by him. As it
now stands we have failed to accord appro-
priate deference to the Idaho Supreme
Court decision in Osborn, and we have
thereby improperly amputated a legislative
enactment of a sovereign state.
To be specific as to the nature of the
error, I believe the panel has misapplied
the holding of the Supreme Court in Wal-
ton v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 110 S.CL
3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), in such
a way as to bring about one application of
the Walton test for Arizona, and a differ-
ent application of the same test for Idaho.
The panel's misapplication of the test vio-
lates the unremarkable precept that federal
law, and especially Constitutional law, shall
be uniformly applied.
The aggravating circumstance in ques-
tion is that "by the murder or circumstance
surrounding its commission the defendant
exhibited utter disregard for human life."
Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(6). I would agree
with the panel that this bare language is
thin under Walton, but I respectfully but
strongly disagree with the panel's conclu-
sion that the limiting construction placed
on this language by the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,
631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981), falls short of the
mark established by the United States Su-
preme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398
(1980). The Idaho Supreme Court in Os-
born explicitly recognized its duty under
Godfrey and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) to
define vague terms so as to give adequate
guidance to the sentencer. On this issue,
Idaho's highest court spoke as follows:
A similar limiting construction must be
placed upon the aggravating circum-
stances in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6) ', that
"[b]y the murder, or the circumstances
surrounding its commission, the defen-
dant exhibited utter disregard for human
life." To properly define this circum-
stance, it is important to note the other
aggravating circumstance with which
this provision overlaps. The second ag-
2515(g)(6).
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gravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-
2515(f)(2), that the defendant committed
another murder at the time this murdez
was committed, obviously could show an
utter disregard for human life, as could
the third aggravating circumstance, I.C.
§ 19-2515(f)(3), that the defendant know-
ingly created a great risk of death to
many persons. The same can be said for
the fourth aggravating circumstance,
I.C. § 19-2515(f)(4), that the murder was
committed for remuneration. Since we
will not presume that the legislative in-
tent was to duplicate any already enu-
merated circumstance, thus making I.C.
§ 19-2515(f)(6) mere surplusage (See,
e.g., Norton v. Dept of Employment, 94
Idaho 924, 500 P.2d 825 (1972)), we hold
that the phrase "utter disregard" must
be viewed in reference to acts other than
those set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(2), (3),
and (4). We conclude instead that the
phrase is meant to be reflective of acts
or circumstances surrounding the crime
which exhibit the highest, the utmost,
callous disregard for human life, i.e., the
cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. With such
an interpretation, it is our conclusion that
this aggravating circumstance meets the
constitutional requirements set forth by
the United States Supreme Court. Upon
remand, the district court should, in ac-
cordance with his opinion and the provi-
sions of I.C.R. 33.1 and 33.2 (enacted
subsequent to original sentencing in this
case), specifically set forth the facts and
reasoning underlying the finding, if any,
that a statutory aggravating circum-
stance exists.
Osborn, 631 P.2d at 200-01.
Under the Walton rule, this not only
gives "some guidance," Walton, 110 S.Ct.
at 3057, it gives substantive guidance. It
defines "utter disregard," in greater detail
than the statute itself, and it goes farther
by telling the sentencer that he or she
cannot infer "utter disregard" solely from
the fact that the defendant has committed
multiple murder, nor can it be inferred
solely from a murder for hire, nor can it be
inferred solely from the fact that the de-
fendant knowingly created a risk of death
to many persons.
Idaho's "utter disregard" factor a.
cused by Osborn is indistinguishable t
the aggravating circumstance approved bythe Supreme Court in Walton:
"especially depraved" [i.e.J. when be
perpetrator "relishes the murder, e
dencing debasement or perversion." ,r
"shows an indifference to the sufferinr
of the victim and evidences a sense o
pleasure in the killing."
Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3058 (citation omit.
ted). How "objective" is "relishing the
murder, evidencing debasement or Perver
sion"? How is that different from evidenc.
ing an "utter disregard for human life,"
defined as intentional, cold-blooded, and
without pity, and as requiring more than
just mass murder, murder for hire, ar.d
endangering many people? This is not just
"wicked and vile," as in Maynard '. Cart.
wright, 486 U.S. 356, 362, 108 S.Ct. 1S3.
1858, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), which are
simply pejorative adjectives that broad!v
describe the crime. This is "utter, callous.
cold-blooded, and pitiless disregard for hu.
man life," which is a standard that can be
proved with facts and circumstances.
"Cold-blooded" means carried out without
feeling or emotion. "Pitiless" means with-
out compassion for suffering. Contrary to
the panel's assertion, Idaho does not call
for a purely "subjective determination" of
whether a defendant is a "cold-blooded.
pitiless slayer." Idaho requires an eviden-
tiary determination supported by facts and
circumstances.
Such a determination under Idaho law
must be set out in writing, and it is subject
to scrupulous appellate review.
Idaho Code § 19-2515(e) states:
Upon the conclusion of the evidence
and arguments in mitigation and aggrs-
vation the court shall make written find-
ings setting forth any statutory agg's-
vating circumstances found. Further.
the court shall set forth in writing any
mitigating factors considered and, if the
court finds that mitigating circumstancs
outweigh the gravity of any !Iggravatin4
circumstance found so as to miake unjust
the imposition of the death lienaltY, the
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court shall detail in writing its reasons
for so finding.
About this section, the Idaho Supreme
Court has said:
.C. § 19-2515(d) 2 is mandatory in its
terms: "the court shall set forth in writ-
ing any mitigating factors considered."
The reasoning behind a similar statutory
requirement for specific written findings
was explained by the Florida Supreme
Court
"The fourth step required by Fla.Stat.
( 921.141. F.S.A., is that the trial judge
justifies his sentence of death in writing,
to provide the opportunity for meaning-
ful review by this Court. Discrimination
or capriciousness cannot stand where
reason is required, and this is an impor-
tant element added for the protection of
the convicted defendant. Not only is the
sentence then open to judicial review and
correction, but the trial judge is required
to view the issue of life or death within
the framework of rules provided by the
statute." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 8
(Fla.1973) cert. den. 416 U.S. 943, 94
S.CL 1951, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974).
We feel the requirement of written and
detailed findings serves a dual purpose.
Initially it focuses the attention of the
sentencing court upon all the information
before it and requires a thorough and
reasoned analysis of all relevant
factors. This helps assure that the impo-
sition of the sentence of death is rea-
soned and objective as constitutionally
required. It also serves the purpose, as
noted by the Florida Supreme Court, of
making the process for imposing death
rationally reviewable. On review, if the
mandates of LC. I 19-2515(d) are met,
we can determine whether the lower
court overlooked or ignored any raised
mitigating factors, whether the evi-
dence supports the aggravating factors
found and finally whether the court
has properly weighed all factors. If the
findings of the lower court are not set
forth with reasonable exactitude, this
court would be forced to make its review
on an inadequate record, and could not
2- Section 19-2515(d) is now section 19-2515(c).
v. ARAVE 891
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fulfill the function of "meaningful appel-
late review" demanded by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.
Osborn, 631 P.2d at 196-97 (emphasis add-
ed). These strict requirements add consid-
erable substance to the process and corral
the possibility of excessive subjectivity.
The Idaho Supreme Court was careful to
verify the factual basis for the pertinent
findings. The Supreme Court said:
We turn now to whether the sentenc-
ing judge complied with those statutory
provisions. Appellant argues that the
court erred in finding beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant has previ-
ously been convicted of other murders;
that the defendant had exhibited utter
disregard for human life and a propensi-
ty to commit murder- that the defendant
was under sentence for first degree mur-
der at the time of his actions; and that
both defendant and his victim were in-
mates at the state penitentiary when the
crime occurred. We have reviewed the
record and hold that the evidence at the
sentencing hearing clearly supports the
trial court's findings of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
Creech, 670 P.2d at 470.
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 19-2827 re-
quires the Idaho Supreme Court to verify
proportionality and to screen out passion,
prejudice, and arbitrariness with respect to
all sentences of death. This section reads
in relevant part as follows:
(a) Whenever the death penalty is im-
posed, and upon the judgment becoming
final in the trial court, the sentence shall
be reviewed on the record by the Su-
preme Court of Idaho. The clerk of the
trial court, within ten (10) days after
receiving the transcript, shall transmit
the entire record and transcript to the
Supreme Court of Idaho and to the attor-
ney general together with a notice pre-
pared by the clerk and a report prepared
by the trial judge setting forth the find-
ings required by section 19-2515(d), Ida-
ho Code, and such other matters concern-
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ing the sentence imposed as may be re-
quired by the Supreme Court.
(b) The Supreme Court of Idaho shall
consider the punishment as well as any
errors enumerated by the way of appeal.
(c) With regard to the sentence the
court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was
imposed under the influence of pas-
sion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor, and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the
judge's finding of a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance from among those
enumerated in section 19-2515, Idaho
Code, and
. (3) Whether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the pen-
alty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant
(d) Both the defendant and the state
shall have the right to submit briefs
within time provided by the court, and to
present oral argument to the court.
(e) The court shall include in its deci-
sion a reference to those similar cases
which it took into consideration. In
addition to its authority regarding cor-
rection of errors, the court, with regard
to review of death sentences, shall be
authorized to:
(1) Affirm the sentence of death; or
(2) Set the sentence aside and remand
the case for resentencing by the trial
judge based on the record and argument
of counsel.
(f) The sentence review shall be in ad.
dition to direct appeal, if taken, and the
review and appeal shall be consolidated
for consideration.
(g) The Supreme Court shall collect
and preserve the records of all cases in
which the penalty of death was imposed
from and including the year 1975.
Idaho Code § 19-2827 (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court applied § 19-
2827 to Creech, saying:
3. Just as in Walton, this case is also distinguish-
able from Maynard because Maynard "the de-
fendant was sentenced by a jury and the jury
We hold that none of these recent Ida.
ho murder decisions militates toward the
granting of leniency in the present case
We find no instance in which a defendant
found guilty of such previous crimes aa
those of Thomas Creech has been found
deserving of a sentence less than death.
We have examined [thirty-four] cases
dating back more than 50 years and our
examination fails to disclose that any
such remorseless, calculating, cold-blool.
ed multiple murderer has (with the ex.
ception of Creech I [State u. Creech, 59
P.2d 114 (1919) ] ever been before this
Court.... We hold that the death penal.
ty imposed in this case is both propor-
tionate and just.
Creeck, 670 P.2d at 476.
Creech had the death sentence imposed
upon him by a judge not a jury.' Creech,
670 P.2d at 466 ("[f]ollowing the conclusion
of the sentencing hearing, the district court
made its written' findings and pronounced
sentence of death upon Creech"). In Wal-
ton, the United States Supreme Court held
that "[wihen a jury is the final sentencer, it
is essential that the jurors be properly in-
structed regarding all facets of the sen-
tencing process .. . (but t]rial judges are
presumed to know the law and apply it in
making their decisions." Walton, 110 S.Ct.
at 3057. In the instant case, as recognized
by footnote 12 of the panel's opinion, the
sentencing judge is thus presumed to have
applied the judicial refinements provided to
him by Osborn.
Did the Idaho Supreme Court have Os-
born in mind while it processed the case
against Creech? The answer is yes. Jus-
tice Shepard, who wrote Creech, was on
the Osborn panel. Moreover, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Creech referred to Os-
born and quoted in haec verba the limiting
passage from Osborn that I quote earlier
in this opinion. See Creech, 670 P.2d at
471. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court had
in mind the Osborn standard when it said.
"We now turn to whether the sentencing
judge complied with those statutory prov-i
either was instructed only in the bare terms of
the relevant statute or in terms nearly as vague.
Walton. 110 S.Ct. at 3057.
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sions.... We have reviewed the record
and hold that the evidence at the sentenc-
ing hearing clearly supports the trial
court's findings of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances." Id. at 470.
Since 1972 in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 92 S.CL 2726, 33 LEd.2d 346
(1972), the Supreme Court has established
certain minimum but strict requirements
for states choosing to pursue capital pun-
ishment. Idaho has rigorously tailored its
laws to meet these requirements. In my
view, our court has strayed from the
course charted by the Supreme Court in
Walton and effectively established a stan-
dard for Idaho more exacting than the one
established for Arizona. Hence, I DIS-
SENT.
0 t KEYMM R SYSTEM
UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Jerry Lawrence PADILLA, Sr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-2179.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 21, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of
New Mexico, Juan G. Burciaga, Chief
Judge, of possession with intent to distrib-
ute less than 100 grams of heroin, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Logan,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) reconsidera-
tion of upward adjustment in offense level
for supervisory role in the offense of con-
viction was warranted on remand; (2) de-
fendant waived right to challenge weight
of heroin in charged offense by failing to
raise objections at sentencing; and (3) trial
ADILLA 893
93 (10th Cr. 1991)
court erred in considering 3.8 grams of
heroin in uncharged count in determining
aggregate amount of drugs for sentencing
purposes absent any explanation in presen-
tence report as to basis for addition of 3.8
net grams.
Remanded.
1. Criminal Law 4=1251
There was sufficient evidence in the
record to support an upward adjustment of
narcotics defendant's sentence for a super-
visory role based on his role in the offense
of conviction, possession with intent to dis-
tribute less than 100 grams of heroin.
U.S.S.G. § 311.1(c), 18 U.S.C.A.App.
2. Criminal Law 4=1181.5(8)
Although there was sufficient evidence
in record to support upward adjustment for
supervisory role based solely on defen-
dant's role in the offense of conviction,
possession with intent to distribute heroin,
reconsideration was warranted where sen-
tencing court did not explicitly base its
determination only on offense of conviction
and referred to other offenses, particularly
since remand was otherwise necessary for
determination of supervised release term.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), 18 U.S.C.A.App.
3. Criminal Law 0-1036.8
Defendant waived right to challenge
weight of heroin involved in charged of-
fense on appeal when he failed to challenge
weight at sentencing.
4. Drugs and Narcotics 0-133
Trial court erred in considering 3.8
grams of heroin in an uncharged count in
determining the aggregate amount of
drugs for sentencing defendant convicted
of possession with intent to distribute less
than 100 grams of heroin; there was no
explanation in presentence report as to ba-
sis for the addition of the 3.8 net grams.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, p.s., 18 U.S.C.A.App.
5. Criminal Law 4-986.2(1)
Although hearsay may be used in de-
termining a sentence, some indicia of relia-
bility is required. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, p.s.,
18 U.S.C.A.App.
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excess of the maximum limit initially pro-
vided. The plan administrator has never
been called on to interpret the last sentence
of the limited amendment provision. We
decline to predict whether the administra-
tor will construe future sequela of Grego-
ry's 1983 injury as "claim(s] arising prior
to" any future amendments that are pro-
posed that would seek to reduce or other-
wise limit the $500,000 lifetime maximum
benefit If the administrator determines
covered expenses which Gregory incurs to
be claims arising prior to amendment,
Gregory's right to reimbursement would be
protected by the limited amendment lan-
guage and cannot be prejudiced. Any such
entitlement would flow, not from ERISA,
but from the terms of the plan. Until the
administrator is required to rule on the
status of a covered claim made by Gregory,
however, the grant of declaratory relief
would be premature.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
awarding benefits for treatment at Tan-
gram is REVERSED and judgment is
RENDERED in favor of Halliburton and
the plan; dismissal of the plan's subroga-
tion counterclaim is VACATED and the
claim is REMANDED for a determination,
consistent with this opinion, of whether the
plan is entitled to relief; the award of
attorneys' fees is VACATED; and the dec-
laration of Gregory's entitlement to future
benefits is VACATED in accordance with
the views set forth in this opinion.
REVERSED and RENDERED in part,
and, in part, VACATED and REMANDED.
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Gary GRAHAM, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas
Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional
Division, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 88-2168.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
Jan. 3, 1992.
State prisoner under death sentence
sought habeas corpus. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, David Hittner, J., denied relief. Pe-
tition for probable cause was denied by the
Court of Appeals, 854 F.2d 715. The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court vacated, 492 U.S.
915, 109 S.CL 3237, 106 L.Ed.2d 585. On
remand, the Court of Appeals granted ha-
beas corpus, 896 F.2d 893 and rehearing en
banc was ordered, 903 F.2d 1014. The
Court of Appeals, Garwood, Circuit Judge,
held that Texas death penalty statute ade-
quately allowed for consideration of miti-
gating factors of defendant's youth and of
defendant's respect for his family members
and support for his children as they were
relevant to the special issue of whether
defendant would represent a continuing
threat to society.
Dismissal of petition affirmed.
Reavley, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed an opinion in which Politz, King, W.
Eugene Davis, and Wiener, JJ., joined.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit
Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion, 896 F.2d 893, superseded.
1. Habeas Corpus 4-818
Standard for granting certificate of
probable cause requires that habeas peti-
tioner make substantial showing of denial
of federal right.
2. Criminal Law 41213.8(8)
Imposition.of death sentence on 17-
year-old convicted of capital murder did not
950 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
violate Eighth Amendment U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 8.
3. Criminal Law <=641.13(7)
Trial attorney in state capital murder
trial was not ineffective, although defen-
dant contended attorney construe death
penalty statute as precluding consideration
of mitigating factors; attorney was not in
any way discouraged by statute from
presenting mitigating evidence of defen-
dant's psychiatric treatment but, rather, his
decision not to pursue that course resulted
from his belief that little convincing evi-
dence existed and that damaging rebuttal
evidence would be introduced. Vernon's
Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend 6.
4. Habeas Corpus *-718
Competent evidence supported state
court finding that defendant was compe-
tent to be executed.
5. Habeas Corpus e773
Habeas petitioner failed to overcome
presumption that state trial court's finding
that defense counsel was effective was cor-
rect. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
6. Constitutional Law *=270(1)
Criminal Law 41206.1(2), 1213.2(2)
Searches and Seizures e12
Texas death penalty statute provides
proportionality and does not violate Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 4-4, 8, 14;
Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071.
7. Constitutional Law 4221(1, 5), 250.-
2(1, 4), 265, 267
Grand Jury 421h
Jury 433(2.1)
Exclusion of 18-year-olds and blacks
from grand jury and petit juries in state
capital murder trial did not violate defen-
dant's due process and equal protection
rights; peremptory challenges against
blacks resulted from venireman's testimo-
ny that they were opposed to death penalty
and no case law suggested that the exclu-
sion of 18-year-olds is unconstitutional.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
8. Criminal Law e1208.1(5)
Merely because mitigating evidence
has some relevance to a negative answer to
one of the special issues submitted to the
jury at the sentencing phase under Texas
death penalty statute does not necessarily
suffice to sustain the application of the
statute. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.p. art
37.071(b) (1990). .
9. Criminal Law 4-1206.1(2)
Where no major mitigating thrust of
evidence presented at sentencing phase is
substantially beyond the scope of the three
special issues submitted under the Texas
death penalty statute, i.e., whether the con-
duct was deliberate, whether there is a
probability that defendant will commit
criminal acts in the future, and whether the
defendant was acting in response to provo-
cation, the Texas statutory scheme is valid
and allows proper consideration of all miti-
gating evidence presented. Vernon's
Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071(b) (1990).
10. Criminal Law 4=1206.1(2)
Mitigating factors of relative youth
and evidence reflecting good character
traits, such as steady employment and
helping others, are adequately covered by
second special issue of the Texas death
penalty statute which asks the jurors to
consider whether there is a probability that
defendant will commit criminal acts of vic.
lence and will constitute a continuing
threat to society. Vernon's Ann.Tezas
C.C.P. art. 37.071(b) (1990).
11. Homicide 4-357(6)
Evidence of good character or tr
itory condition, such as youth or being a
der some particular emotional burdeo at
the time of the homicide, will typically tend
to indicate that the crime in question is no
truly representative of what the def
dant's normal behavior is, or may beaUse
over time, and will tend to indicate th
defendant may be rehabilitated so As mot
be a continuing threat to society and S
mitigating evidence is adequately sA0'
ed for under the Texas death penalty 4.
ute by the requirement that the jurOrs 00
sider likelihood of defendant's futu w
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gerousness. Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P.
art. 37.071(b) (1990).
12. Homicide 4357(6)
Defendant's youth as a mitigating
factor in capital murder prosecution was
adequately encompassed by special issue
asking the jury whether defendant was
likely to be a danger to society in the
future, and that special issue adequately
allowed jury's consideration of that miti-
gating factor; whatever is mitigating
about youth tends to lend support to a "no"
answer to that special issue and its tenden-
cy to do so is essentially proportional to the
degree to which the jury considers that
such factors as youth were influential in
defendant's probable conduct. Vernon's
Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071(b) (1990).
13. Homicide e357(4)
Youth is not a factor mitigating
against imposition of the death penalty
with respect to a defendant's conduct
which is not attributable to youth. Ver-
non's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071(b)
(1990).
14. Homicide 4-357(6)
Mild evidence of normal and good char-
acter on defendant's part, such as respect
for his grandmother and stepfather and his
closeness to his mother, his lack of vio-
lence, his willingness to help out around
the house, and his contribution to the sup-
port of his children was related to special
issue under Texas death penalty statute of
whether there was a probability that defen-
dant would be a continuing threat to socie-
ty, and statute requiring the jury to answer
that special issue adequately allowed for
consideration of that mitigating evidence.
Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071(b)
(1990).
IL Homicide -357(4)
Evidence that defendant's mother was
frequently hospitalized with a nervous con-
dition or mental illness from the time that
defendant was approximately three years
old was not comparable to evidence of a
defendant's own mental illness or retarda-
tion which might be a mitigating factor not
Judges Emillo M. Garza and Harold R. DeMoss.
Jr were sworn in after this case was argued to
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adequately presented to the jury by Texas
death penalty statute. Vernon's Ann.Tex-
as C.C.P. art. 37.071(b) (1990).
16. Homicide 0357(4)
Defendant's youth, respect for his fam-
ily, and support of his children had mitigat-
ing relevance to special issues under Texas
law of whether the conduct of the defen-
dant was committed deliberately and with
reasonable expectati6n that death would
result and whether the conduct of defen-
dant was unreasonable in response to any
provocation of the deceased. Vernon's
Ann.Texas C.C.P. art 37.071(b) (1990).
Douglas M. O'Brien, Houston, Tex., for
petitioner-appellant.
Robert S. Walt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin,
Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
On Remand from the Supreme
Court of the United States
Before CLARK, Chief Judge,
REAVLEY, POLITZ, KING, GARWOOD,
JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS,
JONES, SMITH, DUHP, WIENER, and
BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
A panel of this Court previously affirmed
the district court's denial of Gary Graham's
habeas corpus petition challenging his Tex-
as capital murder conviction and death sen-
tence. Graham v. Lynaugh, 854 F.2d 715
(5th Cir.1988). Thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court, in Graham v. Ly-
naugh, 492 U.S. 915, 109 S.Ct. 3237, 106
LEd.2d 585 (1989), issued a per curiam
order that granted Graham's petition for
writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of
this Court, and remanded the case to this
Court "for further consideration in light of
Penry v. Lynaugh," 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct.
2934, 106 LEd.2d 256 (1989). Pursuant to
that remand order, a panel of this Court
reconsidered the case, and, by a divided
vote, vacated Graham's death sentence, the
the En Banc Court and elected not to participate
in this en banc decision. - .
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panel majority determining that the Texas
ca-pital sentencing system was unconstitu-
tionally applied in Graham's case because
the jury at the sentencing phase of his
trial, having been given no special instruc-
tions, was not able to adequately consider
and give effect to Graham's youth as a
mitigating factor. Graham v. Collins, 896
F.2d 893 (5th Cir.1990). Having ordered
rehearing en bane, id 903 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir.1990), we have again reconsidered the
case in light of Penry and, disagreeing
with the panel majority's determination in
this respect, we now reinstate our former
affirmance of the district court's denial of
habeas relief.
1. The 1988 and 1990 panel opinions in this case
erroneously indicated that only the first two
issues specified in art. 37.071(b) were submitted.
Se4 id, 896 F.2d at 898 n. 4 and 854 F.2d at 718.
Until 1991. sections (a) through (e) of art.
37.071 provided, as they did also in 1981, as
follows:
"(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant shall be sen
tenced to death or life imprisonment. The
proceeding shall be conducted in the trial
court before the trial jury as soon as practica-
ble. In the proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court
deems relevant to sentence. This subsection
shall not be construed to authorize the intro
duction of any evidence secured in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of Texas. The state and the defen-
dant or his counsel shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence of
death.
"(b) On conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the fol-
lowing three issues to the jury-
"(I) whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reason
able expectation that the death of the de-
ceased or another would result;
"(2) whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of vio.
lence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society* and
"(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the de-
ceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased.
"(c) The state must prove each issue sub.
mitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
jury shall return a special verdict of 'yes' or
'no' on each issue submitted.
"(d) The court shall charge the jury that:
"(1) it may not answer any issue 'yes' unless
it agrees unanimously, and
Procedural History
Over his plea of not guilty, Graham wu
convicted by a Texas court jury in October
1981 of the offense of capital murder, the
May 1981 intentional killing of Bobby Las.
bert by shooting him with a pistol while in
the course of robbing or attempting to rob
him. Texas Penal Code, art. 19.03(a)2
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the
jury answered in the affirmative each of
the three special issues provided for in
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 3t..
071(b), and Graham was accordingly sea-
tenced to death.' On direct appeal, Gm.
ham's conviction and sentence were af-
"(2) it may not answer any issue 'no' unles
10 or more jurors agree.
"(e) If the jury returns an affirmative fin&
ing on each issue submitted under this article,
the court shall sentence the defendant to
death. If the jury returns a negative finding
on or is unable to answer any issue submitted
under this article, the court shall sentence the
defendant to confinement in the Texas De
partment of Corrections for life."
The above provisions are the same as when the
statute was first enacted in 1973 (except that by
1981 amendment the word "three" was insertel
in the opening clause of section (b)).
In May 1991 the Texas Legislature passed to
bills amending art. 37.071. S.B. 880, ch. 83
72nd Leg., R.S.1991, extensively amends the
Texas capital sentencing procedure, including
art. 37.071, and specifies an effective date of
September 1, 1991, but is expressly made appli.
cable "only" to offenses "committed on or after
September 1. 1991." S.B. 880, § 5. The
changes made by S.B. 880 § I to art. 37.071
include the entire elimination of the former
first and third special issues (the former second
special issue is retained verbatim in all cases).
provision for a new special issue where the jury
charge allowed the defendant to be found guilty
under the law of parties, and provision in all
cases for the following new special issue:
"Whether, taking into consideration all Of
the evidence, including the circumstances of
the offense, the defendant's character and
background and the personal moral culpab!
ty of the defendant, there is a sufficient Initi
gating circumstance or circumstances to war*
rant that a sentence of life imprisonment t51b-
er than a death sentence be imposed."
If all issues submitted are answered adversely to
the defendant, the sentence is death; otherwise*
the sentence is life imprisonment. S.B. 880 W"
finally passed May 17. 1991. and was filed with'
out the Governor's signature on June 16. 1991.
The other bill. H.B. 9. ch. 652, 72nd 14-
R.S.1991, was finally passed May 27, 1991. and
was signed by the Governor June 16, 1991. Sec.
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oreed by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in an unpublished opinion. Graham
subsequently sought habeas corpus relief
in the Texas courts. After holding an evi-
dentiary hearing on Graham's allegations,
the convicting trial court recommended de-
nis of relief, transmitting to the Court of
Criminal Appeals findings and conclusions
rejecting Graham's contentions. The Court
of Criminal Appeals thereafter denied re-
Bef pursuant to an unpublished opinion.
Graham then brought the present pro-
ceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the
district court. That court denied relief
without an evidentiary hearing, and derizd
stay of execution and a certificate of pioba-
ble cause. A panel of this Cn-- granted
an interim stay, but ultimat.aly denied Gra-
ham's application for eu-tficate of projable
cause. Graham, 854 F.2d i1'- - Judge
Jolly, in his opinion zor -ie panel consisting
of himself and Judges Reavley and King,
considered and rejected seriatim each of
Graham's several claims. In part IIB of
the opinion, the panel dealt with Graham's
contention that the Texas statutory special
tion 9 of H.B. 9 provides that art. 37.071 "is
amended to read as follows" setting it out in full
in the same form as it existed previously (or
before May 1991) with only minor, technical
changes (a new section 1 is added providing that
the judge shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment if the state does not seek the
death penalty; the remainder of art. 37.071 is
put into its section 2, stated to apply only if the
state seeks the death penalty; the only other
changes are from 'upon" to "on" at the begin-
ning of section 2(a) and using the current desig-
nation for the former Texas Department of Cor-
rections in section 2(e)). H.B. 9 specifies Sep-
tember 1, 1991 as its effective date (section 16).
and its section 15(a) states: "(a) The changes in
law made by Section 1-9 and 11. 12. and 13 of
this Act apply to the trial of a capital offense
that commences on or after the effective date of
this Act, whether the trial is for an offense
committed before, on. or after the effective
date.-
We merely note these 1991 enactments, and
express no opinion with respect to whether, for
offenses committed on or after September 1,
1991. the controlling form of art. 37.071 is as
provided in S.B. 880 § I or H.B. 9, § 9.
. The panel also, among other things, rejected
Graham's contention that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited execution for an offense com-
mitted when the defendant was less than eigh-
teen years old. Id. 854 F.2d at 717-718.
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issues, which mandate the death penalty if
all are answered affirmatively, see note 1,
supra, do not permit the jury to adequately
weigh mitigating circumstances when for-
mulating their answers. Id. at 718-20.
The factors Graham relied on as mitigating
were primarily his youth-he was seven-
teen at the time of the offense-and certain
matters reflected by evidence concerning
his childhood.' Id. The panel relied partic-
ularly upon Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 LEd.2d 155 (1988),
and concluded by holding that "the jury's
verdict ... is consistent with the constitu-
tional requirements outlined in Franklin
and other precedents." Id. at 719.3
[1-7] Following the Supreme Court's
remand for reconsideration in light of Pen-
ry, the panel again grappled with this diffi-
cult issue.' Judge Reavley, for the panel
majority, held that:
"The mitigating evidence that Graham
introduced during sentencing included
his youth and his difficult childhood.
Graham argues this evidence is relevant
3. The 1988 panel did, however, observe (id at
720, n. 8):
"We do not suggest that this area of the law
is devoid of wrinkles. The Supreme Court
has recently granted certiorari in the case of
Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1987),
cm granted (487] U.S. [1233], 108 S.CL 2896,
101 LEd.2d 930 (1988). In Penr our court
closely scrutinized evidence of Peary's mental
retardation and concluded that there was
some doubt whether the Texas statute permit-
ted this evidence to be considered in answer-
ing the sentencing questions. 832 F.2d at
925."
4. With respect to the other issues in the case.
the 1990 panel opinion observed:
In remanding this case, the Supreme Court
neither expressed nor suggested disagreement
with any part of our prior opinion other than
that relating to Graham's argument that the
Texas statutory sentencing procedure does not
allow the jury to consider fully the relevant
mitigating circumstances, which is discussed
in section IB of that opinion. Accordingly,
with the exception of section IIB, we reinstate
our prior opinion.' Id. 896 F.2d at 894.
We agree, and reinstate this portion of the 1990
panel opinion. For the same reason, we sim-
ilarly deny relief with respect to Grabam's con-
tentions addressed in footnotes 5, 7. and 9 of the
1988 panel opinion. Id. 854 F.2d at 718 n. 5.
719 nn. 7 & 9.
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beyond the scope of the special questions
and that, because no additional instruc-
tions were given, the Texas statute was
unconstitutionally applied in his case.
Because of Graham's age, we agree."
Id at 897.3
Judge Jolly, in his 1990 dissent, concluded
that the second special issue adequately
encompassed any mitigating aspects of
youth that the jury must constitutionally
be free to consider, as Graham's youthful-
ness was such a factor only to the extent
his offense was a product of it, and youth
was necessarily a transitory condition that
the jury could fully take into account "by
giving a negative answer to the. future
dangerousness inquiry of the second pe-
cial issue." Id. at 899.
Context Facts
At the guilt-innocence phase of the trial,
Graham's defense was essentially only one
of insufficient identification. The state
presented several witnesses to the shoot-
ing, which occurred at about 9:30 p.m. on
Wednesday, May 13, 1981, in the parking
lot of a Safeway Food Store in Houston,
Texas. The perpetrator, a man wearing
black pants and a white jacket, bumped
into Lambert, who was carrying a sack of
groceries out of the store, and attempted to
grab Lambert's wallet Some of the testi-
mony indicated that there was a brief
struggle between the two. Lambert
pushed at the perpetrator, and each
stepped back; the perpetrator produced a
pistol, leveled it at Lambert's chest, and
shot him in the heart from a distance of
about two to three feet. The perpetrator
then fled without being apprehended.
Lambert staggered back toward the store,
fell, and died on the spot The perpetrator
had been observed in the store when Lam-
bert was there, but had left a few minutes
5. The 1990 panel majority, though summarizing
the evidence presented by Graham respecting
his childhood. iL, did not address whether that
evidence, of itself, would have required some
further instruction or jury submission beyond
that given. As to the Penry issue, the panel only
addressed "Graham's age."
6. The other witnesses did not testify to anything
suggesting that Graham was not (or did not
resemble) the perpetrator, but merely stated
before Lambert did. So far as the evid.fshowed, the perpetrator acted alone. 0nlone of the witnesses, Mrs. Skillern, was
able to identify Graham as the perpsa
tor.' She ultimately so identified Grahae
in a May 26 photographic display and in a
May 27 police station "line-up," as well as
in her open court trial testimony. Defense
counsel attacked Mrs. Skillern's identifc
tion, both by vigorous crossexaminadoe
and by emphasizing in argument the faD,
ure of the other witnesses, at least one of
whom was closer to the events in questic,
to make an identification! However, a
defense evidence was presented. In clo
ing argument defense counsel did not sa.
gest -'hat the evidence failed to show that
the offense t'harged had been committed,
.ut rather that 1t failed to show that Gr's
ham '.*, the one wh,.) committed it.
At the senterdiknearing, no evidence
was introduced concerning the offense of
conviction. The state introduced extensive
evidence showing that on five different
days during the week following his murder
of Lambert, Graham committed robberies
at a total of nine separate locations and in
each instance Graham leveled either a pit
tol or a sawed-off shotgun on the victim
The first of these was on May 14, and the
last on May 20. These offenses involved
some thirteen different victims, including
women aged fifty-seven and eighteen and
men aged sixty-four, fifty-seven, eighteen,
and other ages. With respect to a few of
these occasions, the evidence indicated Gra'
ham was using marihuana. In addition to
money and personal effects, five vehicles
were stolen. Two of the victims were pis'
tol whipped, one of them being shot in the
neck. These were the only serious physical
injuries. Graham glancingly struck anoth
er victim, the sixty-four-year-old man, with
the vehicle he was stealing, apparently T
that they did not get a good enough look at (Or
sufficiently recall) the perpetrator's face t
make an identification.
7. The defense also sought to suppress Mrs. Skl'
lern's testimony on the basis that the Phow
graphic display and line-up were unduly sii0*
tive. After an extensive hearing out of the Pep
ence of the jury, this motion was ove
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to run over him. The fifty-seven-year-
g loman was kidnapped and raped, after
'whic Graham fell asleep in her apartment,
At contacted the police and he was arrest-
ad there, thus bringing his crime spree to
s end. On five of these occasions Graham
apparently acted alone; on four others an
:aSeomplice (not shown to be of a different
ag from Graham) was present or nearby,
but Graham wielded the weapon. At least
six of the separate incidents, including that
;vh the sixty-four year old and the two
,with the fifty-seven year olds, involved
,Graham practicing initial successful decep-
-do on the victim. The state also intro-
-doced testimony of a Texas Youth Council
.amployee that she had been familiar since
o unspecified time in 1979 with Graham's
-eputation in the community for being a
peaceful and law-abiding citizen, and that it
was bad, she gave no elaboration or specif-
ks whatever and did not state how she
aquired this information, except that it
was not based on her own personal obser-
vation. This was the entirety of the state's
evidence at the punishment stage.
The only evidence presented by the de-
fense at the sentencing stage consisted of
the testimony of Graham's stepfather, Joe
Samby, and his grandmother, Erma Chron.
Samby testified that he had been married
to Graham's mother for about five years,
and had known Graham for about five
years. He said Graham was fifteen when
he (Samby) first met him. Graham lived
with his father, and worked with him, but
Samby did not know what kind of work
Graham did. Graham would come by Sam-
by's house once or twice a week to visit his
mother. Graham had "real, real respect
for his mother. He cared about his moth-
er. He was real close to his mama." His
mother was present in the courtroom, but
Samby explained "she can't do nothing be-
catuse she is on medication and nervous.
L There was no evidence as to where Graham's
children lived or whether Graham was or had
been married.
H* owever it is undisputed that Graham was in
fact born on September 5. 1963, this being re-
flected in a report of a pretrial psychiatric ex-
antnation filed in the papers of the case in
August 1981. the examination having been or-
dered by the court on motion of defense coun-
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She is the nervous type." Samby stated
that he had never known Graham to be a
violent person, that Graham had been "real
nice, respectable" with him and, when re-
quested to help out around Samby's house,
such as by cutting the grass or to "clean
up and help his mother," Graham "would
do it and be glad to do it for me." Graham
was one of four brothers, and had no sis-
ters. Samby had three children of his own
living in his house. Graham had two chil-
dren, one four and the other two. Graham
would "buy ... clothes for his children and
try to give them food."8
Chron testified that her grandson Gra-
ham began staying with her intermittently,
beginning "when he was around three,"
because his mother was frequently hospi-
talized for a "nervous condition" that
Chron said was "mental illness." He
would stay with his mother when she was
not hospitalized. However, at about age
eleven or twelve Graham went to live with
his father and "he has been with his father
ever since." Graham's mother had been
hospitalized "at least twenty times."
Chron further stated that while Graham
was living with her he attended school, "he
would go to church all the time and every-
thing. He loved the Lord," and he didn't
give Chron "any problems or trouble."
Chron also testified that Graham never had
any weapons, and "he has never been vio-
lent."
Apart from Samby's testimony that he
had known Graham about five years and
first knew him when Graham was fifteen,
which would indicate that Graham was
nineteen or twenty when the offense was
committed, there was no evidence before
the jury as to Graham's age.' Neverthe-
less, each of Graham's two attorneys, in
their closing arguments at the punishment
stage, argued to the jury, without prosecu-
sel. Graham was thus seventeen years and
eight months of age when the offense was com-
mitted. Records of the late May 1981 line-ups
at which Graham was identified, which were
not before the jury but were put in evidence
only in hearings out of the presence of the jury
on suppression motions, also reflect that Gra-
ham was seventeen at that time.
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tion objection, that Graham was seventeen
when his offense was committed.
The first defense counsel's argument in-
cluded the following:
"We have to make a decision on this
young man, Gary Graham. What do we
know about Gary Graham? One thing
we know about Gary Graham is from
May 13 through May 20th he reaped
havoc and hell on a lot of people. May
13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 20th five days.
Pure hell. What do we know about Gary
Graham? We know that at age 3 he
went to live with his Grandmother be-
cause his Mother was placed in a mental
institution or placed herself in a mental
institution. We know he lived on and off
with his Grandmother and when she
would come out of the hospital he would
live with her and when she would go
back he would go live with his Grand-
mother. Draw your own conclusions to
that, what type of life he lived. You
heard from his Step-father. He stated
that Gary Graham would come to his
house and visit his Mother every now
and then. You heard from his Grand-
mother, that Gary Graham has 2 children
of his own.... Gary Graham is a young
man. No doubt about it.... A young
man, hasn't even reached 20 years old.
Not even 20 years old. He goes on a
rage for 7 days, 7 days out of his life.
He is not going to ever forget.... I
would hope that it was something on the
witness stand that you either heard that
show some redeeming value. Something
in Gary Graham's life to say that possi-
bly he can be rehabilitated. Possibly.
And I would urge each and every one of
you all that there is a glimmer or a
possibility that his life can change, given
that opportunity.... Gary Graham, 17
years old, went on a rage for 7 days.
What did he do? He harassed people.
He stuck guns in their face. He shot an
individual and he killed another individu-
al. What was it in response to? Why
did he become so aggressive? What
makes an individual go on a rage for 7
days? Drugs? Alcohol? Maybe. Life?
Maybe...."
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Graham's other counsel argued in a .ilar vein, stating:
"... there are only two answers, an
that is a choice. Life or death. Life ithe penitentiary at the age of 18 year
old. What is the meaning of pu
ment? Why do we punish.... we.
all leaving. Everyone here gets to lea
but him. He either goes to live for life it
the penitentiary or be prepared for death
by injection, and when you look at a
young man of his age, what do you think
about? What do you think about the
years when you think about death. Ya
think about finishing the years of you
life back when you are at a point in you
life when some people have no directio.
Some people have no knowledge of
where their (sic] going or what they
want to do. Some of us are more fort.
nate. You also have to look at change
in society. Changes in ages. See, be
cause what you are called upon to do is
predict whether some time in the futm
Gary Graham could become a person fit
to return to society. At least he is aliw.
See, when you are 17 or 20, you ar
young, hot-to-trot. You are going to set
the world on fire one way or the other,
right or wrong. When people come in
their middle 20's. and middle 30's, a
change a little bit from your more radicl
stands to a more somewhat upright po&
ture because you have had not only tim
to think, but to see what is in the world
Most of the crime is committed by young
people. By the time you get to 25 or 35,
it's different 35 and above.... because
there is something about human nature
that not only changes you, but slows Yo"
down as you live. If you live. If you
live...."
The prosecution's argument did not refer
to Graham's age in any way except to onc
acknowledge "his youth." The prosecuton
stressed Graham's killing of Lambert &0
his other many serious offenses in the Io)
lowing week, stating in part:
"Gary Graham does have direction, '
he has shown you that direction. Ie MIs
shown you that direction in every wl?
that you can possibly look at...-
(There are certain individuals in our 0
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iety that we have got to look at. And
we have got to realize that are not fit to
live with us. The evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt shows that Gary Gra-
ham is not fit to live in this society, that
he will constitute a continuing threat to
society. Compassion? They ask for
compassion. We ask you for his life....
Rights of the individuals of this society.
The life of Bobby Grant Lambert. They
say look at his youth. When does a
human life taken the way he took that
life of Bobby Grant Lambert cease to
have meaning? It ceases to have mean-
ing when the terror and the degradation
of a man such as him holds that life in
his hand. ... Compassion? Care?
Have you just looked at him? ... Death
is the only protection that you, as the
jury, and society can protect from people
and especially Gary Graham. The seeds
of our past are the harvest of the future
and what seeds has Gary Graham plant-
ed? And where has he sowed those
seeds? In the fertile earth? No. He
buried Bobby Grant Lambert in the
earth. His seeds are death. Pain. Suf-
fering. Humiliation. Degradation.
What do those things bring? But one
thing tell you what Gary Graham is.
You have seen his actions. You have
heard from the mouths of these people.
Deliberate conduct... ."
Neither side made any objections to the
other's argument The court instructed
the jury in accordance with article 37.071,
including informing them that the sentence
would be either "death or confinement in
10. The jury was also instructed that the state
still had the burden of proof, which never shift-
ed to the defendant, and that 'each special issue
submitted must be proved by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt" and none could be answered
'yes unless all jurors were convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that it should be so answered.
11. Prior to trial, the court bad denied defense
counsel's motion to "hold article 37.071 ... un-
constitutional and void." This motion was
rounded on the contention that the special
ussues called for were too "vague and indefi-
nitc" and thus "allow total discretion to a jury
to make unfavorable findings against a Defen-
dant, and such findings may be based on any
Prejudice the jury may have, individually or as a
whole." The supporting memorandum ex-
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the penitentiary for life," and that in an-
swering the three special issues they could
take into consideration all the evidence sub-
mitted both at the guilt-innocence stage
and at the punishment stage. 0 The three
special issues called for by art. 37.071(b)
were submitted, and each was answered in
the affirmative. Neither side objected to
the charge or the issues submitted or re-
quested any other or further instructions
or issues."
Discussion
In Jurek v. Teras, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct.
2950, 49 LEd.2d 929 (1976), the Supreme
Court sustained the Texas capital sentenc-
ing procedure of art. 37.071. This case
requires us to examine what, if anything,
remains of Jurek and art. 37.071 after Pen-
ry. To provide context for this examina-
tion, an overview of some of the other
leading decisions of the Supreme Court in
this area is appropriate.
Context cases
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92
S.Ct. 2726, 33 LEd.2d 346 (1972), the Court
effectively struck down all capital punish-
ment statutes then in place. The crucial
votes in Furman were those of Justices
Stewart and White, who, as Justice Scalia
observed in Walton v. Arizona, - U.S.
-, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3061, 111 L.Ed.2d 511
(1990) (concurring opinion), "focused on the
infrequency and seeming randomness"
with which the death sentence was imposed
under the then existing discretionary sys-
plained that "Article 37.071 leaves with both the
judge and the jury a vas(t] residue of discretion
which is precisely what the Supreme Court in
Furman (v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 LEd.2d 346 (1972) ] condemned" and argued
that "Ic]onsequently, the inquiry [of the article
37.071 issues] is fraught with standardless dis-
cretion in the hands of the jury."
There was no suggestion in the motion or
memorandum that defendant complained of in-
sufficient discretion (or an insufficient vehicle
to give effect to it) to determine that the defen-
dant would not receive the death penalty, or
that the jury was not given an adequate basis to
consider or give effect to its conclusions con-
cerning defendant's age or background. The
complaint was indeed the reverse.
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tem.'2 Following Furman some thirty-five
states adopted new capital sentencing stat-
utes that reduced or narrowed the sentenc-
er's discretion in determining whether or
not to impose the death penalty. The Su-
preme Court ruled on five of these statutes
on July 2, 1976. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859
(1976); Jurek; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct.
3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). Gregg sus-
tained the Georgia statute, which directed
the sentencer to consider listed and unlist-
ed aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, but allowed a death sentence only
if at least one listed aggravating circum-
stance were found. The Court observed
that "Furman mandates" that the capital
sentencer's "discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion," id. 96 S.Ct. at 2932, and warned
against sentencing standards "so vague
that they would fail adequately to channel
the sentencing decision patterns of juries
with the result that a pattern of arbitrary
and capricious sentencing like that found
unconstitutional in Furman could occur."
Id at 2935 n. 46. Gregg goes on to note,
however, that "the isolated decision of a
jury to afford mercy does not render un-
constitutional death sentences imposed on
defendants who were sentenced under a
12. Justice Stewart, for example, observed that of
those convicted of capital crimes "many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed" and that the Constitution could
not tolerate systems that 'permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed." Furman, 92 S.CL at 2762-63. Justice
White observed that under the statutes at issue
"there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it [the death penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is
not." Id. at 2764.
13. Justice White. in an opinion in which then
Chief Justice Burger and then Justice Rehnquist
joined, likewise found the Texas statute consti-
tutional. Id, 96 S.Ct. at 2959-60. Justice
White's opinion quotes the statutory special is-
sues in full and observes that "[tlhe statute does
ORTER, Zd SERIES
system that does not create a substanta
risk of arbitrariness or caprice." I. It
2939. Proffitt applied the Gregg rationae
to uphold the somewhat similar Florid
scheme. Woodson, however, struck down
the North Carolina statute under which the
death penalty was made mandatory for
first degree murder, in that case murder
during the course of robbery. The Court
noted that among the "constitutional short.
coming[s]" of this statute was "its failure
to allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant," and
that in capital cases the Eighth Amend
ment "requires consideration of the charac
ter and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense." Id., 96 S.Ct. at 2991. Rober
applied the same rationale to invalidate the
Louisiana statute under which the death
penalty was likewise mandatory for first
degree murder.
We turn now to Jurek, decided the same
day. There seven justices voted to uphold
the Texas scheme as embodied in art. 37.-
071, but no opinion attracted more than
three votes. The judgment of the Court
was announced in Justice Stewart's opin'
ion, which Justices Powell and Stevens
joined, and this opinion has generally been
understood as expressing the rationale of
the Court's action.'3 Justice Stewas
opinion summarizes the facts adduced at
trial, including evidence that Jurek "22
not extend to juries discretionary power to &
pense mercy, and it should not be assumed t
juries will disobey or nullify their instrucuol
Id., at 2959.
Justice White, joined by then Chief Ju4c
Burger, Justice Blackmun, and then Justic
Rehnquist, dissented in Roberts, id, 96 
S.CL I
3008-3020. and also in Woodson. Justice Blck'
mun wrote a separate dissent in Woodson rs
did not join Justice White's dissent there.
96 S.CL at 2992-93. In Jurak Justice Blackodn
separately concurred in the judgment, with 00
a brief reference to his Furman dissent.M J3016
96 S.Ct. at 2960. Justices Brennan and Maflw
dissented in Jurek, as well as in Gre 
M
Proffitt, on the grounds that the death PK"_
was unconstitutional per se. 96 S.Ct.
2977. They concurred in the result in Wood
id., 96 S.CL at 2992, and Roberts, i, 96 Si.C
3007, on the same basis.
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old at the time, had been drinking
in the afternoon" of the offense, and
tbt he "had always been steadily em-
*yed since he had left school and that he
strbuted to his family's support." Id.,
s S.Ct. at 2954. In describing the Texas
gtencing procedure, the opinion states
Ag at the punishment phase the jury is
.,presented with two (sometimes three)
questions, the answers to which determine
iwbether a death sentence will be imposed."
ix (footnote omitted). It observes that
only the first two issues specified in art.
h1.071 were submitted, that both were an-
swered yes, "and the judge, therefore, in
accordance with the statute, sentenced the
-petoner to death." Id. The opinion then
-quotes verbatim the full text of the three
issues specified in art. 37.071, and contin-
ua by stating "[ilf the jury finds that the
State has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the answer to each of the three
questions is yes, then the death sentence is
imposed." Id. at 2955.
In evaluating the constitutionality of the
Texas scheme, Justice Stewart notes that
under Woodson and Roberts "[al jury must
be allowed to consider on the basis of all
relevant evidence not only why a death
sentence should be imposed, but also why it
should not be imposed." Id. at 2956. The
-opinion then observes that "[t]he Texas
statute does not explicitly speak of mitigat-
mg circumstances; it directs only that the
jury answer three questions," and "[tihus,
the constitutionality of the Texas proce-
dures turns on whether the enumerated
questions allow consideration of particular-
ized mitigating factors." rd The Court
Proceeds to answer this inquiry in the af-
firmative, but only with regard to the see-
Od-the future dangerousness--special is-
sue, because "(tihe Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals has not yet construed the first
and third questions ... thus it is as yet
Undetermined whether or not the jury's
consideration of those questions would
Properly include consideration of mitigat-
mg circumstances. In at least some situa-
'~ The case considered was Smith v. State 540
S.W.2d 693. 696-97 (Tex.Crim.App.1976), cerr.
dere4 430 U.S. 922. 97 S.C. 1341, 51 LEd.2d
601 (1977), where the Texas court examined the
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tions the questions could, however, compre-
hend such an inquiry." Id at 2956 n. 7.
In turning to the second special issue, the
opinion notes that "[t]he Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has yet to define precise-
ly the meaning of such terms as 'criminal
acts of violence' or 'continuing threat to
society.'" Id. at 2956. It goes on to state
(96 S.Ct. at 2956-57):
"In the present case, however, it [the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] indi-
cated that it will interpret this second
question so as to allow a defendant to
bring to the jury's attention whatever
mitigating circumstances he may be able
to show-
"'In determining the likelihood that
the defendant would be a continuing
threat to society, the jury could consid-
er whether the defendant had a signifi-
cant criminal record. It could consider
the range and severity of his prior crimi-
nal conduct. It could further look to the
age of the defendant and whether or not
at the time of the commission of the
offense he was acting under duress or
under the domination of another. It
could also consider whether the defen-
dant was under an extreme form of
mental or emotional pressure, some-
thing less, perhaps, than insanity, but
more than the emotions of the average
man, however inflamed, could withstand.'
[Jurek v. State ] 522 S.W.2d [934], at
939-940 [Tex.Crim.App.1975]." (empha-
sis added).
After briefly considering one other Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals decision," Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion states "the Texas
capital-sentencing procedure guides and fo-
cuses the jury's objective consideration of
the particularized circumstances of the indi-
vidual offense and the individual offender
before it can impose a sentence of death."
Id at 2957. The opinion concludes by ob-
serving-
"By authorzing the defense to bring
before the jury at the separate sentenc-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's
affirmative answer to the second special issue.
Jurek, 96 S.Ct. at 2957.
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ing hearing whatever mitigating circum-
stances relating to the individual defen-
dant can be adduced, Texas has ensured
that the sentencing jury will have ade-
quate guidance to enable it to perform its
sentencing function.... Because this
system serves to assure that sentences
of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freak-
ishly' imposed, it does not violate the
Constitution. Id. at 2958 (emphasis add-
ed).
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973
(1978), the Court considered an Ohio death
sentence imposed for the murder of a
pawnshop operator in the course of an arm-
ed robbery of his shop while the defendant,
an accomplice, waited outside in the geta-
way vehicle. Under Ohio law, as the Court
construed it, the sentencing judge was re-
quired to impose the death sentence for the
offense unless he found, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, one of the three statu-
tory mitigating factors, namely (1) that the
victim induced or facilitated the offense, or
(2) that the defendant committed the of-
fense under "duress, coercion, or strong
provocation," or (3) that it was "primarily
the product of" the defendant's "psychosis
or mental deficiency." Id. 98 S.CL at 2959,
2966. "No one planned to kill the pawn-
shop operator in the course of the rob-
bery." Id at 2957. The presentence re-
port reflected that the defendant, a twenty-
one-year-old female, had committed "no
major offenses" and that in the opinion of a
psychologist her "prognosis for rehabilita-
tion ... was favorable." Id. at 2959. The
sentencing judge found that the offense
was not the product of psychosis or mental
deficiency, did not address the other two
statutory mitigating factors, and sentenced
the defendant to death, stating "that he
had 'no alternative, whether [he] like(d] the
law or not' but to impose the death penal-
ty." Id The plurality opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, held that "[t]he limited
range of mitigating circumstances which
may be considered by the sentencer under
the Ohio statute is inconsistent with the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ...
a death penalty statute must not preclude
PORTER, 2d SERIES
consideration of relevant mitigingfactors." Id. at 2967. The scope of th
plurality opinion is unclear. It focuses o
the fact that under the Ohio statute the
defendant's lack of specific intent to kill -S
relevant for mitigating purposes only if it
is determined that it sheds some light a
one of the three statutory mitigang
factors" and that "consideration of a defg
dant's comparatively minor role in the of.
fense, or age, would generally not be pe.
mitted, as such, to affect the sentencing
decision." I. at 2966-67. Similarly, the
plurality notes that the Ohio statute's "cow
stitutional infirmities can best be undwr
stood by comparing it with the statute
upheld in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek" iS at
2965, and "the statute now before as b
significantly different" than those statutes.
Id. at 2966. More broadly, however, the
opinion states that:
"... a statute that prevents the senteae
er in all capital cases from giving ind
pendent mitigating weight to aspects of
the defendant's character and record and
to circumstances of the offense proffered
in mitigation creates the risk that the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe
penalty. ... that risk is unacceptable
and incompatible with the command of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." Id.
If the quoted language concerning "indO
pendent" mitigating weight is understood
in its most apparent literal sense, the Lock*
ett plurality would seem to be wholly incoow
sistent with Jurek for in Jurek it is clear
that the Supreme Court understood what
the Texas statute so obviously facially pro'
vides, namely that although a wide rang*
of evidence concerning the defendtfs
character and record and the circumstances
of the offense is to be considered in detet
mining whether or not to impose the death
penalty, the consideration of that evidene
is not "independent" of such relevance a
the jury may find it has to the special
issues. But such a construction of Lock
is not only much broader than the fact
there, but is also at war with the plurali
statement that the Ohio statute was "sit
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aiicantly different" than the Texas enact-
ment and that the former's deficiencies
"can best be understood by comparing it
with" the valid Texas statute.
Justice Blackmun concurred specially in
Lockett, "for a reason more limited than
that which the plurality espouses," namely
that the Constitution forbids imposition of
"the death sentence for a defendant who
only aided and abetted a murder, without
permitting any consideration by the sen-
tencing authority of the extent of her in-
volvement, or the degree of her mens rea,
in the commission of the homicide." Id. at
2969 (initial emphasis added). Justice Mar-
shall likewise concurred specially, adhering
to his view that the death penalty was
always unconstitutional, but also observing
that the defendant "was sentenced to death
for a killing that she did not actually com-
mit or intend to commit" pursuant to "a
statutory scheme that precluded any effec-
tive consideration of her degree of involve-
ment in the crime, her age, or her pros-
pects for rehabilitation." Id. at 2972 (em-
phasis added). Justice White concurred
specially, expressly disagreeing with the
plurality opinion, but concluding that "it
violates the Eighth Amendment to impose
the penalty of death without a finding that
the defendant possessed a purpose to cause
the death of the victim." Id. at 2983.1s
Then Justice Rehnquist dissented, and Jus-
tice Brennan did not participate.
The next significant decision in this con-
text is Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
102 S.CL 869, 71 LEd.2d 1 (1982), where
the Court struck down a death sentence
imposed on a sixteen year old, whom the
sentencing judge found posed a continuing
threat of violence to society. There, Jus-
tice Powell's plurality opinion focused on
the fact that the sentencing judge appeared
to have determined that "in following the
law" he was not permitted to "consider"
the defendant's troubled background, the
evidence showing the defendant's neglect-
ful and turbulent family environment, ex-
cessive physical punishment by his father,
that the defendant was emotionally dis-
IS. A modified version of this view subsequently
gained majority support. See Enmund v. Flor-
ida. 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.CL 3368, 73 LEd.2d
v. COLLINS 1021
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turbed and his mental and emotional devel-
opment were at a level several years below
his chronological age, and that the offense
was a product of these circumstances. Id.
102 S.CL at 873 & nn. 1 & 2, 877. The
opinion also observed that the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing the
sentence, had noted that defendant's con-
tention " 'that the killing was in actuality
an inevitable product of the way he was
raised,'" but held that "'the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why
he behaved the way he did, but it does not
excuse his behavior.'" Id. at 874. The
plurality opinion states that under Lockett
"the sentencer in capital cases must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigat-
ing factor," id. at 875, and that "the evi-
dence Eddings offered was relevant miti-
gating evidence." Id. at 877. The rule of
Lockett was violated because the trial
judge "found that as a matter of law he
was unable even to consider the evidence"
and the state appellate court "took the
same approach," id at 876, so that "it was
as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to
disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings
proffered on his behalf." Id. at 877.
Justice O'Connor did not join Justice
Powell's opinion, but specially concurred,
stating that "the reasoning of the plurality
opinion in Lockett compels a remand so
that we do not 'risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty.'" Ed-
dings, at 879 (quoting Lockett). A remand
was necessary for this reason because "it
appears that the trial judge believed that
he could not consider some of the mitigat-
ing evidence in imposing sentence." Id.
Then Chief Justice Burger, joined by Jus-
tices White, Blackmun and then Justice
Rehnquist, dissented.
In the case sub judice, not only was no
evidence tendered by the defense excluded,
but the trial court's instructions expressly
authorized consideration of all evidence ad-
mitted in answering the special issues, and,
unlike Eddings, there is nothing to affirm-
1140 (1982): Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107
S.Ct. 1676, 95 LEd.2d 127 (1987).
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atively indicate that the jury believed they
could not consider any of the evidence for
that purpose.
The Court applied Eddings in Skipper v.
South Caroiina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.CL 1669,
90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), to reverse a death
sentence because at the sentencing hearing
the trial judge had excluded as irrelevant
the defense's proffered "testimony of two
jailers and one 'regular visitor' to the jail to
the effect that petitioner had 'made a good
adjustment' during his time spent in jail,"
and the prosecutor had nevertheless ar-
gued to the jury "that petitioner would
pose disciplinary problems if sentenced to
prison and would likely rape other prison-
ers." Id 106 S.Ct. at 1670. Justice
White's opinion for the Court states that
under Eddings the capital "sentencer may
not refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering 'any relevant mitigating evi-
dence."' Skipper at 1671 (quoting Ed-
ding$). Justice White went on to hold:
"Consideration of a defendant's past con-
duct as indicative of his probable future
behavior is an inevitable and not undesir-
able element of criminal sentencing: 'any
sentencing authority must predict a con-
victed person's probable future conduct
when it engages in the process of deter-
mining what punishment to impose.' Ju-
rek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275, 96 S.Ct.
2950, 2958, 49 LEd.2d 929 (1976)....
[E]vidence that the defendant would not
pose a danger if spared (but incareerat-
ed) must be considered potentially miti-
gating. Under Eddings, such evidence
may not be excluded from the sentenc-
er's consideration." Id (footnote omit-
ted).t
16. The opinion concludes that because the ex-
cluded evidence was the only evidence from
disinterested witnesses tending to contradict the
prosecutor's argument, it appears reasonably
likely that the exclusion of evidence bearing
upon petitioner's behavior in jail (and hence,
upon his likely future behavior in prison) may
have affected the jury's decision to impose the
death sentence." 14 at 1673.
17. Indeed, Justice White's opinion indicates evi-
dence such as that of good personal hygiene
practices while in prison might properly be
treated as irrelevant. Id at 1672 n. 2.
Justice Powell, with then Chief Jusf
Burger and then Justice Rehnquist join.
concurred in the result, conceding that ,
versal was required on due pm
grounds because the death sentence had
been sought on a factual basis the deo
dant had not been allowed to rebut, but'
rejecting the notion that Eddings san
Lockett applied. Id. at 1673-1675. Justi
Powell-author of the Eddings plurality,
concluded that the States retained authors
ty "to determine what particular evidenc
within the broad categories described la
Lockett and Eddings is relevant in the fir
instance," that these determinations should
be respected provided "they do not fom
close consideration of factors that may
tend to reduce the defendants culpability.
for his crime," id. at 1674, and that "States
are only bound to consider those factors
that are central to the fundamental justice
of execution." Id at 1675. Nothing in
Justice White's opinion appears inconsist.
ent with these general premises. 7
In Hitchcock v. Dugger 481 U.S. 393,
107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 LEd.2d 347 (1987), Jus-
tice Scalia, for a unanimous Court, me
versed a Florida death sentence where the
record "could not be clearer that the adva-
ory jury was instructed not to consider, and
the sentencing judge refused to consider,
evidence of nonstatutory mitigating cr-
cumstances." Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1824. The
defendant had requested that there be tak-
en into account "the testimony concernist
petitioner's family background and his a'
pacity for rehabilitation," matters which
were not included in the statutory mitigat"
ing circumstances. Id. at 1824.18 Tb
8. The Florida statutory mitigating circ*
stances as set out in the opinion. id at 1823 1.
did not include potential for rehabiUation or
lack of future dangerousness or any ana
consideration (nor any general or residual tuiL
gation category). Nor did they include users
such as troubled family history or urbt
upbringing (here, evidence that as a child tbo
twenty-year-old defendant had the habit of iv
haling gasoline fumes, as an apparent result of
which his mind tended to wander, and th" b
was one of seven children of a poor
whose father died of cancer). although they
include whether the crime was committed w
.under the influence of extreme mental or
1022
Qrt held that "the exclusion of mitigat-
j evidence of the sort at issue here ren-
d" the death sentence invalid," citing
?Abl~r and Eddings. Id."
7he next year the Court revisited the
fa statute in Franklin, where it found
iconstitutional error in the refusal of a
Auested jury instruction that any of the
issues could be answered negatively
V you find any aspect of the Defendant's
bacter or record or any of the circum-
aes of the offense as factors which
itigate against the imposition of the death
plity." Id 108 S.Ct. at 2325 & n. 4.
He only mitigating evidence was that de-
fmdant's prison service for several years
both before and after the offense was with-
eat any disciplinary incident. Id at 2324.
utice White's plurality opinion, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, observed that "the Texas courts
have expressed resolute adherence to Lock-
st" in the decade since it was decided, id
at 2326, and rejected the contention, based
on the "'independent' mitigating weight"
laguage of Lockett, that defendant's
"prison disciplinary record reflected so pos-
iively on his 'character' that the instruo-
ions ... should have provided the jury
with a 'mechanism through which to im-
pose a life sentence' even if the jury other-
wise believed that both Special Issues
abould have been answered 'yes.'" Id. at
2329. Justice White also expressly reject-
ed the claim that the Constitution required
that the jury, even if it answered the spe-
eal issues affirmatively, be "still entitled
to cast an 'independent' vote against the
death penalty," stating that "this submis-
sion is foreclosed by Jurek, which held that
Texas could constitutionally impose the
death penalty if a jury returned 'yes' an-
swers to the two Special Issues" and that
"Jurek has not been overruled; and we are
not inclined to take any such action now."
Id at 2330. The plurality opinion asserts
that "Lockett does not hold that the state
has no role in structuring or giving shape
tional disturbance" and whether defendant's ca.
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform it to the requirements of law
was "substantially impaired." The opinion con-
tains no discussion whatever of the possible
1023
to the jury's consideration of ... mitigat-
ing factors," id., and that "we have never
suggested that jury consideration of miti-
gating evidence must be undirected or un-
focused." Id at 2331. Recognizing that
"two lines of cases"-Eddings and Lockett
on the one hand and Gregg and Proffitt on
the other-"are somewhat in 'tension' with
each other," Justice White notes that
nevertheless "the Texas capital sentencing
system has been upheld by this Court ...
precisely because of the way in which the
Texas scheme accommodates both of these
concerns." Id. He continues by stating:
"Doubtlessly this is why this Court origi-
nally approved Texas' use of Special Is-
sues to guide jury discretion in the sen-
tencing phase, notwithstanding the
fact-expressly averted to in the plurali-
ty opinion for the Court-that mitigating
evidence is employed in the Texas
scheme only to inform the jury's consid-
eration of the answers to the Special
Issue questions." Id. (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, dissented, concluding the
defendant's evidence of freedom from disci-
plinary violations during several years of
imprisonment was relevant as mitigation in
respects other than simply as it bore on his
future dangerousness. Such evidence indi-
cated "that petitioner's character was not
without some redeeming features" and
that he "may have virtues that can fairly
be balanced against society's interest in
killing him in retribution for his violent
crimes," id. at 2335, and, by suggesting
that his commission of the offense was
"not in keeping with his ... usual qualities
or fruits," bore on his "culpability" for the
offense as well as on his future dangerous-
ness. Id. at 2336. Justice Stevens con-
cluded that absent some special instruction
such as the defendant had requested "it is.
probable that the jury misapprehended the
significance it could attach to mitigating
evidence that was descriptive of petition-
relevance of these latter factors to the "family
background" claims of petitioner.
19. The opinion observes that no harmless error
argument was made.
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er's character rather than predictive of his
future behavior." Id. at 2337. This in
Justice Stevens' view rendered the sen-
tence invalid under Lockett and Eddings
and related cases.
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice
Blackmun joined, specially concurred. Id.
at 2332-2335. She considered Lockett, Ed-
dings and Hitchcock as standing for the
proposition that "punishment should be di-
rectly related to the personal culpability
of" the defendant, and she concluded that
"a state may not constitutionally prevent
the sentencing body from giving effect to
evidence relevant to the defendant's back-
ground or character or the circumstances
of the offense that mitigates against the
death penalty." Id. at 2333. In Justice
O'Connor's view, the evidence of defen-
dant's good conduct in prison "had no rele-
vance to any other aspect of petitioner's
character" than his future dangerousness.
Id. Hence, no special instruction was re-
quired. Justice O'Connor contrasted "[t]he
limited probative value" of that particular
mitigating evidence to "[e]vidence of volun-
tary service, kindness to others, or of reli-
gious devotion [which] might demonstrate
positive character traits that might miti-
gate against the death penalty." Id. Her
opinion also states:
"If, however, petitioner had introduced
mitigating evidence about his back-
ground or character or the circumstances
of the crime that was not relevant to the
special verdict questions, or that had
relevance to the defendant's moral cul-
pability beyond the scope of the special
verdict questions, the jury instructions
would have provided the jury with no
vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned mor-
al response' to that evidence. If this
were such a case, then we would have to
decide whether the jury's inability to
give effect to that evidence amounted to
an Eighth Amendment violation." Id.
(emphasis added).
However, Justice O'Connor did not express-
ly proffer an answer to that question.
Penry
At long last, we turn to the crucial deci-
sion in Penry. There the evidence showed
that the defendant, 22 years old and 0
parole from a prior rape conviction at tas
time of the charged offense, "suffered
from organic brain damage and moderat
retardation, which resulted in poor impu
control and in inability to learn from exp.,
rience." Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2941. The braa
damage was likely present from birth, "but
may have been caused by beatings and
multiple injuries to the brain at an e
age." Id. Penry's mother had "frequently
beaten him over the head with a belt whe
he was a child," and he was "routinely
locked in his room without access to a toilgt
for long periods of time." He "was unable
to learn in school and never finished the
first grade." Until age twelve, Penry "wa
in and out of a number of state schools a
hospitals." Id. Thereafter, it took him
over a year to learn to print his name. I&
at 2942. The two psychiatrists testifying
for the State both opined that Penry was
sane, but they also acknowledged his "ex-
tremely limited mental ability, and that be
seemed unable to learn from his mistakes,"
one indicating that Penry had "an inability
to learn from experience and a tendency to
be impulsive and to violate society's
norms." Id Defense counsel unsuccess-
fully objected to the sentencing charge on
several grounds, including its failure to
define "deliberately" as used in the first
special issue, its failure to "authorize a
discretionary grant of mercy based upon
the existence of mitigating circumstances,
and its failure to condition a death sentence
on a determination "that any aggravatg
circumstances ... outweigh any mitigsting
circumstances." Id At sentencing, de
fense counsel argued, among other things,
"that if a juror believed that Penry, be-
cause of the mitigating evidence of his
mental retardation and abused bsek-
ground, did not deserve to be put to
death, the juror should vote 'no' on 0*
of the special issues even if it believed
the State had proved that the ansWe
should be 'yes.'" Id. at 2950.
In response, the prosecutor noted that tbe
defense counsel had not argued the specl
issues or shown how the state had failed W
meet its burden of proof on them.
1024
GRAHAM v. COLLINS
CIte as 950 F.2d 1009 (5th CIr. 1992)
The Cour in an opinion by Justice
(yConnor, joined in this respect by Justices
grnnnan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
Sg aside the death sentence, concluding:
"In light of the prosecutor's argument,
and in the absence of appropriate jury
istructions, a reasonable juror could
well have believed that there was no
vehicle for expressing the view that Pen-
ry did not deserve to be sentenced to
death based upon his mitigating evi-
dence." Id"
Justice O'Connor first determined that
the rule Penry sought to establish-that
where evidence of the defendant's "mental
retardation and abused childhood ... is
presented, Texas juries must, upon re-
quest, be given jury instructions that make
it possible for them to give effect to that
mitigating evidence"-was not a "'new
rule"' for purposes of Teague v. Lane, 489
US. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334
(1989), "because it is dictated by Eddings
and Lockett" Penry at 2947. The opinion
goes on to explain that "Eddings makes
dear that it is not enough simply to allow
the defendant to present mitigating evi-
dence to the sentencer. The sentencer
must also be able to consider and give
effect to that evidence in imposing sen-
tence." Id. at 2947. Quoting her concur-
ring opinion in California v. Brown, 479
U.s. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934
(1987), Justice O'Connor states that "defen-
dants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged back-
ground, or to emotional and mental prob-
lems, may be less culpable than defendants
who have no such excuse" and that a capi-
tal sentence "'should reflect a reasoned
a Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices White and Kennedy, dissented from
this holding. Id. at 2963-68.
Justice O'Connor's opinion also held that the
Constitution did not prohibit execution of the
mentally retarded, although recognizing that
that issue was within the first exception to the
doctrine of Teague v. Lan, 489 US. 288, 109
S.Ct 1060, 103 LEd.2d 334 (1989), barring ret-
roctive habeas application of new rules. Id. at
2952-2958. All Justices concurred in the Teag-
aspect of this holding; but Justices Brennan,
= 11. Blackmun and Stevens dissented from
the substantive holding, id at 2958-2963, while
the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia and
moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime.' " Penry at
2947. Penry's contention is again de-
scribed as being that the Texas statute was
applied in a manner "precluding the jury
from acting upon the particular mitigating
evidence he introduced." Id. Yet again,
his claim is characterized as follows:
"Penry argues that his mitigating evi-
dence of mental retardation and child-
hood abuse has relevance to his moral
culpability beyond the scope of the spe-
cial issues, and that the jury was unable
to express its "reasoned moral response"
to that evidence in determining whether
death was the appropriate punishment
We agree. Thus, we reject the State's
contrary argument that the jury was
able to consider and give effect to all of
Penry's mitigating evidence in answering
the special issues without any jury in-
structions on mitigating evidence." Id.
The opinion goes on to explain this con-
clusion. Respecting the first special issue,
the opinion, though suggesting some doubt
about the matter, assumes, arguendo, that
"'deliberately"' was understood by the
jury in this connection to mean "something
more than" simply " 'intentionally'" (which
had already been established by the guilty
verdict). Id. at 2948. It concedes that
"Penry's mental retardation was relevant
... to whether he was capable of acting
'deliberately.' " Id at 2949. Nevertheless,
"[plersonal culpability is not solely a func-
tion of a defendant's capacity to act 'delib-
erately.'" A "rational juror" could have
concluded "in light of Penry's confession"
that he "deliberately killed ... to escape
detection." 21 However, "that same juror
Kennedy agreed with it (although disagreeing
with a portion of Justice O'Connor's reasoning
in this respect). 1a at 2963-64. This aspect of
Penry is not implicated in our present consider-
ation of the case sub judice.
21. The opinion does not detail the content of the
confession. However, it is described in the
opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals on
direct appeal. Penry v. Stat, 691 S.W.2d 636
(Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied. 474 U.S. 1073,
106 S.Ct. 834, 88 LEd.2d 805 (1986). as reflect-
ing that Penry "had been planning for months
to rape somebody and that in the three weeks
prior to the instant offense appellant had fo-
1025
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could also have concluded that Penry"-
because his "mental retardation" made him
"less able than a normal adult to control
his impulses or to evaluate the conse-
quences of his conduct," and "because of
his history of childhood abuse"-"was less
morally 'culpable than defendants who
have no such excuse,' but who acted 'delib-
erately' as that term is commonly under-
stood." Id Thus, in the absence of a
sufficiently broad definition of deliberately
"we cannot be sure that the jury was able
to give effect to the mitigating evidence of
Penry's mental retardation and history of
abuse in answering the first special issue."
As to the second special issue dealing
with future dangerousness, Justice O'Con-
nor observes that Penry's mitigation evi-
dence "is relevant only as an aggravating
factor because it suggests a 'yes' answer
to the question of future dangerousness."
Id at 2949 (initial emphasis added). She
continues by stating that the evidence of
Penry's "mental retardation and history of
abuse," though diminishing his blamewor-
thiness, "indicates that there is a probabili-
ty that he will be dangerous in the future,"
and then quotes with approval from Judge
Reavley's opinion for this court in that
case, including the following:
"'If anything, the evidence made it more
likely, not less likely, that the jury would
answer the second question yes. It did
cused on the deceased and [another] as possible
victims." id at 653. that on the morning of the
offense when he decided to go to the victim's
house (where he forced his way in) and rape
her "I knew that if I went over to the chick's
house and raped her that I would have to kill
her because she would tell who I was to the
police and I didn't want to go back to the pen."
id at 641. 652-53, and that while the victim was
lying helpless on the.floor following the rape "I
came back and sat on her stomach. I told her
that I was going to kill her and that I hated to
but I thought she would squeal on me." Id at
641.
The opinion of Justice Clinton. concurring in
the result on the direct appeal, espouses the
view that the failure to define "deliberately" was
error (the majority held it was not error), but
that the error was harmless "due to the fact that
the evidence of 'deliberateness' was uncontested.
overwhelming and in large part gleaned from
appellant's written admissions." Id. at 657.
not allow the jury to consider a n
thrust of Penry's evidence as mitga,
evidence.' 832 F.2d at 925 (foo
omitted) (emphasis in original)." Id. t
2950 (initial emphasis added).
Justice O'Connor then turns briefly to
the third special issue, concerning whetbge
the killing "was unreasonable in respons
to the provocation, if any, by the &.
ceased." Although the opinion recites tho
evidence supporting the affirmative answw
to this issue," it does not expressly say or
even suggest that the mitigating evidene
had any relevance to the question (nor doe.
it recite that the State asserted any see&
relevance). Zd at 2950.
Justice O'Connor concludes that rese.
tencing is required because "the jury was
not provided with a vehicle for expressing
its 'reasoned moral response' to" the ev
dence of Penry's "mental retardation and
abused background" in "rendering its see-
tencing decision." Id. at 2952.
[8] Penry clearly stands for the prop.
sition that merely because the mitigating
evidence has any relevance to a negative
answer to one of the special issues does not
necessarily suffice in all cases to sustain
application of the Texas statute. Penry's
evidence had some such relevance to the
first issue. The more difficult question is
whether the Texas statute can operate as
written in any case where the mitigatin
22. Judge Reavley, writing for the court in our
consideration of Pemy, observed concerning the
deliberateness issue.
"Having just found Pery guilty of an int
tional killing, and rejecting his insanly d6'
fense, the answer to that (the first] isse wa
likely to be yes. Although some of Peays
mitigating evidence of mental ret da
might come into play in considering delibr
ateness, a major thrust of the evidence of hia
background and child abuse. logically, d
not.' Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915. 9
(5th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). r-vd Po"
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934.
LEd.2d 256 (1989).
23. "Penry's own confession indicated that b
killed her after her struggle had ended and 21
was lying helpless." Id. at 2950. S -bo - 1
supra (indicating that killing was to avoid dtlg*
tion and was contemplated for thiS p"hX"
from the beginning).
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.ridence, though all clearly relevant to sup-
port a negative answer to one or more 
of
the issues, nevertheless also has any miti-
pting relevance whatever beyond the
scope of the special issues. Penry can
fairly be read as precluding use of the
Texas statutory scheme in any such situa-
tion. But, Penry can also fairly be read as
addressing only a situation where some
major mitigating thrust of the evidence is
substantially beyond the scope of any of
the issues. That, indeed, was the case in
Penry, where as to the third issue the
mitigating evidence was all essentially ir-
relevant, as to the second issue it was only
affirmatively harmful to the defense, and
as to the first issue its favorable relevance
was essentially minor but its "major
thrust" was beyond the scope of the issue
(see notes 21 and 22 supra).
[91 We conclude that Penry does not
invalidate the Texas statutory scheme, and
that Jurek continues to apply, in instances
where no major mitigating thrust of the
evidence is substantially beyond the scope
of all the special issues. That is particular-
ly appropriate in a case such as this, where
there is no "major thrust" of any of the
mitigating evidence which is not relevant to
support a negative answer to the second
special issue, the only special issue which
Jurek addressed. Any other holding, it
seems to us, would effectively render Ju-
re) and the Texas statutory scheme which
it sustained, dead letters.
It is a commonly accepted truism that,
Just as none of us is all good, so also none
of us-not even those who will probably
commit criminal acts of violence constitut-
ing a continuing threat to society-is all
bad. The number of capital crime defen-
dants who have nothing in their back-
ground which might tend to reflect a posi-
tive character trait-who have never per-
formed any voluntary service or exhibited
any kindness to others or supported their
family, to mention but three possible exam-
Ples-must be miniscule at most. And this,
of course, has been obvious all along. So
too has it always been obvious that many
defendants-because of some transitory
condition such as relative youth or emotion-
. COLLINS 1027
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al distress incident to one of life's many
crises to which all are subject such as
divorce or loss of a loved one or a job-
may, when they committed an offense,
have been less able than those not so af-
flicted to control themselves and evaluate
their conduct and its consequences. If
Penry is read broadly, then in none of
these cases can the Texas statutory scheme
pass muster. Every one of these cases-
the case where a month previously the
defendant broke up with his girl friend or
lost his job, the case where as a youth the
defendant volunteered to mow a neighbor's
yard or was in his early twenties when the
offense was committed, and all the oth-
ers-would demand some other system of
sentencing trial. The Texas statutory
scheme would be essentially meaningless
and Jurek would have in substance been
overruled.
We doubt that the Supreme Court intend-
ed this. Not only has the Court not ex-
pressly overruled Jurek, but to the con-
trary it has cited Jurek with approval nu-
merous times. As an early example, in
Adams v. Teas, 448 U.S. 38,. 100 S.Ct.
2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), the Court not-
ed that Jurek upheld the Texas statutory
scheme which "mandates a sentence of
death" if the three "statutory penalty ques-
tions" are answered affirmatively, id. 100
S.CL at 2524 n. 1, and observed that Texas
could properly ensure that its capital case
jurors "be willing not only to accept that in
certain circumstances death is an accept-
able penalty but also to answer the statu-
tory questions without conscious distortion
or bias," while nevertheless recognizing
that "jurors under the Texas ... procedure
unavoidably exercise a range of judgment
and discretion while remaining true to their
oaths." Id. at 2527. See also Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764,
64 LEd.2d 398 (1980). As we have previ-
ously noted, Lockett states that the defi-
ciencies of the Ohio statute "can best be
understood" by comparing it to, inter alia,
the "significantly different" Texas statute
which Jurek upheld. Lockett, 98 S.CL at
2965, 2966. While the Eddings plurality
does not cite Jurek, many decisions of the
Court since then have. We have noted the
1028 950 FEDERAL RE
prominence gfven to Jurek in Skipper, 106
S.Ct. at 1671. Other post-Eddings deci-
sions citing Jurek with approval include
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108
S.Ct. 546, 554-55, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988);
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct.
2716, 2721, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); Lockhart
v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758,
1770, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Pulley v. Har-
ris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 876, 879, 79
LEd.2d 29 (1984) (declining to "effectively
overrule Jurek "); California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 103 S.CL 3446, 3453-54, 77
L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3396, 77
L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983); and Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742 n. 13, 77
LEd.2d 235 (1983). The Franklin plurali-
ty relied principally on Jurek and observed
that the Texas "method for providing for
the consideration of mitigating evidence
has been cited repeatedly with favor." Id
108 S.Ct at 2331 (footnote omitted). Nei-
ther the Franklin concurrence nor Penry
purports to jettison Jurek. Although Pen-
ry clearly makes an exception to Jurek, it
gives no express indication that the excep-
tion made is conceived of or recognized as
being vastly broader than the rule itself, or
that Jurek and the Texas scheme will
thereafter remain valid only in the very
rarest of cases.
Since Penry, the Court has continued to
cite Jurek with approval. Thus, the Chief
Justice's opinion in Blystone v. Pennsylva.
nia, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.CL 1078, 1081-82,
24. Justice Kennedy's opinion states:
'To the extent that Penry's claim was that the
Texas system prevented the jury from giving
any mitigating effect to the evidence of his
mental retardation and abuse in childhood.
the decision that the claim did not require the
creation of a new rule is not surprising.
Locken and Eddingp cdmmand that the State
must allow the jury to give effect to mitigating
evidence in making the sentencing decision;
Penry's contention was that Texas barred the
jury from so acting....
?enry's claim, moreover, did not ask us to
apply the reasoning of Locker and Eddings so
much as it required us to apply our decision
in Jurek v. Texas 428 U.S. 262. 96 S.CL 2950,
49 LEd.2d 929 (1976). Pmr interpreted Ju-
rek as holding that the Texas death penalty
statute is constitutional so long as it is inter-
preted by the Texas courts to permit the jury
PORTER, 2d SERIES
108 LEd.2d 255 (1990), joined in by J.
tices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedydescribes Jurek and the Texas system in away which obviously would be wholly map.
propriate if either were viewed as still va
in no more than a small minority of cse.
The same can be said for the opinion of
Justice Kennedy, joined in by the Chief
Justice and Justices White, O'Connor and
Scalia, in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110
S.Ct. 1257, 1261-42, 108 LEd.2d 415 (1990)
the here pertinent language of which b
quoted in the marginA' Plainly, Justice
Kennedy regards Penry as the exception to
Jurek, not Jurek the exception to Penry.
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy points out
in Saffle (see note 24, supra), a broad
reading of Penry is inconsistent with Pws.
ry 's holding that its result was "dictated
by" Lockett and Eddings for purposes of
Teague.
Similar considerations require rejection
of any notion that a broad reading of Pow
ry is consistent with stare decisis because
the Texas courts have not kept the "asse
ance" of Jurek, or the Texas scheme is
really different than it appears on its face
or had been described by the Texas courts
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Jurek. The opinion in Jurek-rendered
the same day as Woodson required "partic-
ularized consideration of relevant aspects
of the character and record of each convict-
ed defendant"-explicitly recognizes that
the Texas jury is only allowed to answer
"yes" or "no" to three statutory questions
to consider mitigating circumstances Prof-
fered by the defendant.... Having thus cOO.
strued Jrek, we concluded that resolution of
Penrys claim that 'those assurances were no
fulfilled in his particular case,' 492 U.S.. a
[3181, 109 S.CL, at 2947 (emphasis in orif
nal). did not involve the creation of a new
rule.... Penry, ... must be understood in
terms of the Court's ruling in Ju
1 ek and its
application in later cases. We did not view
Locken and Eddings as creating a rule differ
ent from that relied upon in Jurek; rather, we
indicated that Locken and Eddings reaffirmed
the reasoning in Jurek . . .. Id- 110 S.CL a
1261-62 (initial emphasis added).
Justice Kennedy goes on to cite Jurek
example of "our long-standing recognition th.
above all, capital sentencing must be relisbk
accurate, and nonarbitrary." Id. 110 S.CL I
1262.
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id that if these are answered "yes" the
j penalty is automatic. The exact
Woding of the questions is reflected in the
CUrt's opinion. The Court holds that the
ise is whether these specific "enumerat-
-i questions allow consideration of particu-
4rzed mitigating factors." Id. at 2956.
!o Court gives an affirmative answer not
,* the basis of any assumed special in-
stuctions or definitions being given to the
, but rather entirely on what evidence
th Texas courts have said may be brought
before and considered by the jury in an-
sweing the second (future dangerousness)
question. Thus, the Court relies on the
Texas court opinion which it describes as
hterpreting "the second question to allow
g defendant to bring to the jury's atten-
tn whatever mitigating circumstances he
may be able to show." Id. (emphasis add-
ed). The Court next quotes the Texas
enurt's language in which it says "the jury
could consider" various items of evidence-
feluding matters such as presence or ab-
ence of past criminal conduct, "age of the
defendant" and "mental or emotional pres-
sure"-"[ijn determining the likelihood
that the defendant would be a continuing
threat to society." Id (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court then says "[b]y autho-
rising the defense to bring before the jury
whatever mitigating circumstances re-
lating to the individual defendant can be
adduced, Texas has ensured that the sen-
tencing jury will have adequate guidance to
enable it to perform its sentencing fune-
tion." Id. at 2958 (emphasis added). This
assurance" has not been broken or even
slightly bent, but on the contrary has been
fully performed. Texas has continued to
interpret its sentencing statute just exactly
s the Supreme Court in Jurek assumed it
would.
(101 The Supreme Court's opinion in Ju-
rek reflects that the defendant there was
twenty-two years old, had been drinking
beer earlier in the day of the offense, and
had been steadily employed and contribut-
ed to his family's support. Id at 2954. At
the very least, Jurek must stand for the
Proposition that these mitigating factors-
relative youth and evidence reflecting good
character traits such as steady employment
COLLINS 1029
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and helping others-are adequately cover-
ed by the second special issue. Penry can-
not hold otherwise and at the same time
not be a "new rule" for Teague purposes.
The decisions in Eddings and Lockett do
not justify a contrary conclusion, as Saffle
says "[w]e did not view Lockett and Ed-
dings as creating a rule different from that
relied upon in Jurek rather" these cases
"reaffirmed the reasoning in Jurek." Saf-
fle at 1262.
[11] We believe that what Penry repre-
sents is a set of atypical circumstances of a
kind that, quite understandably, neither the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nor the
Supreme Court in Jurek had in mind,
namely circumstances where the defense's
mitigating evidence would have either no
substantial relevance or only adverse rele-
vance to the second special issue. Typical-
ly, evidence of good character, or of trans-
itory conditions such as youth or being
under some particular emotional burden at
the time, will tend to indicate that the
crime in question is not truly representa-
tive of what the defendant's normal behav-
ior is or may become over time, and that
the defendant may be rehabilitable so as
not to be a continuing threat to society.
The core of Jurek-which we cannot con-
clude has been abandoned-is that the miti-
gating force of this kind of evidence is
adequately accounted for by the second
special issue. But in Penry the Court was
faced for the first time with a wholly dif-
ferent type of mitigating evidence. Not
evidence of good character, but of bad
character, not evidence of potential for
rehabilitation, but of its absence; not evi-
dence of a transitory condition, but of a
permanent one; but nonetheless evidence
which was strongly mitigating because
these characteristics were due to the
uniquely severe permanent handicaps with
which the defendant was burdened through
no fault of his own, mental retardation,
organic brain damage and an abused child-
hood. There was no way this type of evi-
dence could be given any mitigating force
under the second special issue. To recog-
nize that, as Penry did, is not necessarily
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to deny the validity of Jurek as it applies to
the more typical case.
We conclude that the core of Jurek re-
mains intact, and we now apply it to the
circumstances sub judice.
Youth
(12] The primary mitigating factor
which Graham urges was not adequately
encompassed in the special issues is his
youth. We disagree.
For at least five years before Graham's
trial, it was established Texas law that the
jury, in answering the second special issue,
could consider "the age of the defendant."
Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex.
Crim.App.1975), aff'd sub nom. Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49
LEd.2d 929 (1976). Since then, the Texas
decisions have consistently followed this
rule. For example, in Roney v. State, 632
S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), the Court
of Criminal Appeals, noting that the defen-
dant was seventeen and that "the age of
the defendant" was "relevant in deciding
the second punishment issue," id. at 601,
held that considering the entire record, in-
cluding the defendant's "young age," the
evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's affirmative answer to the second
issue. Id. at 603. See also, e.g., Robinson
v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex.Crim.App.
23. Nor can we accept the notion that twenty-two
is not youthful for purposes of any constitution-
ally mandated rule that the capital sentencer
must be able to take into account the defen.
dant's "youth' at the time of the offense. Texas
clearly regards those in their early twenties as
youthful for this purpose. See e.g., Lackey v.
State, 819 S.W.2d 111. 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)
(describing as a mitigating circumstance "youth-
ful age (23) at the time of the offense"); Trevino
v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592. 622 (Tex.Crim.App.
1991) ("There is also mitigating evidence of ap-
pellant's youth; appellant was twenty-one years
old at the time of the offense"); Madden v.
State. 799 S.W.2d 683. 684 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)
("Appellant, however. introduced substantial
mitigating evidence. He was only twenty-one
years old at the time of this offense). The
salient factors which make "youth" mitigating-
principally inexperience with resultant dimin-
ished judgment and self-control-are all gener-
ally present among those in their early twenties.
albeit to a lesser degree than in those still
younger. And this, indeed, is the approach tak-
en by Graham's counsel, as reflected in his
PORTER, 2d SERIES
1977); Ear-in v. State, 582 S.W.2d 74
798-99 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Brasfield %State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 293 n. 3 (Tex.
App.1980); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 5%61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Arg
affirmatively reflects that the defendat
was "22 years old at the time" of the
offense, id. at 2954, and, in upholding the
death sentence and the Texas scheme,
quotes the portion of the Court of Criminal
Appeals' opinion stating that in answerng
the second issue the jury can consider
"'the age of the defendant.' " Id. at 29u.
Jurek thus squarely answers the question
of whether "youth" is adequately taken
into account by the second special issue. If
Penry compels a different result, it would
have been a new rule for purposes of Tes.
ue, as Saffle makes clear. Indeed, if .hrsk
may not apply to the very type of case that
was then before the Court, it has ben
overruled. But, as noted, the Supreme
Court has not so treated it. Moreover,
Penry itself involved a twenty-two-yearold
defendant, id. at 2941, and the opinion cow
tains no suggestion whatever that this fac
was one which could not be adequately
taken into account in answering the sta'
tory special issues.n
Since Penry, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has continued to hold that the see-
statements in closing argument (see note 28
infra: see also text at note 9 call supra). We do
not believe that for this purpose a caterfl
distinction is proper based on some specific 0
such as eighteen, which is often the 3 ag
majority (in Texas minors are those under eiO
teen who have never been married: Te. P"'
bate Code § 3(t)) or the minimum age for Pur
poses of engaging in certain conduct (cf. US
Const.Am. XXVI). The Supreme Court
such an approach in holding that the Consti
tion does not forbid the death sentence for 4
fenses committed at age sixteen or save
Stanford . Kentucky, 492 US. 361. 109 SM
2%9. 106 LEd.2d 306 (1989). Moreover,
an approach would be at war with the coUo
of individualized capital sentencing which 
derlies Penry. It is common knowledge tb
individuals develop and mature at dif
rates, and it will frequently be the case'
example, that one eighteen and. say.
months, is actually less "mature and TO
"youthful" than another who is seventee
eight months.
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d special issue provides an adequate ve-
ls for the jury to take into account 
the
'sdat's youth. See Ex parte McGee,
go S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.1991);
' Cv V. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Crim.
Apl991); Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d
a 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). We, too, ap-
to have recognized this. See DeLuna
a Lynaugh, 890 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
S1) (evidence that defendant was twenty-
s when offense committed would not
ag him within Penry).
As the panel majority and dissent each
rrectly recognized, youth is mitigating
bemuse insufficient experience has not al-
kwed judgment and self-control to fully
dvelop, but the limitations attributable to
loath are all necessarily transitory. Gra-
Asm at 898, 899. Therefore, whatever is
.itgating about youth tends to lend sup-
port to a "no" answer to the second special
iue, and its tendency to do so is essential-
) proportional to the degree to which the
Jury concludes such factors were influ-
etial in the defendants criminal conduct.
The greater the role such attributes of
youth are found to have played in the de-
ftendant's criminal conduct, the stronger
the inference that, as his youth passes, he
will no longer be a danger to society.
Thus, the second special issue affords an
adequate vehicle by which the jury can give
effect to the mitigating aspect of youth.
(131 We reject the contention that the
second special issue is inadequate for this
Purpose because the jury may believe that
Youth mitigated the defendant's culpability
though not his future dangerousness. But
Youth is not mitigating with respect to con-
duct not attributable to it. Thus, Penry
"6 It is true that a hypethetical juror might
conclude that death is always an inappropriate
penalty for capital murder committed by a sev-
"teen year old simply because the offender was
seventeen, and regardless of whether the of-
fen" was to any extent attributable to his
youth. However, such a conclusion is not based
On individualized consideration of the offender
but merely on a characteristic which is precisely
the same for him as for every other human
beiag who attains that age, and as such amounts
to no more than disagreement with the Texas
law which allows execution of seventeen yearolds for capital murder.
v. COLLINS 1031
009 (5th Cfr. 1992)
says that evidence of a defendant's back-
ground and character is relevant because
"'defendants who commit criminal acts
that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental
problems, may be less culpable than defen-
dants who have no such excuse.'" Id. at
2947 (quoting Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 107 S.CL 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934
(1987)) (emphasis added). See also Boyde
v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.CL 1190,
1199, 108 LEd.2d 316 (1990) (same).2 To
the extent that Graham's criminal conduct
was a product of his youth he was for that
reason not only less culpable but, to the
same extent, also less likely to be danger-
ous when no longer young. To the extent
Graham's criminal conduct was not attrib-
utable to his youth, his youth neither re-
duced his culpability nor his future danger-
ousness. Nothing in the present record
suggests that the jury here might have
viewed the matter in any other lightr
Finally, the evidence here, and the man-
ner in which the case was approached and
tried in this respect, do not suggest any
special factor or circumstance militating
against application of what we conceive to
be the appropriate general rule, namely
that the mitigating force of the defendant's
youth at the time of the offense may be
adequately taken into account in answering
the second special issue. In marked con-
trast to Penry, there is here nothing to
suggest that defense counsel desired to
have the mitigating force of youth present-
ed or considered in any other manner than
as a basis for a negative answer to the
27. Moreover, to say that the second special issue
is for this reason inadequate to take youth into
account, is necessarily to also say that it is
inadequate to take into account any other miti-
gating factor which is not wholly coterminous
and synonymous with future dangerousness.
Yet, as previously indicated, that would be con-
trary to the core holding of lrek, and would in
effect render lurek and the Texas statute it up
held a dead letter. We do not read Penry as
going that far.
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second special issue. 8 Cf Lowenfield, 108
S.Ct. at 552 (even where absence of objec-
tion is not a waiver it may reflect posture
and understanding of trial participants).
We reject Graham's contention that, in
light of Penry, the mitigating force of his
youth could not adequately be given effect
in answering the special issues.
Other circumstances
[14] Although the mitigating factor pri-
marily at issue is youth, Graham also con-
tends that under Penry the testimony of
his stepfather, Samby, and his grandmoth-
er, Chron, constituted mitigating evidence
which could not adequately be given effect
in answering the special issues. We dis-
agree.
With one exception to be noted, the testi-
mony of Samby and Chron simply consti-
tuted rather mild evidence of normal,
good-though not exceptionally good-
character on Graham's part: he had re-
spect for and was nice to his mother and
28. Counsel in essence argued that Graham's
youth explained his May 13 to 20 crime spree
and that he would grow out of it: 'A young
man, hasn't even reached 20 years old. He goes
on a rage for 7 days. 7 days out of his life. He
is not going to ever forget.... Gary Graham.
17 years old, went on a rage for 7 days." and:
"... what you are called upon to do is predict
whether some time in the future Gary Gra-
ham could become a person fit to return to
society. At least he is alive. See, when you
are 17 or 20, you are young. hot-to-trot. You
are going to set the world on fire one way or
the other, right or wrong. When people come
in their middle 20's and middle 30's. a change
a little bit from your more radical stands to a
more somewhat upright posture because you
have had not only time to think, but to see
what is in the world. Most of the crime is
committed by young people. By the time you
get to 25 or 35. it's different. 35 and
above.... because there is something about
human nature that not only changes you, but
slows you down as you live. If you live. If
you live....'
The only dissatisfaction counsel expressed with
the charge or special issues was by pre-trial
motion asserting that the special issues left too
much standardless discretion to the jury. See
note It. supra.
Nothing in the evidence indicates any basis
for believing that the offense charged was any
more (or less) a product of Graham's youth than
any of his other criminal conduct shown by the
evidence, and neither side ever suggested other-
wise either at trial or in this court.
PORTER, 2d SERIES
stepfather, cared about and was clo* tohis mother, gave his grandmother no N
lems or trouble, was never violent, ft,had weapons, would willingly help am
around the house, went to school and W
church, "loved the Lord," worked and co.
tributed to the support of his two cha&,Mu
It appears to us that the principal mj
gating thrust of all this evidence is to mg
gest that the events of May 13-20 wee
aberrational and atypical of Graham's tr
character and that he thus had potental
for rehabilitation, and would not be a cow
tinuing threat to society. As such, the
mitigating force of this evidence can Ws.
quately be given effect under the se=coa
special issue.
This evidence does not seem different le
kind from that before the Supreme Cort
in Jurek, where the defendant's father to
tified that "the petitioner had always bega
steadily employed since he had left scho
and that he contributed to his family's sup
We reject Graham's contention in this coot
that his case is like Pemry because here t
prosecutor's argument (especially in respect a
"direction" and "seeds of our past) amounted a
an implied assertion that Graham's youth itsd
favored an affirmative answer to the seonMd
special issue. We disagree. The clearly Og
reasonable understanding of this unobjected U
argument is that it is no more than the me
assertion that Graham's criminal conduct a0
the most reliable predictor of the direction hi
future would take. There is absolutely nothin
in the argument which implies that this is any
more likely so because the events of May 13-2
1981 occurred while Graham was sevente a
.opposed to, say, thirty-five (nor even that to
was as likely so as it would have been i
ham had been thirty-five in May 1981). *b
prosecutor was not required to concede that juw
because of Graham's youth he would not in tt
future be a danger to society. And there'*
nothing inconsistent in the assertions that. 0
the one hand, some youthful criniidls Of
pose a danger to society even after they iwa^
and, on the other hand, that crimiad wb
youths are less likely to be predictive of funo
such behavior on their part as a matur
than are similar acts by those who are
mature adults. Moreover, we ate aware d
nothing to suggest that Texas has ever
youth in this connection as anything othn b
a factor tending to favor (albeit not ne= .
to require) a "no" answer to the second
issue.
GRAHAM
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.' Sg at 2954. Nor does this sort of
OWL tr evidence seem other than wholly
OW of what might be expected in a vast
of cases. As noted, were evidence
tls kind held to invoke Penry, then
and the Texas statutory scheme
I for all practical purposes be wholly
*bwmated.n Further, this sort of evi-
dinm is different in kind from that in-
t~jed in Penry, as its relevance to each of
special issues, and particularly the sec-
is entirely in the direction of a nega-
answer, and it has no tendency to
?rod= culpability for the particular crime
j'ged in any way not encompassed with-
bone or more of the special issues. Un-
1*1 Penry type disability evidence, which
ain reduce culpability where it is inferred
bt the crime is attributable to the disabili-
(7 while other similar offenders have no
suc "excuse," good character evidence
eroides no variety of "excuse." Further,
absent some unusual indication of an essen-
tdy permanent adverse change in char-
aete (e.g., brain damage), to the extent
tht the testimony is convincing that the
ddendant's general character is indeed
good it will also, to essentially the same
Uteant, be convincing that he will not con-
ine to be a threat to society.
(151 There remains only to consider the
brief portion of the testimony of Chron
that Graham's mother was frequently hos-
Ph~ihed, commencing when he was approx-
hastly three, with what Chron character-
4e without elaboration as a "nervous con-
3% We observe that since Penry, the Texas couns
have held that this kind of evidence is not Penry
evidence and does not mandate departure from
the Jurek format. Se4 eg., Ex parre Baldre4
810 S.W.2d 213, 216-17 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)
(evidence that defendant 'has been caring, kind.
and nonviolent to others ... is ... reflective of
his character and bears upon his propensity, or
lack thereof. for committing future violent acts*
ad thus is adequately covered by the second
pecial issue without further jury instructions):
.dson State, 1991 WL 99949 (Tex.Crim.
App. June 12. 1991, No. 68934) ("evidence of
appellanes religious devotion is Franklin evi-
"cle and could be properly addressed by a jury
a"*ering issue number two": Mooney v. State,
17 S-W.2d 693 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (same).
S abo Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592. 622
('lex.CrimApp.1 99 1). In Boyd v. State, 811
M 02
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dition" or "mental illness." In an appropri-
ate context, evidence of this general kind
might well form part of a proper Penry.
presentation. We conclude that it does not
do so in this case, however. There was no
evidence of any effect this had on Graham,
or of any reaction on his part to it, and no
attempt was made to even explore that
subject. Further, the entire context in
which this testimony was presented, from
the point of view both of Chron's testimony
as a whole and of all the defense evidence
at the sentencing hearing, suggests that
there was no adverse effect on Graham.
There was no suggestion that he was un-
happy, withdrawn, moody, difficult to con-
trol or the like, or that he had any mental
or psychological problems. The entire
thrust of the defense evidence, both from
Samby and Chron, was the exact opposite,
namely that Graham was a good, stable,
nonviolent, ordinary youth. There is no
substantial evidence that Graham's crimi-
nal conduct was "attributable to a disad-
vantaged background, or to emotional and
mental problems," as Justice O'Connor
used those terms in Penry. Id. at 2947.
See also Boyde, 110 S.CL at 1199. In this
respect, the evidence as a whole is simply
not comparable to that in Penry or Ed-
dings.
(16] In sum, not only Graham's youth
but also his other mitigating evidence could
adequately be taken into account in an-
swering the special issues, particularly the
second.3
S.W.2d 105. 111-112 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the
court considered evidence that appellant 'was a
good worker and was promoted." "was always
polite, nice and helpful," "always behaved in a
respectful manner." and helped his sister "with
her asthma" and his mother 'when she hurt her
ankle." Id at 111. In rejecting a Penry claim,
the court said that this evidence "was given full
effect within the second special issue" and "Itlo
hold otherwise would be tantamount to declar-.
ing the capital sentencing scheme facially un-
constitutional." Id. at 112 (footnote omitted).
30. We have focused throughout on the second
special issue because it is with respect to it that
Graham's evidence had the most apparent and
strongest mitigating relevance, and because that
is the issue addressed in lurek. We do not
imply, however, that Graham's evidence lacked
mitigating relevance to the first (or even to the
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- Conclusion
As directed by the Supreme Court, we
have further considered our previous af-
firmance of the district court's denial of
habeas relief in light of Penry. We con-
clude that our prior disposition is consistent
with Penry, and remain convinced that it
was proper. Accordingly, we reinstate our
prior mandate affirming the district court's
dismissal of Graham's habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge, with whom
POLITZ, KING, DAVIS, and WIENER,
Circuit Judges, join, dissenting-
The Supreme Court directed this court to
reconsider Graham's petition in the light of
Penry, not to modify Penry or to shape
Penry for a comfortable fit with Jurek In
Penry, Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court that the jury must be able to fully
consider and give effect to all "evidence
that mitigates against the death penalty"
and is relevant to a defendant's back-
ground, character, or the circumstances of
the crime. 109 S.Ct. at 2947, 2951. If
youth is an important mitigating factor-
and the Court has said that it is '-then
Penry requires that the sentencing jury be
allowed to decide that the death penalty is
an inappropriate penalty for Gary Graham.
That decision could not have been given
effect in his case, and the writ should be
granted.
The panel majority stated the Penry rule
as follows: "a jury sentencing a capital
defendant who provides evidence about his
character, his background, or the circum-
stances of the offense that is relevant to
personal culpability beyond the scope of
the statutory questions must receive in-
structions that allow the jury to give effect
to such evidence." 896 F.2d at 896. The
en bane majority, after 21 months, pro-
third) special issue; it does have such relevance,
and that relevance strengthens our conclusion
that the special issues were adequate in this
case; but whether such relevance to issues other
than the second would alone suffice to take this
case out of Pen"rys scope is another matter.
1. See panel opinion; 896 F.2d at 897-98. In
Eddings v. Oklahoma the Supreme Court said:
PORTER, 2d SERIES
duces an exclusion to the Penry rule seholds that no instruction or jury decision Ineeded for transitory circumstances of s,
igation. This court says that any dzc.,
stance relevant to whether the defendan h
rehabilitable may be adequately treated bythe answer to the second issue. Con"
to what the Supreme Court wrote, the
Fifth Circuit explains Penry as an atypia
case where the mitigating evidence eithW
had no substantial relevance, or no advert
relevance, to the second special issue qt
future dangerousness. I believe my co.
leagues have gone beyond and contrary t
the directions of the Supreme Court ad
have usurped the role of our superis.
Graham was 17 years old, legally a ask
nor, when he committed the crime. It is
beyond dispute that this fact was a mig*
ing circumstance, material to the "mora
culpability" of the defendant The jury's
sentencing role is to consider such factom
and determine whether the defendant is
indeed personally and morally culpabl.
But "culpability" at the punishment phase
is not simply a question of guilt or "blame'
worthiness," but rather a question of
"deathworthiness." See Lackey v. Sat
819 S.W.2d 111, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)
(en banc). To say that evidence mitigates a
defendant's culpability is not to say that be
is any less guilty or deserving of blame.
but that he is less deserving of death. SO
Penry, 109 S.CL at 2950 (a juror could
believe that "Penry lacked the moral culpe
bility to be sentenced to death").
The special issues of the Texas statute
demonstrate how evidence can be relevant
to a defendant's culpability. The guilty
defendant may be less deserving of death
because the evidence shows that he did not
act deliberately, or that he does not Pose a
continuing threat to society, or that his
conduct was not unreasonable in respOus
to provocation by the deceased. Indeed,
"All this does not suggest an absence of r
sibility for the crime of murder, delibcW*
committed in this case. Rather, it is to say
just as the chronological age of a minor is'
a relevant mitigating factor of great vCIa5
must background and emotional develOp
be duly considered in sentencing. 102 S.CL
877.
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, evdence is mitigating only because it
WhigMt to one or more of these issues.
S,,N'nklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 LEd.2d 155 (1988)
, J., concurring) (evidence of the
&W.ast's good conduct in prison had no
to his character outside of the
issues). But the message of Penry
some evidence may make the defen-
Wg less deserving of death for reasons
1jyond the scope of the special issues."
Ag"s 109 S.CL at 2948. The evidence of
pg's mental retardation and history of
A may not have made his crime less
eRmte or his continuing threat to socie-
gr ibe probable, but it may nevertheless
is" made him less deserving of death
Vtesase it may have made him "less able
.ha a normal adult to control his impulses
V to evaluate the consequences of his con-
ho." Id at 2949. Presented with the
special verdict questions, and "in the ab-
me of appropriate jury instructions, a
jusonable juror could well have believed
bt there was no vehicle for expressing
the view that Penry did not deserve to be
sntenced to death based upon his mitigat-
ig evidence." Id at 2950.
This case presents the same dilemma.
The jury found that Graham's youth did
nt make his crime less deliberate or his
future threat to society less probable. But
a reasonable juror could also have deter-
mined, if given the opportunity, that Gra-
ham did not deserve a death sentence be-
ause, at the age of 17, he was less able to
en0trol his impulses or evaluate the conse-
quences of his conduct, or because of other
relevant reasons. The majority seems to
overlook the fact that "there is no constitu-
naOl infirmity in a procedure that allows a
JU7 to recommend mercy based on the
mitigating evidence introduced by a defen-
&t-" Id at 2951. In this case, as in
PenrY, "in the absence of instructions in-
forming the jury that it could consider and
give effect to the mitigating evidence of
[Graham's youth] by declining to impose
the death penalty, ... the jury was not
Provided with a vehicle for expressing its
'reaoned moral response' to that evidence
a4 rendering its sentencing decision." Id
at 2952. Under Penry, the jury should
. COLLINS 1035
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have been allowed to weigh that factor in
deciding whether Graham deserved to be
sentenced to death.
The majority of this en banc court insists
upon crafting its own exclusion and follow-
ing Penry only where there is a "major
mitigating thrust of the evidence ... sub-
stantially beyond the scope of all the spe-
cial issues." It even declares that youth is
mitigating only with respect to conduct at-
tributable to age, and that the mitigating
factor of youth at the time of the offense
may be adequately taken into account by a
Texas jury in answering the issue of future
dangerousness. But the Supreme Court
requires the sentencer, before assessing
the death penalty, to consider all mitigating
evidence, not only mitigating factors that
contributed to particular criminal conduct.
And the Court does not weigh the "thrust"
of the mitigating evidence as between spe-
cial issues and the decision to sentence to
death.
Youth, like mental retardation or crip-
pling circumstances in the defendant's
background, may be related to deliberate-
ness or to future dangerousness, but those
facts of a defendant's life may also affect
an entirely different "thrust" and decision.
They may reach the much broader ultimate
question: Is death the appropriate re-
sponse to this human being, considering his
moral culpability as a person? Graham's
jury was not told that it could consider
evidence in this light or that it could give
mitigating effect to it in imposing sentence.
The majority opinion is heavy with schol-
arship and fine legal argument. It un-
doubtedly alleviates problems in reviewing
the cases of Texas prisoners on death row.
I fully appreciate the problems. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals is struggling
with them too. See Black v. State, 816
S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ex parte
Harvey Earin, 816 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Crim.
App.1991); Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d
111 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). This does not
justify the failure to follow the dictate of
the Supreme Court. I would follow that
dictate unless the Court, which alone has
the authority, chooses to modify our in-
structions.
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PATRICR E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit
Judge, dissenting:
The ultimate question in this case is
whether the mitigating value of Graham's
youth and family circumstances-age sev-
enteen at the time of the offense-is fully
expressed by the jury in its answer to two
questions: did Graham act deliberately and
does Graham present a future danger.
The majority opinion, after first concluding
that any deficiency in the two questions
must be substantial, holds that the answer
is yes. I am unpersuaded that the jury's
assessment of Graham's moral culpability
is fully, or substantially as the majority has
it, exhausted by concluding that he acted
deliberately and presents a future danger.
A jury's reasoned response could be that
although Graham acted deliberately, and is
likely to do so again, when Graham's
tender years and family circumstances are
entered in the account of moral culpability,
a death sentence is not warranted.
It was true before Penry that "[t]he
state may not by statute preclude the sen-
tencer from considering any ... relevant
mitigating evidence." I That did not neces-
sarily mean, however, that the state could
not limit the effects of mitigation. There
was a powerful argument that, given Ju-
rek, the Eighth Amendment allowed the
state to limit the effects a sentencer might
give to mitigating evidence. Justice Scalia
made the argument in Penry, but his was
the dissenting view.
I intend no criticism of the majority's
able struggle, but I am not persuaded that
we have the freedom to define again the
jury's sentencing role in Texas. I say
"again" because two decisions of the Su-
preme Court control this case. The first is
that the state, without fettering effect,
must give the jury the means for express-
ing its reasoned moral response.2 The sec-
ond decides that Graham's youth and fami-
ly circumstances are relevant to the core
1. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 Us. 104, 113-115.
102 S.Ct. 869, 876-877, 71 LEd.2d 1 (1982).
2. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302. 109 S.Ct. 2934.
106 LEd.2d 256 (1989).
3. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US. 361, 109 S.CL
2969, 2978, 106 LEd.2d 306 (1989); see also
decision for the jury-his moral
ty.3
The state may insist upon the
"reasoned" moral decision, but the coat
bution of Graham's youth to his moral V&
pability, beyond the issues of delibemg
ness and future dangerousness, has no
trinsic measure or objective weight. the
is a point at which we must accept that te
moral culpability of a particular person t
a particular crime is what the jury says
that it is. With all deference, this quiat
sential blackbox decision yields to no lo.
cal or explainable divison whether you*
has some residual "mitigating force after
the Texas questions have been answerd."
It is not a "legal" question at all, but it
rather like asking judges not to reason but
to look to the sky, presumably, and res&
Such discrete Rorschach-like inquiries do
not produce or draw upon normative rules
That we are asked to perform such tasks is
a powerful signal that something is wrong
The wrong is not difficult to locate. As
Justice Harlan put it in McGautha-
Those who have come to grips with th
hard task of actually attempting to draft
means of channeling capital sentencing
discretion have confirmed the lesson
taught by the history recounted above.
To identify before the fact those charsoc
teristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death pen'
alty and to express these characteristics
in language which can fairly be under,
stood and applied by the sentencing au-
thority, appear to be tasks which aft
beyond present human ability (empha
sis supplied).'
Furman repudiated McGautha, but Jut
tice Harlan's wisdom is validated with each
encounter of dead ends in the resulting
conceptual puzzle. And a puzzle it is.
For example, the Supreme Court in C2-
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815. 108 S.C
2687, 2698, 101 LEd.2d 702 (1988).
4. McGautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183. 2, 91
S.CL 1454, 1466. 28 LEd.2d 711 (1971).
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jas v. Bullock s upheld the death sen-
NgO while observing that "the jury may
weB have sentenced Bullock to death de-
t concluding that he had neither killed
wor intended to kill." 6 This despite the
lt that in Enmund v. Florida 
T the court
:id that the Eighth Amendment forbids
the death penalty for "one ... who aids
and abets a felony in the course of which a
nyde is committed by others but who
do not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
btend that a killing takes place, or that
me..l force will be employed." 8  I would
Ive supposed that whether an accused
Wanded to kill lies at the heart of moral
culpability; that the finding of intent to kill
would be left with the sentencer. Stated
another way, if a state's procedures must
allow a defendant's mitigating evidence to
fInd expression in its verdict it is puzzling
to allow a state appellate court to supply
the critical finding of intent to kill, a find-
g missing from the jury's verdict It is a
lng road from McGautha to Penry, but
the resulting jurisprudence is perverse in
that it insists on a reasoned moral response
of the jury, an assignment we jurists have
failed.
The solution must be left to the Supreme
Court, at least in cases as this one where
we are left no meaningful latitude. In any
*went, this case is already so postmarked
by the predictable scattering of judges re-
quired -to react, not reason.
0KEY tiMER SYSTEM
474 U.S. 376. 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 LEd.2d 704
(1986).
8. 458 US. at 797, 102 S.CL at 3376.
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Kenneth David SKELTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
John P. WHITLEY, Warden, Louisiana
State Penitentiary, et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 90-3904.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 6, 1992.
Defendant sought habeas corpus relief
after his conviction for first-degree murder
was affirmed on direct appeal by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court, 340 So.2d 256. The
United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana, Marcel Livaudais,
Jr., J., denied habeas relief. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Edith H.
Jones, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) decision
that reasonable doubt jury instruction was
unconstitutional did not apply retroactively,
and (2) even if decision applied retroac-
tively, defendant failed to demonstrate
prejudice required to overcome abuse of
writ and procedural default.
Affirmed.
1. Habeas Corpus 4385
To invoke federal writ of habeas cor-
pus, petitioner must first have obtained
ruling from state court on constitutional
issue which is asserted.
2. Habeas Corpus <-314
State procedural bar to federal writ of
habeas corpus may arise if petitioner did
not preserve error in state court.
3. Habeas Corpus -894
Habeas petitioner may not ordinarily
file serial petition unless petitioner estab-
lishes cause.
7. 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.CL 3368, 73 LEd.2d 1140
(1982).
I474 U.S. at 384, 106 S.Ct. at 696.
RICHMOND v. LEWIS
Cite as 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Ctr. 1990)
Id at 406-07 (footnote and citation to the
record omitted).
The majority conceived a new scenario,
regarding aggravating circumstances, by
piling an inference upon an inference to
arrive at a conclusion that a "rational ju-
ror" might find that defendant and his
brother went to the victim's home to rob
him, then later murdered the victim in or-
der to avoid arrest for the robbery. Su-
pra, at 1469-70. That theory, it seems to
me, hangs by a chimerical thread, without
support in the record or prior judicial opin-
ions.
This writer need not add to the percep-
tive findings of the district court and the
apt observation of Justice Blackmar. I dis-
agree, however, with any conclusion that
the death penalty would have been im-
posed, absent these mistaken conclusions
by the jury based upon the improper sub-
mission of aggravating circumstances.
Though I do not dispute a finding that the
murder was aggravated by "outrageously
or wantonly vile" circumstances, no court
should invade the jury's province and say
that the jury would have decreed death in
this case on the basis of this single aggra-
vating circumstance.
I would observe that Lewis v. Jeffers, -
U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606
(1990), cited by the majority, does not
change the analysis, inasmuch as no evi-
dence exists relating to the aggravating
circumstances, here in question.
Finally, as Justice Blackmar cogently ob-
served in his concurring opinion:
This case seems to have arisen out of a
drinking session.' The killing was shock-
ing and senseless, but numerous life sen-
tence cases are reported in which the
ultimate punishment is much more appro-
priate than in this case (if, indeed, we
must depart from the practice of nations
who follow the western tradition in ex-
1. This comment relating to drinking seems sup-
ported by Chief Justice Higgins' opinion for the
Missouri Supreme Court, stating in part:
Defendant testified that he and his brother
had been drinking when they went to the
trailer. Although they entered the trailer with
Thornton's permission, Thornton, who had
been drinking heavily, told defendant he did
not like him and wanted him to leave.
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acting the death penalty). The defen-
dant had numerous convictions, but none
for major offenses. His is an unlikely
selection for the death sentence, when
some juries assess it and some do not.
Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d at 502 (footnotes omit-
ted).
Accordingly, I would grant habeas relief
in this case and require that the State of
Missouri retry the penalty phase of the
trial or reduce the sentence to life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole.
Willie Lee RICHMOND, Petitioner-
Appellant,
v.
Samuel A. LEWIS,* Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections; and Roger
Crist, Superintendent of the Arizona
State Prison, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 86-2382.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 18, 1987.
Submission Vacated Sept. 22, 1987.
Reargued and Submitted Sept. 27, 1990.
Decided Dec. 26, 1990.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing
and Rehearing En Banc Oct. 17, 1991.
As Amended Jan. 14, 1992.
Petitioner appealed from denial of ha-
beas corpus relief from state capital mur-
der conviction. The Court of Appeals, 774
State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Mo.) (en
banc), cert. denied 482 US. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220,
96 LEd.2d 707 (1987).
Samuel A. Lewis and Roger Crist have been
substituted for their respective predecessors in
office, James R. Ricketts and Donald Wawrzasz-
ek, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 43(c)(1).
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F.2d 957, reversed and remanded. On re-
mand, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, Alfredo C. Mar-
quez, J., 640 F.Supp. 767, denied petition,
and appeal was taken. Superseding its
opinion at 921 F.2d 933, the Court of Ap-
peals, O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) Arizona's death penalty law was not
unconstitutional as applied; (2) defendant
was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on
claim that administration of death penalty
was unconstitutionally discriminatory; and
(3) fulfillment of death sentence after 16
years on death row was not cruel and un-
usual punishment.
Affirmed.
Pregerson, Circuit Judge, dissented
from denial of rehearing en banc and filed
opinion in which Hug, William A. Norris
and Reinhardt, Circuit Judges, joined.
1. Habeas Corpus 4898(1)
Habeas corpus petitioner was barred
from challenging capital murder conviction
on grounds that were available to him
when he filed first postconviction petition;
after petitioner's sentence was vacated but
his conviction affirmed in response to his
first petition for habeas relief, petitioner
failed to appeal affirmance of conviction.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b); Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases, Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A. foIl.
§ 2254.
2. Habeas Corpus -897, 898(1)
Habeas corpus petitioner was entitled
to challenge reimposition of death penalty
even on grounds available but unraised
when contesting first sentence and on
grounds raised in first petition and decided
against him by district court.
3. Homicide 4358(1)
Judicial determination of existence or
nonexistence of aggravating circumstances
in capital murder prosecution did not im-
permissibly usurp jury's fact-finding func-
tions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
4. Homicide 0358(1)
Requiring defendant to establish exist-
ence of mitigating factors in capital murder
prosecution did not impermissibly shift bur-
den of proof.
5. Homicide 8351, 357(11)
Arizona Supreme Court clearly provid.
ed limiting construction for admittedly
vague statutory aggravating circumstance
of committing murder "in especially hei-
nous, cruel or depraved manner" so that,
although terms of aggravating circum-
stance were facially vague, defendant's
constitutional rights were protected for
purposes of death sentence; definition giv.
en to "especially cruel" provision by Ari-
zona Supreme Court was constitutionally
sufficient and supported finding that mur-
der committed by defendant warranted
death penalty. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F,
par. 6.
6. Homicide 4-343
Invalidation of one aggravating cir-
cumstance in sentencing for capital murder
does not automatically require remand for
resentencing as long as sufficient other
aggravating factors remain.
7. Homicide 4-343
Invalidation of aggravating circun-
stance in Arizona capital murder prosecu-
tion did not mandate reweighing or resen-
tencing where court had found that prose
cution had met its burden of establishing
aggravation sufficient to warrant State's
harshest penalty two or three times and
defense had failed to establish mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-703, subds.
C, E.
8. Homicide 4358(3) -
Even if trial court never specifiml
found the defendant intended to cause Or
attempted to cause victim's death, death
penalty could still be imposed where jury
received instructions on both premeditaW
and felony-murder and evidence was a0*
cient to support finding that defendant iW
tended to participate in murder-
9. Habeas Corpus 00751
Defendant seeking habeas corpus
lief from murder conviction was not eD*
tied to evidentiary hearing on his claim Ai.
Arizona's administration of death peft
d2 RIES
ORTER , 2S
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was racially, sexually, and socioeconomical-
ly discriminatory; defendant offered statis-
tical disparities which, even if proven,
would not support inference of purposeful
discrimination.
10. Criminal Law e-1213.8(8)
Fulfillment of death sentence after de-
fendant had spent 16 years on death row
was not cruel and unusual punishment; de-
lay incurred during hearing of defendant's
failed claims did not accrue into substan-
tive claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 6, 8,
14.
Timothy K. Ford, MacDonald, Hoague &
Bayless, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner-ap-
pellant.
Jack Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix,
Ariz., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona.
Before ALARCON and O'SCANNLAIN,
Circuit Judges, and STEPHENS," District
Judge.
ORDER
The opinion reported at 921 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir.1990) is hereby amended as follows: in
the block quotation in the second column
on page 943 of the opinion, twenty-two
lines from the bottom of the page, delete
the ellipsis and insert in lieu thereof: "In
[State v.] Gretzler, [135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d
1 (1983) ] supra, we discussed factors
which lead to a finding of heinousness or
depravity. One factor is the infliction of
gratuitous violence on the victim; another
related factor is the needless mutilation of
the victim."
The final paragraph in Part IV-D on
page 947 of the opinion is hereby amended
to read as follows:
In this case, there is no similar doubt
Elimination of the challenged factor would
still leave enough support -for Richmond's
sentence because the statute at issue here
"The Honorable Albert Lee Stephens, United
States District Judge for the Central District of
) v. LEWIS 1475
473 (9th Cir. 1990)
is fundamentally different from the statute
at issue in Clemons [v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725
(1990) ]. The Mississippi law that Clemons
considered authorizes the death penalty if
"'there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances ... to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.'" Id. 110 S.Ct at 1446 n. 2
(quoting Miss.Code-Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c)
(Supp.1989)) (emphasis added). Arizona's
law mandates the death penalty "if the
court finds one or more of the (enumerat-
ed] aggravating circumstances ... and
that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for lenien-
cy." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(E) (em-
phasis added). The difference is signifi-
cant: a conclusion by the Arizona courts
that there are no substantial mitigating
circumstances is separate from and inde-
pendent of any conclusion regarding the
existence of aggravating circumstances.
Invalidation of an aggravating circum-
stance does not mandate reweighing or re-
quire resentencing where the court has
found that the prosecution has met its bur-
den of establishing aggravation sufficient
to warrant the state's harshest penalty two
or three times and that the defense has
failed to establish mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
See id. §§ 13-703(C), (E). Under the stat-
ute at issue in Clemons, the invalidation of
an aggravating circumstance necessarily
renders any evidence of mitigation
"weightier" or more substantial in a rela-
tive sense; the same, however, cannot be
said under the terms of the Arizona statute
at issue here. Nothing in the Arizona stat-
ute suggests the need for plenary reweigh-
ing where the record still reveals that there
are "one or more of the [enumerated] ag-
gravating circumstances ... and that there
are no mitigating circumstances sufficient-
ly substantial to call for leniency." Id.
§ 13-703(E).
The panel has voted to deny the petition
for rehearing. Judges Alarcon and
O'Scannlain have voted to reject the sug-
California. sitting by designation. . .
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gestion for rehearing en bane and Judge
Stephens so recommends.
On the request of a judge in regular
active service, the suggestion for rehearing
en bane was put to a vote of the full court,
and the majority of the court voted to deny
rehearing. Fed.R.App.P. 35(b). Judge
Pregerson dissented from the denial of re-
hearing and was joined by Judges Hug,
Norris and Reinhardt. The dissent is filed
as an attachment to this order.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED
and the suggestion for rehearing en bane is
REJECTED.
OPINION
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
Willie Lee Richmond, who was sentenced
to death upon conviction of first-degree
murder in Arizona state court, appeals
from the district court's denial of his peti-
tion for habeas corpus. He contends that
imposition of capital punishment will vio-
late his rights under the sixth, eighth, and
fourteenth amendments. We now affirm.
I
A
This case arises from Richmond's convic-
tion in 1974 for first-degree murder in the
death of Bernard Crummett. On an Au-
gust evening seventeen years ago, the vic-
tim met Rebecca Corella, a nude dancer, at
the Bird Cage Bar in Tucson, Arizona. Af-
ter leaving the bar, the pair met Richmond
in the bar's parking lot where Corella at-
tempted to persuade Richmond to allow his
fifteen-year-old girlfriend, Faith Erwin, to
prostitute herself with Crummett. Rich-
mond and Erwin refused, and after a brief
conversation, Corella agreed to have sex
with Crummett herself. Crummett there-
upon produced a twenty-dollar bill, which
Corella handed to Richmond and which
Richmond palmed and surreptitiously ex-
changed for a ten. A brief argument en-
sued as Richmond and Corella insisted that
Crummett had only given them ten dollars.
Crummett eventually yielded and agreed
to pay more. As he reached into his wallet
PORTER, 2d SERIES
a second time, Corella observed what
seemed a considerable amount of cash, and
she communicated her observation to Rich-
mond. All four individuals then proceeded
in a borrowed station wagon to Corella's
motel-room apartment. There, just as Ca
rella and Crummett emerged from the bed-
room, Richmond whispered to Erwin his
intention that they rob Crummett, explain-
ing that they should not commit the crime
in the apartment because Crummett might
remember the surroundings.
The group then left the motel and with
Richmond as their driver proceeded to the
end of a road on the outskirts of Tucson.
Richmond thereupon stopped the car, and
either Richmond or Corella-the testimony
conflicts-told Crummett to get out be-
cause the car had suffered a flat tire.
Richmond then assaulted Crummett, beat-
ing him with his fists and knocking Crum-
mett to the ground. As Crummett lay
motionless, Richmond pelted him with
rocks. Corella, meanwhile, grabbed Crum-
mett's wallet According to Erwin, who
admitted that she was vomiting and "com-
ing down" from heroin during the incident,
the following events then transpired
Q. [Mr. Howard, Prosecutor]
Then what happened?
A. [Erwin]
Well, they all got in the car, and Becky
[Corella] was getting the wallet and
what else, you know. I looked over to
see what else was taken. And Becky
[Corella] was getting the wallet and
we came in the car and left.
Q. And where did you go from there?
A. Back to the Sands Motel.
Q. Did you run over anything?
A. Yes, a man. It was a bump, after
we were leaving.
Q. After you felt that bump, was say
thing said in the car when you felt that
bump?
A. Becky [Corella] said, it felt lke -
man's body.
Q. Who was driving the car? e
A. Willy (sic].
Under cross-examination, Erwin stood
her contention that Richmond had been -
RICHMONI
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driver at the time the car ran over Crum-
mett. She admitted, however, that she was
suffering greatly under the influence of
her drug injections at the time and that she
was lying back on the car seat with her
eyes closed.
The police found Crummett's body at five
o'clock the following morning. The exam-
ining pathologist testified at trial that the
body exhibited signs of three forms of ex-
treme force. First, there were wounds and
indentations in the head consistent with a
contention that the victim had been pum-
meled with rocks. In conjunction with this
observation, he noted that several blood-
stained rocks were found in the immediate
vicinity of the body. Second, he testified
that the victim's head had suffered severe
trauma and "bursting" from a crush injury
most probably attributable to an automo-
bile tire. He identified this second injury
as the probable cause of death. Third, he
testified to the presence of a second crush
injury along the trunk and the abdominal
section. This too the pathologist attributed
to an automobile tire, which impacted the
body from the opposite direction at least
thirty seconds after the fatal blow. He
concluded, therefore, that the victim was
twice run over--once while alive but pre-
sumably unconscious and a second time
after death. A police detective also testi-
fied to the discovery of human blood and
hair on the undercarriage of the recovered
station wagon.
Shortly after the night of Crummett's
death, Richmond was arrested on two un-
related murder charges. As he awaited
proceedings on those charges in jail, he
was served with an arrest warrant for the
murder of Crummett, and he agreed to
waive his rights and make a statement at
that time. Although he admitted to rob-
bing and beating Crummett, he claimed
that he was not the driver when Crummett
was run over. In his statement, which was
taped and played at trial, Richmond insist-
ed:
I opened the door. I snatched the dude
out by his collar, and bam, he falls
straight out I wanted to go through his
pockets, but she [Corella] was already
going through his pockets and he was
D v. LEWIS 1477
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getting up and I reached down and
punched him again. So my old lady,
Faith [Erwin], she couldn't take it. She
got out of the car and she looked and she
started crying, you know. And about
that time I am looking at her, and going
through his change. And this rock, you
know, like that, and dip, dip like that, you
know. And I said, wow, to myself, you
know. Come on let's get ifi the car and
me and her [Erwin] get in the car, and I
am talking to her [Erwin] and Rebecca
[Corella] gets in the car and she backed
up and she throws up in gear and comes
back over. And we were going on down
further and she was all over the fucking
road, and said, give me this mother-fuck-
ing car and let me drive, you know.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary
phase of the trial, the judge instructed the
jury that Richmond could be convicted of
first-degree murder upon either a finding
of premeditation or a felony-murder theory:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a hu-
man being, with malice aforethought.
The unlawful killing of a human being,
whether intentional, unintentional or ac-
cidental, which occurs as a result of the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
the crime of robbery and where there
was in the mind of the perpetrator the
specific intent to commit such crime, is
murder of the first degree.
If a human being is killed by any one of
several persons engaged in the perpetra-
tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, the
crime of robbery, all person[s] who either
directly and actively commit the act con-
stituting such crime or who knowingly
and with criminal intent aid and abet its
commission or, whether present or not,
who advise and encourage its commis-
sion, are guilty of murder in the first-
degree, whether the killing is intentional,
unintentional, or accidental.
Upon these and other instructions, the jury
found Richmond guilty of first-degree mur-
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der on February 5, 1974.'
B
After a separate hearing held before the
trial judge alone, the court pronounced its
sentence:
The court rendered a special verdict find-
ing the existence of two aggravating cir-
cumstances: 1) that the defendant was
previously convicted of a felony involving
the use or a threat of violence on other
persons, and 2) that the defendant had
committed the offense in an especially
heinous and cruel manner. It found
none of the statutory mitigating circum-
stances to be present Based on its find-
ings, the court sentenced the defendant
to death.
State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 189, 560
P.2d 41, 44, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97
S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1976).
Richmond petitioned in state court for
post-conviction relief claiming the discovery
of new exculpatory evidence. He present-
ed an affidavit from Daniel McKinney, a
former boyfriend of Corella, in which
McKinney stated that Corella had admitted
to being the driver when the car ran over
Crummett. The state countered with a
transcribed tape recording in which McKin-
ney claimed that Richmond had threatened
him in prison. The petition for relief was
denied. On automatic appeal, the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed both the convic-
tion and the sentence, holding inter alia
that (1) Richmond's case was properly sub-
mitted on a theory of felony murder, (2)
post-conviction relief was properly denied,
and (3) the Arizona death penalty statute
was constitutional, both as written and as
applied. See 114 Ariz. at 190-98, 560 P.2d
at 45-53.
1. On August 9, 1974, Richmond was convicted
of first-degree murder on one of the two un-
related charges and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. "It is not disputed that the killing that
was the basis of th[at] conviction occurred prior
to the murder of Bernard Crummett." Rich-
mond v. Ricketts, 640 FSupp. 767, 780 (D.Ariz.
1986). At the time of that earlier murder, "the
death [penalty] had not yet become effective (in
Arizona] so that the sentence of life imprison-
ment was the only possible sentence." Id
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After the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on direct appeal, Rich.
mond petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
in the federal district court of Arizona. He
argued that the Arizona statute unconstitu-
tionally deprived him of the opportunity to
present non-statutory mitigating circum-
stances before the judge at sentencing.
The district court upheld Richmond's con-
viction but ruled the Arizona statute uncon-
stitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments for its failure to allow consid-
eration of a convict's character. Rich.
mond v. Cardwell, 450 F.Supp. 519
(D.Ariz.1978). The court therefore vacated
Richmond's sentence.2
At a second sentencing hearing in March
1980, the state trial court again found no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to war-
rant leniency, and it resentenced Richmond
to death. Once again, on mandatory ap.
peal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the sentence. State v. Richmond, 136
Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, cert denied, 464
U.S. 986, 104 S.CL 435, 78 L.Ed.2d 367
(1983). - Independently reviewing the
record,3 the state supreme court found that
Richmond had actively participated in the
robbery and had played an integral role in
the events leading up to Crummett's death.
Although it acknowledged that the force of
Richmond's manual blows had not caused
the death, the court held that circumstan-
tial evidence supported Erwin's testimony
that Richmond had been the lethal driver.
It found that the sentence was appropriate
under these conditions. Again on direct
review, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.CL
435, 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983).
Richmond then pursued a second writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. After a
brief hearing, the district court denied te
Richmond was acquitted of the other nurder
See id.
2. The Arizona death penalty statute was
quently revised to cure this defect. Se A*t-
Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(G), as amendad by 19"
ArizSess.Laws ch. 144, (effective MAY L
1979).
3. See infra note 10.
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writ and dismissed the petition. Four days
later, a panel of this court stayed Rich-
mond's execution and issued a certificate of
probable cause to provide time for a full-
fledged appeal. In due course, the court
affirmed dismissal for failure to exhaust
state remedies, but it remanded with in-
structions to allow amendment to permit
the prosecution of any claims that had been
properly exhausted.' Richmond v. Rick-
etts, 730 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.1984). Follow-
ing such amendment, the district court
again denied Richmond's petition, and this
court again reversed, remanding for a full
review of the state record. Richmond v.
Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957 (9th Cir.1985). Af-
ter reviewing the full record, the district
court denied Richmond's petition for the
third time in a thirty-five page opinion.
Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F.Supp. 767
(D.Ariz.1986).
Richmond now appears before this court
with the assistance of counsel to appeal
this most recent denial order. This court
originally entertained oral argument in his
appeal on September 18, 1987, but deferred
submission pending the en banc decision of
this circuit in Adamson v. Ricketts. See
No. 84-2069 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1987) (en
bane) (order scheduling oral argument for
Oct. 20, 1987, in light of Ricketts v. Adam-
son, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.CL 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d
1 (1987)). Adamson presented a similar
challenge to the constitutionality of Ari-
zona's revised death penalty statute. A
year later, in December 1988, the Adam-
son court ruled the Arizona statute.uncon-
stitutional. 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988)
(en bane). Arizona petitioned the Supreme
Court of the United States for review of
that decision, and this court further de-
ferred submission pending that outcome.
In the meantime, on direct review from
the state's highest court, the Supreme
Court of the United States announced in
Walton v. Arizona that the Arizona death
penalty statute is not unconstitution-
4. Under the "total exhaustion rule" announced
by the Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509. 102 S.Ct. 1198. 71 LEd.2d 379 (1982), a
federal court cannot adjudicate a habeas peti-
tion if it contains any unexhausted claims--even
if it also contains exhausted claims. The re-
v. LEWIS 1479
473 (9th Ctr. 1990)
al. - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111
L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), reh'g denied, - U.S.
-, 111 S.Ct. 14, 111 L.Ed.2d 828 (1990).
In a companion case decided that same day,
Lewis v. Jeffers, the Court restated and
elaborated upon its Walton holding. -
U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606,
reh'g denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 14,
111 L.Ed.2d 829 (1990). On. the following
day, the Court denied certiorari in Adam-
son. Lewis v. Adamson, - U.S. -,
110 S.Ct 3287, 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990), de-
nying cert to Adamson v. Ricketts, 865
F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc).
In light of these developments, this court
ordered the parties to file supplemental
briefs, and on September 27, 1990, the
court entertained a second oral argument
to consider the effects of Walton, Jeffers,
and other recent Supreme Court decisions
on this appeal. The court thereafter took
the entire appeal under submission for deci-
sion.
II
A
The district court had proper jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This court has
proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
We review the denial of a habeas corpus
petition de novo. See Weygandt v. Duc-
harme, 774 F.2d 1491, 1492 (9th Cir.1985).
However, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the
factual findings of state trial and appellate
courts are presumed correct if fairly sup-
ported by the record. See Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764,
768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981).
B
Richmond has presented four arguments:
(1) that Arizona's death penalty law is un-
constitutional both on its face and as ap-
plied, (2) that the trial court never specifi-
cally found that he caused, intended to
mand order was intended to satisfy this rule.
See 730 F.2d at 1318.
Upon amending his petition. Richmond con-
tinued to asser eighteen claims. See 774 F.20
at 959.
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cause, or attempted to cause Crummett's
death and that imposition of the death pen-
alty would therefore violate the rule of
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102
S.CL 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), (3) that
he was improperly denied an evidentiary
hearing on his claim that Arizona's admin-
istration of the death penalty is unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory, and (4) that fulfill-
ment of his sentence after so many years
on death row would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Respondent Arizona
has challenged all four contentions and has
further argued that Richmond's petition
constitutes an abuse of the writ. We ad-
dress the state's latter contention first and
then address Richmond's arguments se-
quentially.
III
[1] In its 1978 judgment on Richmond's
first petition for habeas relief, the district
court vacated Richmond's sentence but af-
firmed his conviction. The State of Ari-
zona argues that because Richmond failed
to appeal the affirmance of his conviction
at that time, it is abuse of the writ to
challenge the conviction now. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b); Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases, Rule 9(b). A prior panel of
this court has already addressed this con-
tention. See Richmond, 774 F.2d at 959-
61. We are bound to adopt its conclusions
as the law of the case. See Handi Inv. Co.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392 (9th
Cir.1981); see also lB J. Moore, J. Lucas &
T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice
11 0.404(1], at 119 (2d ed. 1988) ("If there is
an appeal from the judgment entered after
remand, the decision on the first appeal
establishes the law of the case to be fol-.
lowed on the second.").
Thus, to the extent that Richmond seeks
to challenge his conviction on grounds that
were available to him when he filed his
first petition, we agree that he is barred
from doing so now:
The relief obtained on the first petition
went only to the sentence. The incentive
remained, therefore, for Richmond to ap-
peal the rejection of his challenges to the
underlying conviction, since if he were
to prevail on appeal on these claims, he
could not be resentenced. The district
court could properly decline to reconsider
these underlying-conviction claims when
raised in a second petition.
Richmond, 774 F.2d at 960 (emphasis in
original). Whether termed abuse of the
writ or res judicata, the reassertion of such
claims is not permissible at this stage.
[2] Richmond, however, has focused his
attention in the current appeal on challeng.
ing the re-imposition of his sentence. This
he certainly may do, and in so doing, he
may challenge the death penalty on
grounds that were available to him but that
he did not raise when contesting his first
sentence:
Previously unadjudicated claims must be
decided on the merits unless the petition-
er has made a conscious decision deliber-
ately to withhold them, is pursuing
"needless piecemeal litigation," or has
raised the claims only to "vex, harass, or
delay." None of these three situations
applies to Richmond's petition.
Id. at 961 (citing Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 18, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1078, 10
L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)). Richmond may also
renew challenges to the death penalty that
were raised in his first petition and decided
against him by the district court
[W]hen the district court enjoined Rich-
mond's [initial] death sentence, it relied
solely on the [original] Arizona statute's
failure to consider mitigating factors of
an individual's character. Richmond v.
Cardwell, 450 F.Supp. at 526. Because
Richmond had obtained the sentencing
relief he sought, he had no incentive to
appeal the adverse determination of his
other grounds for challenging the death
sentence, and perhaps would not have
been permitted to do so on mootness or
ripeness grounds. The ends of justice
would not be served by denying Rich-
mond appellate consideration of these
other constitutional challenges to the
death penalty merely because he ob-
tained relief on a different ground.
Id. at 960. With respect to any of the
proffered challenges to his sentence, there-
1480
RICHMOND v. LEWIS
Cite as 948 F.Zd 1473 (9th CLr. 1990)
fore, "Richmond's petition does not consti-
tute an abuse of the writ." Id. at 961.
IV
A
At the time of Richmond's conviction in
1974, Arizona law defined first-degree mur-
der in relevant part as follows: "A murder
which is perpetrated by ... any ... kind of
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
or which is committed ... in the perpetra-
tion of, or attempt to perpetrate ... rob-
bery ... is murder of the first degree."
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-452 (repealed
1978) (current version at § 13-1105). For
those convicted of first-degree murder, the
Arizona code provides a sentencing hearing
independent of the trial. § 13-703(B).
Here, the trial judge must choose without
the assistance of a jury between the op-
tions of life imprisonment and capital pun-
ishment. § 13-703(AHB). For purposes
of this determination, a special verdict is
required regarding the existence or non-
existence of any aggravating or mitigating
factors. § 13-703(D). The statute puts
the burden of establishing the existence of
any aggravating factors on the prosecution
and the burden of establishing the exist-
ence of any mitigating factors on the de-
fense. § 13-703(C). The statute then
channels the court's discretion:
[he court ... shall impose a sentence
of death if the court finds one or more
of the aggravating circumstances enu-
merated in subsection F of this section
and that there are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.
I 13-703(E) (emphasis added).
Subsection F enumerates ten aggravat-
ing circumstances, including the following
three:
(1) The defendant was previously con-
victed of a felony in the United States
for which under Arizona law a sen-
tence of life imprisonment or death
was imposable.
(2) The defendant was previously con-
victed of a felony in the United States
1481
involving the use or threat of violence
on another person.
(6) The defendant committed the offense
in an especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved manner.
§ 13-703(F). By the time of Richmond's
resentencing in 1980, subsection G of the
statute had been revised to read as follows:
Mitigating circumstances shall be any
factors proffered by the defendant or the
state which are relevant in determining
whether to impose a sentence less than
death, including any aspect of the defen-
dant's character, propensities or record
and any circumstances of the offense,
including but not limited to [(1) the de-
fendant's incapacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of
law, (2) the defendant's suffering of un-
usual or substantial duress, (3) the defen-
dant's relatively minor participation in
the crime, (4) the defendant's reasonable
inability to foresee that his conduct
would cause or would create the grave
risk of causing death, and (5) the defen-
dant's age].
§ 13-703(G).
B
Richmond challenges the constitutionali-
ty of this revised sentencing scheme on
four grounds. First, he contends that j-1di-
cial determination of the existence or non-
existence of aggravating circumstances im-
permissibly usurps the jury's fact-finding
function. Second, he claims that requiring
the defense to establish the existence of
any mitigating circumstances illegitimately
shifts the burden of proof. Third, he ar-
gues that the Arizona statute creates an
unconstitutional presumption that death is
the proper sentence. Finally, he insists
that imposing the death penalty upon find-
ing that the killing was "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" is unconstitutionally
vague.
(3] The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Walton v. Arizona specifically ad-
dressed and rejected the first three conten-
948 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
tions, and Richmond has not forcefully ad-
vanced these arguments since.s With re-
spect to the judicial determination of sen-
tencing factors, the Court stated: " 'Any
argument that the Constitution requires
that a jury impose the sentence of death or
make the findings prerequisite to imposi-
tion of such a sentence has been soundly
rejected by prior decisions of this Court.'"
Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3054 (quoting Clem-
ons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct.
1441, 1446, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990)). In-
deed, even before Walton, it was well set-
tled that "'the Sixth Amendment does not
require that the specific findings authoriz-
ing the imposition of the sentence of death
be made by the jury.'" Id (quoting Hild-
win v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640, 109 S.Ct.
2055, 2057, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989)); see
generally id. 110 S.CL at 3054-55 (Part II
of the opinion). As the district court noted
when it rejected this argument in Rich-
mond's first petition:
"[The Supreme Court] has never sug-
. gested that jury sentencing is constitu-
tionally required. And it would appear
that judicial sentencing should lead, if
anything, to even greater consistency in
the imposition at the trial court level of
capital punishment, since a trial judge is
more experienced in sentencing than a
jury, and therefore is better able to im-
pose sentences similar to those imposed
in analogous cases."
Richmond, 450 F.Supp. at 523 (quoting
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 96
S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976)).'
S. We have already had occasion to note Wal-
ton 's rejection of the first and third contentions.
See Sinith v. McCormick 914 F.2d 1153, 1169-70
(9th Cir.1990). We also note in passing that
Richmond's able and experienced counsel, Tim-
othy K. Ford, is intimately familiar with the
Walton case. Mr. Ford represented Jeffrey Alan
Walton in his petition before the United States
Supreme Cduzt. This fact-in addition to the
cases' underlying similarity-may help to ex-
plain why several of the arguments raised here
are identical to arguments decided by the Court
in that case. See infra note 7 (noting the factual
similarities between the two cases).
6. Since the Walton decision, Richmond has ap-
parently conceded that the sixth amendment
does not require jury factfinding at the sentenc.
ing phase in capital punishment cases, but he
[4] The Walton Court likewise rejected
the contention that requiring the defendant
to establish the existence of mitigating
factors impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof. Denying that the practice violates
the eighth and fourteenth amendments, the
Court ruled:
So long as a State's method of allocating
the burdens of proof does not lessen the
State's burden to prove every element of
the offense charged, or in this case to
prove the existence of aggravating cir-
cumstances, a defendant's constitutional
rights are not violated by placing on him
the burden of proving mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.
Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3055; see generally
id. at 3055-56 (Part III of the opinion).
Finally, the Walton Court also rejected
the claim that the Arizona statute creates
an impermissible presumption that death is
the proper sentence for first-degree mur-
der. Like Richmond, Walton had chal-
lenged the statute's directive that a court
"shall impose a sentence of death" if it
finds one or more aggravating circum-
stances and no substantial mitigating cir-
cumstances. Ariz.Rev.StatAnn. § 13-
703(E) (emphasis added). Walton had con-
tended, as Richmond does here, that this
provision violates the proscription against
mandatory death sentences announced in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). The
Court disagreed, citing its recent decisions
in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
has stressed the alternative argument that the
equal protection clause does require jury fact-
finding at sentencing. Because Arizona law
provides for jury factfinding in many similar
circumstances. Richmond contends, it is arbi-
trary and irrational not to provide for it here.
We find this argument unpersuasive. As the
Supreme Court noted in Proffitt, there is indeed
a rational reason for committing the factfinding
function to the judge at the sentencing phase in
capital punishment cases, and it probably pro-
motes more evenhanded justice to do so. Seg
Proffitt, 428 US. at 252, 96 S.Ct. at 2966. More-
over, the Court's sixth amendment holding on
this issue in Walton would make little sense if
the broader, less specific terms of the equal
protection clause could be read to require the
opposite result.
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110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990), and
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110
S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316, reh 'g de-
nied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1961, 109
L.Ed.2d 322 (1990), both of which had up-
held similarly worded capital punishment
laws. The Court ruled that so long as the
statute provides individualized sentencing
and does not automatically impose death
for certain categories of murder, it passes
constitutional muster under Woodson. See
generally Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3056 (Part
IV of the opinion).
In short, the Supreme Court has specifi-
cally rejected three of the constitutional
arguments raised here, and it has done so
in the context of reviewing the very same
statute.
C
Richmond insists, however, that his
fourth constitutional challenge to the stat-
ute survives Walton. Indeed, he contends
that Walton itself renders his death sen-
tence unconstitutional and that this court's
en banc decision in Adamson v. Ricketts
mandates resentencing. See Adamson,
7. The facts of the Walton case are strikingly
similar in many respects to the facts of the
present case. Walton. who also acted with the
assistance of two friends, "went to a bar in
Tucson, Arizona,. ... intending to find and rob
someone at random, steal his car, tie him up,
and leave him in the desert.... In the bar's
parking lot, the trio encountered Thomas Pow-
ell, a young, off-duty Marine." 110 S.Ct. at
3052. Forcing Powell to accompany them, the
three commandeered his car and drove to a
remote area on the outskirts of town. When
they stopped, they
forced Powell out of the car and had him lie
face down on the ground near the car while
they debated what to do with him.... Wal-
ton then took a .22 caliber derringer and
marched Powell off into the desert. After
walking a short distance, Walton forced Pow-
ell to lie down on the ground, placed his foot
on Powell's neck, and shot Powell once in the
head. Walton later told [his two accompany-
ing friends] that he had shot Powell and that
he had "never seen a man pee in his pants
before."
1d Despite the similarities, the circumstances
of Powell's death were somewhat more grue-
some than those of Crummett's-
Powell's body was found approximately a
week later.... A medical examiner deter-
mined that Powell had been blinded and ren-
v. LEWIS 1483
73 (9th Cir. 1990)
865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Lewis v. Adamson, -
U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3287, 111 L.Ed.2d 795
(1990). We are not persuaded.
In Walton, another Arizona inmate who
was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death challenged his sentence
on constitutional grounds.7 The Supreme
Court denied all four of his claims and
affirmed the sentence. Despite this result,
Richmond contends that Walton's fourth
claim and the Court's disposition of that
claim bolster his petition.8
(5] In his fourth claim, Walton alleged
that the aggravating circumstance found
and relied upon by the sentencing judge-
his commission of the crime "in an espe-
cially heinous, cruel or depraved man-
ner"-was unconstitutionally vague. Ariz.
Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(6); see 110 S.Ct.
at 3056-57. The Supreme Court agreed
that the relevant statutory provision was
vague but did not agree that it was uncon-
stitutional. In essence, the Court held that
facial vagueness alone does not decide the
question: one must look beyond the lan-
guage of the suspect provision and consid-
er the full circumstances attending its ap-
dered unconscious by the shot but was not
immediately killed. Instead, Powell regained
consciousness, apparently floundered about
in the desert, and ultimately died from dehy-
dration, starvation, and pneumonia approxi-
mately a day before his body was found.
Id.
8. Walton's first three claims, which were also
raised by Richmond. were the three claims dis-
cussed in Part IV-B above. First. Walton al-
leged that "every finding of fact underlying the
sentencing decision must be made by a jury, not
by a judge." 110 S.Ct. at 3054; compare Ariz.
Rev-Stat.Ann. § 13-703(B). Second, he alleged
that the Arizona statute unconstitutionally "im-
poses on defendants the burden of establishing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the exist-
ence of mitigating circumstances." 110 S.Ct. at
3055; compare Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(C).
Third, he alleged that the Arizona statute "cre-
ates an unconstitutional presumption that death
is the proper sentence" because it requires the
death penalty "if one or more aggravating cir-
cumstances are found and mitigating circum-
stances are held insufficient to call for lenien-
cy." 110 S.Ct. at 3056; compare ArizRev.Stat.
Ann. § 13-703(E). The Supreme Court rejected
all three of these claims as well as the fourth,
which is discussed herein.
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plication. Safeguards built into the sen-
tencing scheme through other provisions-
and even extra-statutory procedural safe-
guards-may preserve the scheme's consti-
tutional integrity. See generally Walton,
110 S.Ct. at 3056-58 (Part V of the opinion).
The Court found three such safeguards
within Arizona law. First, the Arizona
scheme provides for sentencing by a judge,
not by a jury. That fact alone distin-
guished Walton from Maynard v. Cart-
wright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64
L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), two cases relied upon
by Walton in which the Supreme Court had
invalidated death sentences due to similarly
vague statutory definitions of aggravating
circumstances. Where a judge makes the
sentencing findings there is less danger of
impermissibly broad applications of statu-
tory terms: "Trial judges are presumed to
know the law and to apply it (correctly] in
making their decisions." Walton, 110 S.Ct.
at 3057.
Second, the Court found, the Arizona Su-
preme Court had effectively salvaged the
suspect provision by affording it a "limit-
ing definition" in the course of reviewing
the trial judge's sentencing decision. What
the state legislature had improvidently left
out, the state supreme court properly in-
serted:
The Arizona Supreme Court stated that
"a crime is committed in an especially
cruel manner when the perpetrator in-
flicts mental anguish or physical abuse
before the victim's death," and that
"[m]ental anguish includes a victim's un-
certainty as to his ultimate fate." ...
Reco
defin
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(1989)) (emphasis added). By injecting this
limiting definition into a sentencing process
already restricted to judges, Arizona pro.
vided ample protection for Walton's consti-
tutional rights.
If the Arizona Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the definition of the "especially
heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating
circumstance, we presume that Arizona
trial judges are applying the narrower
definition. It is irrelevant that the stat-
ute itself may not narrow the construc-
tion of the factor.
Id. at 3057 (emphasis added).
Third, the Court reasoned:
[E]ven if a trial judge fails to apply the
narrowing construction or applies an im-
proper construction, the Constitution
does not necessarily require that a state
appellate court vacate a death sentence
based on that factor. Rather, as we held
in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
[738), 110 S.Ct 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725
(1990), a state appellate court may itself
determine whether the evidence supports
the existence of the aggravating circum-
stance as properly defined or the court
may eliminate consideration of the factor
altogether and determine whether any
remaining aggravating circumstances
are sufficient to warrant the death penal-
ty.
Id.
In his reliance on Walton, Richmond
points out as an initial matter that the
same aggravating circumstance at issue in
that case was cited by the Arizona Su-
preme Court in its review of his death
sentence. Richmond insists that the terms
of this aggravating circumstance-"espe-
* * * * * * cially heinous, cruel or deprave -are ia-
cially vague. He is undeniably correct;
gnizing that the proper degree of Walton held so explicitly. Richmond then
ition of an aggravating factor is not argues, however, that whereas the Arizona
eptible of mathematical precision, we Supreme Court cured this potential defect
lude that the definition given to the in Walton, it failed to do so in his case.
ecially cruel" provision by the Ari- The court, he maintains, applied no comPa-
Supreme Court is constitutionally rable "limiting construction" in its review
cient because it gives meaningful of his sentence. This contention is empiri-
ince to the sentencer. cally incorrect.
Id. at 3057-58 (quoting State v. Walton,
159 Ariz. 571, 586, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032
In reviewing Richmond's sentence, the
Arizona Supreme Court quite clearly did
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provide a limiting construction for the ad-
mittedly vague aggravating circumstance.
In fact, if anything, the state court provid-
ed a more narrowly tailored and more obvi-
ously sufficient limiting construction in
Richmond's case than it did in Walton's:
"Cruel" has been defined as "disposed to
inflict pain especially in a wanton, insen-
sate or vindictive manner- sadistic."
State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562
P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978).
Cruelty involves the victim's pain or suf-
fering before death. State v. Gretzler,
[135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983) ]; State v.
Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784
(1982); State v. Lujan, 124 Ariz. 365, 604
P.2d 629 (1979). The offense must be
committed in an especially cruel, heinous
or depraved manner to be considered an
aggravating circumstance. State v. Lu-
Jan, supra....
"Heinous" has been defined as "hate-
fully or shockingly evil; grossly bad,"
and "depraved" is "marked by debase-
ment, corruption, perversion or deteriora-
tion." State v. Knapp, supra. Heinous
and depraved involve the mental state
and attitude of the offender as reflected
in his words and actions. State v. Gretz-
ler, supra; State v. Poland, supra,-
State v. Lujan, supra. In Gretzler, su-
pra, we discussed factors which lead to a
finding of heinousness or depravity.
One factor is the infliction of gratuitous
violence on the victim; another related
factor is the needless mutilation of the
9. Richmond argues that only two of the five
Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court con-
curred in this portion of the court's opinion.
He is correct. Two other Justices voted to af-
firm the sentence but on other grounds. They
explicitly rejected the argument that the killing
had been especially heinous and depraved. See
Richmond, 136 Ariz. at 322-24, 666 P.2d at 67-
69 (Cameron. J., concurring and Gordon, V.CJ.,
joining). The fifth Justice dissented altogether.
See 136 Ariz. at 324-26, 666 P.2d at 69-71 (Feld-
man. 3., dissenting). The fact that a majority of
the court did not concur in this finding, how.
ever, does not deny that the Justices who did
concur in it provided an adequate limiting con-
struction. The relevant point is that members
of the court who premised their votes on the
challenged factor undertook the deliberations
and analysis constitutionally required.
v. LEWIS 1485
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victim. Here the victim was already un-
conscious and bleeding when he was run
over not once, but twice, each time from
a different direction. The evidence indi-
cates that the first run by the vehicle
was over the victim's head crushing his
skull and killing him. The second run of
the vehicle was over the body of the
victim. The investigating-officers found,
at the location of the murder, two large
pools of blood separated by about 30
feet, which was consistent with the body
having been run over and dragged to
where it was found.. ..
... We believe the facts of this case
set it "apart from the normal first de-
gree murders." State v. Brookover, 124
Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979).
Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 319, 666 P.2d 57,
64 (plurality opinion) (finding Crummett's
killing especially heinous and depraved but
not especially cruel); 9 compare id. with
Walton, 159 Ariz. at 586-88, 769 P.2d at
1032-34.
As in Walton, the sentence in this case
was (a) imposed by a trial judge presum-
ably knowledgeable in the law, (b) thor-
oughly and independently reviewed by the
Arizona Supreme Court, and (c) reimposed
under a sufficiently limiting construction.10
Under a fair reading of Walton and the
record alone, therefore, Richmond's conten-
tions must fail.
Richmond attempts to avoid this conclu-
sion by challenging the legal accuracy of
the Arizona Supreme Court's limiting con-
More importantly, Richmond's observation is
irrelevant in light of the fact that lour Justices
concurred in the finding of two other aggravat-
ing circumstances, either one of which could
constitutionally have justified imposition of the
death penalty. See infra Part IV-D.
10. See Richmond, 136 Ariz. at 317, 666 P.2d at
62 ("[I]n each case where the death penalty is
imposed, this court conducts an independent
review of the record to assure a just result. We
have reviewed the record in the instant case
... "); 136 Ariz. at 320, 666 P.2d at 65 ("In death
penalty cases, this court will conduct an inde-
pendent examination of the record to determine
for ourselves the presence or absence of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances and -the.
weight to give to each. We also independently
determine the propriety of the sentence.").
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struction. He cites several state court de-
cisions, most notably State v. Gretzler, 135
Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983), for the proposi-
tion that the court applied a definition of
the aggravating circumstance that is un-
tenable under Arizona law. This court,
however, is foreclosed from engaging in
any such inquiry. A federal appellate
court cannot challenge the Arizona Su-
preme Court on matters of Arizona law; in
that realm, the authority of the state court
remains supreme.
Both Walton and its companion case,
Lewis v. Jeffers, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct.
3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), support this
analysis. As Walton pointed out, the rele-
vant focus for this court's attention is not
upon the language of the Arizona statute
per se or even upon the sentencing decision
of the state trial judge; rather, it is upon
the constitutional legitimacy of Richmond's
sentence as that sentence stands today af-
ter review by and exhaustion of the state
court process. See Walton, 110 S.Ct. at
3057-58. The only question for this court
is whether the final state result violates
constitutional law so as to warrant grant-
ing a writ of habeas corpus. Walton re-
quires this court to pay due deference to
state judicial systems in the administration
of their own criminal sanctions and to rec-
ognize both the competence and duty of
state courts of general jurisdiction to en-
force federal constitutional law.
Jeffers thoroughly reinforces the Walton
rule. In Jeffers, the Supreme Court re-
stated and reapplied the Walton holding to
deny another Arizona prisoner's challenge
to the legitimacy of his death sentence.
Because Jeffers was before the Court on
collateral review, the Court concluded that
even greater deference was owed to the
state system than the Court had urged in
Walton, which it had heard on direct re-
view. The Court never reached the merits
of Jeffers's constitutional claims, and it
certainly never approached any questions
of state law; rather, the Court reached its
decision upon formulation of the appropri-
ate standard of review. Writing for the
Court, Justice O'Connor explained:
[Riespect for a state court's findings of
fact and application of its own law coun-
sels against the sort of de novo review
undertaken by the Court of Appeals in
this case.... Where the issue is solely
whether a state court has properly found
existence of a constitutionally narrowed
aggravating circumstance, we have nev-
er required federal courts "to peer ma-
jestically over the [state] court's shoulder
so that [they] might second-guess its in-
terpretation of facts that quite reason.
ably-perhaps even quite plainly-fit
within the statutory language." . . .
Rather, in determining whether a state
court's application of its constitutionally
adequate aggravating circumstance was
so erroneous as to raise an independent
due process or Eighth Amendment viola-
tion, we think the more appropriate stan-
dard of review is the "rational factfind-
er" standard established in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
LEd.2d 560 (1979). We held in Jackson
that where a federal habeas corpus
claimant alleges that his state conviction
is unsupported by the evidence, feder
courts must determine ... "whether, af-
ter viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any ration-
al trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt"
Jeffers, 110 S.CL at 3102-03 (quoting God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 450, 100
S.Ct. 1759, 1776, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) and Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh'g denied, 444
U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 LEd.2d 126
(1979)) (emphasis in original).
In short, this court's focus must not be
on the underlying sentence but on whether
the state system in both imposing and re-
viewing that sentence committed an inde-
pendent constitutional violation. To va-
cate Richmond's sentence, this court would
have to find that there is no rational basis
in law or fact for the state supreme court's
final evaluation that- the circumstances
warrant the sentence of death:
[A] federal court should adhere to the
Jackson standard even when reviewing
the.decision of a state appellate court
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that has independently reviewed the evi-
dence, for the underlying question re-
mains the same: if a State's aggravating
circumstances adequately perform their
constitutional function, then the state
court's application of those circum-
stances raises, apart from due process
and eighth amendment concerns, only a
question of the proper application of
state law. A state court's finding of an
aggravating circumstance in a particular
case-including a de novo finding by
an appellate court that a particular
offense "is especially heinous ... or
depraved "-is arbitrary or capricious if
and only if no reasonable sentencer could
have so concluded.
Id. 110 S.Ct. at 3103 (emphasis added).
We therefore reject Richmond's invita-
tion to "conduct(] a de novo, case-by-case
comparison of the facts" of various state
court precedents. Id. at 3101. Like the
Supreme Court in Walton, we "conclude
that the definition given to the 'especially
cruel' provision by the Arizona Supreme
Court is constitutionally sufficient." Wal-
ton, 110 S.Ct at 3058. Applying Jeffers,
we further conclude that under that defini-
tion a rational factfinder could indeed have
found Crummett's murder heinous or de-
praved so as to warrant the penalty of
death.
D
Even if Richmond were to prevail in his
claim that the Arizona Supreme Court
failed to provide a sufficiently limiting con-
struction for the aggravating circumstance
discussed above, however, his contentions
would still lack merit. The Arizona Su-
preme Court rested its affirmance of his
sentence upon a finding of not one, but
11. The court also hinted at the possible applica.
bility of a fourth aggravating circumstance: the
defendant's commission of the crime in expecta-
tion of pecuniary gain. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann.
§ 13-703(F)(5); Richmon4 136 Ariz. at 320, 666
P.2d at 65. Although noting that the trial court
had improperly analyzed this factor in reaching
the conclusion that it did not apply, the Arizona
Supreme Court declined to determine whether
under a proper analysis it would apply.
With respect to consideration of Richmond's
kidnapping conviction, the Arizona Supreme
v. LEWIS 1487
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three aggravating circumstances and an
insufficient showing of mitigating circum-
stances. See Richmond, 136 Ariz. at 318-
21, 666 P.2d at 63-66. The second aggra-
vating factor relied upon was Richmond's
conviction for another murder six months
after his initial conviction. Although this
latter conviction postdated Richmond's
first, "[i]t is not disputed that the killing
that was the basis of th[at] conviction oc-
curred prior to the murder of Bernard
Crummett." Richmond, 640 F.Supp. at
780; see supra note 1. In any event, both
convictions were duly on record by the time
of Richmond's resentencing in 1980.
Furthermore, although the state su-
preme court explicitly found and addressed
only these two aggravating circumstances,
it held that "[t]he trial court correctly
found three aggravating circumstances."
Richmond, 136 Ariz. at 320, 666 P.2d at 65.
The third was an entirely separate prior
conviction for kidnapping-statutorily rele-
vant for death penalty purposes as an of-
fense "involving the use or threat of vio-
lence on another person." Ariz.Rev.Stat.
Ann. § 13-703(F)(2)." Arizona law explic-
itly provides that a single aggravating cir-
cumstance may suffice for imposition of
the death penalty. See § 13-703(E).
[61 Richmond does not contend, nor
could he reasonably, that the statutory def-
initions of these two other factors are un-
constitutionally vague. See § 13-
703(F)(1H2). Rather, he sidesteps consid-
eration of these additional factors by citing
this circuit's en banc decision in Adamson
v. Ricketts for the proposition that invalida-
tion of any one aggravating circumstance
requires resentencing. See 865 F.2d at
1037 n. 42, 1038, 1039. We have just held
that the aggravating circumstance to which
Court's majority opinion does not address it
except to express general agreement with the
trial court's reliance upon it. The concurrence,
which was endorsed by two Justices, is some-
what more explicit in its embrace of the lower
court's reliance on both the prior murder con-
viction and the prior kidnapping conviction.
See Richmond 136 Ariz. at 323-24, 666 P.2d at
68-69 (Cameron, J., concurring and Gordon.
V.CJ., joining). -
948 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
Richmond refers is not invalid, but assum-
ing for the sake of argument that it is,
Richmond's reliance on Adamson is not
well taken.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Walton specifically because of this circuit's
en banc holding in Adamson,12 and Walton
reached the opposite conclusion regarding
the Arizona statute's constitutionality.
Even if the portion of Adamson upon
which Richmond relies survives Walton, it
still does not support his claim. Contrary
to the suggestion, Adamson did not hold
that invalidation of one aggravating cir-
cumstance automatically requires remand
for resentencing; rather, the court simply
noted that it is the common practice of the
Arizona Supreme Court to remand for re-
sentencing when that court invalidates an
aggravating circumstance. Id. There is
no suggestion in Adamson that the United
States Constitution requires remand when
one aggravating factor is eliminated from
the analysis if sufficient other aggravating
factors remain.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110
S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), upon
which Richmond also relies, is not to the
contrary. In Clemons, a Mississippi in-
mate challenged the constitutionality of a
death sentence imposed partially on the
basis of a court's finding that it had been
an "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
killing. Id. 110 S.Ct. at 1445. The Missis-
sippi law in question permitted imposition
of the death penalty upon a finding of only
one aggravating circumstance so long as
that aggravating circumstance outweighed
all mitigating circumstances. Finding the
state supreme court's consideration of the
"especially heinous" factor impermissibly
vague, the Supreme Court remanded for
resentencing.
The Court did not hold, however, that
imposition of the death penalty on the basis
of the single remaining aggravating factor
12. See Walton. 110 S.Ct. at 3054 ("Because the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has held the Arizona death penalty stat-
ute to be unconstitutional for the reasons sub-
mitted by Walton in this case, see Adamson v.
would have been ipso facto unconstitution-
al. Rather, it implicitly recognized that
reliance on a single aggravating factor can
be constitutional. See id at 1446, 1450-51.
The Court remanded because once the
vague factor was removed from the analy-
sis, it was unclear from the Mississippi
Supreme Court's opinion whether the one
remaining circumstance still outweighed all
the mitigating evidence. See id. at 1449-51
(Parts III-IV of the opinion).
(7] In this case, there is no similar
doubt. Elimination of the challenged
factor would still leave enough support for
Richmond's sentence because the statute at
issue here is fundamentally different from
the statute at issue in Clemons. The Mis.
sissippi law that Clemons considered au-
thorizes the death penalty if "'there are
insufficient mitigating circumstances ... to
outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances.'" Id. at 1446 n. 2 (quoting Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (Supp.1989))
(emphasis added). Arizona's law mandates
the death penalty "if the court finds one or
more of the [enumerated] aggravating cir-
cumstances ... and that there are no miti-
gating circumstances sufficiently substan-
tial to call for leniency." Ariz.Rev.Stat.
Ann. § 13-703(E) (emphasis added). The
difference is significant: a conclusion by
the Arizona courts that there are no sub-
stantial mitigating circumstances is sepa-
rate from and independent of any conclu-
sion regarding the existence of aggravat-
ing circumstances. Invalidation of an ag-
gravating circumstance does not mandate
reweighing or require resentencing where
the court has found that the prosecution
has met its burden of establishing aggrava-
tion sufficient to warrant the state's harsh-
est penalty two or three times and that the
defense has failed to establish mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency. See id. Hg 13-703(C), (E).
Under the statute at issue in Clemon, the
invalidation of an aggravating crum
stance necessarily renders any evidence Of
Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (1988) (en banc). w
granted certiorari."): id 110 S.CL at 3059 (S
lia, I., concurring) (describing Adanue'"s-
Walton as "essentially identical" cass).
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mitigation "weightier" or more substantial
in a relative sense; the same, however,
cannot be said under the terms of the Ari-
zona statute at issue here. Nothing in the
Arizona statute suggests the need for ple-
nary reweighing where the record still re-
veals that there are "one or more of the
[enumerated) aggravating circumstances
... and that there are no mitigating cir-
cumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency." Id. § 13-703(E).
V
181 Richmond next contends that be-
cause the trial court never specifically
found that he caused, intended to cause, or
attempted to cause Crummett's death, im-
position of the death penalty would violate
the rule of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982).
The defendant in Enmund had been con-
victed of felony murder and sentenced to
death for his involvement in the killing of
two robbery victims, even though the
record only suggested that he was the driv-
er of the get-away car. In vacating En-
mund's sentence, the Supreme Court held
that imposition of the death penalty vio-
lates the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments in the absence of a specific finding
by the trier of fact that the defendant
actually killed, attempted to kill, intended
to kill, or contemplated that life would be
taken:
Enmund himself did not kill or attempt
to kill; and, as construed by the Florida
Supreme Court, the record before us
does not warrant a finding that Enmund
had any intention of participating in or
facilitating a murder. Yet under Florida
law death was an authorized penalty be-
cause Enmund aided and abetted a rob-
bery in the course of which murder was
committed.
Id. at 798, 102 S.Ct. at 3377; see id at 801,
102 S.Ct. at 3378.
Enmund, however, is clearly-distinguish-
able from the present case. The jury that
convicted Richmond received instructions
on both premeditated and felony murder,
and the record before us clearly provides
sufficient evidence for a finding that Rich-
) v. LEWIS 1489
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mond expressly intended to participate in
and to facilitate that murder. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's holding in Enmund
was predicated upon the attenuated nature
of the defendant's responsibility for the
deaths in that case. As the Supreme Court
pointed out more recently in Tison v. Ari-
zona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95
L.Ed.2d 127, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921,
107 S.Ct. 3201, 96 L.Ed.2d 688 (1987), En-
mund does not stand for the blanket prop-
osition that capital punishment is unconsti-
tutional in cases of felony murder:
(S]ome nonintentional murderers may be
among the most dangerous and inhu-
mane of all-the person who tortures
another not caring whether the victim
lives or dies, or the robber who shoots
someone in the course of the robbery,
utterly indifferent to the fact that the
desire to rob may have the unintended
consequence of killing the victim as well
as taking the victim's property. This
reckless indifference to the value of hu-
man life may be every bit as shocking to
the moral sense as an "intent to kill."
... [WMe hold that the reckless disregard
for human life implicit in knowingly en-
gaging in -criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death represents a
highly culpable mental state, a mental
state that may be taken into account in
making a capital sentencing judgment
when that conduct causes its natural,
though also not inevitable, lethal result.
... [W]e simply hold that major partic-
ipation in the felony committed, com-
bined with reckless indifference to hu-
man life, is sufficient to satisfy the En-
mund culpability requirement.
481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-88
(footnote omitted).
Furthermore, in its independent review
of the record in this case, the Arizona Su-
preme Court explicitly did consider En-
mund, and it set forth findings sufficient
to satisfy both that test and the Supreme
Court's later pronouncements in Tison
Even if we accept appellant's conten-
tion that he was not driving the car.when
the victim was run over, we do not be-
1490 948 FEDERAL RE
lieve this case falls within the parame-
ters of Enmund. The facts from the
appellant's version indicate that he was
the leader of the group; he was the first
to use violent force on the victim; he was
aware that the victim, if allowed to live,
could identify him. Appellant, from his
version of the facts, was willing to leave
the wounded and unconscious victim
alone in the desert to an uncertain
fate.... There is no evidence that ap-
pellant protested or showed any emotion
when the victim was twice run over.
The appellant's version of the facts indi-
cates appellant played an integral part in
the events which caused the victim's
death, and he willingly assisted in the
acts which were intended to cause the
victim's death.
The evidence presented by the state
was that the appellant drove the vehicle
over the victim, thus killing him. The
testimony of Faith Erwin was that the
appellant was the driver at the time the
victim was run over. The circumstantial
evidence supports Faith's testimony.
Richmond, 136 Ariz. at 318, 666 P.2d at
63.1
Nor does it matter that the Enmund
finding was made by the state supreme
court rather than by the original sentenc-
ing court:
At what precise point in its criminal pro-
cess a State chooses to make the En-
mund determination is of little concern
from the standpoint of the Constitu-
tion....
... [WJhen a federal habeas court re-
views a claim that the death penalty has
been imposed on one who has neither
killed, attempted to kill, nor intended
that a killing take place or lethal force be
used, the court's inquiry cannot be limit-
ed to an examination of jury instructions.
Rather, the court must examine the en-
tire course of the state-court proceedings
against the defendant in order to deter-
mine whether, at some point in the pro-
cess, the requisite factual finding as to
13. Interestingly, the Arizona Supreme Court
conducted its Enmund analysis in this case be-
fore the United States Supreme Court narrowed
the Enmund holding in Tison. The United
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the defendant's culpability has been
made.
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386-87,
106 S.Ct. 689, 696-97, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986)
(footnote omitted). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the Arizona courts have predi-
cated Richmond's sentence upon a suffi-
cient finding of criminal intent.
VI
[9] As a black male of moderate means,
Richmond next contends that the district
court erred in denying his request for an
evidentiary hearing upon his claim that Ari-
zona's administration of the death penalty
is racially, sexually, and socio-economically
discriminatory. We disagree. A habeas
corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentia-
ry hearing both if he "alleges facts which,
if proved, would entitle him to relief" and if
he did not receive a full and fair evidentia-
ry hearing on the issue in the state court.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83
S.Ct. 745, 756, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); see id.
at 312-19, 83 S.Ct. at 756-60. The facts
that Richmond has alleged, even if proven,
would not entitle him to relief.
In support of his request for a hearing
on this issue in the district court, Richmond
made an extensive proffer of what he seeks
to prove:
The proffer included that, although 15%
of the victims of homicides in Arizona
since 1973 have been black, every person
under death sentence was convicted of
killing a white victim; that [although]
approximately 10% of the persons con-
victed of homicide in Arizona since 1973
have been women, no women are on
death row. All three experts who had
examined the Arizona death sentencing
process from 1973 to the present [March
1987] found significant discrepancies
based on the victim's race; two found
evidence of discrimination based on the
defendant's race, and one demonstrated
significant disparities based on sex and
economic status as well.
States Supreme Court decided Ennund in 1982;
the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Rkbf
mond's sentence in 1983; and the United StZO
Supreme Court decided Tison in 1987-
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Brief for Appellant at 38-39 (citations omit-
ted). This proffered evidence, however, is
precisely the sort of generalized statistical
evidence that was rejected as unactionable
by the Supreme Court in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95
L.Ed.2d 262, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920,
107 S.Ct. 3199, 96 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987).
Even if proven, the statistical disparities to
which Richmond points would be insuffi-
cient to support an inference of purposeful
discrimination in his own case. To require
the district court to weigh this evidence
would be to suggest that Richmond's death
sentence could conceivably be invalidated
solely on the basis of his physical or social
affinity to other defendants who are not
now before this court but who may have
suffered unconstitutional discrimination in
their receipt of the same sentence. This
we cannot do. To prevail in challenging his
sentence under the equal protection clause,
Richmond "must prove that the decision-
makers in his case acted with discriminato-
ry purpose." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292,
107 S.Ct. at 1767 (emphasis in original).
Richmond has alleged no facts to suggest
that either the Arizona Supreme Court, the
state trial court, or the prosecutor's office
acted with prejudicial or discriminatory
purpose in either seeking or imposing his
sentence. The district court thus properly
denied his request for an evidentiary hear-
ing on this issue. See generally id. at 292-
320, 107 S.Ct. at 1766-82.
VII
(101 Richmond's final contention is that
fulfillment of his sentence after sixteen
years on death row would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments." We
know of no decision by either the United
States Supreme Court or this circuit that
has held that the accumulation of time a
defendant spends on death row during the
prosecution of his appeals can accrue into
14. Richmond actually alleged that fulfillment of
his sentence after thirteen years. on death row
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Because he raised that claim in his opening
brief, which was filed in 1987, we have added
the past three years during which we deferred
v. LEWIS 1491
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an independent constitutional violation, and
Richmond has cited no such decision.
On the other hand, the State of Arizona
has directed the court's attention to two
relevant, though not controlling, prece-
dents. In a decision affirmed two years
later by the Tenth Circuit, the United
States District Court for the District of
Utah rejected a similar claim brought by a
habeas corpus petitioner who had been on
death row for ten years. Andrews v. Shul-
sen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 431 (D.Utah 1984),
affd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.1986), cert
denied, 485 U.S. 919, 108 S.Ct. 1091, 99
L.Ed.2d 253, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1015,
108 S.Ct. 1491, 99 L.Ed.2d 718 (1988). The
court reasoned that to accept the petition-
er's argument would be "a mockery of
justice" given that the delay was attributa-
ble more to the petitioner's actions than to
the state's. Id. Like Richmond, the peti-
tioner in Andrews had sought "extensive
and repeated review of (his] death sen-
tence." Id. Arizona also points to the
well-known decision of the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Chessman, in
which that court rejected the same claim by
an eleven-year death-row inmate. 52
Cal.2d 467, 497, 341 P.2d 679, 699 (1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 925, 80 S.Ct. 296, 4
L.Ed.2d 241, rek 'g denied, 361 U.S. 941, 80
S.Ct. 383, 4 L.Ed.2d 362 (1960). Finally, we
note the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 221 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2009 n.
4, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), which the district
court cited in its rejection of this claim and
which held that an eight-year delay be-
tween an arrest and sentencing was not
unconstitutional where the delay resulted
from the need to assure careful review of
an unusually complex case. See Rich-
mond, 640 F.Supp. at 803 (citing Harri-
son).
Especially in light of the relative absence
of contrary precedents, we believe that the
reasoning of these cases is sound. A de-
submission of his appeal. We note, however,
that because this appeal properly concerns Rich-
mond's sentence only as of the date of its reim-
position in 1980. the relevant period of his resi-
dency on death row is actually ten years.
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fendant must not be penalized for pursuing
his constitutional rights, but he also should
not be able to benefit from the ultimately
unsuccessful pursuit of those rights. It
would indeed be a mockery of justice if the
delay incurred during the prosecution of
claims that fail on the merits could itself
accrue into a substantive claim to the very
relief that had been sought and properly
denied in the first place. If that were the
law, death-row inmates would be able to
avoid their sentences simply by delaying
proceedings beyond some threshold amount
of time, while other death-row inmates-
less successful in their attempts to delay-
would be forced to face their sentences.
Such differential treatment would be far
more "arbitrary and unfair" and "cruel and
unusual" than the current system of fulfill-
ing sentences when the last in the line of
appeals fails on the merits. We thus de-
cline to recognize Richmond's lengthy in-
carceration on death row during the pend-
ency of his appeals as substantively and
independently violative of the Constitution.
VIII
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the district court and deny
Richmond's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
AFFIRMED.
HARRY PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
with whom Judges HUG, NORRIS and
REINHARDT join, dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc:
By declining to rehear this case en banc,
this court sends a man to his death without
undertaking even the minimal review that
the Supreme Court continues to find appro-
priate in habeas cases. In this case, even
the most deferential review of the record
reveals that no rational sentencer could
have concluded that Richmond's mental
state was "especially heinous," as that
term is defined by the Arizona Supreme
Court. The Arizona Supreme Court's con-
clusion that Richmond's mental state was
. "especially heinous" turns on the assump-
tion that he was driving the car when it ran
over the victim. The identity of the driver,
however, was the subject of a credibility
dispute. Neither the jury nor the trial
court resolved that dispute, and the Ari-
zona Supreme Court is incapable of resolv-
ing it rationally.
Moreover, the panel maintains that any
error in the finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance is harmless because the sentenc-
ing judge concluded that the mitigating
circumstances were not sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for leniency. The panel's
conclusion is based on the erroneous prem-
ise that Arizona law permitted the sentenc-
ing court to arrive at such a conclusion
without weighing the aggravating factors
against the mitigating circumstances. See
Richmond v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 933, 947 (9th
Cir.1990). By maintaining that Arizona's
statute is not a weighing statute, the pan-
el's opinion directly conflicts with Arizona
case law and the prior decisions of this
court. That case law demonstrates that in
Arizona, the sentencer evaluates whether
the mitigating evidence is sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant leniency by weighing it
against the aggravating factors. When an
invalid aggravating factor is removed from
the scales, the equation can change. Some-
one must reevaluate the mix of mitigating
factors in light of the reduced gravity of
the remaining valid aggravating factors.
I
The panel's opinion acknowledges that
the "especially heinous" aggravating cir-
cumstance is unconstitutionally vague on
its face, but it concludes that the Arizona
Supreme Court applied a sufficiently nar-
row construction of the facially vague
term. Once a state appellate court W
articulated a constitutionally sufficient nM
rowing construction of a facially vague sa
gravating circumstance, federal court!
must still review the state courts' applie
tion of that narrowed definition to the facts
of a particular case. That review is to be.
conducted under the deferential "rations
factfinder" standard of Jackson v.
nia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 LE.02
560 (1979). A state court's finding of s
aggravating circumstance, including '
state appellate court's finding that a mo
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der is "especially heinous," violates the
Constitution if no reasonable sentencer
could have made the finding. See Lewis v.
Jeffers, - U.S. -, 110 S.CL 3092, 3102-
03, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990).
In this case, no rational sentencer could
have found that Richmond's mental state
was "especially heinous" as that facially
vague term has been narrowed by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court. The limiting defini-
tion, as reported in the panel's opinion,
requires that the sentencer make a factual
finding about the defendant's mental state.
"Heinous and depraved involve the mental
state and attitude of the offender as re-
flected in his words and actions." State v.
Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, 64
(Ariz.1983), quoted in Richmond v. Lewis,
921 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir.1990). In addi-
tion, the Arizona Supreme Court tells us
that "heinous" means "grossly bad" or
"shockingly evil." The Arizona Supreme
Court applies several factors to determine
whether the "especially heinous" aggravat-
ing circumstance applies. In determining
in this case that Richmond's mental state
was grossly bad or shockingly evil, the
Arizona Supreme Court mentioned only
two of those factors: the infliction of gra-
tuitous violence on the victim and the muti-
lation of the corpse. I believe that by
focusing solely on those two factors in this
case, the Arizona Supreme Court could
draw rational inferences about the mental
state of only one actor- the driver of the
car.
Here the victim was already unconscious
and bleeding when he was run over not
once, but twice, each time from a differ-
ent direction. The evidence indicates
that the first run by the vehicle was over
the victim's head crushing his skull and
killing him. The second run of the ve-
hicle was over the body of the victim.
The investigating officers found, at the
location of the murder, two large pools
1. Erwin received immunity in return for her
testimony. Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F.Supp.
767, 792 n. 30 (D.Ariz.1986).
2. Corella was granted immunity, but neither the
Prosecution nor the defense called her as a
witness. State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560
P.2d 41, 44 (1976).
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of blood separated by about 30 feet,
which was consistent with the body hav-
ing been run over and dragged to where
it was found.
Id., quoted in Richmond, 921 F.2d at 943.
As this quotation demonstrates, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court clearly focused on the
actions of the driver when it determined
that the facts warranted a finding that the
killer's mental state was "especially hei-
nous." The Arizona Supreme Court ap-
peared to assume that Richmond was the
driver. Yet neither the jury nor the sen-
tencing court ever found that Richmond
was the driver.
Indeed, the driver's identity has been vig-
orously disputed throughout this case.
Faith Erwin provided the only testimony
implicating Richmond as the fatal driver.'
Richmond has always denied being the fa-
tal driver, and he has witnesses to support
him. In his statement to the police, Rich-
mond said that Becky Corella backed the
car up over the victim, then drove forward
and ran over him again. Richmond v.
Ricketts, 640 F.Supp. 767, 771 (D.Ariz.
1986). Corella did not testify.2 A witness
for Richmond testified that Erwin earlier
reported that Corella had been driving.
640 F.Supp. at 778. The jury did not deter-
mine who drove the car. Because the jury
was instructed on felony murder, the jury's
verdict is consistent with either version.
At the sentencing hearing, Richmond
.submitted additional evidence to show that
Corella was the lethal driver. 640 F.Supp.
at 778-79. According to affidavits signed
by two witnesses, Corella admitted being
the driver. Moreover, an affidavit signed
by the prosecutor in the original trial stat-
ed that Corella was prepared to testify
"and accept blame for the killing." A
Neither the jury, the sentencing court,
nor the Arizona Supreme Court has ex-
3. In discussing the procedural history of the
case, the panel's opinion mentions that Rich-
mond filed one of these affidavits in a petition
for post-conviction relief. 921 F.2d at 936. It
does not discuss the other affidavits.
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pressly resolved the dispute over who
drove the car over the victim's body. Yet
the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion
that Richmond's mental state was "espe-
cially heinous" turns on the tacit assump-
tion that he was the driver.
Just as the jury's verdict did not neces-
sarily determine that -Richmond was the
driver, the trial court's finding that the
murder was "especially cruel or heinous"
did not turn on any finding that Richmond
was the driver. Nor did it turn on any
conclusion about Richmond's mental state.
At the time Richmond was sentenced in
1980, the Arizona Supreme Court had not
yet narrowed the definition of "especially
heinous" to restrict the application of that
aggravating circumstance to determina-
tions of the defendant's mental state or
attitude. The sentencing court did not ex-
plain why it concluded that the aggravating
circumstance applied, nor did it assume
that Richmond was driving the car when
the victim was run over. The findings and
special verdict of the sentencing court do
not even discuss the identity of the driver.
Nevertheless, the identity of the driver
was an issue on appeal to the Arizona
Supreme Court. While Richmond's case
was on appeal, the United States Supreme
Court decided Edmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1982), which held that the Constitution for-
bids capital punishment for certain types of
felony murder convictions. In Edmund,
the Court determined that states cannot
execute defendants convicted of felony
murder unless they actually killed, attempt-
ed to kill, or intended that a killing occur.
See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 378,
106 S.CL 689, 693, 88 LEd.2d 704 (1986).
Richmond contended that the ruling of Ed-
mund should spare him from execution.
4. The opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court
includes one sentence that suggests that the sen-
tencing court resolved the credibility conflict
and made a factual finding that Richmond
drove the car. The court said that "the trial
judge was justified in concluding that appellant
drove the vehicle that was used to kill the vic-
tim." State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 666
P.2d 57, 63 (1983). This sentence suggests that
the Arizona Supreme Court believed that the
trial court made a finding about the driver's
The Arizona Supreme Court's discussion
of the Edmund argument is the only sec-
tion of the state supreme court opinion that
discusses the dispute over the driver's iden-
tity. As I read the opinion of the state
supreme court, it determined that Rich-
mond's Edmund argument was a loser no
matter who drove the car. Even under
Richmond's version of the facts, the court
noted, Richmond's level of involvement in
the crime was substantial enough that it
satisfied Edmund, without regard to
whether Richmond was responsible for the
final lethal action. See State v. Richmond,
666 P.2d at 63.
Although the Arizona Supreme Court
discussed the dispute over the identity of
the driver, the Arizona courts resolved the
Edmund question without determining
whether or not Richmond drove the car.
The Arizona Supreme Court was institu-
tionally incapable of resolving the credibili-
ty dispute over the identity of the driver.
See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 388
n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 689, 698 n. 5, 88 L.Ed.2d 704
(1986). Conceivably, the Arizona Supreme
Court could have determined that the sen-
tencing court actually made an Edmund
finding, and could have further determined
that such a finding was supported by the
evidence. The record, however, shows that
the sentencing court made no Edmund
finding, nor did it determine whether Rich-
mond or Corella drove the car over the
victim.4 The opinion of the panel confirms
that it was the state supreme court, not the
sentencing court, that resolved the Ed-
mund question. See Richmond 921 F.2d
at 948 ("Nor does it matter that the Ed-
mund finding was made by the state s1
preme court rather than by the original
sentencing court").
identity. If so. then the court was mistake-
There is simply nothing in the record to suggest
that the trial judge made any conclusion aboiu
whether Richmond or Corella drove the car. If
any state court can be said to have determined
the identity of the driver, it is the Arizona Su
preme Court. not the sentencing court. Yet the
Arizona Supreme Court could not rationally do'
termine whether it was Richmond or E
who was telling the truth.
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In sum, although the sentencing court
may have been capable of resolving the
dispute over the identity of the driver, it
did not do so. The factfinder in this case
can only be the Arizona Supreme Court.
Yet the Arizona Supreme Court could not
rationally resolve this factual dispute on
the basis of a cold record. See Cabana,
474 U.S. at 388 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 698 n. 5.
Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court's
conclusion that Richmond's mental state
was "especially heinous" depends on the
assumption that Richmond, not Corella, de-
liberately drove the car over the victim's
body. Applying the deferential standard
articulated by the Supreme Court, I do not
see how, under these circumstances, any
rational factfinder could conclude that the
"especially heinous" aggravating circum-
stance, as narrowed and defined by the
Arizona Supreme Court, applied in this
case.
II
Richmond was sentenced to death on the
basis of three aggravating factors. Be-
cause Richmond does not challenge the ap-
plication of two of those aggravating
factors, the panel asserts in part IV.D. of
its opinion that any error in applying the
"especially heinous" aggravating circum-
stance is harmless. I strongly disagree.
In Richmond's case, the trial court arrived
at a verdict of death only after weighing
the mitigating evidence against the aggra-
vating factors. Because the ultimate sen-
tencing determination in Arizona involves a
balancing of the mitigating evidence
against the aggravating factors, Arizona is
a "weighing" state, as the Supreme Court
used that term in Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 1450,
108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). If the sentencing
court's balancing included a constitutional-
ly invalid aggravating factor, the fact that
the scales also contained a valid aggravat-
ing factor does not, as the panel believes,
dispose of Richmond's claim. In weighing
states, the rule of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978),
forbids such an "automatic rule of affirm-
ance," because "it would not give defen-
dants the individualized treatment that
v. LEWIS 1495
473 (9th Cr. 1990)
would result from actual reweighing of the
mix of mitigating factors and aggravating
circumstances." Clemons, 110 S.Ct. at
1450. There must either be a resentencing,
see Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481, 1489
(9th Cir.1991); Adamson v. Ricketts, 865
F.2d 1011, 1038-39 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc),
or at a minimum, the Arizona courts must
reweigh the defendan's mitigating evi-
dence against the valid aggravating
factors.
In expounding its view that any error in
the finding of the "especially heinous" ag-
gravating circumstance was harmless, the
panel begins with the erroneous premise,
which it advances without citing any case
law, that Arizona is not a weighing state.
See Richmond, 921 F.2d at 947. That
premise is simply wrong. The language of
the Arizona statute, as well as the cases of
this court and the Arizona Supreme Court,
establish that Arizona is indeed a weighing
state.
It appears that the panel misreads Ari-
zona law simply because the statute's text
does not include the word "weigh." Never-
theless, it is clear that the statute requires
weighing. If the trial court finds any ag-
gravating circumstances, it must then
make findings on the existence of mitigat-
ing circumstances. It is only after the trial
court has made findings on the existence of
both that it must make the sentencing deci-
sion. The statute requires a sentence of
death if there are any aggravating circum-
stances "and there are no mitigating cir-
cumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency." Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(E).
Without citing any. authority, the panel
mistakenly concludes that the aggravating
circumstances do not influence the Arizona
sentencer's inquiry into whether the miti-
gating circumstances are sufficiently sub-
stantial. 921 F.2d at 947. On the con-
trary, it is clear that the trial judge deter-
mines whether the mitigating circum-
stances are "sufficiently substantial" by
evaluating them in relation to the aggra-
vating circumstances that exist. This.is a
balancing, a process of weighing.
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Numerous cases of the Arizona Supreme
Court confirm that the sentencer deter-
mines whether mitigating evidence is "suf-
ficiently substantial" by weighing it
against aggravating circumstances. See,
e.g., State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 706 P.2d
371, 379 (Ariz.1985) ("Once the trial judge
finds that defendant's capacity was signifi-
cantly impaired ... a mitigating factor
arises which is then weighed against any
aggravating circumstances that the trial
judge may find to determine whether miti-
gating factors are sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency"); State v. Harding,
670 P.2d 383, 397 (Ariz.1983) ("We have
described the formula of 'sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for leniency' as involving the
weighing of aggravating against mitigat-
ing circumstances on the basis of the gravi-
ty of each circumstance."); State v. Gretz-
ler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1, 13 (1983)
(determining whether mitigating circum-
stances are sufficiently substantial involves
weighing and balancing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that are present).
The Arizona Supreme Court has clearly
explained that determining whether miti-
gating circumstances exist is distinct from
the final balancing test:
[The trial court acts first as the fact
finder. It must consider whether the
state has proven any of the aggravating
factors.... It must also determine
whether the defendant has shown miti-
gating circumstances ... After the trial
court has made these findings of fact, it
then engages in a balancing test in which
it determines whether the mitigating
factors are sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency.
State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 708 P.2d 719,
730 (1985), quoted in Adamson v. Ricketts,
865 F.2d 1011, 1063 (9th Cir.1988) (en bane)
(Brunetti, J., dissenting). The Arizona case
law thus confirms that the panel in this
case has misconstrued the operation of the
Arizona statute.
5. The panel's opinion also conflicts with our
previous reading of the virtually identical lan-
guage of Montana's capital sentencing statute.
In Montana. as well as Arizona, the sentencer
determines whether mitigating evidence is suffi-
The panel has not simply misinterpreted
Arizona law; it has also overlooked our
prior cases. Although some portions of
our opinion in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865
F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988) (en bane), have not
survived as good law, our description of the
Arizona statute remains valid. We ex-
plained that after the parties have' estab-
lished the existence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, "the court must
weigh the aggravating circumstance(s)
against the mitigating circumstance(s)."
Id. at 1040; see also id. at 1065-66 (Brunet.
ti, J., dissenting). In Adamson, the State
of Arizona itself acknowledged that the
statute requires the sentencer to balance.
See id. at 1043.s
In Richmond's case, the trial court found
that there were a number of mitigating
circumstances. See State v. Richmond,
136 Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, 65 (1983). It
was only by comparing them to the aggra-
vating circumstances that the sentencer
concluded that they were not sufficiently
substantial to warrant leniency. If a re-
viewing court's analysis reduces the num-
ber of valid aggravating circumstances, it
reduces the weight and gravity of the ag-
gravating factors that the sentencer may
permissibly consider. The reviewing court
can no longer rely on an earlier finding
that the mitigating circumstances were not
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
A new balancing must be conducted in or-
der to determine whether the mitigating
circumstances are sufficiently substantial
in relation to the remaining valid aggravat-
ing factors.
The panel fails to recognize that the find-
ings of no mitigating circumstances suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency is
simply the end result of the balancing or
weighing that the Arizona statute requires.
It is not an isolated finding of fact. It
depends on the nature and gravity of the
aggravating circumstances. If the sen-
tencing court weighed the mitigating cir-
cumstances against both valid and invalid
ciently substantial to warrant leniency by vie-
ing it in relation to the aggravating circu0
stances that have been established. So Smith
v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1990)
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aggravating circumstances, then the sen-
tence of death cannot stand. At a mini-
mum, there would have to be a determina-
tion whether the mitigating circumstances,
when weighed against the remaining valid
aggravating circumstances, were suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency.
III
Because no rational sentencer could have
found that the "especially heinous" aggra-
vating factor applied, Richmond is entitled
to further proceedings in the state courts.
Richmond presented a considerable amount
of mitigating evidence at his sentencing
hearing. Indeed, one justice of the Arizona
Supreme Court would have reversed the
sentence of death on the strength of the
mitigating evidence. See Richmond, 666
P.2d at 69 (Feldman, J., dissenting). Rich-
mond is entitled to have the Arizona courts
reevaluate the strength of that mitigating
evidence in relation to the valid aggravat-
ing factors, with the invalid "especially hei-
nous" factor removed from the scales.
Garry Vincent FEATHERSTONE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
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State prisoner sought habeas corpus.
The United States District Court for the
The panel finds this case appropriate for submis-
sion without oral argument pursuant to Ninth
E v. ESTELLE 1497
497 (9thClr. 1991)
Central District of California, Pamela A.
Rymer, J., denied relief, and prisoner ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Trott, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that: (1) evidence of prior
offense was admissible; (2) error in not
giving limiting instruction was harmless;
(3) denial of motion for severance of
charges did not deprive defendant of fair
trial; (4) use of photographic lineup identi-
fication did not violate due process; and (5)
counsel was not ineffective.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law e369.15
Testimony that person identified as de-
fendant had committed prior rape and bur-
glary was properly admitted to establish
defendant's identity as perpetrator of rape
and burglary for which he was charged
based on the similarities of the circum-
stances, and admission of the evidence did
not deprive him of due process. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
2. Habeas Corpus e=498
Failure of court to give limiting in-
struction when it admitted evidence of pri-
or offense which was relevant to one of the
two sets of charges against defendant but
not to the other was harmless; court did
give adequate limiting instruction confining
evidence to the issue of identity based on a
characteristic method, jury's verdicts indi-
cated that it had not misused the evidence,
defense counsel, as a tactical matter, did
not want the court to mention certain
charges in the instruction, and deputy dis-
trict attorney urged the jury to consider
the evidence only in relation to the charges
to which it was relevant.
3. Habeas Corpus e478
Defendant's trial was not fundamental-
ly unfair because court refused to separate
two sets of charges, even though evidence
of similar prior offense was admissible only
Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).
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contrasting Bush's World War 1l record, experience in
roreign affairs, and leadership in Desert Storm with
Clinton's lack of experience and alleged draft dodging.
Republican consultants are adept at exploiting the
commander-in-chief issue. In 1988 Roger Ailes pro-
duced an ad showing Dukakis riding in a tank, looking
silly. The ad mocked the notion of Dukakis as comman-
der in chief. It was devastating.
Is there a way Clinton might pull through? Yes, but
don't count on it. Clinton advisers note that Bush's neg-
atives are high too. impling that Clinton is no worse off
than Bush. But Bush's low approval rating is based on
his performance as president. So long as the economy
improves, his rating will rise. Clinton's negatives are
personal and harder to uproot. Clinton aides point also
to Bush's success in 1988 in shedding his wimp image.
But Bush was viewed more favorably once he became a
presidential nominee-his wimp problem was largely a
product of being vice president (a veep isn't his own
man). Clinton doesn't have this luxury. Nor can he face
his detractors the wayJohn Kennedy did in 1960. whe-n
he appeared before Protestant ministers in Houston.
Who would Clinton confront? Gennifer Flowers? Opal
Ellis, the 84-year-old draft official who says Clinton mis-
led his local draft board?
There are two lifelines for Clinton. One is for the
campaign to turn inexplicably into a riveting issues
debate between Clinton and Bush. Clinton fared best in
the primaries when engaged with Tsongas in a debate
of economic principles. Then voter concern about his
character dipped. If Clinton finds a strong, single issue.
he might "get the focus off personality and character."
says Wirthlin, the GOP pollster. It would have to be an
economic issue more sweeping than the middle-class
tax cut Clinton championed in the primaries. But if the
economy slips into recession again. Clinton may stum-
ble onto the big issue he needs. The other lifeline is a
White House scandal. That would put Clinton's charac-
ter problem in a different context. Absent a scandal or
economic collapse, Clinton's a goner. *
Roger Coleman vs. William Rehnquist.
DEAD END
By John Tucker
On a March night in 1981 in the hardscrabblecoal town of Gru dy, Virginia, Brad McCoyreturned home to find his wife, Wanda Fay,
raped and murdered, her throat cut so deep
that her head was nearly severed from her still warm
body. Eleven years later Wanda McCoy's brother-in-law,
Roger Coleman, waits in the Virginia State Penitentiary
to be executed for her murder. There is a good chance
the execution will take place on May 20, as scheduled.
There is also a good chance that Coleman is innocent. In
the legal atmosphere created by the Rehnquist Supreme
Court, however, he may never get a chance to prove it.
From the time he joined the Court, William Rehn-
quist has campaigned to limit the scope of habeas cor-
pus, and as the Court has changed, his efforts have
borne fruit. Over the past decade the Court has chipped
away at access to habeas corpus, accepting state proce-
dural arguments it once rejected, limiting the right to
file successive writs as new facts or theories emerge, and
holding that even the most compelling arguments may
be waived if they are not raised at the first opportunity.
There are few more compelling arguments against this
JOHN TUCKER is a lawyer and free-lance writer in Virginia.
trend in this judicial reasoning than the case of the
bizarre, chilling-and still mysterious-murder of
Wanda McCoy.
From the discovery of McCoy's body, the investigation
of her murder was less an inquiry into who was responsi-
ble than an effort to find evidence to convict Roger
Coleman. There were few compelling facts pointing to
Coleman's involvement, but police believed he was one
of the few people McCoy would have admitted into her
house at night. More important, four years earlier Cole-
man had been convicted of attempted sexual assault.
At first, evidence against Coleman was hard to come by.
No one could place him at the scene of the crime. and
four independent witnesses corroborated his near-per-
fect alibi. However, by discounting the testimony of one
witness and ignoring the medical examiner's original
estimate of the time of death, there was a period of fifteen
or twenty minutes in which Coleman could have entered
the house, struggled with the victim, dragged her into a
spare bedroom, removed her clothes, raped her, cut her
throat, stabbed her twice after she was dead, and made
his escape undetected through the front (and onlv) door
before Mr. McCoy came home to discover his wife's body.
continued on page 24
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It was a thin reed. but when forensic tests indicated
that sperm found in the victim's vagina came from
someone with blood type B (a type shared by Coleman
and about 13 percent of the population). some small
spots of blood on Coleman's pants were reported to be
type 0 (the same as the victim and about 45 percent of
the population). and two pubic hairs found on the vic-
tim were declared 'consistent' with Coleman's. the
authorities charged him with capital murder. Repre-
sented by appointed lawyers who had never defended a
murder case. Coleman was found guilty and sentenced
to death.
viction and death sentence has begun to comeT he web of evidence that led to Coleman's con-apart since his trial. If. as mineworker PhillipVan Dvke testified, he spoke with Coleman
miles from the murder scene at about 10:30 p.m., there
was no time at all for Coleman to have committed the
crime before Mr. McCoy arrived home. At trial the pros-
ecutor argued that Van Dyke was guessing about when
his conversation with Coleman ended. However, the
possibility that Van Dyke was mistaken was largely elimi-
nated by a time card showing that he had punched in at
the mine at 10:41 p.m., exactly what you would expect
if, as he testified. Van Dyke left Coleman at 10:30, went
directly to his job, changed clothes, and punched in.
The prosecutor had Van Dyke's time card at the time of
trial, but it was not shown to the jury.
Other elements of the state's case are disintegrating
as well. According to the prosecution, the major reason
Coleman was a suspect is that he was related to Wanda
McCoy and there was no sign of forced entry. What the
prosecution did not reveal is that during the investiga-
tion of the crime scene the police found a pry mark on
the McCoys' doorjamb. Close by the pry mark police
found and lifted a latent fingerprint. No report of the
state's effort to identify the fingerprint has been pro-
duced. If it were Coleman's. the fingerprint would have
been introduced at trial with great fanfare.
The most significant evidence that Coleman was
wrongly convicted, however, emerged after Jim Mc-
Closkey. a nationally known investigator, agreed to
study the case in 1988, and Kathleen Behan, a young
lawyer at Arnold and Porter, was assigned to it in 1990.
McCloskey began his investigation with a visit to
Grundy in the spring of 1988. It was McCloskey who
uncovered the police report mentioning the pry mark
and fingerprint. He also scoured the area for witnesses,
turning up a good deal of new information useful to
Coleman's defense, including a witness who says that
on the night of the murder Coleman's truck was not
parked where it had to have been under the state's
theory. But McCloskey hit the jackpot when he inter-
viewed Goldie Owens and Mrs. Bobby Ramey. Owens is
the mother-in-law of Roger Matney, a convicted felon
who testified that Coleman confessed to him when
they were cellmates. After telling his story, Matney was
released from the remainder of a four-year prison sen-
tence. Owens swears that Matney later told her his tes-
timony was false. Matney denies it.
The Ramey home sits a few yards above the house
where Brad and Wanda McCoy lived, overlooking it.
When McCloskey knocked on the door in 1988 and
explained that he was looking for information about the
murder, Mr. and Mrs. Ramey, their daughter, and one of
their sons, Donnie. were home. With the rest of the fam-
ily chiming in from time to time. Mrs. Ramev told a story
that seemed odd. Yes, she said, she remembered the
night vividly. Donnie and his brother Michael had gone
out to the movies. When they got home about 9:45.
Donnie was angry because "that damn Roger Coleman s
truck is parked in my parking space." Then Michael
went outside to bring in the laundry but quickly
returned and grabbeda fireplace poker. shouting that a
man was lurking under the porch. He ran back out. but
the man was gone.
Jim McCloskey was puzzled. but he knew two things
for sure. One was that Coleman's truck was not parked
in Donnie Ramey's parking space at 9:43-it was undis-
puted that he was miles away at that time. The other was
that the Rameys had not told their story to the police-
if they had, it would have been used at trial to put Cole-
man at the scene of the crime. And yet it seemed equallk
unlikely that the Rameys would not have told their storv
to the police if it happened. McCloskey was coninced
the Rameys were lying-but why?In 1990, two years after the Rameys talked to
McCloskey, Kitty Behan received an anonVMrOLLS
report that someone had admitted to McCov'i
murder, and that the same person had tried to
rape several other women in the Grundy area. cIti-
mately three women came forward and gave sworn affi-
davits that Donnie Ramey had sexually assaulted them.
(Ramey has not been charged in connection with any of
these alleged assaults). One of the women, Teresa
Horn, also swore that when she screamed and tried to
fight Ramey off, he told her to "shut up, or I'll do you
like I did that woman on Slate Creek." Wanda McCoy
lived on Slate Creek.
Two years ago the swabs that were taken from
McCoy's vagina were submitted to an expert to see
whether more sophisticated testing could identify or
eliminate Coleman as the source of the sperm that was
found. Like almost everything in this case, the results
were surprising. Though it was not possible to obtain a
DNA "fingerprint" identifying the source of the sperm,
the expert did isolate three blood components known as
"alleles." The bad news for Coleman is that two of them
were the same as his, and thus he could not be elimi-
nated as the source of the sperm. Indeed, the state
claims the test results make it even more likely that he
was the source. The good news is that there are only two
alleles in any one person's blood, so the sperm found in
McCoy's vagina came from at least two people. not just
one.
Suddenly a lot of things began to make sense.
McCloskey always believed there were two people
involved in the crime based on crime scene pho-
24 THE NEW REPUBLIC MAY 4. 1992
tographs. Then too, there was sperm in. McCoy's rectum
as well as her vagina. indicating she was both raped and
sodomized, an unlikely feat for one man within the brief
period when the crime had to have occurred. There was
also verifiable evidence that Coleman left home that
night expecting to go to work; was alone when he left
work after his shift was canceled: was alone when he met
and talked to Van Dyke: and was alone when he was seen
a few minutes before the state claims he went to the
scene of the murder.
As McCloskey puts it. -If you ask why Roger would
rape and murder his wife's sister, it doesn't make sense:
and if you ask how he had time to commit the crime, I
don't think he did; but if you ask how Roger Coleman,
after he was alone all night, recruited someone out of
the clear blue sky to help rape and murder his sister-in-
law. I say it's impossible.' McCloskey believes Donnie
Ramey and someone else killed McCoy and the Ramey
family knows it. That's why they made up the story about
Coleman's truck and the man under the porch. Ramey
denies it and has backed up his denial with an identifi-
cation card that claims his blood type is A.
The next bizarre twist in the story came earlier this
year, on Thursday, March 5. That day Teresa Horn met
with Behan and gave an interview to a local television
station about her claim that Donnie Ramey had tried to
rape her and confessed to the murder of Wanda McCoy.
The next day her bovfriend returned home in the late
afternoon and found Teresa unconscious. Two hours
later she was pronounced dead. Preliminarily the doc-
tors think she died of an overdose of some drug-
whether self-inflicted or not may never be known.
At first it seemed that Coleman's last chance to sur-
vive had been buried with Horn, but the curious cir-
cumstances of her death renewed public concern that
someone other than Coleman, someone still at large,
may have killed McCoy. More important, within a week
of Horn's death two new witnesses reportedly told
friends that Donnie Ramey had admitted involvement
in the McCoy murder. Behan and McCloskey are now
checking out their stories in hopes they will be able to
provide affidavits the way Horn did.Is Roger Coleman innocent? With the legal and
investigative resources now available, an evidentiary
hearing before an impartial court should reveal the
truth. Except for one problem-there may not be
any hearing. For most of this century courts have exam-
ined death penalty cases more carefully than others and
created a system of appeals that would provide a dispas-
sionate forum for reviewing convictions often obtained
by zealous authorities in the charged atmosphere of a
brutal murder. This effort to avoid the irreversible
tragedy of executing an innocent defendant has had two
opposing effects on the debate over the death penalty in
America. On one hand the effort to avoid mistakes
inevitably causes long delays between conviction and
execution, a result that death penalty advocates bitterly
deplore. On the other hand this same care makes it far
less likely that an innocent person will be executed
before the truth is discovered, thus allowing death
penalty advocates to minimize their opponents' most
powerful argument. the possibility of mistake.
Thus, although there are many examples of innocent
men and women convicted of capital crimes. some of
whom came within a few hours of execution, there have
been few if any executions of the factually innocent
because the Warren Court provided state criminal
defendants with realistic access to federal review by writ
of habeas corpus. That record, however, is about to
change dramatically. The Rehnquist Court's reluctance
to interfere with state court decisions and its acceptance
of state procedural arguments in a manner eschewed by
its predecessors mean that a case like Coleman's is par-
ticularly vulnerable.
Last summer Coleman fell %ictim to the Court's
increasingly skeptical approach to habeas corpus. Years
ago one of his appointed lawyers counted the time for
filing a document from the date an order was entered b.
a clerk instead of the date it was signed by ajudge. From
that day on, Coleman's case has proceeded with the cer-
taintyofa Kafka story. The Virginia Supreme Court held
that the document was filed one day late, and therefore
refused to consider Coleman's appeal on its merits.
Next, Coleman filed for habeas corpus in federal court.
but despite a 1963 Supreme Court decision to the con-
trary, a federal judge held that because the delay had
prevented Coleman from obtaining a decision on the
merits of his appeal, his claims would not be considered.
Last year Coleman's case reached the Supreme Court
itself, and in June the Court overruled its 1963 decision
and held that because of the one-day delay in state
court, Coleman was not entitled to a hearing in federal
court.
S o Coleman. waits in his cell on death row, won-dering whether somehow his lawyers will find a
judge willing to make the state wait a little longer
before killing him in order to try to find out who
really murdered Wanda McCoy. His only hope, short of
the politically charged realm of executive clemency, is
that some court will decide that the evidence of his
innocence is so strong that fundamental justice requires
a hearing. But with the Rehnquist Court, even inno-
cence may not be enough. That question is before the
Court this term in the case of Leonel.Herrera, whose
claim of innocence, supported by the affildait of an eye-
witness to the crime, was rejected by a lower court on
the ground that innocence, even if undisputed, pro-
vides no basis for a federal court to interfere with the
execution of a state prisoner. Since a majority of the jus-
tices voted against even hearing Herrera's case, it
appears that unless someone's mind is changed, that
decision will be upheld.
With the decision in the Coleman case and the likely
result in Herrera, the Rehnquist Court's triumph over
forty years of American death penalty jurisprudence is
substantially complete. On May 20 Roger Coleman may
well become the first innocent victim of that triumph.
He will surely not be the last. *
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The Rehnquist
Rush to Execute
Should States Get the Tnal Say?
By John Tucker
HE EVENTS leading to the execution of Robert
Alton Harris in California's gas chamber at dawn
last Tuesday dramatically focused public atten-
tion on the final stages of Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist's long crusade to limit the power of federal courts
over the execution of prisoners sentenced to death by
the states.
While public attention was focused on the drama in-
side San Quentin and the concurrent drama in Wash-
ington as the Supreme Court dissolved lower court
stays of execution as fast as they could be entered, a
broader and ultimately more significant story was gath-
ering force in less visible cases in Virginia and Texas.
No one seriously contended that Harris was innocent
of the murders for which he was convicted, and in the
end the question was only when and how he would be
executed. But for Roger Coleman in Virginia and
Leonel Herrera in Texas, for hundreds of other death
row inmates across the country-and for thousands
more who will be sentenced to death in years to
come-the issues are quite different. Simply stated,
they are these:
w Whether the federal courts will continue to play a
significant role in protecting defendants from the unfair
trials and erroneous convictions that occur with sur-
prising frequency in the emotional and political crucible
See KECUTION, C4, COL I
John Tudcer is a lawyer and writer who lives near
Wilfiauurg, Va. He has participated in and writen
about death penalty camwwndy ~ s... 9do O 4P
Rush to Execute
EXECUTION, From Cl
created when someone is prosecuted for a
heinous murder.
a Or whether the courts instead will with-
draw from the process and leave the ac-
cused to the not-so-tender mercies of state
court judges and governors who may in turn
be subject to the pressures of an aroused
electorate that wants someone punished for
the crime.Federal review of state criminal cases
occurs primarily under the federal
habeas corpus statute, which empow-
ers federal courts to order a state to release
a citizen held in violation of due process and
other constitutional protections. If a defen-
dant can show that a coerced confession
was used against him, for example, a federal
court can order the state either to retry him
without the confession or release him out-
right.
Beginning in the early 1950s, the Su-
preme Court substantially broadened the
availability of habeas corpus to provide
more protection against unfair state court
trials. But for the past two decades, and
with increasing success, Rehnquist has
campaigned in opinions and speeches to lim-
it federal court use of habeas corpus to re-
view state criminal cases-especially in
death penalty cases.
In recent weeks, considerable attention
has been focused on Roger Coleman. a
Southside Virginia coal miner convicted of
murder and scheduled to die on May 20.
Coleman's lawyers have developed not only
examples of unfair government conduct at
his trial but also substantial evidence that
he is innocent. But thus far Coleman has
been unable to obtain a federal hearing on
his claims because in 1986 one of his ap-
pointed lawyers mistakenly filed a paper
one day late. Last term, the Rehnquist
court held that the lawyer's mistake re-
quired dismissal of Coleman's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Cole-
man's lawyers, believing the decision left
open the right to a hearing on a substantial
claim of actual innocence, filed a new fed-
eral petition last Wednesday.
But whether Coleman ever gets his hear-
ing may depend on two questionable as-
sumptions: that his lawyers can obtain a
stay of execution or a commutation to keep
him alive until the Supreme Court decides a
case involving Texas inmate Leonel Her-
rera; and that the court will hold in that
case that the Constitution requires consid-
eration of a substantial claim of innocence
based on evidence uncovered after the judg-
ment of conviction becomes final.
Leonel Herrera was convicted and sen-
tenced to death for the 1981 murder of two
police officers, primarily on the basis of eye-
witness identifications and proof that the
killer was driving a car owned by Herrera.
Three years later, in a privileged conver-
sation with his lawyer. Leonel's brother
Raul allegedly confessed that he. not
Leonel. killed the policemen.
The lawyer's subsequent affidavit
presented this account: Raul stated that he
had driven his brother's car to South Padre
Island for an appointment involving drug
smuggling that his brother was too ill to
keep. Raul said the first policeman killed
was a participant in the drug ring, and the
killing resulted from a dispute between the
two of them: the second officer was killed
when he stopped Raul for speeding as he
fled the scene of the first murder. (The sec-
ond officer signaled his identification of
Leonel as the killer on his hospital death-
bed, but other witnesses have testified the
brothers look much alike.)
According to his lawyer's affidavit, Raul
said he and Leonel had always believed
Leonel would ultimately be exonerated,
since he was in fact miles away from the4
scene of the crime. Several weeks after
making his confession, Raul himself was
murdered during an argument with another
alleged member of the ring-and the stage
was set for ultimate appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Leonel's appointed lawyers learned of
Raul's confession and in late 1990 suc-
ceeded in persuading the lawyer who had
heard it-a former Texas state judge-that
in light of Raul's death and the imminent
execution of Leonel, he was released from
the obligations of the attorney-client priv-
ilege and should reveal Raul's statement.
The courts, however, were not persuaded
by the lawyer's hearsay recitation of his
deceased client's statement.
Then. Iast December, Raul Herrera
son. Raul Jr. came forward. Raul Jr. was
years old in 1981. According to his stato
ment. his father had taken him along on th
trip the day of the murders, and he had wii
nessed both killings. Raul Jr. swears that hi
father killed both police officers and that hi
uncle Leonel was not even in the car.
hile the vast majority of American
now favor the death penalty, pre
sumably most of us would oppos
executing an innocent man for his brother'
crimes. And we probably would be shockei
to learn that our legal system provides n
procedure for considering evidence of in
nocence once a conviction is final, even i
the result is to execute an innocent man
And yet that is the position the state court!
have taken in both Texas and Virginia. anc
the lower federal courts have said the same
thing in the Herrera case. Many legal ob'
servers expect the Rehnquist court to af.
firm that view when it decides the Herrera
case next fall, leaving Leonel Herrera and
Roger Coleman-if he's still alive-without
any court to consider the substantial evi-
dence that they are innocent.
For most of the men and women on death
row now and in the future. however, anoth-
er case from Virginia poses an even greater
threat to their chance of obtaining mean-
ingful federal court review of their convic-
tions. Since at least 1953, the Supreme
Court has held that in considering claims
that a state prisoner was convicted in vio-
lation of the Constitution, federal courts are
entitled to reexamine the correctness of
state rulings on mixed questions of law and
fact as well as pure questions of law. For
example, if the question was whether a po-
lice officer struck a defendant while ques-
tioning him, and there was evidence on both
sides, the federal court is required to defer
to the state court finding because that is a
pure question of fact. But whether a beating
resulted in sufficient coercion to violate the
defendant's constitutional rights is a mixed
question of law and fact. As such, the fed-
eral court would be entitled to review de
nove-that is to say, decide for itself with-
out regard to what the state court decided.
The vast majority of federal reversals of
state court convictions involve this kind of
mixed question of law and fact If the stan-
dard were changed to require federal courts
to defer to the state court finding on such
mixed questions, meaningful federal review
of state court convictions would cease to ex-
ist in most cases. It is precisely this result
that Rehnquist has sought to achieve in lob-
bying Congress to change the habeas cor-
pus statute.
Last fall. after efforts in Congress to
amend the statute again failed, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear an appeal by the state
of Virginia in a routine larceny case. The
conviction in that case had been overturned
by a federal court because it found that the
undisputed evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the verdict and the conviction there-
fore violated the Constitution's due process
clause. (Whether evidence is sufficient to
satisfy due process is a mixed question of
law and fact.)
Although neither side had raised the is-
sue, the Supreme Court asked the parties to
prepare briefs on the question of whether
federal courts should now be required to
defer to state court findings in such cases.
The Court has not yet ruled on the matter,
but a majority decision to overrule 40 years
of precedent and congressional acceptance
of the court's prior interpretation of the
habeas corpus statute would be judicial ac-
13 tivism as blatant as anything charged to the
9 liberal members of the Warren Court,
According to statistics compiled by Prof.
e James Liebman of Columbia Law School.
t- the potential for error inS the kinds of ex-
3 treme cases that result in the death penalty
S is so great that between 1976 and mid-
1991, approximately 50 percent of all cases
where the death penalty was imposed weres reversed by the state reviewing courts. and
a nother 20 percent were reversed by a fed-
e ral court in habeas corpus proceedings. Of
course, not all of these reversals occurred
because ihe defendant was not guilty: in the
majority, the defendant was retried and re-
f convicted or pleaded guilty. and not infre-
iquently he was again sentenced to death
after a new trial or sentencing hearing.,B ut there ire cases. some well known
u n some not, where the hearing or
retrial ordered by a reviewing court
or simply the passage of time has resulted
Iin the discovery of evidence that a man or
woman who was sentenced to die was in
fact innocent.
In Illinois, Lloyd Eldon Miller came with-
in a day of execution numerous times during
the 11 years he spent on death row. Finally
a federal court ordered a new trial when it
Was revealed that a pair of "blood-stained"
undershorts the prosecutor had displayed to
the jury were stained with paint, as the
prosecutor knew from a laboratory report
he had concealed from the defense. There-
after, it was shown that his confession was
coerced and that the testimony of the only
witness against him was false, and Miller
was released.
In Florida in 1983. Joseph Brown was 15
hours from his date with the electric chair
when a federal court stayed the execution
to consider his clam that the prosecu~tor
had knowingly used false testimony to se-
cure his conviction. Three and a half years
later, his accuser recanted, and the recanta-
tion was corroborated by other witnesses
and a lie detector test. After 13 years on
death row, Brown was finially released and
all charges against him were dropped.
Similarly, in the case which gave rise to
the widely praised documentary film 'Me
Thin Blue Line.* Randall Adams was re-
leased by the state of Texas in 1989 after
13 years in prison when there could no
longer be any serious doubt that the murder
for which he had been sentenced to die was
in fact committed by his accuser.
Also in Texas, Clarence Brandley was
released in 1990 after 10 years on death
row. In 1987 Brandley had been six days
away from execution for murder when his
lawyers obtained a stay after an eyewitness
came forward ind named the real killers.
After an evidentiary hearing, a Texas judge
held that Brandley had been the victim of
perjured testimony and misconduct by the
police, the prosecutor and the trial judge.
Even so it took another three years and two
epis!odes of "60 Minutes" before Brandley
was finally released.
Robert Alton Harris. executed last week
in California, was not innocent, but. Lloyd
Miller and Randall Adam and the others
were, It is doubtful that any of them would
be alive today if the courts had applied the
rules that Chief justice Rehnquist is at-
tempting to invoke in the handling of death
penalty cases in the future. His determina-
tion to limit the availability of habeas corpus
and remove the federal courts from most
death penalty decisions is certain to have an
enormous impact on the 2.594 prisoners on
death rows across the country, some of
whom are almost certainly innocent.
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I DEVELOPMENTS
Courts Battle Over Harris Execution
An impatient Supreme Court orders an end to last-minute stays by 9th Circuit
T he off-again, on-again executioiof Robert Alton Harris in Califor
nia represented everything that ob
servers on both sides of the issue sa,
is wrong with the death penalty ir
America.
In the hours before the execu
tion, Harris' attorneys engaged in .
frantic, no-holds-barred search for E
stay that finally resulted in
an angry and unprecedented
rebuke from the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
Death penalty propo-
nents and opponents-albeit
for different reasons-agreed
that what went on in the last
hours before the cyanide tab-
lets were dropped into an
acid solution was both wrong
and typical.
Orders Lifted Stays
The Supreme Court is-
sued its first order in the
case on April 21 at 2:20 a.m.
(all times are Eastern Day-
light Time) vacating a stay
issued by an undisclosed
judge on the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The stay was to con-
sider claims that Harris' trial
attorney had failed to obtain
records showing his client
suffered from brain damage
and that the state had failed
to disclose that Harris'
brother, a witness against
him, had failed a polygraph
test.
At 6 a.m., an increas-
ingly frustrated Court, which
had seen three appeals by
Harris in the 13 years after
his conviction, issued an-
other order lifting two stays.
Both had been granted in a
federal class action lawsuit
claiming that California's
method of execution, by cya-
nide gas, is cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
One stay had been issued by 10
9th Circuit judges, eight of them
Carter appointees. The other was
issued by an undisclosed appeals
judge upon the request of Harrii
ACLU attorney, who was worried
that procedural rules permitted only
one judge to issue the stay.
In its one-page ruling, the Court
said: "This claim could have beer,
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brought more than a decade ago.
There is no good reason for this
abusive delay. which has been com-
pounded by last-minute attempt.z to
manipulate the judicial process.
Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined by Justice Harr- Blackmun,
added some ire of his own with a
six-page dissent.
In the hours before the execution
of Robert Alton Harris (above), his
attorneys engaged in a frantic, no-
holds-barred search for a stay.
Afterdescribing in graphic terms
what happens to someone who is
killed by cyanide gas, the dissenters
said. "The barbaric use of cvanide
gas in the Holocaust. the develop-
ment of cyanide agents as ch,:mical
weapon . our ciontemporary Under-
standing of execution by lethAl gas.
and the development of less cruel
method nofexecution all demonstrate
that execution by cyanide gus is
unneesrianlv cruel
However, this was not the last
word. That came at 8:45 a.m. when
the Court vacated yet another stay.
It had been issued by 9th Circuit
Judge Harry Pregerson so that the
gas chamber lawsuit could be con-
verted from a civil rights action to a
habeas petition listing reasons why
1 the claim was not raised earlier.
In its final order, the
Court sent an unusual re-
buke to the appeals court:
"No further stays of Robert
Alton Harris' execution shall
be entered by the federal
courts except upon order of
this Court."
Harris was hustled to
the death chamber within 15
minutes of the last Court
order and was dead in an-
other 20.
He was executed for kid-
napping and murdering two
16-year-old boys so that he
and his brother could use
their car for a robbery. At
the time, Harris was on pa-
role for the beating death of
a neighbor.
Questioning the Court
The episode has raised
concerns, not only among
the expected partisans and
opponents of executions, but
also among the judiciary.
Within days, two 9th Circuit
judges, who had joined the
stay to consider the gas cham-
ber's constitutionality, criti-
cized the Supreme Court.
Judge John T Noonan,
in a carefully worded opin-
ion piece in The New York
Times on April 27, suggested
that the Supreme Court's
position is that the lower
court must "commit treason
to the Constitution and ab-
stain from exercising its juris-
diction" in such cases.
"The Court has resolved the
national ambivalence and decided
that it is intolerable for a federal
court to delay an execution to decide
a constitutional question," wrote
Noonan, a Reagan appointee.
"Robert Alton Harris was a
casualty of this decision. Was the
Constitution, too?"
His colleague on the circuit,
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, issued his
own broadside in a speech at Yale
s:P It Es Sm Rtnv"as'*
Law School. An Associated Press
story quoted the judge, a Carter
appointee, as saying, "I think it is
clear that the constitutional rights of
individuals are no longer of para-
mount importance to the Court."
With a note of resignation,
Stephen Bright, of the Southern Cen-
ter for Human Rights, said what
happened to Harris is typical in
death penalty litigation. He said
habeas petitions often charge that
key information-such as the evi-
dence Harris was afflicted with fetal
alcohol syndrome-was not presented
to the jury.
He acknowledged that in death
penalty cases there often is a flurry
of activity as the execution approaches
because issues come into focus.
Bright denied that the last-
minute attempt to delay Harris' exe-
cution was an abuse of the legal
system, noting that 10 judges of the
9th Circuit apparently agreed. He
charged that the Supreme Court's
role was yet another sign of its
"growing impatience" with the pace
of executions.
Harris' attorney, Michael Lau-
rence, the director of the ACLU of
Northern California Death Penalty
Project, said his challenge to the gas
chamber was not raised 13 years
earlier because cyanide executions
may not have been unconstitutional
then. They are now, he asserts,
under the "Eighth Amendments evolv-
ing standards of decency."
He also said he first filed the
gas chamber class action as a federal
civil rights lawsuit because 9th Cir-
cuit precedent requires it when con-
ditions of punishment are challenged.
But Laurence thinks the Su-
preme Court was scolding him in its
second order for filing the civil rights
suit-instead of a habeas petition-
in its belief he did so to avoid, limits
on successive habeas claims estab-
lished in an April 1991 Supreme
Court case, McCleskey v. Zant.
That is why Laurence tried to
convert the suit to a habeas petition,
in which he hoped to show his failure
to raise the claim earlier was due to
changing constitutional standards
rather than inexcusable neglect.
A Berserk Circuit?
Kent Scheidegger, legal director
of the pro-death penalty group Crim-
inal Justice Legal Foundation in
Sacramento, Calif., has a different
interpretation of the events. He be-
lieves that the "9th Circuit went
berserk."
"The claim that the gas cham-
ber is cruel and unusual punishment
filed 13 years after Harris was sen-
tenced to die in the ga i chamber is a
perfect example of an abuse of the
process." he said.
He singled out Pregerson for
special criticism. saying it was clear
from the Supreme Court's second
order that it considered the Eighth
Amendment claim to be too late.
whether raised in a civil or habeas
case. The judge. in Scheidegger's
view, disregarded the Supreme Court's
clear and controlling precedent when
he issued the fourth stav.
He also disagreed with Lau-
rence's claim that the Eighth Amend-
ment had "evolved since Harris was
sentenced. "Nothing much has
changed in the Eighth Amendment
recently. It'S one thing to say our
standards are different than two
centuries ago. but to say they've
changed in the 13 years Harris was
on death row is absurd.
He said the last-minute activity
could be avoided with a law that
guarantees one run through the ap-
pellate system and no further claims
other than compelling new evidence
that the defendant didn't commit the
crime. -Henry J. Reske
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Court to Decide
If New Data Can
aExecutions
DAVID G.SAVA
.IMES STAk.
WASHINGTON-After an ex-
traordinary series of middle-of-
the-night phone calls, the Supreme
Court at the insistence of four
justices agreed early last Wednes-
day to rule on whether the Consti-
tution forbids the execution of a
convicted murderer in Texas who
may be innocent.
But, at the same time, the high
court turned down an appeal for a
stay of execution of the man, whose
lawyers say can be proved not
guilty by new evidence. And, had it
not been for the intervention of
two state judges, the execution
would have been carried out within
a short time.
The blunt legal question came
before the justices in the hours
before Leonel E. Herrera, a Texas
Death Row inmate, was scheduled
to die for the murder of a police
officer in 1981. Little notice was
taken Wednesday of the justices'
actions outside of Texas.
In recent weeks. Herrera's law-
yers had compiled strong evidence
that his brother. Raul. actually
committed the murder. The con-
victed man's nephew, Raul Herre-
ra Jr., who was 9 at the time of the
crime, says in a court affidavit that
he saw his father, not his uncle
Leonel, kill the policeman.
But Texas state attorneys de-
scribed this new evidence as a
"ploy" to stop the execution. They
insisted that Herrera should have
died by lethal injection at dawn last
Wednesday.
On Tuesday afternoon, the U.S.
5th Circuit Court of Appeals had
lifted a stay of execution granted
earlier by a federal judge. Without
ruling on the validity of Herrera"
. Please see COURT, Al
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flew evideice, the three-judge
panel said that it was too late to
raise such a claim.
: "Herrera's claim of 'actual inno-
cence' presents -no substantial
claim for relief" under federai law,
the appeals court ruled.
.When Herrera's lawyers filed a
midnight appeal at the Supreme
Cburt, they found the justices split,
,5:to 4. on the issue. Because the
high court decides issues of law,
'not factual disputes, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist has insisted
that the court avoid second-guess-
ng decisions made by juries and
state judges. Joined by Justices
-Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White.
'Ahthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas, Rehnquist refused to
block Herrera's execution.
*. nder the high court rules, it
A-) takes five justices to grant a
stay. However, it takes only four
justices to grant a "petition for
certiorari," whereby a case is fully
grgued and decided by the Su-
preme Court.
Four justices-Henry A. Black-
pnun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra
Day O'Connor and David H. Sou-
er-said that Herrera's execution
should be blocked. They also noted
that his case raised an important
legal issue that had not been decid-
id. Does the Constitution require
that 11th-hour evidence of "actual
innocence" be fully considered be-
granted Herrera a stay of execution
so that the new evidence could be
fully considered.
.But Barton persuaded the 5th
Circuit Court to lift that order.
"The rule is well-established that
claims of newly discovered evi-
dence" are not subject to federal
review at this late stage in the
fore an execution proceeds?
IWhen the court clerk informed
Herrera's lawyers of the justices'
split decision, they quickly typed
up a "petition for certiorari" and
faxed it back to the court about 4
a.m. Wednesday.
The court then issued an unusual
order. Herrera's petition was
granted a full review by the court.
But the five justices reiterated that
they would not block Herrera's
execution so that~he would be alive
when his case is heard in the fall.
About 4:30 a.m., Robert McGlas-
son, Herrera's attorney in Austin,
Tex.. was told that state prison
officials wanted to proceed with
Herrera's execution, despite the
high court's willingness to hear his
legal -case. But two judges on the
state court of criminal appeals.
when told of the Supreme Court's
action, agreed to issue an order
stopping the execution.
Supreme Court spokeswoman
Kathleen Arberg confirmed the
unusual sequence of events. When
the. justices were called at home,
they continued to split, 5 to 4, on
the issues raised by Herrera, she
said.
Quite often, the justices are
called at home to vote on emergen-
cy orders, including requests to
block an execution. But rarely does
the court officially grant a full
review of a case in other than its
regular conference session on Fri-
process, the Texas state lawyers
argued, relying on recent Supreme
Court rulings narrowing the basis
for federal judges to get involved in
state death penalty cases.
In one of several cases on the
issue, the high court ruled last year
that state Death Row inmates
should have only one chance to
day morning.
Herrera's lawyers, who recount-
ed their all-night struggle to stop
their client's execution. said that
they were shocked and dismayed
by actions of the Texas state attor-
neys and the federal judges in-
volved.
"We were embroiled in a . . .
fiasco of litigation unparalleled in
our combined experience," said
McGlasson of the Texas Resource
Center, which represents murder
defendants. "In the view of these
life-tenured federal judges, inno-
cence was, the state had argued,
irrelevant."
Attorneys for Texas could not
Ibe reached for comment late
Friday or Saturday but in court
papers, they did not concede that
Leonel Herrera was innocent. In-
deed, they argued that the evi-
dence against him was over-
whelming. He had .een seen by
eyewitnesses at the time of the
murder and had br :n identified as
the killer by the victim before he
died. Joan C. Barton, an assistant
state attorney general. told the
appeals court last Monday.
But she also argued that it was
too late for the federal courts to
take a new look at the evidence in
the case.
U.S. District Jucm Rcardo H.
Hinojosa of McAllen. Tex., had
appeal their convictions in the
federal court system. Herrera's
case already had been to the Su-
preme Court once before on a legal
issue.
The 5th Circuit Court agreed
.with the Texas officials 'Tuesday
afternoon, setting the stage for the
middle-of-the-night drama.
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Fed up with death-row petitions
High court's unusual order shows its impatience
By Aaron Epstein
INQUIRER WA.HINGTON HUREAU
WASHINGTON - The execution of Robert
Alton Harris yesterday provided the most
dramatic demonstration yet of the conserva-
tive Supreme Court's mounting impatience
with last-minute petitions from death row.
Awakened through the night by four at-
tempts to put off Harris' execution, the jus-
tices issued an apparently unprecedented
order forbidding any more federal court
delays. Harris was pronounced dead 36 min-
utes later.
"To my knowledge, it's never happened
before." said University of North Carolina
law professor Jack Boger, who handled death
penalty cases for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund from 1978 to 1990. "It's a more authori-
tarian act of the Supreme Court than I've
ever seen."
Even before Harris died at dawn in San
Quentin's gas chamber, his case had come to
symbolize a criminal appeals system gone
awry. It is a system that has consumed an
average of six or seven years from sentence
to execution.
.Many legal experts argue that a lengthy
process of federal review is necessary to
uncover injustices. During the last 15 years,
federal judges have found serious constitu-
tional errors in nearly 40 percent of all death
penalty. cases brought before them.
But to families of victims of crime, most
prosecutors and a majority of Supreme Court
justices, the system encourages an irrational
maze of piecemeal, chaotic and seemingly
endless appeals.
Nearly 14 years have passed since Harris
killed two San Diego high school boys. He
was convicted and sentenced to death 13
years ago. But he remained alive while his
resourceful lawyers carried numerous issues
through 75 state and federal court reviews,
including four separate appeals through the
federal courts up to the Supreme Court.
. For the last three years, the justices have
been cracking down on the power of federal
judges to upset state convictions.
In a battle of faxed messages on the final
night of Harris' life, the justices received
four requests from California Attorney Gen-
eral Daniel E. Lungren to cancel successive
stays of execution obtained by defense law-
yers from the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco.
At 6 a.m. Eastern time yesterday. the jus-
tices voted 7-2 to nullify the second and third
stays with a blistering attack on Harris' de-
fense lawyers for an "obvious attempt at
manipulation."
Harris' claim - that his execution by le-
thal gas would be cruel and unusual punish-
ment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment
- "could have been brought more than a
decade ago," the court majority declared in
an unsigned opinion.
"There is no good reason for this abusive
delay, which has been compounded by last-
minute attempts to manipulate the judicial
process."
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Jus-
tice Harry A. Blackmun, dissented. Stevens,
recalling the "barbaric use of cyanide gas in
the Holocaust," cited the conclusions of nu-
merous medical and legal experts that execu-
tion by cyanide gas is "extremely and unnec-
essarily painful."
An hour and 15 minutes later, at 7:15 a.m..
the justices received notice of the fourth -
and final - stay of execution from the Ninth
Circuit.
This time, Judge Harry Pregerson, ap-
pointed to the appeals court by President
Jimmy Carter, had authorized a one-day de-
lay to permit Harris' lawyers to present "un-
exhausted claims" to the California Supreme
Court.
At 8:45 a.m., the frustrated court majority
called a halt, declaring: "No further stays...
shall be entered by the federal courts except
upon order of this court." Stevens and Black-
mun again disagreed.
The lethal gas was released in the chamber
20 minutes later; Harris died at 9:21 a.m. (6:21
a.m. Pacific time).
"The message to defense lawyers has been
clear for some time: If you have Ireasonablel
claims, you'd better put them in early and
not at the last minut-," Boger said.
Bush crime bill
stirs habeas fight
PEALS, from 1-E
Prank v. Mangum, refused to help
IAlO M. Frank, a Jewish man found
guilty of raping and killing a young The Bush billCrsin woman In Atlanta. .
Despite evidence that an antiSe- Would bar federal
mitic mob bad prejudiced Franks
trial, the high court refused to hear appeals by many
his claims because they had already
been denied by Georgia courts after on death row.
.A full review.""-"- t o l
Later it was disclosed that the mob. CritiCS say it would
dominated atmosphere had fright.u h l vnu is
ened away a witness able to testify t uphold even unjust
Frank s innocence. By then, it was too
late. Frank had been executed. State ourt
The administration's proposed re o
form of habeas corpus, Curtin told convictioRs.
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Jack Carlton House
"might well be the Leo M. Frank bill Lawyers "too busy" to prepare case
-a bill to make the discredited rule
'and the barbaric result of Frank v.
Mangum the:! law of the United-. they undermine the integrity of the der the prisoners brought into court.
,States." .s. . - entire criminal justice system." ., where they could challenge their
.vrBut.administration officials, Chief :.. John A. Collins. who .directs a. confinement
Justice:William H. Rehnquist, hi ,lcrime victims' organization in IntheUnitedStates.federalhabeas
rconservative goleagies on the So. ,Springfield, Va., summed up the case corpus has been widely used not to
-preme Court, most prosecutors and. for the victims' families in a recent decide the guilt'or innocence of a
[the families of victims of crime take ,Senate appearance* . defendant, but to' be certain thatva far different view of habeas corpus. : "Justice aplenty for the killer, with even the guiltiest., most depraved-
'!iTo them, habeas corpus is a consti. delays, continuances. reviews, stays, killer gets fair treatment
utional. guarantee jgone. out of ,tests, hearings, examinations. re.'.1 The purpose of federal review is to
back, an extraordinary maze of re hearings, appeals and petitions. determine whether 'state proceed-petitive, precemeal' chaotic and . "For us, the victims, neglect. un- ings - often overseen by elected
seemingly endless appeals 'certainty, waiting, frustration, more judges closely tied to their communi-
-They see457 convicted murder- waiting. Injustice and a growing ties-were, In the words of the great
ers on death row filing 13,000 habeas sense of despair." ''. jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, "more
petitions a year In a convoluted sys Collins has bad a long wait of his than an empty shel"
tem in which only 146 killers have own. His daughter was raped and But state courts have Improved sig.
been executed since the Supreme murdered in 1985. The convicted nificantly in recent decades, and
Court restored the death penalty in killer, having completed four years state judges resent implications that
197&..........:r.....of appeals in state courts, is. just they cannot protect the constit*-
Pi ales executed in 1988 the beginning his federal appeals. tional rights of criminal defendants.
average time from sentence to execu- "What we are trying to do," said Still, significant constitutional er-
tion was six years and eight months. White House chief of staff John H. rors continue to be uncovered in I
" It has been 13 years since Robert Sununu, "is to make sure that some. federal courts. In 1989, when theN"
Alton Harris killed two San Diego thing that is a principle of protection Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals I
high school boys, shooting one of the; does not become a mechanism for overturned a Montana death sen-
boys as he prayed for;his life - and ' unlimited procrastination. ... It's tence, Judge Stephen Reinhardt ob.
tthen finished the victims' half-eaten .where the Supreme Court is headed." 'served.'
'hamburgers: V Indeed it is. .t:.: * ' ' "The mockery ofourcriminal jus.,
c" Harris has remained aliveon death *a <Rehnquist: and. .the other high tice system lies not in repetitive fed-'
:'row' while his resourceful lawyers court conservatives did not wait for eral review but in the persistent dls.
carried -various issues through .75.. legislation. They have placed new regard by our Istatel courts ofstati and federal court reviews, in.. limitson federal habeas corpus three fundamental constitutional rights."
cluding four separate appeals to the times in the last three years. '' "Some inmates have gone to their
Supreme Court ..- £ t . . In 1989 and 1990 decisions, they" deaths despite the existence ot clear'.
14 Now after coming within days of made it clear that Inmates may not constitutional errors." said Ameri-
execution at Sen Quentin, Harris is take advantage of new constitutional can University's Robbins. "We know
awaiting word from afederal appeals rulings, Issued after their convic that, because their co-defendants
panel in San Francisco on two new., 'dons became final In state courts. In won reversals. There are at' least
issues. including alleged perjury by April they closed the doors to most three cases like that.".........
a celmate." . ',' , . prisoners seeking to challenge the,' In one of them, Rebecca Machetti
Y And there is the case 'of William constitutionality of their convictions masterminded the murder plot and
Andrews, who forced his victims to,'. a second time in federal court. ber husband. Tony, fired the shots.
'drink' Drano in a stereo store in * The latest ruling predicted Justice Both were convicted and sentenced3
Ogden,' Utaf. 17 years ago. He has Anthony M. Kennedy,. "should cur* to death. ' .,
*been on death row ever since, while, tail the abusive petitions that in re. But on appeal in the federal courts,
his sentence has been reviewed 27 cent years have threatened to under. Rebecca Machetti's lawyers succas.
times - and there is "still no end in mine the integrity of the habeas- fully argued that the jury system in
sight." complained Sen. Orrin G. corpus process." -. . . .Bibb County, Georgia, systematically
Hatch (., Utah). p - Habeas corpus. which Alexander ' excluded women. She got a new trial
"-When society promises to punish' Hamilton called the greatest per., and was sentenced to life imprison-
:,by death certain criminal conduct, sonal liberty of all, has Its roots in ment.
and then the courts fail to do so," English history. When English kings Tony Machetts lawyers could
,Rehnquist-has written., "the courts ...threw prisoners into dungeons,, have raised the same issue. but did
1not only lessen the deterrent effect judges used writs of habeas corpus not do so until it was too late. He was
of the threat of capital punishment. (literally. "to have the body") to or- executed.
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